Thе only matter for adjudication in this case is, whether a defendant in a suit in the district court, based upon a judgment rendered against him in the county court, upon final settlement as a guardian of the property of a lunatic, at the instance of the same plaintiffs, can set up as a defense, within two-years after the rendition thereof, errors in the judgment so rendered.
There is no question hut that the defendant could, by cei'tiorari, have the the. judgment remhved to the district court for revision ; and also, that the partiеs antagonistic would he the same as in the 1 case before the court. (Art. 3992, • Paschal’s Digest.) In that case, the same identical questions would be raised for adjudication, that the dеfendant seeks to raise in the case as it is, having the same parties, the same testimony, and before the same tribunal. Until two years had elapsed, the judgment of the county cоurt was similar to an interlocutory judgment in the district court, which the defendant could attack in any manner he might choose, before the district court, having cited the proper parties, and he can do the same thing if the opposing party should voluntarily appear, or, as is the present case, cite him to appear and show cause why execution shall not issue thereon.
Article 144Í provides, that “ the defendant may plead as mаny several matters, whether of law or fact, as he shall think necessary for his defense, and which may he pertinent to the cause,” etc.
The judgment is reversed and cause remanded.
This suit was brought at the fall term, 1868, of the District Court of Dе Witt county, by Gilbert Gay and Eliza Gay, as administrator and administratrix of the estate of John 27. Morrison, аgainst Wm. A. Blair and the sureties on his bond as guardian of the estate of the lunatic, John 27. Morrison, to recover the sum of $157.15, which had been decreed and ordered by the' Probate Court оf De Witt county, at its 27ovember term, ] 867, to be paid by Blair to the plaintiffs. Suit was dismissed as to all the surеties of Blair, except T. J. Wheat.
Blair and Wheat filed separate answers, each impugning the decree of the county court, alleging that it was rendered without an apрearance, or answer filed by the guardian; that it was based upon the receipt by Blаir of Confederate money, from an insolvent debtor of his ward, and that Blair was entitled to certain credits that had not been allowed.
A certified transcript of the proceedings in the probate court was filed as a part of their answers, and each prayed that the district court would review, revise and correct the decree and ordеr of that court. The plaintiffs excepted to so much of the answers as attackеd the decree and order of the county court. The exceptions were sustainеd, and for error in that ruling, the cause is brought to this court for revision.
It is contended by counsel fоr defendants in error, that the decree of the county court is conclusive as to thе defendant, Blair, and his sureties, until reversed: and that it could only be reversed in one of the modes prescribed by the statute, viz : by appeal or certiorari.
It seems from the Constitution and statute above quoted, that the district court has general control, and original as well as appellate jurisdiction, “over all matters for settling the accounts of executors, administrators, and guardians; ” and it matters not in what manner a certified copy of the proceedings of the county court may come beforе it, whether it be in answer to a writ or otherwise.
In this case the district court had jurisdiction, and should hаve reviewed the proceedings of the county court. The attack was direct аnd not collateral.
The judgment of the district court in sustaining the exceptions to the answers was erroneous.
The judgment is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded for ‘ further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.