DAN M. BLAYLOCK v. PETRA SMELTZER STARKE
Case No. 1:23-cv-03606 (TNM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
September 29, 2025
Plaintiff Dan Blaylock moves this Court to sanction Defendant Petra Starke for flouting a discovery schedule. The Court held its initial status conference setting discovery deadlines in July 2024. Those deadlines have been distended beyond recognition. The Court most recently ordered Starke to complete document production by May 12, 2025. Blaylock asserts that Starke did not meet that deadline either. The Court agrees. But because severe sanctions are a last resort, the Court imposes more moderate sanctions of finding hеr in civil contempt and requiring her to pay Blaylock‘s attorneys’ fees for briefing the sanctions motion.
I.
The procedural history here is tedious. A thorough recounting is in order, though, to explain the Court‘s reason for imposing sanctions.
The Court first set a discovery schedule over a year ago. Min. Entry July 19, 2024 (setting discovery deadlines to conclude by March 2025). A month later, the Court granted a joint extension request for the first document production and interrogatory deadline, bumping it from September to October. Min. Order Sept. 12, 2024 (also shifting all subsequent discovery deadlines accordingly). The parties had requested this extension because Starke was undergoing
October came and went without production: Starke asked for another extension, the Court asked the parties to meet-and-confer, then Blaylock peppered Starke with requests for prоduction throughout late October. Mot. Extension of Time, ECF No. 52; Response Mot. Extension of Time, ECF No. 53; Min. Order Oct. 18, 2024; Opp. Mot. Protective Order, ECF No. 57, at 8 (citing Exs. C-F). Mid-November brought another defense extension request alongside two medical letters and a list of boilerplate production objections largely based on medical incapacity. Mot. Extension of Time, ECF No. 54; Mot. Extension of Time, ECF No. 54-1, Ex. A at 7, Ex. G at 18; Opp. Mot. Protective Order, ECF No. 57-7, Ex. G at 1-28.
All the while, Blaylock said that he was enduring ongoing harm from Starke‘s “false accusations” that were still plastered across the internet. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 1-2; Opp. Mot. Protective Order, ECF No. 57, at 5. To summarize: After the two ended a romantic relationship in 2022, Blaylock alleges that Starke circulated a video interview via email to Blaylock‘s family and friends accusing him of sexually assaulting her, then posted similar information on a specially created website for this purpose. Compl. ¶ 2; Compl. Ex. F, ECF No. 1-6, at 2. Blaylock says that the site contains nude photos of him alongside other texts and images that Starke stole from his personal cell phone. Opp. Mot. Protective Order at 6-7.
When production was still dragging in mid-November, the Court asked the parties to jointly propose a temporary restraining order that would mitigate Blaylock‘s harm while giving Starke the time necessary for cancer treatment. Hr‘g. Tr. Nov. 18, 2025, at 5:22-6:17. Though both parties at first seemed amenable, they could not reach agreement. Hr‘g Tr. Nov. 21, 2025,
To the contrary, the Court “ma[de] a finding that Starke [was] able to[,] with the assistance of excellent counsel[,] provide appropriate responses to the interrogatories and document requests.” Hr‘g Tr. Nov. 21 at 8:11-14. The Court rejected the suggestion that because Starke is an attorney, she had to be more intimately involved with privilege review than a normal client would. Hr‘g Tr. Nov. 21 at 8:15-9:2. Given the Court‘s “findings about her abilities,” the Court expected her to participate as fully as a normal represented defendant. Hr‘g Tr. Nov. 21 at 8:15-9:2.
Accordingly, the Court ordered Starke to respond to Blaylock‘s first set of requests for production and interrogatories—with more than medical-incapacity objections—by December 12. Hr‘g Tr. Nov. 21 at 6:7-10:5. The Court also expected Starke to sit for a truncated, “maybe one-hour deposition,” after that date and reset all other discovery deadlines. Hr‘g Tr. Nov. 21 at 4:19-5:5, 10:10-12:13. In mid-December, defense again submitted a very similar list of medical-incapacity production objections with no documents. Opp. Mot. Protective Order, Ex. I, at 1-33. Starke also asked opposing counsel for another delay because she had emergency
The Court held two more status conferences and spoke with Starke‘s physician off-the-record to fully understand her condition during the clinical trial. Hr‘g Tr. Jan. 21 2025, at 9:8-22. The Court decided to stay discovery from Starke until April 2025, allowing any third-party discovery to continue in the interim. Hr‘g Tr. Jan. 31, 2025, at 9:22-10:12. In so doing, though, the Court gave Starke two warnings. First, Starke should be prеpared for counsel to conduct privilege review for her records and produce documents on her behalf; otherwise, the Court would “impos[e] sanctions.” Hr‘g Tr. Jan. 31 at 6:16-7:2. The Court also remained open to receiving updates about Starke‘s social media activity if it continued while she was in the clinical trial. Hr‘g Tr. Jan. 31 at 7:16-9:4. Starke maintained that a social media team posted photos in her absence. Hr‘g Tr. Jan. 31 at 8:13-18. But the Court agreed with Blaylock that “the position that she can do everything she wants to excеpt for responding to a court-ordered litigation schedule is not going to be tenable.” Hr‘g Tr. Jan. 31 at 9:5-12.
