*1 TERM, 1905. Syllabus. 201 U. S. he authority law, remaining without tempted suspension could duties place, ready discharge willing n have the suspension, of such period wrongful not, during belonging legally him of compensation effect to deprive the position. to hold one entitled n Judgment affirmed. v. CITY OF CHICAGO. BLAIR v. RAILWAY COMPANY CITY CHICAGO NORTH BLAIR. v. FETZER. OF CHICAGO
CITY BLAIR v. CITY OF CHICAGO. RAILWAY COMPANY v. WEST DIVISION
CHICAGO BLAIR. FETZER. OF CHICAGO
CITY VÜNITED, THE COURT OF THE CIRCUIT PROM APPEALS STATES OF THE NORTHERN DISTRICT FOR .. ILLINOIS.;. Argued January 15, 11, 12, 332, 333, 334. 335 336. 331, Nos. 1906. Decision Opinion April 2, filed 1906. March announced payable by corporation to the order of its own are made Where notes State, as a matter of convenience and treasurer, of the same a citizen who, to a holder custom, him bona indorsed and delivered fide -represented money State, different furnishes of a a citizen corporation, assignee an directly is not fact treasurer nóte 13, 1888, August meaning, 25 Stat. note within "be the Circuit Court brought suit such holder notwithstanding such jurisdiction parties, having United States .of Falk diversity note. indorsing first does exist to the treasurer Moebs, Goldsmith, V. Í27 U. S. Holmes v. jurisdiction citizenship, Where proper there cause action and diverse is exists, courts desires Federal and the motive of creditor who immaterial, litigate jurisdiction; is that forum and does not affect jurisdiction exists, actually such if it that a nor affected fact BLAIR CHICAGO. Syllabus. S.U. judgments receivership in view when were entered. South Dakota Carolina, v. North 192 IT. S. 286. *2 case, Where, municipality in this the attitude as and claims of the cast a property consisting largely cloud the title to in of franchises the court, and to be hands of receivers administered under orders of the the court, may, authority proceed by ancillary receivers with the bill- protect jurisdiction to property, the to administer the and to validity parties determine of claims of which cast a cloud such injunction is proper franchises and in such a case it an until the parties can be determined. corporation having Whether a a limited capacity purchase and definite real estate only hold has exceeded those limits concerns the State jurisdiction cannot, property situated; question within whose by it, expressly necessary implication unless the or statute be authorizes ' collaterally Palmer, by private persons. raised Frittn v. 132 IT. S. 282. The generality a title of state statute does it not invalidate under a
n provision private of the constitution of the State that and local shall laws only subject expressed title, embrace one which long shall be in the as so comprehensive enough reasonably the title is gen- include within the subject thereof, eral or the objects subordinate branches the several effect, legislation incongruous which statute seeks and does not cover which having in itself and no fair intendment any can be included as Ramsdell, necessary proper connection. Montclair v. U. S. 147. Although' highest binding decisions of the court of a State are not on this determining court in legislative whether a contract was made action protection impairment of that which is entitled to under the State Constitution, obligation it clause of Federal will consider decisions point question. on of that court in asserting private rights public property in grants One- under of franchises they plain terms, must show that have been nothing conferred in gránt except passes by clearly it be necessarily implied. stated or Legislative grants any way of-franchises which are in ambiguous as to granted longer period whether for a or a shorter be are to construed strictly against grantee. aAs rule of construction a statute amended is to be understood in the same exactly if sense as it had beginning read from the as it does amended. corporation Although organized be period a under a charter for a limited may grant muring a it receive to the benefit of its lawful successors for period life, beyond corporate its a but right granted must be con- system strued with reference to the part of which it is a and where that system is general period for a single ordinance, limited a naming not a term, specific will be granting not construed as a perpetuity. in franchise A in the title they declaration of state statutes that concern railways, horse apparent it is where these terms were intended to indicate street railways distinguished railways, not, from steam will because of a con- object provision stitutional that the expressed, statute must be in title, prevent exercising powers under the statute vol. coi —26 TERM, 1905.
