Blair v. StateBlair v. State
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and Beth Slate Poe, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
TAYLOR, Judge.
Jonas Blair was convicted of the sale of cocaine. Having several prior felony convictions, he was sentenced to life imprisonment under the provisions of the Habitual Felony Offender Act,
The appellant first contends that since the testimony of the undercover officer who bought $25 worth of cocaine from him was contradicted, that the evidence should not sustain a verdict. That is not the law. The undercover officer stated that she closely observed Jonas Blair when the purchase was made because she thought she might have to identify him in court. The contradiction came from a confidential informant who was not paid the amount he was promised by the Anniston Police Department. The informant testified in such a way as to keep the police department from securing convictions in his cases as best he could. There was clearcut testimony from which the jury might conclude that the appellent was indeed guilty, and they did so conclude. As we said in Scroggins v. State, 341 So.2d 967 (Ala.Cr.App.1976), cert. denied, 341 So.2d 972 (Ala.1977):
“‘Where there is legal evidence from which the jury can by fair inference find the defendant guilty, this court has no right to disturb the verdict. Whether there is such evidence is a question of law, its weight and probative value are for the jury.‘” Quoting Haggler v. State, 49 Ala.App. 259, 270 So.2d 690.
Appellant also contends that the court received immaterial evidence when Sgt. Hembry testified that Anthony Woods told him that the envelope containing the cocaine was purchased from Jonas Blair at Jonas Blair‘s house. Where the issue in the case is whether the appellant sold cocaine to undercover officer Thompson, it is material that other persons purchased envelopes containing cocaine from the appellant. Materiality is “that quality of evidence which tends to influence the factfinder because of its logical connection or pertinency to the disputed issues.” Dawkins v. State, 455 So.2d 220, 221 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984).
III
Appellant next contends that the court erred in receiving testimony concerning a conversation between the confidential informant, Anthony Woods, and Sgt. Hembry. There was a question asked concerning a conversation between Woods and Hembry. In response to the state‘s question, “What did he say?” Sgt. Hembry answered: “He [Woods] filled this individual in on the accounts of buying cocaine from [appellant] and other persons.” Only after the answer came in did defense counsel object. As we have many times stated, an untimely objection does not serve as a basis for a reversal.
IV
We finally address a question relating only to the sentencing in this case. Appellant, after being convicted of the sale of cocaine, was sentenced under the Alabama Habitual Felony Offender Act. Our Supreme Court has ruled in Ex parte Chambers, 522 So.2d 313 (Ala.1987), that the Habitual Felony Offender Act does not apply to drug cases. In Chambers, Mr. Justice Beatty stated that only the Alabama Uniform Controlled Substances Act,
REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
All the Judges concur.
ON RETURN TO REMAND
TAYLOR, Presiding Judge.
Upon remand, the Circuit Court for Calhoun County resentenced Blair pursuant to our instructions. This case is now due to be affirmed.
OPINION EXTENDED; AFFIRMED.
All the Judges concur.