Blanchard v. FarmerBlanchard v. Farmer
Plaintiff, Timothy Blanchard, appeals from the granting of defendants’1 peremptory exception of prescription in this medical malpractice suit. Under
Plaintiff alleges that during his surgery in December, 1976, Dr. Leo Farmer negligently failed to remove a piece of metal from plaintiff‘s hand. Plaintiff claims he did not discover this fact until March 13, 1979. Suit was filed on March 12, 1980. In response thereto, defendants filed a peremptory exception of prescription based on
On appeal, there is no dispute that the alleged act of negligence occurred in December, 1976. At issue is the application of 9:5628 and its constitutionality.
SPECIFICATIONS OF ERROR NOS. 1-3
The first three specifications of error address the trial court‘s application of
“A. No action for damages for injury or death against any physician, chiropractor, dentist, or hospital duly licensed under the laws of this state, whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought unless filed within one year from the date of the alleged act, omission or neglect, or within one year from the date of discovery of the alleged act, omission or neglect; provided, however, that even as to claims filed within one year from the date of such discovery, in all events such claims must be filed at the latest within a period of three years from the date of the alleged act, omission or neglect.” (Emphasis added).
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The underlined portion of the statute provides specifically for the present situation. Plaintiff filed suit within one year of discovery of the alleged negligent act but not within three years from the occurrence thereof. As a result, the exception of prescription was correctly sustained.
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 4
Further, plaintiff argues that application of this peremptive provision of
The constitutional guarantee of access to the courts is
The malpractice claimant‘s right to sue for damages caused by medical professionals is not a fundamental constitutional right. Consequently, its constitutionality is tested by the lesser standard of rational basis. Everett, supra.
Under the instant statute, the legislature has removed from the scope of liability those disabilities discovered more than three years after the date of the alleged act of negligence. As to these belated disabilities, the statute confers no cause of action. As thus analyzed, we do not think that the state is constitutionally required to provide a cause of action in its medical malpractice statute for long-delayed disabilities and losses. Accordingly, we hold that
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed at plaintiff‘s cost.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
“A. The trial judge erred in maintaining the exception of prescription.
“B. The trial judge erred finding prescription had run where more than three years had passed since the negligent act of malpractice, despite it was not discovered until within one year of filing.
“C. The statute R.S. 9:5628, by its obvious ambiguity, requires it be strictly construed against prescription and in favor of obligation sought to be extinguished by it.”