Syllabus. S.U. power the use such as cable to authorize of-other such maimer as electricity. operated authorizing every railway' be repeal street of a state statute may animal, municipal or other as the authorities such electric granted destroy ratify not its effect to contracts existence would have passed. when was requires municipal the consent of a officer to au- Where a state statute of a street the abolition of that office does thorize the extension consent; any the extension without official and where not authorize required relating municipal authorities is for franchises the consent statute, subsequently general act limits special localities any city any granted such franchise can the time for which period any given presumed, will be the absence village, the consent period specified as so limited. not to be in but for perpetuity, in, corporations simple municipal fee of Illinois have a Under law streets, over, municipal authorities do exclusive control of, with, incompatible anything use the streets with the or allow established, legitimate it is a use of a ends for streets are street *3 track to be laid in a street railroad down it.-. allow principles foregoing to the and the Applying the construction effect of various Illinois, legislature of the and of the ordinances of the acts of the State city Chicago adjacent towns, municipal of the and in re- authorities railway companies gard of the several street and to the franchises owned Company, Chicago the Union Traction and the receivers controlled held, thereof that1 of the for the Northern District of 1. The Circuit United States Court against Chicago jurisdiction judgments the the had to render Union Illinois Company and the Company, Chicago Railroad the North Street Traction Company up set in the bills afterwards filed Chicago Railroad West Street appointment of receivers. for the appointment not shown to for the of receivers were proceedings 2. The fraudulent, jurisdiction to entertain and the court had and be collusive possession prop- put and in of the appoint the receivers them bills and the companies. erty railway the in ancillary filed' maintainable aid bills receivers were 3. The property jurisdiction controversies as to the settle of the court's of the disposed of under the orders and decree be administered'and was to court. 1859, under the and were not unconstitutional 1865 The acts 4- passed. in'force when the same were of 1848 of Illinois constitution 6, 14, 1859, 1865, February amending February the act of 5. The act City Railway Chicago corporate lives of extend had the effect to Railway Chicago Chicago City Company and Company, the North years. It ninety-nine Company, term of Railway for the West Division Mr; Day in paragraphs announc are stated Justice The numbered as judgment court. ing the and of the decision BLAIR v. CHICAGO. Syllabus.
201 U.S. city prescribing rights affirmed the contracts with the privileges respects made, Chicago in the streets of all as theretofore including time passed. as in the previously contained ordinances It recognized, limitations right city companies in force the and continued and the to make the use conditions, for of the streets terms including contracts occupancy, might agreed as úpon the time of be between the council and corporations. . privileges only Corporate can granted against 6. held to be public as plain explicit rights, when conferred terms. ambiguous phrase The 1865, “during hereof,” life operate in the act of did not to extend exist- jof. ninety-nine ing years contracts for term or limit right city companies make future contracts with the covering shorter periods. amending act of had Chicago 7. The reference to the North City Railway Company corporations as well as the specifically named in the acts of first sections of the 1859 and 1861. 23, May 1859, granting rights ordinances of The privileges City Railway Company streets certain and the North Chi- Railway Company, respectively, cago radically are different. The company the former for grant to the south west city divisions of the specified 14, term during February 1859, all the the- act of which act 1858, granting the ordinance of expressly right ratified to use the streets twenty-five years the term of named for therein and until the shall purchase pay for the same as set forth in said ordinance.- On the granted is twenty-five years the term longer.” north side “and no ' .upon Chicago City Railway conferred Company and its confirmed, made, grantee were act of with the effect to right compaiiies occupy continue the streets named "in the ' 23, 1859, May ordinances, and similar ordinances for the term years and until the twenty-five purchase shall elect to pay companies. said property side, On the north no such use in the purchase by to remain streets until city. exists streets, existed in the Whatever were not lost to the com- acceptance by the panies granting ordinances a change from animal *4 power Operation electric the of railways. to cable or the Jefferson, grants The in the town of having 10. been made after the ac- Act, ceptance Villages of the Cities and are limited to the term twenty of years. grants by supervisor the of Lake View are not perpetuity, an as Lake View road was but the extension of the system, North Side expressly was limited in the grants duration to the term of twenty-five years. presumed No intention will be to make an extension part''beyond of this the life of the to the main lines of the North Side road. grants by beyond 12. The the trustees of Lake View will not extend the corporation making life of the them and the annexation of the town of Lake the Chicago, further View to use the streets must be.de- TERM,
Statement the Case. grants by the of that from council under rived conferred the Villages and Act. Cities cause 'The decree reversed and remanded proceedings for further expressed. with the herein views accordance are from two appeals decrees the Circuit Court of These the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. The the cases dates April 22, 19Ó3, when origin the Guar- of New anty Company York, Trust corporation and citizen filed three suits State, that Circuit Court of the United Northern District of against States Illinois .the Chicago the North Company, Union Traction Street Chicago Railroad the West and Street Chicago Railroad Company, Company, and citizens State of Illinois. On the corporations day was filed the Issue was declaration general joined, jury .the trial judgment rendered waived, against the re- $318,690.66, $565,052.66, defendants spective $270,440. been awarded and having Executions returned no property were filed found, Guaranty Trust bills Company, for the property of each all appointed receivers of those Under the order of the court of July 'companies. 18, 1903, two‘ancillary bills, filed one Chi- against City receivers West Division Railway the Chicago cago, Company, Traction Union Company the West' Chicago Chicago Railroad Company; other, City Street against Union Traction Chicago the North Chi- Chicago, Company, Railroad Company Street and the North cago Chicago They were afterwards Company.' amended Railway by leave These state, bills other the court. among (having things that, now Side case), reference receivers West 'the court, the order were in complainants posses- under in- system street-railroads; property sion of. franchises rights, privileges originally granted cluded West Division Railway Company by State to the Chicago Di- West 20, 1887, on Illinois; Chicago October leased the to the West property Railway Company vision term, full for- nine Railroad Company Street *5 BLAIR v. CHICAGO. of the Case.
