Blanding v. Sports & Health Club, Inc.

peti- ORDERED HEREBY IT IS be, review further Smith Peter tion of is, denied. same and the BLANDING, Respondent,

Philip CLUB, HEALTH &

SPORTS

INC., Appellant.

No. C5-85-305. Appeals of Minnesota.

Court 27, 1985.

Aug. 24, 1985. Oct. Granted

Review Minneapolis, for re-

Ellen Dresselhuis spondent. Jamar, Anderson,

Clyde P. D. Steven Minneapolis, appellant. POPOVICH, and decided Considered FOLEY, JJ., with and PARKER and C.J. argument waived. oral OPINION PARKER, Judge. Club, Inc., appeals Sports

The & Health from an order of by writ of certiorari The Minneapolis Civil Commission. terminated concluded the Club Commission Blanding’s membership the Club Philip preference. of his affectional because the termination of further concluded that membership a violation of constituted prohibiting discrimi- Minneapolis ordinance public accommodations because nation preferences. affectional sexual or compensato- Blanding awarded Commission punitive damages and attor- ry damages, (1) Blanding ney’s fees. The Club contends to readmit that its refusal did establish preference; on his sexual him was based (2) under the imposition of sanctions unconstitutional Minneapolis ordinance is infringes on the free exercise because it commitment; (3) evangelical religious an put up Club two bulletin boards. necessity for reasonable rules is an One was entitled “What God thinks of Ho- defense; (4) award mosexuality.” affirmative of com- The other was entitled pensatory damages supported by “Christianity is not versus False Cults.” Staff evidence; (5) Blanding is not entitled to members talked to homosexuals about their punitive damages; (6) the award of preference views and sexual attorney’s fees is We improper. affirm as them homosexuality told wrong. modified. On March there were only people

few at the Blanding Club. and two FACTS working others were out on piece equipment. aWhen certain tune was Sports & Health offers recrea- played system, over the they sound dis- public. tion and exercise facilities to the cussed whether jig it was Irish for St. Philip Blanding joined in January the Club Day Patrick’s something else. One of by paying for his first 12 $381.50 schottische, them said it was a and Bland- months. Under the terms of his member- ing said he would show them how it was contract, ship he guaranteed perma- was done. He did or quick steps. four five monthly nent rate after the first $11 long year as as he his maintained member- Loso, member, Paul a staff observed the ship. paid He this each month amount step appeared dance and quite be dis- suspended. until March was when he tressed, so Blanding left for the locker membership paid Over course of his he room. Blanding Loso followed and told to the Club. $942.50 him he was or disruptive wrong and was in losing membership. Blanding risk of his Blanding regularly exercised at the La- responded nothing wrong that he did and Membership Salle Branch of the Club. at leaving asked to left As alone. he was during period the LaSalle Branch in- Club, Crevier, owner, Mark an told significant cluded number homosexu- Blanding to his come into office and talk als. Blanding about the situation. When re- July Blanding In wrote to Arthur fused, longer Crevier said he could no abe Owens, president Club, taking of the issue they another member. Loso told member editorial with an Owens had written for the up going put gay' “not with this were In Blanding newsletter. the letter indi- anymore.” stuff he was cated homosexual. Blanding returned the Club on March part In latter of the 1970’s some of but was refused admittance. Loso in engaged open the homosexuals sexual membership him to his asked return card. activity and sexual harassment. Hetero- subsequently manager The Club wrote to sexual members engaged also similar Blanding they “willing were said but frequency. behavior with less As a problem on discuss his behavior and atti- result, management the LaSalle received a willing tude” if he to come was in. of complaints resigna- and some number August Blanding joined membership Sales of the Nau- tions. declined. at per tilus Fitness Center a cost of $28 early Sometime 1980’s the Club month. “cracking began down” on its homosexual Blanding complaint It special members. enforced unwritten filed a with the Min- against neapolis “sodomite” rules homosexual mem- Civil Commission. At the hearing opportunities Blanding pro- to foreclose Crevier testified that bers what it atmosphere by to be inappropriate considered behavior. It moted homosexual chat- homosexuals, required ting with other homosexual to use facili- that was members to him. was one other promptly up ties and services and broke indecent There alle- engaged in any congregating socializing by gation Blanding that indecent homo- sexuals. behavior. support does not ing that the evidence allegation found the

