29 A.D. 388 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1898
This action was brought to recover damages fot personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by reason of the defendant’s negligence. The plaintiff had a verdict of $5,000, and from the'judgment entered thereon and the order denying a motion for a new trial the defendant has appealed.
■ The plaintiff was engaged in manufacturing and selling mattresses, feather pillows and bedding; he also bought and sold iron bedsteads. Upon the trial he was permitted,' against the objection of the defendant, to state the gross receipts of his business for the year prior to the accident; and the court, after stating that the plaintiff had testified
We think these exceptions were well taken. The evidence referred to was inadmissible; the charge, as made, was not a correct statement of the law, and the defendant was entitled to have the jury instructed in the manner asked.
The plaintiff’s business was quite extensive. He employed in connection with it some five workmen. His sales, at times, amounted to upwards of fifty mattresses a day. It is apparent that the receipts ■or profits of a business as extensive as this did not depend entirely upon the personal services of the plaintiff. They depended in no small degree upon the capital invested, the location of the establishment and the condition of the market, both as to the cost of the raw material and the price to be obtained for the goods manufactured. Future receipts or profits of such a business must of necessity be uncertain and speculative ; and so much so that they cannot be used as a basis of awarding damages for a personal injury sustained by the owner. The conclusion of a jury, based upon such evidence, must be purely speculative; indeed, little or no better than a guess. In Masterton v. Mt. Vernon (58 N. Y. 391) a similar question was presented, and the court there held that proof of past profits of the business in which the plaintiff was engaged could not be received for the purpose of determining the damages to which the plaintiff was entitled for personal injuries sustained. (See, also, Marks v. Long Island R. R. Co., 14 Daly, 61; Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 52 Hun, 111.) This authority is binding upon us, and requires a reversal of the judgment appealed from. In reaching this conclusion we have not overlooked the case of Pill v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co. (6 Misc. Rep. 267). There the plaintiff was a custom corset maker. She personally solicited orders from individuals, and then
It. follows that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered, with cost to the appellant to abide the event.
Van Brunt, P. J., Patterson, O'Brien and In&raham, JJ.,. concurred.
Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event.