201 U. S. Statement June, years'; and that on that ninety-nine 1,'1889, hundred com- and Union conveyed transferred Traction pany Chicago all its franchises and which were property, rights, Company of that and were company taken and possession possessed it with the enjoyed by city council, consent until the complainants that appointment receivers; ap- since the have been directed ex- they by the court to make pointment of about $580,000 penditures new procuring equipment; that it was necessary issue purpose certificates receivers’ be-, they money, borrow alleged they were unable to do, cause hostile acts of- its city Chicago, mayor, council committees an representatives, which amounted to of the contract impairment franchises secured by the acts of-.the as- complainants granted general sembly Illinois, passed February 14, 1859, February 6, They received notice from the superintendent streets, July 16, dated 1903, addressed them as receivers, all that issued permits Union Traction stating Chicago to do work and make streets, alleys Company repairs upon city public were to be revoked on places bill July 30, 1903. The sets out a number of ordinances large acts State of Illinois, under which acts, it was franchises alleged, fifty- were .on granted of the city, six of the streets for the period ninety-nine years February 14, 1859. It was averred that denies any contract right under and virtue complainants of the said laws and or- and, dinances, purpose the railroad coercing com- to surrender their franchises, panies received from the State, claims that asserts and the act of 1865 is unconstitutional and that if void; valid, only operates to the extent such lines authorized as were and consented to before its passage; if valid, only railroads could their operate lines animal power; July force the ordinance of 30, 1883, lines operate constructed was absolutely thereto prior July 30, 1903, limited to and that thereafter the railroad com- TERM,
Statement the Case. *6 would abe streets pany trespasser upon that, the of the city; (cid:127)by and official messages declarations of the and mayor council city, of the defendant it was out given that, unless the railroad would its company surrender franchises and to rights occupy streets of the city, city the the would oust com- the railroad therefrom and an pass ordinance the pany granting right the the railways street operate streets, occupied now (cid:127) un- railroad other That corporations. company, persons an is the injunction city will, July 30, 1903, less after granted, by declaration of forfeiture or otherwise to interfere proceed enjoyment fifty- and the and prevent with the occupation in six routes described the bill. That as the street railroads where ordinances until the provided possession the the has purchase lines, city shall never made an offer city and seeks to force a surrender of the franchises purchase and to the railroad to accept and privileges, compel company (cid:127) twenty at an and years’ ruinous license, oppressive rental. That if the claim and the annual contentions of of the railroad com- city sustained, system are the entire will and its con- destroyed be charter illegally pany rights fiscated. Division Rail-” for relief is that the
The West prayer Chicago to be State Illinois way decreed vested the Company and the franchises and maintain own, with operate railway routes, described until 1960 fifty-six bill, street the the, city until time the and such thereafter as shall purchase then value, lines and for them in cash at their pay appraised that it be contract; terms of ordinance according that the claim the city that Chicago rights decreed July will on expire 30, 1903, obliga- the companies impairs and the charter State of Illinois tion of between the subsisting and an unlawful taking the said constitutes companies, without compensation, property company rights custody of unlawful interference with in the an the property to main- court; the charter' of. the companies until lines in the bill enjoy described tain, operate BLAIR v. CHICAGO. of the Case. IT. Statement until the city thereafter
year 1960, purchases same, hostile'claims of the against.the be established quieted that such claims and decreed be declared unconsti- city, law and clouds contrary to exist as the title of tutional, for a perpetual injunction the company, against the claims aforesaid or asserting interfering pos- and enjoyment of the railroad’s session, occupation property, exercise until except proper police power, of the charter lawful determination rights. the North is substantially bill case the same.