During a check-in conference on March 5, defense stated that separate counsel had been retained to review Starke‘s privileged client communications before production began in April. Hr‘g Tr. March 5, 2025 at 4:15-5:7. The Court told counsel that he “should assume this [was] . . . [his] last chance to come up with a plan for review of any potentially responsive documents
In mid-April, the Court met with the parties again to ensure that production had begun. No progress had been made because defense counsel was ill. Hr‘g Tr. Apr. 18, 2025, at 2:17-4:5. The Court rescheduled for the end of the month. Min. Entry, Apr. 29, 2025. When the parties reconvened, defense had produced only four individuals’ contact information. Hr‘g Tr. Apr. 29, 2025, at 4:4-9. Starke had identified “about 3,000 to 4,000 pages of documents,” including both mеdical and business records, to begin rolling production. Hr‘g Tr. Apr. 29 at 4:10-19. But none had been produced yet. Hr‘g Tr. Apr. 29 at 4:9-6:2. Counsel said that he had “tried as much as [he could] to date to try to get [Starke] to start this production.” Hr‘g Tr. Apr. 29 at 4:2-3. Defense counsel also reported that the privilege-review counsel had not worked with Starke because she “was physically unable” to meet. Hr‘g Tr. Apr. 29 at 5:6-14.
The Court directed Starke to produce all her identified responsive records to Blaylock by May 12. Hr‘g Tr. Apr. 29 at 9:2-6. If privilege review had not occurred by that point, Starke would waive it or she could designate materials “for attorneys’ eyes only.” Hr‘g Tr. Apr. 29 at 9:7-16. Defense counsel asked whether he could just produce the 100 pages he possessed, with the rest coming in rolling productions; the Court rejected that proposal. Hr‘g Tr. Apr. 29 at 10:7-11:12. The Court wanted to “be very clear that May 12th is for all document production, not just the 100 pages or so that [defense counsel] currently has,” and that a privilege log should be included if review had occurred. Hr‘g Tr. Apr. 29 at 11:6-12. Another discovery conference would follow on May 16 to verify production. Order, ECF No. 65, at 2.
On May 12, Starke produced 128 pages of medical records related to her cancer diagnosis and treatment, seven pages of photographs and doctors’ letters that she had already submitted to the Court, and two videos that were edited versions of the interview that Starke had already “circulated to Blaylock, his family and friends.” Mot. Sanctions, ECF No. 66-8, at 10; Decl. of Sarika Andavolu, ECF No. 66-1, ¶ 7. Then, on May 16, before the follow-up discovery confеrence, Starke made another small production of 27 pages, including eight redundant pages with her previous production and 19 pages of “photos and text messages between Blaylock and another individual.” Reply Mot. Sanctions, Third Decl. of Sarika Andavolu, ECF No. 70-1 ¶¶ 2-5.
Defense counsel represented that these two productions constituted “in the 90th percentile of the producible documents [Starke] has.” Hr‘g Tr. May 16, 2025, at 3:10-16. The Court asked about the discrepancy between the production and defense‘s claims аbout thousands of responsive documents. Hr‘g Tr. May 16 at 6:4-9, 8:18-20. Starke responded that there had been thousands to review but only a few hundred to produce because only those “relate[d] to Mr. Blaylock specifically.” Hr‘g Tr. May 16 at 6:12-23, 13:15-19. Defense counsel also claimed that the high estimates came from the medical documents in her online charts, over which she did not have control. Hr‘g Tr. May 16 at 8-22. Blaylock responded that he knew she possessed, at least, text communications between them, and that none of those had been produced as requested; this was just one category where the production was incomplete. Hr‘g Tr. May 16 at 12:6-13:11. Defense maintained that “it‘s been a rolling production.” Hr‘g Tr. May 16 at 3:17-20.
