159 So. 477 | La. Ct. App. | 1935
A motion to dissolve the seizure filed in behalf of both defendants was sustained after *478
trial as to the Coats Petroleum Corporation and all property released, except a drilling rig and equipment belonging to Stovall, as to whom the motion was overruled. The Coats Petroleum Corporation then filed an exception to the jurisdiction ratione personæ, which was sustained, finally removing that defendant from the case, as plaintiff has not appealed. Stovall then filed an exception of no cause or right of action, based upon the alleged unconstitutionality of Act No.
After hearing on the merits, the lower court rendered a judgment in rem for the amount claimed in favor of plaintiff, and against Cliff Stovall, recognizing plaintiff's lien and maintaining the writ of provisional seizure as to the drilling rig. From this judgment Stovall has suspensively appealed.
Defendant's first contention is that the seizure should have been dissolved as to him because of the falsity of plaintiff's allegation of belief that the lease and well were about to be abandoned and the equipment removed. Testimony taken on trial of the motion to dissolve shows that the well was completed and brought in as a producer of between 75 and 150 barrels of oil per day, between the 15th and 20th of August, 1932; that at that time the drilling rig had been taken down and stacked on the lease preparatory to removal, which could be made in a day, and a standard rig, tanks, and equipment, valued at $2,500, moved onto the lease to be used in pumping the well and storing the oil. After the seizure, the drilling rig was bonded and removed. It is apparent that the fear as to the abandonment of the producing well was unfounded and unreasonable, but that the fear as to the removal of the drilling rig and equipment was justified. The question then is, considering the value of the other property subject to his lien, Was plaintiff within his rights in seizing the rig? It seems to us that this question is answered most positively in the affirmative by the developments in this case. The lower court, having dissolved the seizure as to all property but the drilling rig, plaintiff would be out of court had he not seized it. Unquestionably, he had a lien upon it, and unquestionably it was about to be and was, as soon as bonded, removed to another location.
We do not see how a laborer, having a lien upon a lease, oil well, and equipment, can be restricted in its exercise to the lease, well, or any particular article of equipment. It is well known that an oil well may be of great value one day and worthless the next. Furthermore, the action as instituted was one in rem. Young v. Reed, supra.
Stovall was a nonresident of the parish. He could only be subjected to the jurisdiction of the Sabine parish court by a seizure of his property. The privilege and relief granted in Act No.
On the merits, the testimony shows that the well and lease were owned by Anderson Kerr, of Oklahoma City; that the well was being drilled by the Southland Drilling Company; that the rig was owned by Cliff Stovall and by him leased to the Southland Drilling Company for a period not to exceed thirty days, for a consideration of $500; that a man, named Craig, was employed by the Southland Drilling Company as driller, and that plaintiff was employed by Craig. He was therefore not working for Stovall, but was working on the rig owned by him and on the lease where the rig was placed, with his consent. Under these facts and the terms of Act No.
Defendant contends further that in any event plaintiff's privilege can only extend to that part of the work done after noon of July 28, 1932, for the reason that the Legislature adjourned July 7th of that year, and its acts did not become operative until twenty days thereafter. Plaintiff testified that he worked for the period from July 15 to August 16, 1932.
The record contains no proof as to the exact date Act No.
In the case of State v. Bauman,
The most appropriate and authoritative source accessible to us from which to learn the precise time when the act in question became effective is the notice appearing over the signature of the secretary of state on the very first page of the bound and published acts of that year, which notice reads as follows: "The Regular Session of the Legislature of 1932 which convened May 9th, adjourned July 7th, 1932."
Therefore, under the constitutional provision, the act became effective at 12 o'clock noon on the 27th day of July, 1932.
The prior Act No.
Remedial or procedural acts may have a retroactive effect, but not acts affecting substantive rights. Act No.
It is therefore apparent that plaintiff in this case, there being no personal liability on the part of Stovall, can recover in this action only in rem for that part of his wages which accrued after noon of July 27, 1932. He demands pay for thirty days, from July 15 to August 16, 1932, at $5 per day. This is a period of thirty-one days. We can only assume that he worked on Saturdays and Sundays, with a one-day lay off. As he does not show when the lay off occurred, we must construe his testimony against himself and assume that it was during the period that he enjoyed the lien. This would entitle him to a lien for eighteen and one-half days, at $5 per day, or $92.50.
The judgment appealed from is accordingly amended by reducing its amount from $150 to $92.50, and, as thus amended, it is affirmed.