The Commission findings. We have reviewed modest attire Commission’s Blanding failed to wear that that record and conclude the entire by the record. It fur- supported was clearly sup- findings are parallel between Commission’s there was no found ther by the evidence. ported Blanding and heterosexu- the treatment specifically of the Club. al members en- Blanding was never The Club admits privileges of heterosexüals noted misconduct explicit in the sexual gaged egregious only for more discontinued were to make rules gave rise to its decision acts, nudity or overt sexual behav- such creating a homosex- socializing and against further found The Commission ior. conduct to which ual environment. Blanding’s effectively terminated incident, Blanding’s dancing refers is the pref- of his affectional membership because management to discuss with Club refusal that the differ- Club’s erence and concluded behavior, his proper bounds Blanding constituted treatment ential that he would give assurances refusal Minneapolis ordinance. violation engage improper behavior. $7,466 compen- awarded The Commission Blanding was cre- argues-that The Club $6,000 punitive dam- damages, satory char- atmosphere and ating a homosexual attorney’s fees reasonable ages, and done as effeminate and acterizes the dance $4,500. in the amount costs manner. obviously homosexual in an Blanding’s dance evidence that There is no ISSUES obviously or done effeminate determination Is the Commission’s only The' reference manner. homosexual Blanding readmit refused to that the Club mem- remark to a the dance was Loso’s preference of his affectional on the basis put up they going not that were ber of his conduct than on the basis rather Loso did not “gay any stuff” more. the by the evidence? supported hearing. testify at the imposition of sanctions under the 2. Is that the the Club also noted In its brief Minneapolis ordinance unconstitutional the man. being another done with dance was infringes free exercise of an it on because steps the man did a few dance The other evangelical religious commitment? in which from the one opposite direction There is no indica- facing. Blanding was against improp- Are the rules 3. Club’s man. the other Loso observed tion that af- socializing offensive conduct an er not. fact, that he did record indicates the against Blanding’s com- defense firmative plaint? that Bland- found The Commission of com- award 4. Is the Commission’s a four or five-second ing impulsively did damages supported the evi- pensatory his found that be step. It further dance dence? obscene, considered would not be havior community at in the or unlawful perverted, dam- punitive Blanding entitled Is 5. membership of heterosexual large and that ages? more only for was terminated members im- attorney’s fees award of 6. Is the nudity or overt conduct such as egregious proper? these supports acts. evidence sexual Blanding that the conclusion findings and DISCUSSION of his effectively terminated because not his conduct. preference and affectional I right have the same must Homosexuals Blanding did not es- contends The Club step in a dance quick, impulsive do a refusal to readmit that the Club’s tablish society. of place as other members public prefer- on his affectional him was based Blanding is ex- against The discrimination on contends the refusal was based ence. It public discrimination actly type argu- Essentially the Club his conduct. 789 Minneapolis applied accommodations that ordi- ordinance does not impose a to address. See Potter enacted nance was upon burden the principals’ free exercise of Club, Sports Health v. LaSalle & 368 religion. (Minn.Ct.App.1985). N.W.2d 413 Initially we consider the issue of

II standing. jurisdictional issue, As a it may Sports time. State v. & any be raised at the Minneapolis The Club asserts that Club, Inc., Health (Minn. 370 N.W.2d 844 infringes applied ordinance as reli- 1985). In this case the issue is not whether gious principals, of the all freedom who are standing but, has to litigate rath born-again Christians. further asserts er, regarding Blanding standing their actions whether it has were to assert in the made free exercise their evan- free-exercise clause as a defense to the religious gelical Id. There are two con- commitment are claim of discrimination. Thus, stitutionally protected. con- the Club possible theories under which an institution un- imposition tends that sanctions might assert the free-exercise clause as a Minneapolis der the ordinance is unconsti- (1) it defense: has rights institutional analysis tutional. Club undertook no exercise, (2) may free it assert the free- but merely of case law made its assertions. rights principals. exercise its Cf. Church Scientology v. imposition We conclude that of sanc- of California Cazares, (5th Cir.1981). 638 F.2d 1272 upon tions Club is unconstitutional practices Club makes no assertion that its First, for two reasons. Club does upon genuine are based belief standing have to assert free-exercise holds, and there are no facts which would clause of the first as a amendment defense See Bob Uni Further, Jones support theory. to the claims of discrimination. States, v. versity United 574, if even the Club could assert free-exer- U.S. principals, (1983).1 Rather, cise of its the Minneapolis S.Ct. 76 S.Ct. 157 States, University against privilege compulsory In Bob Jones United as the such incrimination, self- (1983), U.S. 103 S.Ct. 76 L.Ed.2d corporations are unavailable to Supreme Court assumed that an organizations institution and other because the "historic could have a sincere belief thus particular guarantee function” of the has been standing to assert the free-exercise Be clause. protection limited to the individuals. apparently cause the issue was never and raised particular guarantee Whether or not a is opinion, was not discussed in that the we note "purely personal” corpora- or unavailable is to the or existence nonexistence of institutional depends for some reason on the tions nature, other rights "per of free exercise has been called a history, purpose particular and of the legal plexing question." Brown v. Dade Chris provision. constitutional Schools, 310, Inc., (5th tian 556 F.2d 313 Cir. 778, Bellotti, 435 U.S. n. 14 at 98 S.Ct. n. 14 at 1977). First In National Bank Boston v. Bel (citations omitted). 1416 of lotti, 765, 1407, U.S. 435 98 S.Ct. 55 L.Ed.2d 707 history of the free-exercise clause indi (1978), Supreme the Court did not the address personal purely guarantee. cates that it is a It question corporations "abstract whether have Virginia was contained in the Act for celebrated rights enjoy the full measure of that individuals Religious by Establishment of Freedom drafted Bellotti, under First U.S. the Amendment.” 435 pushed through Thomas Jefferson and the Vir 777, However, S.Ct. at at 98 the Court ginia Legislature by he James Madison before guidance determining offered which consti major played securing a role the in enactment rights may corporation tutional assert: particular of the Bill of in reli and the Corporate identity gious been has determinative clauses of the First Amendment. Dono Foundation, denying corporations Tony decisions cer- and 722 several van v. Susan Alamo Cir.1983) - 397, (8th rights, privilege granted, such as tain constitutional the F.2d 401 rt. ce U.S. -, self-incrimination, 290, (1984). against compulsory 105 S.Ct. 83 L.Ed.2d 226 religion equality enjoyment "wholly with individuals in the of considered to be a Madison matter,” Education, privacy, right private to but is not the v. Board because Everson of 1, 39, 504, 523, rights States are free to the 67 711 define of their 330 U.S. S.Ct. 91 L.Ed. J., (1947) (Rutledge, dissenting), creatures without wise, view constitutional limit. Other- and this statute, corporations religion Virginia protec- be is the could denied the of reflected in including guarantees, provided: tion all of process constitutional which profess, equal protection due the men free and the that all argument shall be maintain, opinions "purely guarantees, personal” laws. Certain their in mat- 790 rights of and exercise facilities. It is a