At the Court‘s invitation, Blaylock filed a motion requesting the following sanctions: civil contempt; counterclaim dismissal with prejudice; preclusion of further evidence in support
The Motion for Sanctions and the motions concerning discovery are ripe for consideration. ECF Nos. 66-71 (Motion for Sanctions); ECF Nos. 55-62 (Motion for Protective Order and Cross-Motion to Compel Discovery). This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under
II.
“If a party” “fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery,” “the court where the action is pending may issue further just orders” to sanction the offending party.
Upon finding clear and convincing evidence of a violation, a court may impose discovery sanctions including, among other things, “striking pleadings in whole or in part,” “prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses,” “dismissing the action,” “rendering a default judgment agаinst the disobedient party,” and “treating as contempt of court the failure to obey.”
“The central requirement of Rule 37 is that any sanction must be just, which requires in cases involving severe sanctions that the district court consider whether lesser sanctions would be more appropriate for the particular violation.” Bonds v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 801, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (cleaned up). District courts have “broad discretion” to impose sanctions for discovery violations. Id. at 807. Indeed, federal courts possess the inherent authority to manage their own affairs to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases, so long as any sanctions are compensatory, not punitive, in nature. Service Empl. Int‘l Union Loc. 32BJ v. Preeminent Prot. Servs., 415 F. Supp. 3d 29, 33 (D.D.C. 2019).
III.
The Court must answer two questions: Did Starke violate its Order demanding that document production conclude by May 12, 2025? If so, what sanctions are just?
A.
The Order required Starke to “produce the documents that have been identified as responsive to the Plaintiff‘s requests” by May 12. Order, ECF No. 65, at 1-2. Defense counsel represented during a discovery conference that Starke had identified 3,000-4,000 responsive documents. Mot. Sanctions, ECF No. 66-8, at 9-10; Hr‘g Tr. Apr. 29 at 4:10-19. Starke also had stated in an affidavit that she had thousands of images supporting her claims about Blaylock. Opp. Mot. File Under Seal, ECF No. 15-1 ¶ 16. Her less-than-200 pages prоduced by May 12 were, at best, responsive to six of the 25 requests for production—though Blaylock claims that they really only responded to one. Mot. Sanctions Ex. 5, ECF No. 66-6, at 2-28 (showing
If there was any doubt that Starke‘s production was incomplete, defense affirmatively dispelled it. After the May 12 deadline passed, defense counsel admitted at the May 16 status conference that he had produced only 90% of producible documents. Hr‘g Tr. May 16 at 3:10-16. And he continued to characterize their production as “rolling” even though the Court had specifically required it to be complete. Hr‘g Tr. May 16 at 3:17-20. Recall that this would not be the first time that Starke has missed a court-ordered production deadline. See supra Part I.
Even if those representations did not confirm her violation, the latter two productions on May 16 and June 2 do. Starke claims that she was merely disclosing supplemental information as required by
Starke has not explained why these two productions were “new information” that had been “gathered” between May 12 and June 2. Opp. Mot. Sanctions, ECF No. 67, at 2. Mainly,
In sum, Starke violated the Court‘s Order requiring document production to be completed by May 12, 2025. Order, ECF No. 65, at 1-2. Blaylock has carried his burden to show by “clear and convincing evidence” that Starke violated the Order. Food Lion, Inc., 103 F.3d at 1016.
B.
The Court next considers just sanctions for Starke‘s violation. Recall that courts have an array of available sanctions for discovery violations, including “default judgment,” “treating as contempt of court the failure to obey,” and “striking pleadings in whole or in part.”
The Court hаs considered and rejected severe sanctions. “[T]he harshest sanction[s] of dismissal of the action,” “default judgment,” or preclusion of evidence, which is tantamount to dismissal, “should be awarded only upon a finding of “willful bad faith.” Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2001). “[D]efault judgment must be a sanction of last resort, to be used only when less onerous methods . . . will be ineffective or obviously futile.” Webb v. District of Columbia, 146 F.3d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Given that this is the Court‘s first consideration of sanctions, it is prudent to avoid such measures at this time despite Blaylock‘s requests. See Walls v. Paulson, 250 F.R.D. 48, 54 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[D]ismissal of a lawsuit never heard on its merits is a drastic step, normally to be taken only after unfruitful resort to lesser sanctions.“).
