172 Ga. 313 | Ga. | 1931
The petitioners, alleging themselves to be heirs of Joseph L. Blalock, brought a petition to enjoin Ed B. Bell from entering upon certain premises or interfering with the possession of one whom they alleged to be their tenant. They asserted that the defendant had slandered their title continuously, both orally and in writing, for several years, asserting his right and title to certain described lands, when in fact he had no right or title in the same, and when in fact all right and title to said lands was vested in petitioners. They prayed that he be required to come into court and show his claims, right, and title; that title be decreed to be in the plaintiffs, etc. It appeared from the testimony of the ordinary that their grandfather had left a will in which there was a clause by which he devised to his widow (who afterwards intermarried with Sanford Bell and became the mother of Ed B. Bell, the defendant) “four hundred dollars to be expended in land in lieu of her dower out of my present homestead.” The petitioners alleged that their mother remained in possession, and in 1884 executed a deed in which she conveyed to the children of
The evidence fails to show that Mrs. Susan Blalock ever applied for dower, that any commissioners were ever appointed, or that any land was ever set apart and assigned to her as dower as the widow of Josiah L. Blalock. The only real circumstance- from which an inference could be drawn that Mrs. Blalock elected to take dower, or had placed herself within the rule of the authorities ■where by her conduct she should be estopped to deny having taken dower instead of a child’s part in her husband’s estate, is the mere presumption that she was of the opinion that she had no further interest in the land of Josiah L. Blalock than a dower estate; this by reason of the fact that she had conveyed to her Blalock children her life-estate in the land in question. As to this, we think the trial judge was right in holding, as a matter of law, that a contract to convey to another merely the interest of the grantor for his life does not carry with it title to the fee in remainder. We know of no rule of law by which one is not permitted to take into consideration the value of his land during his probable expectancy, as much as he would have to convey a leasehold for a period of ten or twenty years, without thereby transmitting to the grantee in the deed the fee in remainder. We think that this fact, without more,
Judgment affirmed.