It avers vested in the property receivers North Division about one hundred miles of .street rail- *7 road and the franchises and thereunto privileges belonging; May that on 24, 1886, the North Chicago Railway Com- Railroad, to the North leased Street pany Chicago Company term nine hundred and ninety-nine years the all its property, franchises and to exist except the as rights, corporation. 1, 1899, That on the North June Street-Railroad Chicago Com- for, conveyed and the pany leased the full life of property, the lessor Union corporation, Traction Chicago Company that the traction entered into of the company possession prop- continued to erty use the same until the appointment the receivers named therein. city
The answered and set other that the up among things suits the wherein receivers were were collusive and appointed in aof by scheme concocted the West pursuance Chicago Street Railroad the North Street Company, Railroad Com- Chicago the Union pany, Traction Company the Guaranty Trust of N’ew York for Company the purpose conferring jurisdiction the Circuit upon Court of the United on States of diverse ground citizenship; tha-t the Trust Com- Guaranty was not a pany bona owner judgment fide the suits were and that brought; the evidences of indebtedness which that company suit and obtained brought judgment as a- colorable basis for the allowance creditors’ bills and of receivers appointment were in fact owned the Guar- term, .408 October Statement of the Case: anty but were owned Company, Trust divers persons of Illinois. corporations State denies that the any council passed ordinances or that an resolutions constitute impairment contract under the acts of rights complainants, granted gen- eral assembly Illinois, February 14, 1859, the State February 1865, or the city, ordinances of.the denies it has ever lawful threatened interference rights, franchises or It admits held complainants. ' that its streets sent written notice to~the superintendent bill without authority -the but complainants alleged same was July 21, and that on re- defendant, scinded recalled. then the claims of the city,
The answer sets up concerning acts and ordinances admits pleaded bill, legislative but thereof, attempted denies passage passage railroad has with a investing companies same resulted maintain and State, operate.the system franchise from and avers that ninety-nine railroads for years, rights bill on certain of ordinances set up expire under unlawfully Defendant denies that it July 30, oppres-* the lawful admits that sively injured company; and now contends that the act of 1865 has contended alleged is unconstitutional void as construed the company; - when did not act, properly construed, that the said operate *8 ordi- beyond the duration of time that fixed in various extend said, the' said com- lines; to that nances respectively relating railway lines by no to street other have panies right operate time of certain operation than animal that the power; to prior July 30, under ordinances passed of the lines existing 1903, reason of the time limits July 30, by on 1883, expired as ordinance of by extended the ordinances, in said prescribed the reason the limitation by July 30, 1883, Illinois, Law of the State Village the claimed it has in force It avers that never July 1,1872. constructed of lines operation that the time for asserted BLAIR CHICAGO. Case. Statement
under ordinances to prior July 1883, passed 30, absolutely ceased and but on the has determined, contrary recognized and conceded the existence clause contained purchase jn certain of‘said ordinances as the time limitations affecting to therein, has endeavored fiscal procure proper legislation assembly which would general State, enable the avail city to itself of said ordinance' with reference provisions purchase, has frequently proposed desired negotia- tions with the new companies provide ordinances for the purchase by defendant of the of said tangible property ánswer denies the companies. as The bill allegations to unlawful threats and but compulsions, admits that it does to enforce its its streets intend the unlawful rights against claims of the and admits companies, that, unless restrained it will injunction, proceed every and lawful proper method enforce in its rights streets as set inup the answer, and to procure necessary railway street facilities for the citizens of and to prevent Chicago, companies from unlawful usur- patión the streets or from rights continuing occupy the same, after the so to do has ceased and determined. It admits that as early as 1883 a serious difference as to the nature and extent of the and contract of the street legal rights in certain of the companies streets the city arose between ’ the-companies and It defendant. sets up messages mayor and copies the various resolutions of the council with regard opening negotiations companies as- n ' certainment their and those of the city. case tried, been having the Circuit Court rendered decree that the holding legislative acts of and 1865 constituted a.grant the companies to-use the streets of the -to be by the designated council, that but the franchise to use the streets State; the acts of 1859, 1861, amended extended franchises of for ninety-nine companies years, the extended life of. cor- poration; constitution of Illinois of 1870 prohibited the further creation of corporations by special laws, and de- *9 TERM, 1905. of the Case. 201 U.
