1. By the act of August 16, 1915 (Acts 1915, p. 233), the office of county treasurer of Fayette County was abolished. By the authority vested in them by that act, the county commissioners of that county selected the Bank of Fayetteville “as de
In the interpretation of a statute the courts must look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly. Penal Code, § 1. This is the cardinal rule in the construction of statutes, and the intention when ascertained must be carried into effect. Erwin v. Moore, 15 Ga. 361. The construction must square with common sense and sound reasoning. Now what is the meaning of this act ? A synopsis of its terms will aid us in reaching its meaning. By its first section the office of the county treasurer of Fayette County was abolished from and after January 1, 1917. By the second section it was made the duty of the county commissioners to “select some bank, banks, or bankers in said county to act as depository or depositories and disbursing agent or agents of and for the public funds of said county.” By the third section it was provided that “such depository or depositories, and disbursing agent, or agents, shall receive no compensation for acting as such, but said commissioners shall, if possible, get such bank, banks, or bankers to pay said county for the privilege of acting as such depository and disbursing agent.” By section four, no bank shall be allowed to act as such depository and disbursing agent, until it shall have given a bond, with sureties, in a sum which, in the judgment of the commissioners, will be double the amount of the county funds which will be deposited with such bank or bankers for the ensuing twelve months from the date of the bond. The property of said bank or bankers and that of the securities on such bond shall be bound from the time of its execution for the payment of any liability
The bank as such depository was to receive no compensation for the services required of it under this statute. Besides, it was made the duty of the county commissioners, if possible, to have this bank pay for the privilege of acting as such depository and disbursing agent. Furthermore, the bank was required to give a bond with sureties for the faithful performance of its duties as such depository and disbursing agent. This bond created a lien on all of its property and on all of the property of its sureties. The depository was required to keep books in which should be entered all receipts, stating whenj from whom, and on what account received, all amounts paid out, stating when, to whom, and on what account paid, and in which should be entered a full description of all county orders "or other form of indebtedness as they were presented, and to record therein a copy of the order of the county authorities levying county taxes. The depository was further required to render reports to and appear before the commissioners whenever notified, and to appear before any grand jury on request, to render an account of its acts and doings as such depository and disbursing agent, and to exhibit its books and vouchers as such depository and disbursing agent when notified. Furthermore, such depository was made liable both civilly and criminally, just as county treasurers are liable, for any nonfeasance or malfeasance of duty, and the county commissioners had the right to proceed summarily against it and the sureties on its bond, as county treasurers and the sureties on their bonds may now be proceeded against in case of nonfeasance or malfeasance in the conduct of their offices. In view of these facts can it be held that it was the intention of this act that this bank should not have the right to use these funds ? Would it be reasonable to hold that the legislature contemplated, in enacting this statute, that this bank was to receive no compensation by way of salary or commissions for the services which it was to render as such depository, that it was to give bond for the faithful performance of the duties imposed
Where general deposits are authorized and made, from the very nature of the case the depository has the right to use and mingle the funds with -its own. Brown v. Board of Com’rs, 58 Kan. 672, 674 (50 Pac. 888); State v. Lawrence, 80 Kan. 707 (103 Pac. 839); Board of Com’rs v. Citizens’ Bank, 67 Minn. 236 (69 N. W. 912); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Wilkinson County, 106 Miss. 654 (64 So. 457, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 1248); In re Salmon, 145 Fed. 649; Cadwell v. King, 84 Iowa, 228 (50 N. W. 975); Robertson v. Bank of Batesville, 116 Miss. 501 (77 So. 318); State v. Bartley, 39 Neb. 353 (58 N. W. 172, 23 L. R. A. 67); 18 C. J. 592, § 70 b; Colquitt v. Simpson, supra. The weight of authority is to the effect that, where there is an authorized general deposit with a depository of public funds, the resulting relation is that of debtor and creditor. Wallace v. Davis, 123 Ark. 70 (184 S. W. 834); Yellowstone County v. First Trust &c. Bank, 46 Mont. 439 (128 Pac. 596); In re State Treasurer’s Settlement, 51 Neb. 116 (70 N. W. 532, 36 L. R. A. 746); U. S. Fidelity &c. Co. v. American Bonding Co., 31 Okla. 669 (122 Pac. 142); Watson v. El Paso County (Texas Civ. App.), 202 S. W. 126, 129; Henry County v. Salmon, 201 Mo. 136 (100 S. W. 20); Lewis v. Park Bank, 42 N. Y. 463; State v. Rubey, 77 Mo. 610, 620; 18 C. J. 579, § 43, 2. In County of Glynn v. Brunswick Terminal Co., 101 Ga. 244 (28 S. E. 604); this court held that where county funds are deposited in a bank, and the bank fails, the county, in a contest over the distribution of the assets of the bank, is not entitled to a lien on these assets in preference to the individual depositors. Knight v. State, 137 Ga. 537 (73 S. E. 825). When funds of the county were deposited in this bank under the above act of 1915, the title thereto immediately passed to the bank, and the relation of debtor and creditor was created between the bank and the depositor. Ricks v. Broyles, 78 Ga. 610, 614 (3 S. E. 772, 6 Am. St. R. 280); Schofield Mfg. Co. v. Cochran, 119 Ga. 901 (47 S. E. 208) ; McGregor v. Battle, 128 Ga. 577 (58 S. E. 28); Williams v. Bennett, supra.
2. In view of the answer given to the first question propounded by the Court of Appeals, we do not think it necessary to answer the second and third questions propounded, as the effect of our answer is to dispose of this case.