The Court chooses this course even though Blaylock has experienced prejudice from the discovery delay. “[P]rejudice to the other party” is one of “three justifications for the imposition of defaults or dismissals as sanctions for misconduct.” See Butera, 235 F.3d at 661. Recall that throughout over a year of discovery delays, the original subject of Blaylock‘s suit—allegedly defamatory content posted on the internet—has remained live and publicly accеssible. See supra Part I. He claims that his harms continue each day that the grave accusations remain viewable. Opp. Mot. Protective Order at 6. There is also an argument that the other two justifications for default or dismissal are present as well. Butera, 235 F.3d at 661 (listing (2) “prejudice to the judicial system” when the district court “modif[ies] its own docket” to “accommodate the delay”
Accordingly, for now, the Court holds Starke in civil contempt.
Starke argues that she should escape civil contempt because of her “good faith substantial compliance.” Opp. Mot. Sanctions at 3. But the D.C. Circuit has been clear that “a finding of bad faith on the part of the contemnor is not required. Indeed, the law is clear in this circuit that the contemnor‘s failure to comply with the court decree need not be intentional.” Food Lion, Inc., 103 F.3d at 1016. “[G]ood fаith is not entirely irrelevant to the ultimate determination of
Even if the good faith defense does survive, the “burden of proving good faith and substantial compliance is on the party asserting the defense, and [Starke] has failed to meet that burden in this case.” Food Lion, Inc., 103 F.3d at 1017. To carry such a burden, a party must show that it “took all reasonable steps within its power to comply with the court‘s order.” Id. Starke‘s briefing makes broad gesturеs to her health struggles as justification for failing to comply with discovery. Opp. Mot. Sanctions at 2-3.
But recall that the Court had worked with defense counsel for months before May to ensure that Starke‘s counsel could conduct a privilege review and make productions in her absence. See supra Part I. The Court reviewed medical records, spoke with her doctor, and emphasized repeatedly that Starke was not the only person who could manage document production. Id. The Court made appropriate accommodations for more physical tasks like a personal deposition. Id. And the Court did all of this despite persuasive evidence from social media that Starke was overstating her medical incapacity to the Court while riding camels, exercising, and wandering abroad on foot. Id. Ultimately, defense makes no argument at all in its briefing that it tried to take reasonable steps to have counsel meet the production deadline for Starke while she underwent treatment. Opp. Mot. Sanctions at 1-6. Dеfense counsel‘s brief overture during the late-April status conference to failed meetings between Starke and privilege review counsel do not adequately explain why months of planning and promising the Court about a production plan were stymied at the last minute. Hr‘g Tr. Apr. 29 at 5:6-14.
The question remains what civil contempt sanctions should be levied. Civil contempt must be remedial, not punitive, in purpose. In re Fannie Mae Secs. Litig., 552 F.3d 814, 823 (D.C. Cir. 2009). So contempt sanctions “must be calibrated to coerce compliance or compensate а complainant for losses sustained.” Id.
Accordingly, the Court looks to compensate Blaylock for some of his injury from this unjustified discovery delay and ensure the delay will end quickly. The Court will require Starke to certify under penalty of perjury that all discovery documents have been produced within one week of the date of this Order. That includes both documents supporting her counterclaims and those Blaylock has requested several times to support his claims. Failure to comply will result in a $1,000 fine per day until she certifies thаt production is complete. See, e.g., United States v. Travers, 1989 WL 7363, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 1989) (imposing a $1,000 per day fine for civil contempt until the sanction achieved compliance with a court order).
Though Blaylock did not formally seek more production, opting instead for sanctions, and even though Starke‘s counsel represented that production was 90% complete, the Court chooses to give Starke one last chance to support her counterclaims and defense before ending document production. Hr‘g Tr. May 16 at 15:21-25. But Starke will be prоhibited from introducing any evidence that was not properly produced within one week of the date of this Order. All these sanctions are designed to bring Starke into compliance with the discovery process rather than accomplish a punitive purpose.
Finally, the Court awards Blaylock reasonable attorneys’ fees required to brief the motion for sanctions. Like civil contempt, “monetary sanctions are considered to be relatively mild given the spectrum of Rule 37‘s arsenal, and thus may be awarded in thе absence of bad faith.” Quadrozzi v. City of New York, 127 F.R.D. 63, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). More, the federal rule
All monetary sanctions will be levied against Starke rather than her attоrney because there is no evidence before the Court of attorney wrongdoing. See Bolger v. District of Columbia, 248 F.R.D. 339, 346 (D.D.C. 2008) (“Under Rule 37, an attorney may only be sanctioned for personally violating a discovery order or for advising a client to do so.“)
IV.
For all these reasons, the Court holds Defendant in CIVIL CONTEMPT OF COURT.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 29, 2025
TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.