the asserts the free-exercise recreational corporation. evangelical reli- for-profit principals. its gious principals its commitment of is not Scientology In the Church of germane purpose, profitseek- to the Club’s a church has considered whether court ing. bring action on behalf of its standing to particular followers of a sect enter When freely they could members who claimed activity into commercial matter of as.a religious rights. applied their exercise choice, they accept the limits on their three-part test set forth Hunt v. own conduct as matter of conscience Apple Advertising Washington State superimposed faith not to be are 333, 343, Commission, 97 432 U.S. S.Ct. binding statutory schemes are which 2441, (1977). 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 Under activity. on others that representational has an association Hunt Lee, 261, 102 United States v. U.S. standing when: (1982). S.Ct. L.Ed.2d (a) have its would otherwise members Similarly, because Owens and other right; (b) standing to sue their own principals of the Club have chosen enter ger- protect it seeks to are the interests entrepreneurs, they the economic arena as organization’s purpose; mane to accept they must cannot attribute (c) claim nor the neither the asserted beliefs, their own however sin requested requires partic- relief cere, corporation. profit-seeking to their a law- ipation individual members Sports This case is unlike v. State & suit. Club, Inc., corporate veil Health where Scientology, F.2d at 1279 Church pierced held principals and the liable Hunt); McRae, (citing see also Harris illegal for the actions of Club. There 297, 320-21, 100 448 U.S. S.Ct. 2689- free they rights could assert their exer- rela- 65 L.Ed.2d 784 While the Here, Club, princi- not the cise. it is tionship corporation principals to a pals, held Under the which has been liable. clearly relationship from different circumstances, only the Club’s defenses association, help- to an test members asserted. We conclude has no ful, corporation for if a could assert rights free-exercise or deriva- institutional principals, it free exercise of its would have rights thus no tive free-exercise stand- rigorous at as meet standards least ing to assert free-exercise as mat- those set forth in Hunt. this case the ters defense. Hunt test is determinative. The second general competi- standing public Club serves the Even if the Club had presenting rights, its claim tion with similar businesses assert free-exercise religion, purpose ters of and that the same shall in no of the free-exercise clause also diminish, guarantee. purely personal enlarge, indicates that it is wise or affect their civil * * According Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. capacities *. Yoder, designed was to the free-exercise clause Donovan, at 722 F.2d 401. There was little prevent being compelled individuals from under religious congres- of the clauses discussion perform threat of criminal "to acts the sanctions debates, fact a reflection of the that the sional undeniably at with of odds fundamental tenets Everson, been issues had settled. 330 essential 218, Yoder, religious U.S. their beliefs.” 406 at 42, 67 at 524. the U.S. at S.Ct. “Indeed matter Clark, 92 S.Ct. at 1534. See also Guidelines for as to been had become so well understood have Clause, 327, Free Exercise the 83 Harv.L.Rev. granted phras- in all but the formal taken (fairness (1969) individ- 338 conscientious 42, Any ing." Id. at 67 S.Ct. at 524. under- major purpose the the ual is of free-exercise standing beliefs the based on Madison’s and clause). Virginia necessarily exclude an statute would Finally, the of the nature free-exercise clause right of free also institutional exercise. See guarantee. purely personal that it a indicates is 303, Connecticut, at Cantwell v. 301 U.S. 60 S.Ct. religious merely not The clause is statement of ("freedom and to at of conscience freedom 903 "legislative principles pro- of tolerance but a organization religious of adhere to such form freedom conscience and nouncement religion worship choose be as the individual cannot rights are inherent individual.” law”). by restricted 34, Everson, 67 330 U.S. at S.Ct. at 520.

