17 N.E.2d 1 | Ill. | 1938
Lead Opinion
Appellant's intestate was awarded $58,152 in a special assessment proceeding for land taken, and judgment was entered in her favor for that amount February 16, 1926. After deducting $3598 for benefits, the net judgment amounted to $54,554. This amount was paid October 28, 1926. More than five years afterwards, to-wit, December 5, 1934, this suit was brought in the circuit court of Cook county against appellee for interest on the full amount of the award from *482 February 16, 1926, to the date when payment was made and for interest on such unpaid interest after October 28, 1926. The trial court entered a judgment for interest on $54,554 from February 16, 1926, to October 28, 1926, in the sum of $1909.24, but it refused to allow interest on that sum. The city of Chicago appealed to the Appellate Court. That court held that whatever claim for interest plaintiff had was barred by the Statute of Limitations. The judgment was reversed and the cause is here on leave to appeal.
Appellant's contentions are that interest on a judgment is a part of it; that a judgment cannot be satisfied unless the face of the judgment, interests and costs are paid; that this proceeding is a cause of action based upon a judgment, and that such an action is barred only by the twenty-years' Statute of Limitations. On the other hand, appellee contends that appellant's claim is solely for interest; that it is purely of statutory origin, and is not a part of the judgment, and comes within the purview of "all civil actions not otherwise provided for" and is barred by the five-years' limitation in section 15 of the Statute of Limitations.
The record conclusively shows the claim is for interest, and being for interest, only, she could in no event recover interest on interest. The trial court and the Appellate Court correctly so held. If she is entitled to recover interest at all, it is only upon $54,554 from the date the judgment was entered to the date it was paid. Blaine v. City of Chicago,
In determining whether interest on a judgment is a part of it, the character of a judgment and the authority for imposing interest are important factors to be considered. A judgment is the sentence of the law pronounced by the court upon the matter contained in the record. (3 Blackstone's Com. 395.) It is the law's last word in a judicial controversy and may be defined as the final consideration and determination of a court upon matters submitted to it in an action or proceeding. (15 R.C.L., Judgments, *483
569.) A judgment is the judicial act of the court. (Dorman v.Usbe Building and Loan Ass'n,
Section 3 of the Interest act, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, chap. 74, par. 3,) provides: "Judgments recovered before any court or magistrate shall draw interest at the rate of five (5) per centum per annum from the date of the same until satisfied. When judgment is entered upon any award, report or verdict, interest shall be computed at the rate aforesaid, from the time when made or rendered to the time of rendering judgment upon the same, and made a part of the judgment." It is to be observed that two classes of interest are contemplated by the statute, — i.e., that which accrues prior to judgment, and interest which accrues after the judgment is entered. Interest accruing before judgment is expressly made a part of the judgment, but no such provision is made as to interest accruing on a judgment after it is entered. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that the expression of one thing or one mode of action in a statute excludes other things or modes though not expressly prohibited.(People v. Wiersema State Bank,
The right to interest under the statute on a condemnation judgment is well settled. (Blaine v. City of Chicago, supra;Feldman v. City of Chicago, supra; Turk v. City of Chicago,supra; Girard Trust Co. v. United States,
Section 15 of the Statute of Limitations provides that actions on unwritten contracts, awards of arbitrators, or to recover damages for injury to property, or to recover possession of or damages for the detention or conversion of personal property "and all civil actions not otherwise provided for, shall be commenced within five years next after the cause of action accrued." We do not agree with appellant that the doctrine of ejusdem generis
excludes this action from the terms of the statute. In Ambler v.Whipple,
Since we hold that whatever claim for interest appellant may have had is now barred by section 15 of the Statute of Limitations, there is no occasion for our determining the other questions which were raised in the briefs.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Mr. JUSTICE GUNN took no part in this decision.
Dissenting Opinion
I cannot agree that where the principal of any judgment, either in a condemnation suit or any other, is paid some months or years after that judgment was rendered but none of the interest was paid, then the five-year Statute of Limitations began to run against the unpaid interest on the day of *486
payment. The statute on judgments is that giving the creditor twenty years, and our holding in Epling v. Dickson,
Certainly, interest is no part of the compensation to be paid the landowner in a condemnation suit. If it were, a jury would have to be called to assess the interest. But it does not follow from that fact that interest is not an incident of and a part of the judgment.
The history of interest and the fact that it is a part of judgments where under statutes they draw interest, is set out inNational Bank v. Mechanics Nat. Bank,
If I have a note for $100 and my debtor pays me the principal, even though the note made no mention of interest, since I am entitled to interest under the statute I can sue for that interest which was due on the day the principal was paid and bring my suit within ten years. The same thing, in my opinion, is applicable to a judgment, except that the limitation is twenty years instead of ten as in the case of the note.
Mr. JUSTICE ORR, also dissenting.