OPINION
{1} In this case, we decide whether a domestic corporation resides in a county for venue purposes solely because its registered agent for service of process resides in that county. Resolution of the issue requires us to interpret the meaning of “resides” as it occurs in Section 38-3-l(A) of our venue statute, 1978 NMSA, Section 38-3-1 (1875-76, as amended through 1988). Based on the plain language of Section 38-3-l(A), we hold that a domestic corporation does not reside in a county solely because its registered agent resides therein.
I. BACKGROUND
{2} The Blancetts (Plaintiffs), residents of San Juan County, filed this action in Santa Fe County against Ron Dial, Dick Dial, Sue Dial, and the Dial Oil Company (Defendants), seeking to recover damages allegedly caused by their actions in San Juan County.
{3} The district court denied the motion to dismiss. Noting that the case presented an “interesting issue” and “close question,” which was both dispositive and undecided by New Mexico’s appellate courts, the district court granted leave to seek interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals denied Defendants’ application for interlocutory appeal, and we granted certiorari, Blancett v. Dial Oil Co.,
II. DISCUSSION
{4} “A motion to dismiss for improper venue based on the meaning of the venue statute involves questions of law, which we review de novo.” Baker v. BP Am. Prod. Co.,
{5} Plaintiffs initiating an action in New Mexico must look to the venue statute to determine the proper county in which to bring their suit. Section 38-3-1. Our “venue statute is expansive and provides plaintiffs with broad discretion in choosing where to bring an action.” Baker,
{6} New Mexico case law has long recognized that, for venue purposes, a domestic corporation resides at the location of its principal place of business. See Sunwest Bank of Albuquerque, N.M. v. Nelson,
First, except as provided in Subsection F of this section relating to foreign corporations, all transitory actions shall be brought in the county where either the plaintiff or defendant, or any one of them in case there is more than one of either, resides; or second, in the county where the contract sued on was made or is to be performed or where the cause of action originated or indebtedness sued on was incurred; or third, in any county in which the defendant or either of them may be found in the judicial district where the defendant resides.
{7} The parties agree that Dial Oil resides in San Juan County because its principal place of business is located there, and it is undisputed that Defendants are each San Juan County residents. The dispute in the instant case centers on whether Dial Oil also resides in Santa Fe County because its registered agent resides therein. Defendants argue that venue is not proper in Santa Fe County because Section 38-3-l(A) does not expressly place venue at the residence of a domestic corporation’s registered agent. They rely on Section 38-3-l(F) to make their point. It reads:
Suits may be brought against transient persons or non-residents in any county of this state, except that suits against foreign corporations admitted to do business and which designate and maintain a statutory agent in this state upon whom service of process may be had shall only be brought in the county where the plaintiff, or any one of them in case there is more than one, resides or in the county where the contract sued on was made or is to be performed or where the cause of action originated or indebtedness sued on was incurred or in the county where the statutory agent designated by the foreign corporation resides.
Section 38-3-l(F) (emphasis added). Defendants contend that the absence of equivalent language regarding statutory agents in Section 38-3-l(A) shows that the Legislature did not intend for a domestic corporation’s registered agent to establish corporate residence for venue purposes. By contrast, Plaintiffs claim that the Legislature included language about statutory agents in Section 38-3-l(F) because so doing was necessary to limit the counties in which a foreign corporation with a statutory agent could be sued, whereas such language was unnecessary in Section 38-3-1(A) because the section limits venue to those counties in which a domestic corporation resides and the Legislature intended that a domestic corporation reside where its registered agent does.
{8} Our primary goal when interpreting a statute is to effectuate the Legislature’s intent in enacting it. Sunwest Bank,
{9} Domestic corporations are New Mexico residents subject to suit where their principal place of business is located, see Sunwest Bank,
{10} Although “the [venue] statute limits venue for foreign corporations with statutory agents to the county where the statutory agent resides, it does not so limit venue for resident defendants.” Gardiner v. Galles Chevrolet Co.,
{11} When a statute’s meaning is clear from its plain language, we must apply the statute as written by the Legislature. State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos,
{12} Plaintiffs would have us consider NMSA 1978, Sections 53-11-11 and 53-11-14 (1967) of the Business Corporation Act (BCA) to construe the meaning of “resides” as it occurs in Section 38-3-l(A). Although we have concluded that the venue statute’s plain language is dispositive of the issue before us, we assume that the statute is ambiguous for the purpose of discussing Plaintiffs’ argument. They explain that the purpose of designating a registered agent under Section 53-11-11 is to identify an individual or entity in a particular location where the domestic corporation can be served with process, pursuant to Section 53-11-14. They thus argue that the venue statute and the cited BCA sections should be read together because service of process is a component of litigation and the venue statute governs where litigation may occur. Based on that construction, Plaintiffs contend that the venue statute and cited BCA sections together establish that a registered agent’s residence also creates a domestic corporation’s residence for venue purposes.
{13} When seeking to understand the legislative intent of an unclear statute, we will construe “[statutes on the same general subject ... by reference to each other, the theory being that the court can discern legislative intent behind an unclear statute by reference to similar statutes where legislative intent is more clear.” State v. Ogden,
{14} The venue statute sets forth the requirements that must be met before a lawsuit may proceed in a particular county in this state. Section 38-3-1. The cited BCA sections require a corporation to establish a registered agent, Section 53-11-11, and to allow service of process upon that agent, Section 53-11-14; they do not contain any explicit language relating to venue. For those three statutory sections to be in pari materia, the language of the BCA sections would have to contain more specific language regarding venue.
{15} Were we to accept Plaintiffs’ argument that “resides,” as it occurs in Section 38-3-l(A), should be interpreted by reference to Sections 53-11-11 and 53-11-14, our “rule [would] undermine[ ] the venue statute by allowing a party to pick a forum convenient to no one, a result contrary to the limited venues the venue statute authorizes for residents and foreign corporations with a statutory agent.” Baker,
III. CONCLUSION
{16} Based on the plain language of Section 38-3-l(A), we hold that a domestic corporation does not reside in a county for venue purposes solely because its registered agent for the service of process is located therein. In so holding, we reverse the district court’s denial of Defendants’ motion to dismiss and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
{17} IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. Plaintiffs also named Conoco/Phillips, Inc. and Federated Insurance Co. as co-defendants in their initial complaint. Neither Conoco/Phillips nor Federated Insurance is involved in the instant appeal.