791 Minneapolis applied impos- ordinance as from the Commission or from the district es a on those would fail. burden court that the principals beliefs its were government prohibits The first amendment abridged by the ordinance. Our review of regulating from beliefs but not conduct. yields However, record contradictions. on Bible, based his understanding of the The Amendment embraces two con- (the Owens principals agree other cepts to believe and freedom —freedom him) clearly opposed but, to to act. first is homosexual The absolute acts. The Minneapolis things, applied nature ordinance cannot be. as here second subject regulation deals with Conduct remains to discrimination on based affec- protection preference, for the tional society. regard acts. With homosexuals, emphasizes Owens that he Connecticut, 296, Cantwell v. 310 U.S. has a 303-04, 60 S.Ct. 84 L.Ed. 1213 love, (1940). them, regulate A cannot a heartfelt attempt state love for but not religious single particular activity. beliefs or for the way out The I same would religious treatment, belief for adverse but have a anybody; heartfelt love for but as regulations it can issue neutral which have says word, God in his we can hate the sin * * interfering religious effect of with the but we love the *. sinner Christ practices of its citizens. v. Yo Wisconsin didn’t my good- die for me because of der, 1526, 92 406 U.S. S.Ct. 32 L.Ed.2d ness, he died because I in that situa- 15 Minneapolis ordinance does tion. It is the same with homosexuals. regulate not attempt religious belief or We accept their Owens’ words on face. single out a belief for treatment. adverse Lee, See United v. States 455 U.S. at neutral facially regulation. 102 S.Ct. at 1055. From his words would Supreme The Minnesota Court difficult Christianity to conclude that his three-step analysis uses a to determine supports prefer- discrimination based whether an individual’s of a facial violation Thus, ence rather than acts. the Minne- ly exempt neutral statute should be under apolis applied ordinance in this case does the free-exercise clause of the Constitution: impose upon a burden Owens’ free requirements 1. Do the the statute religion. exercise of actually impose a upon the indi- burden Because no we conclude there is burden religion; vidual’s exercise of free Club, upon Owens therefore the we do exists, justified 2. If a burden is it steps analysis. not reach the next in the. interests; compelling government However, that the Minnesota Su- we note regulation question 3. Is preme recently govern- Court said that has achieving least restrictive means of overriding, compelling ment has “an inter- goals? State’s prohibiting employ- est discrimination Club, Inc., Sports public v. & ment and in accommodation.” State Health State Club, Inc., Sports N.W.2d at 851. v. & Health N.W.2d at considering step, the first we must first determine whether the legitimate.

beliefs are See Wisconsin Ill Yoder, at at 1532. U.S. S.Ct. at Club asserts that conditions That issue been has resolved State v. necessary facility imple- LaSalle made it Club, Sports and Health Inc. owners improper socializing against ment rules president deeply Club have held conduct which creates homosex- offensive and sincere beliefs. Id. The atmosphere. It further asserts that ual question more difficult is the Min whether their rules constitute an affirmative de- ordinance, neapolis prohibits which discrim Blanding’s complaint. to fense ination preference, based on affectional ac tually abridges the We understand that the Club’s ob principals’ religious be ligation may liefs. members necessitate sought findings The either its Club no effect, asking Blanding to is, The regulations. These Club and rules reasonable improp- was acknowledge that his behavior uni- must be enforced regulations rules and re- damages can be that the er so Club’s regard to a member’s formly and without argument. merit to this We find no duced. In this case Potter. sexual orientation. Blanding’s quick finding that there is no argues that the The Club further conduct, and offensive constituted dance $6,120 compensate for the addi award making such a grounds for are no there charges Blanding will incur main tional circumstances, the finding. Given program is in error be taining his fitness af- its rules are an that Club’s assertion years. The it is too much for three cause fail. Potter. must See firmative defense The error sum is correct. Commission’s years. saying made in it was for three was that also found The Commission years. is for 30 The Commission’s award harassment. Blanding was victim correctly, we the sum was stated Because prevented he that There was evidence penalize Blanding because of will not mem heterosexual socializing, while from describing period typographical error rules were not Because the were not. bers covered. orienta regard to sexual enforced without tion, the rules are an that assertion V again must fail. defense affirmative The Club contends that Com punitive damages is im award of mission’s IV (1984) 549.20 proper because Minn.Stat. § com- The claims Commission’s convincing evidence requires “clear and supported damage award is pensatory show a will that the acts of the defendant byor law. by the evidence safety of ful indifference to hearing damages committee of Com is punitive The An others.” award respondent dis may order sound mission committed to Commission’s only if arbi be modified cretion has suf- pay aggrieved party, who unsupported by capricious or if trary and discrimination, dam- compensatory fered in the record. evidence See substantial damages for mental an- ages, including * * State, 297 N.W.2d Co. v. Continental Can *. guish suffering (Minn.1980). Minn., Minneapolis, Code of Ordinances 6, 6-82). 141.50(1) (1976 Supp. No. & supported case is § The award compensatory ordered The Commission arbitrary evidence and is by substantial $7,466. in this damages totaling Included capricious. Club “crack[ed] paid in Blanding is which amount $942.50 and en on homosexual members down” argues that he membership fees. The Club to fore “sodomite” rules forced unwritten bargain and the full benefit of his received it considered opportunities for what close is erroneous. therefore the award inappropriate It had differ behavior. Blanding that was vic- found Commission its heterosexual and expectations ent harassment, thus an award of tim policies led to members. Its homosexual during period of harassment his fees Blanding solely on the suspension of However, acknowledges Blanding proper. policies sexual orientation. basis of begin until harassment did not a willful indifference demonstrate We manager became Creviers and its conduct rights of homosexuals fees. modify the award of therefore sufficiently egregious to warrant fees for the Blanding is entitled to recover damages Blanding. punitive granting termination of his period from 1980 to the Potter. See membership. VI Blanding argues also