Statement should not assembly grant 'creed the general without railways city acquiring construct street over then control having consent of .the local authorities Act and of 1872 streets; empowered the Cities Villages or that act to permit, regulate prohibit under cities organized tracks railroads of horse constructing locating, laying was alley but such any street, public place, permission twenty acts years; a not exceed that the limited to period a did not constitute 1865, as amended 1859, 1861, n be used streets were authorized to- by the legislature of. and to be city and after it elected by adopted occupied and that after date of Act, City Village governed- railway companies’ the street May 3-, streets, as such 1875, same; city ordinances affecting were rights regulated tenth section of which the under the North 1859, that the act amended Railway incorporated, City Company Chicago of the corpora- the life February 21, 1865, the act of extended that said amendment ap- and held ninety-nine years; tion for but as Railway only City Company* to the plied Chicago the North well 1859 on conferred in 132 Railway The case is reported Chicago Company. Fed; Rep. acts 16, 1858,-the ordinance of August
Pertinent parts February 21, February 6, 1865, February 14, 1859, in the margin.1 are given - August Ordinance authorizing operation the construction and of certain horse
An ordinance ’ city Chicago (passed August 16, 1858). railways in the streets Chicago council : by the common it ordained Be granted Henry Fuller, hereby Franklin there 1. That Section persons Bigelow, such other hereafter Liberty Parmaleo,and executors, them, to their administrators associated become of the common council authority and consent assigns, permission and necessary railway, and convenient with all lay track for single or double turn-outs, switches, along the course of in and tracks side tracks mentioned,'and operate hereinafter in the certain streets for' the time and manner and carriages thereon .cars
BLAIR CHICAGO.
' city Argument Chicago. for the 201 U.
Mr. Clarence S. Mr. Glenn Edward Barrow, Plumb and Mr. B. Tolman, with whom Mr. James Hamilton Edgar Lewis was for brief, city on the of Chicago: Circuit had no jurisdiction-to
The Court entertain the so- prescribed; provided, hereinafter the conditions that said tracks shall not feet upon any be within twelve of the sidewalks laid the streets. parties hereby lay are single 2. That said authorized to a or double Sec. railway along following in and course of the streets in track for said Commencing street, extending same on city, and as follows: State at street; present city of Lake the south side thence south to limits. commencing street, Also, junction Ringgold place; thence on State at the Ringgold place Cottage' avenue, Cottage on thence on Grove Grove present city Also, Chicago. commencing avenue to the limits of the on street, junction road; at the along State of the Archer thence said present Also, city. limits of the commencing Archer road on State street, street; extending along at intersection of Madison and west said present city Madison street to the limits. upon operated 3.. cars to be used said tracks shall be ani- Sec. power only; railways mal and said shall not any connect with other rail- used, power is carriage on which other and no car or road used any upon passed in this State shall other railroad be used or said tracks. railways 4. The said tracks and shall be purpose used no other Sec. transport passengers ordinary their baggage, than to and the cars or carriages purpose style for that shall be of used the best and class in use n railways. on such The common council shall have at all times to regulations speed to the rate running make such and time of cars said safety carriages public may require. as the or and convenience railways 5. The tracks' of said shall be Sec. elevated above the street; rails, improved shall be laid with surface modern and shall carriages easily freely so laid that other be vehicles can cross said any points, any directions, all tracks at and in and all without ob- struction. any The rate fare for distance' cents, shall not exceed five Sec. except carriages when cars or shall specific purpose. be chartered parties, successors, The said their Sec. associates pay <shall one- the cost of grading,. paving, third of macadamizing, filling planking or on parts streets or they streets on which shall construct their said rail- respects ways, in last keep portion mentioned shall such of respective occupied streets railways, as shall be their said or either of them, good repair during and condition time that whole hereby granted parties extend, to said shall in accordance with whatever may passed orders be that behalf the common council of the said Chicago; parties legal consequential be and said shall for all liable by any person by damages which sustained reason of the care- TERM; 1905. Chicago. Argument for the 201 ü. S. *11 n thetime of occupation going respective of into of either said streets successors, railway by parties, with the said said their associates or paved, planked, or one-third of the reasonable and be macadamized cost by owners, expense paid property respectively. thereof so said granted rights privileges parties by The and of to said virtue Sec. 8. Chicago the city shall be forfeited to óf unless the this ordinance construc- railways day one of tion of said Shall commenced on before the first or November, 1858; railway of A. D. and unless the commencing said on the extending Ringgold fully of street place side Lake and to shall be south ready October, (cid:127)completed day for use on or before the and fifteenth of 1859; railway, commencing A. D. and Madison street- at inter- street, running city of State section and on Madison street to the said limits, completed ready day and for use on before the fifteenth or of Octo- ber, 1860; place A. D. said Ringgold Cottage and from Grove avenue, along city limits, by day January, and the same to the the first of 1861, mentioned, remaining railways A. D. and all on or hereinbefore A, day January, together first railways, of D. before the said city improvements same, made of all shall be forfeited to said Chicago, city parties common of unless the council said shall said time; provided, by parties delayed extension of that if said are further court, injunction any delay of the time of ex- or such shall be the order time, periods prescribed, cluded, in addition to the and the same above railways of completion during said as that for which shall be allowed delayed. may be they so successors, parties, shall their associates hereafter If the said 9. Sec. privileges granted by incorporated, rights and to them virtue become corporation such the time and shall extend of this ordinance incorporation prescribed, and when such of shall herein thé conditions privi- maintained, corporation rights such shall have all the and been have parties, of without further hereby as successors said leges granted .the council. the common action-of operate railways time right to said shall full extend Sec. hereof, passage expiration at said twenty-five from the years and railways enjoy parties operating said be entitled to all of time shall elect, by pur- council shall the common order for that privileges until said v. CHICAGO.
