Bland v. CarterBland v. Carter
Self-represented Petitioner Willie J. Bland, who is currently confined at the Federal Correctional Institution-Cumberland (“FCI-Cumberland“) in Cumberland, Maryland, has filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to
BACKGROUND
In the Petition, Bland asserts a violation of his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution arising from two disciplinary actions that resulted in the loss of good conduct time (“GCT“).
On August 4, 2016, Bland began to serve a 33-month term of imprisonment imposed following his federal convictions for possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of
On March 9, 2018, after the application of 80 days of GCT, Bland was released from this term of imprisonment. From March 9, 2018 to June 22, 2022, Bland remained on supervised release in the community.
During Bland‘s service of the first sentence, from August 20, 2016 to March 9, 2018, he did not file any administrative grievances, known as administrative remedy requests (“ARRs“) pursuant to the BOP‘s administrative remedy program.
On July 5, 2022, Bland began to serve a 96-month total term of imprisonment at FCI-Cumberland for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of
As relief, Bland seeks the restoration of 54 days of GCT.
DISCUSSION
In the Petition, Bland asserts that the failure to provide him with the DHO‘s written decision following his disciplinary proceedings violated his right to due process of law under the Fifth Amendment because he had no ability to appeal the DHO‘s decision without a copy of that report. Respondent contends that the Petition must be dismissed because Bland failed to exhaust administrative remedies, his claim is barred by the doctrine of laches, and his revoked GCT arising from a completed sentence cannot be retroactively applied to that sentence or applied to his present sentence.
I. Due Process
Under the Fifth Amendment, certain due process protections are required when an inmate faces the loss of a liberty interest, such as the possible loss or diminution of good conduct credits. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-66 (1974); Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). These steps include (1) advance written notice of the charges
II. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Respondent asserts that the Petition should be dismissed because Bland failed to exhaust administrative remedies. “Prior to hearing a
Exhaustion requires that prisoners pursue a claim through all available stages in the administrative process until they receive a final denial of the claim. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 735 (2001) (affirming the dismissal of a prisoner‘s claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because the prisoner “never sought intermediate or final administrative
The BOP has established an Administrative Remedy Program,
BOP records demonstrate that during the first sentence, during which the GCT sanctions were imposed in July 2017, Bland did not file any ARRs at any point prior to his release on March 9, 2018. Bland did not file an ARR relating to the disciplinary hearing and the July 2017 GCT sanctions until October 30, 2023, over six years after the DHO‘s decision, during the separate second sentence. Because an initial ARR must be filed within 20 days of the incident in question, these ARRs were properly deemed to be untimely by the Mid-Atlantic Regional Office. See
Bland offers no explanation for the failure to file a timely ARR other than his apparent belief that he could not do so without having received the DHO‘s written decision. Although Respondents do not dispute that Bland did not receive that decision, Bland has not demonstrated that the administrative process was unavailable to him without that document. Exhaustion of administrative remedies can be excused if the administrative process is unavailable, which occurs in rare circumstances when that process “operates as a simple dead end,” when it is “so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use,” or when “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of [it] through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642-44 (2016).
None of these circumstances existed here. First, Bland, in fact, later filed ARRs relating to the DHO‘s decision during the second sentence, in 2023. Second, although Bland asserts that his ARRs were denied “on all levels” because he did not have a copy of the DHO decision, Pet. at 5, ECF No. 1, the Regional Office actually denied his appeals as untimely, not based on failure to submit the DHO report, as reflected in its notice to Bland stating that the appeals were denied because an appeal to the Regional Office “must be received within 20 days” of the Warden‘s response or “receipt of the DHO report.” ARR Rejection Notices at 1-2, Pet. Ex. 2, ECF No. 1-2. Thus, Bland could have filed an ARR and then an appeal within 20 days of the Warden‘s denial. See id. Third, Bland has acknowledged that he did not file an appeal of the Regional Office‘s decision to the Central Office but has provided no basis to conclude that an appeal to the Central Office could not succeed unless he submitted the DHO decision with his appeal.
For these reasons, the Court finds that Bland‘s petition is subject to dismissal based on the failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
III. Restoration of GCT
Even if the Court were to excuse Bland‘s failure to exhaust administrative remedies, he would not be entitled to the relief sought because he is no longer serving the term of imprisonment during which he lost the GCT. Bland appears to argue that if his GCT are restored, they should be applied to reduce the sentence he is presently serving.
At the time of the service of the first sentence, GCT was applied as follows:
Subject to paragraph (2), a prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year ... may receive credit toward the service of the prisoner‘s sentence, beyond the time served, of up to 54 days at the end of each year of the prisoner‘s term of imprisonment, beginning at the end of the first year of the term, subject to determination by the Bureau of Prisons that, during that year, the prisoner has displayed exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations. Subject to paragraph (2), if the Bureau determines that, during that year, the prisoner has not satisfactorily complied with such institutional regulations, the prisoner shall receive no such credit toward service of the prisoner‘s sentence or shall receive such lesser credit as the Bureau determines to be appropriate.... Credit that has not been earned may not later be granted. Subject to paragraph (2), credit for the last year or portion of a year of the term of imprisonment shall be prorated and credited within the last six weeks of the sentence.
(2) Notwithstanding any other law, credit awarded under this subsection after the date of enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act shall vest on the date the prisoner is released from custody.
Consistent with this provision, when a prisoner is released from a term of imprisonment onto supervised release or parole “the good time earned during that period of imprisonment is of no further effect either to shorten the period of supervision or to shorten the period of imprisonment which the offender may be required to serve for violation of parole or mandatory release.”
Based on the statutory framework underlying GCT and the text of the applicable regulation, the Court agrees with this line of case law and finds that any restored GCT, which would have been earned in relation to the first sentence, which was completed on March 9, 2018, could not be applied to Bland‘s current sentence, which began on July 5, 2022. Bland‘s requested relief in the form of restored GCT credits is therefore unavailable, and the Petition is subject to dismissal as moot.
Thus, based both on the failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the present unavailability of the relief sought, the Petition must be dismissed. The Court therefore need not and does not address Respondent‘s additional argument for dismissal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Bland‘s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus will be DISMISSED. A separate Order shall be issued.
Date: September 1, 2026
THEODORE D. CHUANG
United States District Judge