The Club appeals the Commis- Finally, the Club by meet- mitigated have his losses should fees, claiming attorney’s sion’s award returning to the Club. ing Owens and unsupported by agree by award is Commission’s We that its own terms the provides only APA evidence. Affidavits submitted on for be- of deci- review Blanding’s attorneys agencies jurisdic- half of detail total sions of with statewide $3,880.20 tion, provide and and charges expenses. for fees does not for review of local agency The decisions. Blanding Commission concluded that is See Minn.Stat. 1402, (1982). 2 and 3 attorney’s his subd. entitled “to reasonable fees § and costs incurred herein the amount of Id. at 460. $4,500.” Minneapolis Rights Civil Ordinance Minneapolis, Minn. Code Ordi and Minnesota Administrative 141.50(1)provides nances that Com § Procedure Act may attorney’s mission order “reasonable” Minneapolis Code of Ordinances fees. In this case the are com affidavits provides judicial for review of decisions plete through hearings. only The time made Rights the Civil Commission: necessary prepare final for the written Any person aggrieved by a final decision argument not do was covered. We not find of a hearing committee or a com- review Respon that the was award unreasonable. case, mittee in a judi- contested seek attorney’s ap dent has asked for fees on cial provid- review in the district court as peal any authority upon but has cited Chapter ed in Statutes, 15 of Minnesota which such award an could be made. Ac Act, the Administrative Procedure and cordingly, cannot we make the award. the District shall the deci- Court review sion in conformance with provisions DECISION of this Title. supports The evidence the Commission’s Minn., 141.60(b)(1976 Minneapolis, Code § effectively conclusion termi- 6, 6-82). Supp. & No. The Administrative Blanding’s membership nated because of formerly Chapter Procedure Act 15 of the preference his affectional and not because Statutes, Minnesota has been renumbered of his The Minneapolis conduct. ordinance is at now found Minn.Stat. 14.- §§ applied as unconstitutional. Under (1982 Supp.1983). & 01-70 case, the circumstances of this the Club’s 1982, promul when ordinance rules do not constitute an affirmative de- gated, provided judicial the APA for review membership fense. The award fees for district court. See 14.- Minn.Stat. § vacated; 1978 and 1979 is remainder of 1983, August Effective how compensatory damages are affirmed. ever, the APA was amended to take into Blanding punitive damages. is entitled to existence, account this court’s 14.63 § attorney’s The award of is not unrea- fees provides appeal now court. to this sonable. 1983 Minn. Laws ch. at 856 See § Affirmed as modified. (1982)). (amending Minn.Stat. 14.63 § defining jurisdiction statute this court’s FOLEY, Judge part, (concurring dis- consistent with the amended APA senting part). hear, gives jurisdiction this court inter result, alia, respectful- agen I concur in the “the decisions of administrative but also cases, ly provided dissent I do not believe this cies contested sec because case, jurisdiction court 14.63 14.69.” has of this not- tions Minn.Stat. 480A.06, (Supp.1983). withstanding Hennepin County Civil subd. § City Commission Minne- By Pro- its own terms Administrative (Minn.Ct.App.1984), apolis, 355 N.W.2d 458 provide cedure Act does not for review of case should be remanded Henne- APA, agency both local decisions. pin County District Court. amended, provides for re- formerly and as agree Hennepin I of decisions in “contested cases.” See portion do view 14.63, 480A.06, 4. A Minn.Stat. subd. County which states: §§ 794 granted by which are “proceed- powers a and duties is defined as case” “contested 1974, 363, Chapter to 3, 14.02, Minnesota Statutes subd.

