Blattel v. StallingsBlattel v. Stallings
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Cooley, Westhues, Bohling G- (per curiam)
The deeds were canceled on the theory that the property conveyed therein was transferred for the purpose of hindering and defrauding creditors of W. C. Stallings. The parties to the suit are Ollie Blattel, Gussie Slack Williams and Noah Roberts, as plaintiffs, respondents here; Henry Stallings and his wife Bessie, Marcellus Stallings and his wife Anna, defendants, appellants here. Ollie Blattel, Gussie Slack Williams, Henry Stallings and Marcellus Stallings are children of W. C. Stallings, deceased. Noah Roberts, also referred to in the record as
Appellants have briefed many points upon which they seek a reversal of the decree of the trial court. They assert that the petition of respondents was insufficient because it failed to state that the respondents had no adequate remedy at law. They also assert that
“We do not think it necessary that the petition should contain those words. It must allege facts from which the court can draw the conclusion that there is no adequate remedy at law. It is the facts, and not the conclusion, which must be alleged.”
We deem the petition sufficient.
Laches was pleaded as a defense because respondents did not enforce their claim during the life of W. C. Stallings. Roberts did have an execution issued, and the land was advertised for sale. Appellants threatened to file an injunction suit to stop the sale. Thereupon Roberts recalled the execution. This was during the life of W. C. Stallings. Why the execution was recalled was left to speculation. Perhaps Roberts was not financially able to handle the transaction. The evidence, however, disclosed that there was no property visible to satisfy the judgment and execution, except the farm here in question. One of the deeds expressly recited that the land conveyed was all the land owned by Stallings. Appellants were in possession of the land, receiving the rents and profits therefrom, and were therefore not injured but benefited by the delay. They are in no position to complain.
A number of assignments of error were based upon the admission of evidence of various witnesses tending to prove that the deceased Stallings and appellants made statements that the title to the land was transferred to avoid the payment of the Roberts note. This being an equitable proceeding it is here for trial de novo. We have reached the conclusion that if all the questioned evidence were disregarded, respondents would still be entitled to a decree. Appellants did not pay for the land conveyed to them. They so testified. Note the evidence of Mrs. Bessie Stallings, wife of Henry Stallings:
“When the land was deeded over to the defendants, that left Mr. and Mrs. Stallings without any property except household goods, a few chickens and a cow. We didn‘t pay any money to them for the conveyances in 1932, and we didn‘t in the deed assume and agree to pay off the $6,000 deed of trust. My husband‘s name is Henry.”
Henry Stallings testified as follows:
“When they deeded the land to us, that left them with no property except some personal property. At the date of those deeds, no money changed hands. Both before and after the execution of the deed
at different times we gave them money. The purpose wasn‘t mentioned. I guess it is right that the deeds were given without monetary consideration.”
When a debtor transfers all his property without receiving a consideration therefor the transfer is considered in law as being in fraud of creditors and void as to them. [George v. Surkamp, 336 Mo. 1, 76 S. W. (2d) 368, l. c. 370 (1-6); 27 C. J. 550, sec. 249, and cases there cited from numerous jurisdictions.] When the deeds were executed in 1930, creating an estate by the entirety, W. C. Stallings was making payments on the notes held by the respondents in this case. When the deed was executed in 1932, he had been sued by two of his creditors. The transfers referred to stripped him of all property which could be reached by execution. These conveyances were made admittedly without consideration and were therefore void as to creditors.
Appellants, however, insist that the value of the land did not exceed the debt against it and the value of the homestead which was exempt from execution. It is conceded to be the rule that the conveyance of a homestead, even without consideration, is not a fraud upon existing creditors. Creditors are not hurt by such a transfer because nothing is transferred which can be subjected to the payment of their claims. The evidence in this case, however, justifies a finding that the market value of this land was far in excess of the amount of the note and deed of trust and the value of the homestead. All parties conceded that the land was very productive and fertile. In 1910 the debtor paid $16,000 for this farm. One of the appellants testified it could have been sold during what he called the high times for $35,000 or more. One of the Stallings testified that about 1931 he offered $10,000 for the place, and the husband of one of the respondents said he offered $12,000. Appellants contend that the evidence as to these offers was rooted in prejudice and was not the truth. But even if this evidence be disregarded, there is substantial evidence in the record that the farm was easily worth $10,000 at the time the deeds in question were executed. The contrary evidence consisted almost entirely of instances where land in that neighborhood had been sold under foreclosure proceedings. In a number of these it was shown that the owner later redeemed his property. The trial court, by rendering a decree for respondents, must have found that the value of the property exceeded the amount of the deed of trust and the homestead. This finding was amply supported by the record.
Appellants further assert that the probate court had no power or jurisdiction to allow the claims of respondents, Williams and Blattel, because of lack of notices on the administrator.
“As probate courts are established by organic law, the Constitution of Missouri, their judgments are entitled to the same credit and presumptions accorded to courts of general jurisdiction. [Robbins v. Boulware, 190 Mo. 33, l. c. 43, 88 S. W. 674, 109 Am St Rep. 746.]”
PER CURIAM: The foregoing opinion by Westhues, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.
PER CURIAM:—In appellants’ motion for rehearing our attention has been directed to the fact that the judgment which we affirmed provided for a sale of the land subject only to a deed of trust of $6,000 in favor of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and not subject to the homestead. Appellants claim that they are entitled in any event to the homestead rights existing in the property as held by their grantors. The question was preserved for review. It was not referred to in the opinion. Appellants are correct in their contention. [See Farmers’ Bank v. Handly, 320 Mo. 754, 9 S. W. (2d) 880, l. c. 896 (15); Brennecke v. Riemann, 102 S. W. (2d) 874, l. c. 877 (5, 6).]
Our opinion is therefore modified, and the trial court is hereby directed to modify its judgment so as to provide, in case of a sale of the land, that it be sold subject to the homestead as well as the deed of trust mentioned in the judgment of the trial court.
J. M. Haw and James Haw for appellants.
J. Grant Frye for respondents.