87 Ind. 298 | Ind. | 1882
The appellants’ complaint alleges that Adam P. Hanna, one of the appellees, was indebted to the appellants in the year 1868, and that they recovered judgment for the debts due them; that after the debts were created Hanna bought the real estate described in the complaint, and, for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, caused it to be conveyed to his brothers John and George Hanna; that after this purchase and conveyance Adam P. Hanna was adjudged a bankrupt; that he fraudulently concealed his ownership of the land, and that it never went into the hands of his assignee.
We think the court did right in sustaining a demurrer to this complaint for the reason that an adjudication by the United States court possessing jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings can not be collaterally impeached. It is a well settled general rule that an adjudication in bankruptcy finally and conclusively settles all matters connected with the administration of the bankrupt’s estate. Wiley v. Pavey, 61 Ind. 457 (28 Am. R. 677); Black v. Blazo, 117 Mass. 17; Smith v. Ramsey, 27 Ohio St. 339; Burpee v. Sparhawk, 108 Mass. 111 (3 Am. R. 320).
The appellants contend that the present case does not fall within the general rule, because their judgments were liens upon the land fraudulently conveyed to the brothers of the bankrupt. In our opinion the question of whether there was a fraudulent conveyance of property was one exclusively for the consideration of the court possessing jurisdiction in the bankruptcy proceedings, and is one which can not be litigated after a final adjudication by that court. The bankrupt act expressly vests title in the assignee to all property fraudulently conveyed, and charges him with the duty of overthrowing all fraudulent conveyances. R. S. U. S., 2d ed., p. 973. The Supreme Court of the United States has decided in several cases that the creditor can not maintain an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance, but that the remedy to be pursued is ■that provided in the bankrupt act. In Trimble v. Woodhead, 102 U. S. 647, it was said: “The primary object of the bank
The cases of Truitt v. Truitt, 38 Ind. 16; Pierce v. Wilcox,
The case of Reed v. Bullington, 49 Miss. 223; S. C., 11 Bank. Reg. 408, is more nearly in point than any of the other cases cited, but is far from covering the question here involved, and is in many respects in conflict with the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. We need, however, not say more of that case than that it is not decisively in point here for the reason that there was there no question of fraudulent conveyance, while here that is one of the material elements of the case. The statute of the United States expressly invests the assignee with power to wage all litigation for the purpose of annulling fraudulent conveyances, and charges the district court with full jurisdiction and supervision of the matter, and thus makes a special provision which excludes the adoption of different remedies than those provided in the bankrupt act and denies jurisdiction to all other courts than the court vested with the control of all bankruptcy proceedings.
The right to enforce a lien created by a judgment is one which can not be executed by a sheriff’s sale after an adjudication in bankruptcy, unless there has been a levy prior to the filing of the petition. O’Horra v. Stone, 48 Ind. 417; Jones v. Leach, 1 Bank. Reg. 595. This rule goes far beyond what we are required to do here, for here the right to set aside the fraudulent conveyance is vested in the assignee by ex
Judgment affirmed.