BLAIR Chicago. city for the Argument 201 U. Si Illinois Revised founded. all the were which proceedings on Illinois, 241; Pike, 3, 4, 5, 8; Hately ch. Statutes, §§ v. Elton, Statutes, §629; Thompson Revised United States Knox Rep. Wilson v. 43 Fed. County, Fed. Rep. cars, houses, railways, carriages, purchase station pose, said tracks said every grounds, depot grounds, implements furniture and kind station railways, operation of description, in the construction or said and used same, appurtenances pay for the same and about in the manner hereinafter mentioned. city fix the time Such shall when said will order Sec. 11. mentioned, railways property other shall before take such order, passage months after the and at' the time of be less than six said railways property taking other before mentioned Chi- said parties money cago pay operating.the same a to be as- shall sum commissioners; appointed purpose, three to be for that certained County One to be chosen from the follows: disinterested freeholders of Cook council, parties, the said common one in like manner their said successors, persons and the associates and two so chosen choose the third' said freeholders. rights All Sec. heretofore vested in the Water Board of Commissioners Commissioners, Sewerage corporations, impaired or other are not to be ordinance, hereby or affected but the granted subject thereto. are Henry Fuller, Sec. 13. The said Liberty Franklin Parmalee Bigelow good, shall enter into a sufficient Chicago, bond with the in the penal twenty-five dollars, sum of performance thousand faithful *12 of the terms and herein ordinance, all conditions in contained and that railways said herein completed mentioned shall be. at the times and'manner stated, delayed by herein unless injunction the order or of some court hav- ing jurisdiction of such matters from so completing same, and until such shall bond be so executed parties said this ordinance shall have no force or effect whatever. Sec. 14. All parts ordinances or of ordinances passed, respect- heretofore ing subject matter of this (except ordinance to which this is an amend- ment), inor conflict with this ordinance or that to which the same is an amendment, hereby are repealed. Act of February 14, 1859. promote Act to railways construction of horse city Chicago. of 1. Be it enacted the people Section Illinois, the State represented Assembly,
in the General That Parmalee, Franklin Liberty Bigelow, Henry Fuller Gage, and David A.' successors, their and be they and hereby are “ body and constituted a corporate politic created and the name of The Railway City Company” for years, of twenty-five term with TERM, 1905.
Argument city Chicago. for the 201 U. S. 816; v. 481; Barr, 77 Rep. Fed. New Orleans Skinner v. 411; Utah, U. v. Delamar, Nevada Co. Benjamin, 113; R. Fed. Rep. Davidson, Mexican Nat’l R. Co. U. S.
201, 208; Co., Co. Otoe Parker King’s Bridge authority corporations, purposes powers all to for the and 'incident hereinafter mentioned. corporation hereby The empowered Sec. 2. is to said authorized and construct, single operate railway, and or with all maintain double track turn-outs, necessary appendages tracks and convenient for side tracks and in, streets, Chicago, on, along city in the and over and such street or rivers, present highway highways, bridge bridges, or or river or within the future, city Chicago, or limits of the South ór West Divisions of the corporators any have or council said authorized said common corporation do, authorize said so to in such manner and of them or shall condition, such terms and such and as 'the may any parties or have with said or said common council has contracted corporation, prescribe, them but either of said shall not liable for the or any baggage railways kept on the care of loss carried said in and under owner, agent. his servant or capital to stock.] Sec. 3. [As directors, Sec. 4. [As etc.] corporation hereby The is Sec. said authorized extend said built, railways herein to be in the manner several authorized aforesaid State; any point points county or within the of Cook in this and to enable any corporation railways authorized, to construct or all the therein or said corporation hereby is appendages, their to take said vested with property purposes private prescribed for the apply the manner “An condemning right way entitled amend law an act improvement,” approved 22, 1852, internal purposes of June sev- thereof, amendatory exercise powers eral all' acts conferred twenty-fifth by the corporations twenty-sixth sections railroad system general provide incorporations,” of “An act railroad 5, 1849, ascertaining making recompense’for approved November all provisions agreeably to the of the act hereinbefore first damages sustained mentioned. hereby authorized, corporation with the assent of said Sec. township, lay supervisor maintain the down and said in, along any highway railways upon, over and common said town- ship, pub- as not to obstruct the travel of the but such manner common lic the same.- In where vehicles meet or car- over all cases shall the cars riages railway, country, give in the shall of said either said vehicle railway. way carriages to the cars or on *13 privileges granted All and to Sec. 7. of' so be intended Parmalee, Liberty Henry Fuller, Bigelow, said Franklin their and asso- ciates, in by and the common ordinances of council and amend-
BLAIR v. CHICAGO. Argument city Chicago. for the of Lousiville, U. S. Ormsby, Pope New Albany &c. U.