ing agency,” an before § relations, rights, human any state human having as bodies agencies are defined commissioner, department, rights or civil 14.- jurisdiction.” Minn.Stat. “statewide § or state board. Minneapolis Civil 2. Because the subd. agency of local Rights is an Commission 82, 1, 2, 1975, May ch. 1975 Minn. Act of § agency than an government rather codified). (the (not Chapter 363 321 Laws appealed jurisdiction, the decision Act) statewide provides: Rights Human a decision in a “contested from was not aggrieved by a final decision person [A] APA, by the and thus case” as defined rights] human department of the [of do 14.63 and 480A.06 combination § hearing pursuant § to reached after a held hear jurisdiction on this court to not confer may judicial 363.071 seek review § the matter. chapter 14. accordance with 363.072, (Supp.1983). 1 subd. Minn.Stat. § Constitution Minnesota general require- apply If did not we provides that The Minnesota Constitution jurisdiction discussed ment of statewide “appellate jurisdiction this court shall have above, right judicial if to obtain re- a court, courts, supreme except all over “power,” to be a then view is considered pre- appellate jurisdiction as and other authority that derives from the 1975 Minn.Const., VI, art. scribed law.” § give special arguably this court law would “by that the words law” in It is well-settled “prescribed by to hear jurisdiction law” by legislative constitution mean the state agency. local appeals from decisions of the County Lyon enactment. In re Clerk of however, fails, interpretation for This Compensation Lyon County Court’s 363.072 several reasons. Minn.Stat. § Commissioners, 241 308 Minn. “reached speaks of review of a decision (1976). Therefore, N.W.2d 363.071.” hearing pursuant held to after § jurisdiction appellate court does have hearing is not Although the Commission’s other than review decisions of bodies 363.071, functional literally pursuant § jurisdiction unless that is conferred courts statutory requirements equivalent to by statute. 363.071incor- Section should be sufficient.. provide statutory APA au- does contested all of the porates by reference appeal thority for this court to hear provisions of the Minnesota proceeding case agency of a local such as from a decision (formerly APA, 14.57-.62 Minn.Stat. §§ §§ Commission, Minneapolis Rights Civil 15.0418-.0422). a com- provides APA above, pro- as determined and therefore assure a mean- designed to plete framework depends appeal to this court on priety of aggrieved hearing for the ingful and fair a any confers the nec- other statute whether appel- complete record for party and a essary authority. court. late Rights Initially, Minneapolis Civil Laws, and Chapter 1975 Minnesota appear provide proce- Commission does the Minnesota Statutes Chapter 363 of hearing. The ordi- dures for a sufficient Act) (The Rights Human hearing rights provides nance for a civil statutory jur- possible Another basis Chapter complaints “in accordance with by a read- isdiction is constructed combined of Min- renumbered to §§ 14.01-.70] [now ing special legislation and the Minne- Statutes, the Administrative Proce- nesota special gives A apolis ordinance. law Minn., Minneapolis, Code dure Act.” City “power” Minneapolis Council the referring 141.500(1) After § to: however, APA, Minneapolis de- Code any rights, parts requirements from the APA and sets grant Minneapolis human relations, separate hearing procedure or commis- forth human civil hearing sion, director, materially from the APA department, any all varies procedure. example, Minneapolis Interlocutory For Subd. 2. decisions. court hearing appeals jurisdic- Civil Commission shall examiner have of interlocutory tion hearing appeals need the APA not fulfill examiner other prescribed matters as requirements designed insure a neutral rules (“All appellate procedure. of objective hearing fact-finder ex- have aminers shall demonstrated knowl- Subd. 3. Certiorari The review. edge procedures of administrative and shall appeals of jurisdiction court shall have to any political be free of or economic associa- review decisions of the commissioner of impair tion ability that would their to func- pursuant economic security, to section tion in a officially objective fair and man- 268.10. 14.48). person ner.” pre- Minn.Stat. The § 4. Subd. Administrative review. siding hearing, at a Commission in con- appeals jurisdic- The court of shall have

trast, picked from the members of tion to review on the validity record the commission, Minn., Minneapolis, Code rules, of provided administrative as in 141.50(h), and is required to be “known § 14.45, sections 14.44 and and the deci- principles equal opportunity, to favor the of sions of agencies administrative in con- objectives nondiscrimination and the of [the eases, provided tested as in sections 14.- id., Minneapolis Rights Ordinance],” Civil 63 to 14.69. 141.20. § Ancillary jurisdiction. 5. Subd. The of appeals court jurisdiction shall have to hearing proce- Because of different all necessary issue writs and orders in dures, hearing the Minneapolis before jurisdiction respect aid its of with to Civil Commission not the or literal pending cases it and before for the en- equivalent functional a “hearing of held judgments forcement of its or orders. pursuant 363.071,” to and therefore Ch. § jurisdic- is not sufficient to confer § Minn.Stat. 480A.06 § “prescribed by tion law” on this court In legislature 1983 Minnesota amend- appeals hear from Minneapolis Civil Chapter appeals” ed by adding 606 “of Rights Commission. after the word “court.” Section 606.04 provides appeals

