Tony BLAKELY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF CLARKSVILLE, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 06-5372.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Aug. 7, 2007.
681
Before: SILER and COOK, Circuit Judges; REEVES, District Judge.
There is, moreover, no sufficiently alleged due process violation. As a matter of procedural due process, assuming that Redmond has a liberty or property interest, he does not allege that the Jockey Club denied him notice of or an opportunity to be heard with respect to its decision, nor does he allege that the Jockey Club was somehow impermissibly impartial. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578-79, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973). Instead, Redmond simply alleges that “the denial of Mr. Redmond‘s right to use the name ‘Sally Hemings’ is arbitrary and irrational and serves no legitimate state interest.” JA 19 (¶ 69). It is even more obvious that there is no substantive due process violation alleged in this case. “The contention that the [state actor‘s] actions were arbitrary or capricious cannot be sufficient; otherwise judicial review for compliance with substantive due process would become the equivalent of a typical state or federal Administrative Procedure Act.” Bell v. Ohio State, 351 F.3d 240, 251 (6th Cir.2003).
The City of Clarksville (“City“) appeals the district court‘s denial of its Rule 50(b) motion following a jury verdict in favor of Tony Blakely, an African-American officer of the Clarksville Police Department (“CPD“). The City argues that: (1) it is immune from suit for claims of outrageous conduct and malicious harassment; (2) the district court erred by admitting evidence of an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC“) determination and a prior trial verdict; and (3) the district court erred by admitting evidence of discrimination alleged by current and former employees. Because the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of a prior jury verdict, we REVERSE the denial of the City‘s Rule 50(b) motion for a new trial with respect to Blakely‘s claims for discriminatory discipline, hostile work environment, and retaliation, and REMAND for a new trial. We DISMISS Blakely‘s claims for outrageous conduct and malicious harassment because the City is entitled to immunity.
I. BACKGROUND
Blakely began working for the CPD in 1990. He was promoted to detective in 1996 and successfully passed the sergeant exam in 2000. The CPD promoted three white officers to sergeant following this test, but not Blakely. In 2001, he filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging retaliation and hostile work envi
In 2001, Blakely sued the City in federal district court, alleging failure to promote and retaliation. He filed a second complaint in 2004, asserting claims for failure to promote, retaliation, hostile work environment, intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress, outrageous conduct, and malicious harassment. The claims were based upon Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
The jury found in favor of Blakely on his claims of hostile work environment, retaliation, racial discrimination in administering the City‘s disciplinary policy, outrageous conduct, and malicious harassment, and awarded him $325,000 compensatory damages total, or $65,000 per claim. Blakely‘s claim of racial discrimination in the promotion process was dismissed with prejudice.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Outrageous Conduct and Malicious Harassment Claims
The City first argues that it is immune from Blakely‘s claims for outrageous conduct and malicious harassment. We agree with the City and dismiss these claims because the City is immune from suit based on Tennessee‘s Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA“),
B. Admission of EEOC Determination and Prior Verdict
1. EEOC Determination
The City next asserts that the district court erred by permitting Blakely to introduce the EEOC determination. A trial court has the discretion to allow an EEOC determination into evidence, even though these determinations are not per se admissible in all civil rights suits. Heard v. Mueller Co., 464 F.2d 190, 194 (6th Cir.1972). In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting this evidence. While “[a] strong argument can be made that a jury would attach undue influence to this type of agency determination, viewing it as a finding of discrimination ... rather than as a mere finding of probable cause,” Williams v. Nashville Network, 132 F.3d 1123, 1129 (6th Cir.1997), the district court minimized any potential undue influence by specifically instructing the jury that it was free to disregard any conclusions contained in the report because the EEOC may not have had the same evidence as the jury had.
2. Prior Verdict
The City‘s next argument is that the district court abused its discretion by permitting Detective Kenneth Austion, an African-American CPD employee, to testify about a verdict in his similar racial discrimination suit against the City. Evi
While Detective Austion‘s history of similar treatment and experiences may have had some probative value, see Robinson v. Runyon, 149 F.3d 507, 512-13 (6th Cir. 1998), testimony regarding a jury verdict in his favor did not “possess such additional probative value ... to overcome the risk of prejudice and confusion that the verdict posed.” Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1010. Had Austion testified only to the similar treatment he endured, there would have been little potential for prejudice and confusion. However, when he testified that he obtained a favorable verdict in his trial, there was a substantial risk that the jury would import the whole verdict from the Austion case, especially since his case involved identical claims. Moreover, just after this case was argued on appeal, the Austion case was decided by this court, partially affirming the jury verdict and partially reversing the judgment, in particular, with regard to his demotion and failure-to-promote claims. Austion v. City of Clarksville, No. 05-6626, — Fed.Appx. —, 2007 WL 2193597 (6th Cir.2007). Although the district court gave the jury a limiting instruction, it did not cure any resulting prejudice. The admission of this evidence was an abuse of discretion.
C. Admission of Previous Racial Conduct
Finally, the City argues that the district court should have excluded evidence of racial comments directed at other City employees. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence because it was relevant to Blakely‘s claim of a hostile work environment. Although these incidents were not aimed at Blakely, “an employer may create a hostile environment for an employee even where it directs its discriminatory acts or practices at the protected group of which the plaintiff is a member, and not just the plaintiff herself.” Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 661 (6th Cir.1999) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986)). Further, “[c]omments that single out a member of a protected class are relevant not only as to whether a particular work environment was objectively hostile to members of the protected class, but also as to whether an employee belonging to the protected class subjectively felt harassed.” Jackson, 191 F.3d at 661.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the denial of the City‘s Rule 50(b) motion with respect to Blakely‘s claims for discriminatory discipline, hostile work environment, and retaliation, and REMAND for a new trial. We DISMISS Blakely‘s claims for outrageous conduct and malicious harassment.