R. R. S. 577. Co., The bills should have been by dismissed the' court for lack an of examination of jurisdiction, upon record, thereto, hereby things pass in all meats are affirmed and shall and be- corporation hereby come vested created. ' Nothing herein shall Sec. contained authorize the construction of single nécessary turn-outs, with the more than a track only which shall crossings upon street streets, at State between be street Madison Twelfth and except property, the owners of the consent of two-thirds of the in lineal measurement, lying State street between said Madison and upon Twelfth (cid:127) aforesaid, anything nor herein streets shall contained be construed to incorporated Company hereby permit authorize the cars of other whatever, steam, company propelled by along upon railroad run company hereby incorporated. (cid:127) company hereby incorporated, shall, 9. The said years within two Sec. act, erect, passage operate this and from the maintain railways, two one boundary from Lake street southern and one from the River, street, Chicago south on Madison branch to the western bound- ary city, upon failure do of said and so act and all and hereby conferred shall cease and franchises determine. grants, powers, privileges, 10. All the immunities and franchises Seó. required obligations upon, Parmalee, all conferred and duties and Franklin Liberty Bigelow, Henry Gage by A. Fuller and David this act for the South Chicago county Cook, and West Divisions of the and the are hereby required Ogden, B. Turner, conferred and William John B. Dyer, Turner, by V. JL Rees Charles James and Valentine C. the name of Chicago Railway “The North ,City Company” for the North Division of city, county Cook, fully effectually said and said all and intents purposes they as if separate had been a incorporated, act with all grants, powers, privileges, franchises, of said immunities and conferred them, them, and all of said obligations imposed upon duties and corporation, and the said last may take, hold, named mortgage convey real estate. Seo. 11. This act shall be public deemed all courts noticed pleading, as such without passage: shall take effect
Act February 21, An act to authorize railways City Chicago. extension of horse in the Section 1. Be it people represented enacted the State Illinois Assembly, Ward, McAllister, in the General That Edward P. K. William Walker, Brown, Wilson, B. Samuel James L. B. Charles Nathaniel P. Wilder, successors, hereby their they be and are created constituted body corporate politic, by name “The West Division *14 TERM,
416 1905. city Argument Chicago. for the of and showed face collusion the attempted imposition upon v. Little R. of a fraud the Rock R. upon Sage Memphis, court. 571; S. Bowers, 18 125 Little v. Co., C., 362; Fed. U. S. Rep. 547; 134 U. Industrial & Min. Guar. Co. v. Electric Supply S. powers Railway Company,” twenty-five years, the for the term of with all authority pertaining corporations purposes. for like to corporation possess powers 2. The shall all the conferred said Sec. third, second, fifth subject provisions be the in the to all contained promote sixth art “An to the construction sections of act entitled act (cid:127) 14, February railways Chicago,” approved of horse in the of 1859: any Provided, to in nothing shall be so construed as that herein contained any injuriously the of either manner affect of invalidate or hereby act, corporation corporations created said or to authorize the any railway of in the North Division created to construct or use track Railway Chicago, Chicago City except by the written consent North And, provided, two-thirds Company: further, the consent of the owners of measure, through fronting upon property, by lineal the streets of pass, said shall shall be obtained. directors, to 3. Sec. etc.] [As hereby corporation purchase, to hold 4. created is authorized' Sec. convey personal estate; mortgage real or to or lease its franchises franchises, acquire, any powers, property; unite and exercise upon City Railway Chicago or immunities Com- conferred By aforesaid, any the act of said pany or ordinance of common council city, upon may by such terms conditions as contract between the said railway corporations, prescribed; di- and the consent of board of writing, City Railway Company, rectors of said manifested exercising precedent corporation hereby be a condition shall created powers any them of conferred of the second section aforesaid, Chicago, as street said South and act West Divisions Chicago City Railway acquired Company the said in which has Provided, laying its track: con- obtaining down such contract aforesaid, corporation thereupon shall en- thereby sent become titled, others, as to streets last above the same mentioned and no use aforesaid, provisions any- according to of said contract and ordinances thing contrary notwithstanding. herein contained to cars, obstructing Sec. etc.] [As 6, February Act of railways concerning the city Chicago. An act horse people Illinois, represented 1. Be it enacted State Section. Assembly, That the first in the General section of an General act of said promote Assembly, railways “An entitled act to the construction of horse 14, city Chicago,” approved February in the first and the section .Assembly, other certain act of said General “An entitled au- BLAIR v. 417 CHICAGO. Argument city Chicago. S. for the 201 U. 732; Put-in-Bay 58 Fed. Rep. v. Ryan, Waterworks Co.
