1 Wall. Jr. 337 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Pennsylvania | 1849
The point here raised by the defendant’s counsel is not without its difficulty, and the force of his argument cannot be evaded if his assumption be true, that this deed transfers the legal title to Carter of that portion of the patent, which it purports to vest in him. But if it does not so operate, it cannot be noticed in a court of law and cannot affect the case.
As the grants of the crown were, at common law, construed with the greatest strictness, the privileges granted by a patent for a monopoly, would probably not have been treated as capable of assignment, unless made so by the letter of the grant Since the statute 21 Jac. I. c. 3, § 5, patents for useful inventions (notwithstanding the statute itself mentions the “inventor” only,) have always granted the privilege or monopoly to the inventor, his executor, administrator and assigns. These monopolies are, therefore, assignable as other personal chattels, by force of the grant which creates them.
As a chattel also, it might be held by two or more joint owners: Hence any undivided portion or interest in the whole as an unity might be assigned, and if the original grantee died, such assignees might join in an action for an infringement of their right. Boulton v. Bull, 2 H. B1. 463. “But the patent right itself was insusceptible of local subdivision.” Whittemore v. Cutter [Case No. 17,-600]. As a privilege or monopoly, it was an entire thing, indivisible, and incapable of apportionment. Brooks v. Byam [Id. 1.948].
But the act of congress of 1836 [5 Stat. 121, § 11] has regulated the assignment of patents. The eleventh section provides, that a patent shall be assignable: 1st. As to the
But it is sufficient for purposes of the present inquiry, that the act of congress has not given a legal sanction to such transfers or assignments, nor subjected even a pirate of the machine to fifty different suits by fifty several assignees, whose several interests might be affected, if a patent could be thus split up into numerous exclusive rights, or submonopolies. Whether the deed confers on Carter and his assigns more than a special license, or what remedy a court of equity might be disposed to extend to him, where his rights are infringed, it is not nec- : essary now to inquire. As it does not con- ¡ fer a legal title to the whole, or an undivided portion of the patent, nor grant “an exclusive right within a specified part of the United States,” it cannot be received to affect this case. It was wholly irrelevant and ought not to have been received in evidence.
It adds to my confidence in the correctness of this view, that, as I have been informed, my Brother Nelson has ruled the question in the same way in the second circuit. New trial refused.