now the “court of “pre- party award double costs” to a (Writs Minnesota Chapter Statutes 606 of any on vailing pro- a writ of certiorari in Certiorari) and Minnesota Statutes ceeding of a nature.” civil Minn.Stat. )80A. (Jurisdiction, Section Court (Supp.1983). 606.04 This addition is ar- § Appeals) of gued jurisdiction to confer on exclusive argument has been also advanced appeals all court of for writs of certiorari. (Supp.1983) that Minn.Stat. 606.04 con- § argument petitions runs that because jurisdiction fers in this court addition to security in certiorari economic cases are 480A.06, jurisdiction provided § already specifically dealt with Minn.Stat. primary jurisdiction. court’s source of (Supp.1983), 268.10 then the reference § appellate juris- Section 480A.06 confers appeals awarding of 606.04 court § in- following diction on this court in the proceeding costs certiorari would be stances: meaningless if did redundant not type petition Subdivision 1. Final decisions. The refer some certiorari jurisdiction appeals security court of shall have other one in than an economic appeals “[e]very from all final decisions of case. Because law shall be con- courts, strued, possible, give trial other than the conciliation if effect to all its courts, Minnesota, (1982), except provisions,” state Minn.Stat. 645.16 sec- § 606.04, jurisdiction that it shall not have of crimi- tion should such construed appeals way meaningless super- nal eases in the defend- render it which ant has in the fluous. A construction that would render been convicted of murder degree. first to inter- meaningless 606.04 not would be § May ch. 165 Act of grant juris- review. See as a broad the section pret (West). Minn.Sess. Law Serv. presented to hear cases § this court diction to appeal such as this by petitions, certiorari newly other instances the In whatever Rights Commis- Minneapolis Civil from the applicable, the might be amended statute no other sion, this court has for which the time review was taken law in force at jurisdiction. source of differently read new to this court apply to this case. statute does fails, Such a however. argument interpretation is not and strained broad POPOVICH, Judge (dissenting). Chief meaningful. necessary render 606.04 § respectfully I dissent on several to this court cases come A number of However, totally agree I grounds. in addition to of certiorari petition for writ assumption jurisdiction. this court’s “cer- security cases for which the economic Hennepin Rights Com- County v. Civil 480A.06, subd. 3 specified in is tiorari” § 458 Minneapolis, 355 N.W.2d mission of ap example, all of the (Supp.1983). For considered (Minn.Ct.App.1984), this court are re the APA which peals pursuant to jurisdiction the district court had whether 4, id,., appealed are now ferred to in subd. Minneapolis appeal in from the Civil certiora by petition for writ of this court to and affirmed a district Rights Commission (Supp.1983). 14.63 Minn.Stat. ri. See § dismissing petition a for re- decision court meaningful is 606.04 The reference § jurisdicition. lack of There were view for petitions. to those certiorari reference Hennepin a County is no dissents. refutes a Additionally, another statute jur- opinion which concludes well-reasoned 606.04 as an exclusive construction § grounded upon a in this court is isdiction grant court for writs of jurisdiction to this power. legislative grant of certiorari, be con- jurisdiction if could even directly to this appeal made A recent The su- language. indirect by ferred such Minneapolis Civil Com court from given power preme court is broad without decision was also affirmed mission (1982) writs of 480.04 to issue Minn.Stat. § Sports & dissent. Potter v. LaSalle See especially provided for “whether certiorari (Minn.Ct. Club, 368 N.W.2d 413 Health of this or not.” The existence by statute jurisdictional A dissent now on App.1985). given its requires that 606.04 be statute § and is grounds precedent denies unwar allowing costs in writs of logical reading of ranted. ap- brought the court of certiorari before right There exists no constitutional writs of requiring than all peals, rather activity, private public. or to homosexual brought here. to be certiorari 1985, Dronenburg recently as As does not leave decisions This decision denied, 1388, Zech, banc reh’g 741 F.2d en Minneapolis Civil agencies such as the local (D.C.Cir.1984),it was held F.2d 1579 746 Ap without review. Rights Commission consensual, con- private, homosexual provided in the district review is propriate constitutionally protected. The not duct is 484.01 pursuant to Minn.Stat. § courts stated: court origi (1982), gives the district court which point, the Doe v. More to the Court “special proceedings in all jurisdiction nal Attorney Rich- Commonwealth’s other exclusively cognizable some mond, S.Ct. 47 425 U.S. 901 [96 are of certiorari tribunal.” Writs court or (1976), summarily affirmed L.Ed.2d 751] meaning special proceedings within F.Supp. 403 judgment, court a district Com v. Civil Service our statutes. State Virginia (E.D.Va.1975),upholding a missioner, 154 N.W.2d 278 Minn. to making it a criminal offense statute homosexual engage private consensual in Doe had here, The district court mindful that conduct. dissenting I am right privacy to did found that the Section legislature has amended conduct be- private to homosexual extend 480A.06, to certiorari respect subd. with to cause latter bears no relation mar- defend its blanket exclusion of homosex- riage, procreation, or life. 403 family ground uals on the that they are offen- at F.Supp. Supreme 1200. The Court’s majority military’s sive to the or to the summary disposition of a consti- case socially view of acceptable, what then merits; such, a vote on the it is tutes as rights no are safe from encroachment binding on lower federal courts. minority protected no against dis- Appellant’s crimination.” Opening Brief * * * Appeal at 11-12. Passing the inaccu- Qourj-jjas ijste(j illustra rate posi- characterization of the Navy’s right privacy tive of the matters such here, tion it deserves to be said relating marriage, pro as activities argument is completely frivolous. creation, contraception, family relation provisions Constitution has that create ships, rearing and child education. specific rights. protect, among These hardly need said that none these others, racial, ethnic, minor- right covers homosexual conduct. * * n ities. If court new refuses to create a impossible We would find it right protect constitutional homosexu- right conclude that a con homosexual conduct, al thereby the court does not “implicit is “fundamental” in the duct ** destroy established constitutional concept of ordered *. liberty” solidly that are based in constitutional history. text and * * * guidance We have no from the Appellant goes further, however, and or, Constitution as we have shown with contends that the existence of moral dis- hand, respect to the case at articu- from approval types certain for of is behavior Supreme If principle. lated Court courts very the that government fact disables should, circumstances, appeals of such from