159 Mo. App. 405 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1911
Plaintiff, a brakeman in the service of defendant, was injured while in the discharge of the duties of his employment and claims in his petition that his injuries were caused by negligence of defendant. The defenses interposed in the answer are a general traverse and pleas of assumed risk and contributory negligence. The causa is here on the appeal of defendant from a judgment of five hundred dollars, recovered by plaintiff and the sole contention of counsel for defendant isi that the cause of action pleaded in the petition finds no substantial support in the evidence. .
Plaintiff was injured during the night of January 1, 1907, at the station of Nassau on defendant’s line between St. Joseph and Kansas City. The freight train on which he was a brakeman had stopped at this station and, for purposes connected with the stop, it became necessary for plaintiff to open the door on the east side of one of the freight ears loaded with
Counsel for defendant are right in their insistence that plaintiff must be held to his specification of negligence and that in this aetioñ he can recover on no other hypothesis than that of his petition, but we do not agree with counsel in their contention that the evidence, taken as a whole, does not support the petition. • Standr ing alone, the evidence of plaintiff is substantial and in accord with physical laws. ' It shows that the door in controversy had been constructed with a strip at the top; that the.door had been kept in use after the strip had rotted off and that had the strip been replaced the hooks could not have jumped their track. It was the duty of defendant to exercise reasonable care to provide plaintiff, its servant, with a reasonably safe car door, and the acceptance of plaintiff’s evidence would compel the inference that defendant negligently had failed to perform that duty.
But the chief argument of counsel for defendant, in substance, is that the existence of facts contradictory of plaintiff’s theory of his injury was so indisputably established that the evidence of plaintiff in support of his theory should be rejected as wholly devoid of probative value. We fail to find any reasonable ground for giving such conclusive effect to the evidence adduced by defendant. Indeed, there is much in defendant’s evidence from which conclusions favorable to plaintiff’s version reasonably may be drawn. Defendant denies that the car door in question ever had a . strip and contends that the top ends of the vertical planks were left uncovered. The evidence, however, further shows that car doors are interchangeable, that some types of doors are stripped at the top and some •are not and that after the very car in question was
Defendant lays much stress on its evidence that the car was inspected at St. Joseph before and after • the injury and at Kansas City shortly after the injury. The inspectors found the car in bad order in some respects and so reported to defendant but their reports made no mention of a defective door. The failure of defendant to provide for the inspection of cars at reasonable intervals would constitute a breach of its duty toward its servants to exercise reasonable care for their safety and the negligent failure of its inspetors to do their work properly would be negligence for which defendant should be held hable. The jury were not bound to believe that the car was inspected on the occasions claimed by defendant, nor, if it was inspected, that the inspectors who examined it observed reasonable care in looking for defective doors. It is possible, as one of the inspectors stated on cross-examination, that the top of the car door was overlooked in the examination actually made. The most that can be said of the evidence of defendant on this
The trial court committed no error in overruling the demurrer to the evidence nor in refusing to grant defendant a new trial. The judgment is affirmed.