26 Pa. 274 | Pa. | 1856
The opinion of the court was delivered by
It was the province of the jury, under the evidence, to determine whether Seaver’s compensation was to be measured by the profits or otherwise. There was no direct evidence upon the subject; an inference could be drawn from the testimony of Hugh J. Smith that Seaver was to receive ten per cent, on the nett amount of profits, for his services as clerk. Assuming that the jury would find from the evidence that he was to receive a portion of the actual profits, the evidence of Cooper was clearly admissible, as its direct tendency was to establish what the profits were. Consequently it was the duty of the court to receive this evidence, for to have rejected it would have been a determination of the measure of compensation by the court. As this was a question of fact, the court was bound to submit it to the jury.
Horace M. Sharp was offered as a witness by the plaintiff. After he was sworn, but before he was examined, an objection was made to his competency, for the reason that he did not believe in a God or a future state of rewards and punishments. To establish his want of religious belief it was shown that nearly two years before the trial he had said that “ he did not believe the Bible to be the inspired work of God, and did not believe in a future state of rewards and punishments.”
A belief in a future state of reward and punishment is not essential to the competency of a witness, nor is it cause of exclusion' that one does not believe in the inspired character of the Bible.
As the evidence was insufficient to exclude Sharp from testifying, it is unnecessary for us to say anything about the time when the objection was made, or the refusal to let the witness state his own religious belief at the trial.
We have noticed the first and second assignments of error; the third and fourth were very properly abandoned at the argument.
Judgment affirmed.