it. regulating says He that as a begin rights freely, create new the general matter princi- of constitutional volume of decisions that would mean ple, “it is difficult to understand how an many Supreme would evade Court re- partner of adult’s selection a to share view, great body a judge-made of law intimacy sexual is not immune from bur- grow up, “pre- would and we would have by den state as an element the of consti- exempt[ed] part for another [ourselves] protected tutionally privacy. That the governance country of the of the without particular partner choice of re- be express constitutional If authority.” the the pugnant majority argues its for appellant revolution sexual mores that arrive, vigilant protection vulnerability its proclaims is in fact ever to we —not Appellant’s Opening think it must arrive Brief through the moral sanction.” people of the Appeal theory major- choices and their elected at 13. This that representatives, through morality ukase ity majority the al- choice is this court. ways presumptively made invalid cases, very predicate Turning Constitution attacks the from the decided which provide government. think ambigu- we do not of democratic When even an right speak ous warrant for the does not con- constitutional Constitution seeks, appellant arguments he trary, put offers of those in authori- choices upon theory. based constitutional ty by process who the electoral or those Though theory obviously that unten- is persons, are to such come accountable able, isit so often heard it is worth that majori- suspect not as before us because stating briefly why reject we it. conclusively that tarian but valid for stress, Appellant very can We morality denies that ever reason. because being so legislation or, spe- possibility the basis for misunderstood is be more cifically, great, for a and as- that this deference to democratic regulation, naval apply why serts two reasons so. The choice does where the Constitu- that is argument military majorities. can tion the choice from first is: “if removes institutional would, fact, destroy between The distinction Appellant’s theory corporation’s rights exercise and the most valued of free for much of basis would, rights free exercise of its society has. It assertion of the legislation our civil without a differ- example, legislation principals render about is a distinction closely held. safety, preservation corporation rights, worker ence when a more, environment, uncon- might pertinent much While such a distinction be areas, legis- circumstances, of these stitutional. each it is under different factual made moral choices majorities have operates lative as a unimportant here. The Club It of minorities. contrary to the desires principals’ religious beliefs. reflection of its many very that laws is to be doubted Owens, In order for Crevier and Larson’s justification does ultimate exist whose protected, be free exercise morality. For society’s upon not rest rights. must able to assert those reasons, argument will appellant’s these disagree portion I that also examination. not withstand finding makes a with re- the decision that omitted) (footnote (citations 1391-97 Id. at gard to Owens’ beliefs. Such omitted). an anti- clear that when seems finding by the administrative must be made conflicts with the discrimination ordinance finding, if body. role is to review the Our religion, first amendment’s freedom sup- requested, to whether determine prevail. In addi- amendment should first Therefore, ported by substantial evidence. tion, sodomy is still it should be noted findings. further I would remand for 609.293 crime in Minnesota. Minn.Stat. § courts are not It should be noted that interpretation. scriptural arbitrators disagree with the de- respectfully 3.I application interpretation of reli- the Club does not have termination gious teachings “is not within beliefs standing the free exercise clause to assert judicial compe- judicial function and as a defense to the claims of discrimination. v. Review Board Indi- tence.” Thomas closely corporation. The The Club is a held Division, Security Employement ana Owen, operators, Arthur Mark owners and 707, 716, 101 U.S. S.Ct. Larson, and Forrest are all born- Crevier L.Ed.2d again fundamentalist reli- Christians whose finally disagree the award of I with act in gious “require them to convictions Blanding’s damages. Loso observed After teachings with the of Jesus accordance dance, “disruptive” Blanding he told it was in their business and the will of God Christ losing in “wrong” and he was risk of his or personal in lives.” ex as well as their State membership membership. Blanding’s was Club, Sports v. & Health rel. McClure he refused to not terminated until Inc., (Minn.1985). If their 370 N.W.2d after management. talk about the situation re- religious practices conflict with state $7500, damages puni- Compensatory were quirements, closely corporation their held $6000, attorney’s fees and damages tive their free exercise must be able to assert $4500, $18,000. costs for a total award Otherwise, three rights as defense. these as I view the Health This seems excessive effectively precluded from men would be being conduct as more of elementa- Club’s it entering marketplace. Can be said award, that ry rudeness. The basis for the incorpo- professional person who that a Blanding charges additional in will incur corporation loses professional rates a sole years, speculative. There the next 30 in- all constitutional because of the are dozens of health facilities various corporation? a result be ab- Such would kinds in the Twin Cities area available strong religious surd. Individuals of con- damages statute was punitive him. The practice or victions do not live a vacuum serious, wanton, and malicious aimed at worship. only days their faith on their degree higher than is found conduct of a Religious permeate a values should and do this case. person’s daily activities. wrong if

Even their claim Club is they exercising religious right, were upon

their action was based sincere de- upon religious principles.

fense based their findings

There should solid have been egregious

fact proven that the act was

malicious. no There was evidence that be- Blanding longer

cause was no member of friends, any

the Health he lost Club that public any private

suffered or embarrass-

ment, prevented getting from job, advancing any

was hindered in way, any

suffered indirect direct or economic

loss.

Blanding’s talk refusal to exacerbated an

otherwise small incident which itself did

not result in membership. a loss of Club

Thus, his refusal to discuss situation proper

constitutes a for defense the Club. deepest compassion

While I have the any

those against way, discriminated I apply interpret

must I law as to be. THORN, Appellant,

James DEPOT Robert GLASS

Best, Respondents.

No. C9-85-47. of Minnesota. Appeals

Court of 27, 1985.

Aug. 1, 1985.

Review Nov. Denied

Case Details

Case Name: Blanding v. Sports & Health Club, Inc.

Court Name: Court of Appeals of Minnesota

Date Published: Oct 24, 1985

Citation: 373 N.W.2d 784

Docket Number: C5-85-305

Court Abbreviation: Minn. Ct. App.