Co., 409; U. v. 138; S. U. S. Farmington Pillsbury, Ber- U. 354; 23 Am. & Stebbins, nard’s Township 2d ed. Robinson Ency. Law, p. Anderson, Eng. railways Chicago,” approved thorize the extension of horse in the 21, 1861, February same hereby Be and the are so amended as' all respective “company” therein, in said sections words after word *15 follows, respectively, ninety-nine years, shall be and read as “for viz: authority powers expressed, all the pertaining with and hereinafter or corporations purposes for hereafter mentioned. by 2. That the second section of the act first above referred to Sec. title, part is in and section included and made a secondly of thereof, by ’the title hereby above referred to be and the 'same is toas both follows, acts amended as to read as corporation of said so viz: “The said construct, hereby empowered operate, authorized and maintain and railway, necessary single tracks, a or double track all and convenient turn-outs, appendages, city in, side tracks and in Chicago, of and on, streets, along highway highways, bridge and such street or over or or rivers, present or within the bridges, river or future limits of the south city Chicago, and west of the of as the common of divisions said council them, city corporators, any shall, have authorized said or of or from time them, corporations, to time said or either of to do in authorize so such manner, conditions, terms such such and and with exemptions, as immunities and the said common council has privileges, any by parties, prescribe, either them or contract with said or or of any of'rights, franchises, all or deeds of transfer or .acts any corporations them, acts named between the1 said several or two of contracts, made, stipulations, undertakings, licenses and and all entered given,
into and as made or amended and between the said or common council, any corporations, respecting one more or the loca §aid tion, streets, railways any use or exclusion in or or of them city of said shall be deemed and held during and continued force life effectual, as purposes, part, hereof valid and to all intents and if a as made hereby part Provided, same are a and the made of said several acts: competent council, it shall be for the said common with the written consent of the party parties, or concurrence other or .assigns, any or their said contracts, stipulations, amend, or undertakings, modify licenses or same; corporations not, but any them, annul said shall or either or any property be liable for the loss thing railways, carried on said owner, kept the care agent: Provided, under of its his servant or hereafter made common council contract corporations act, Chicago, higher with either referred to for a cents, subject fare than five shall be repeal rate of to modification or at council, any regular meeting of said common majority vote all elected, general assembly aldermen of the State of Illinois. VOL. cci—27 TERM, 1905.
418 Chicago. 201 U Argument & Rock R. R. Memphis v. Little Overton, Trustee, 522; U. S. Illinois, 155 v. 866; People Weigley, Rep. 10 Fed. Co., from and title to quiet a bill to remove cloud Regarded Receivers, custody allegations in the property to warrant the insufficient exercise were proofs bill Smith, 885; v. 26 Fed. Rep. the court. Preston jurisdiction of Ave. Church, v. Madison Baptist Ave. Church Baptist Madison 547; v. Hannewinkle 15 Wall. 73; Georgetown, Pr. 26 How. v. Wisconsin, 287; County v. 16 Dunklin Dougherty, Meloy v. 60; Leech 27 Missouri, Day, California, et 51 al., Clark 505; 14 Parker v. Wisconsin, Shannon, v. 648; Loop, Gamble Waterworks &c. v. 452; Bartlett, Illinois, Spring Valley 121 616; v. Village Yonkers, 16 Fed. Sanders 63 Mayor, Rep. Fox v. 489; Wisconsin, 320; Ogden Y. 92 Williams, N. 168 Rich Tamlin 224; Benjamin U. S. v. Brax Armstrong, v. v. Edmiston, U. S. W. al., 375; Simpson ton et Va. Park Commissioners, 678; Roby Illinois, 200; South Challen, U. S. United States ex rel. McIntosh Holland v. 47 Fed. from the al., Rep. Regarded point Crawford et *16 interference, of to an on view bills prevent of part with' city the receiver’s et possession estate, allegata made out no case of interference or probata threatened inter-. ference.
Under the revised charter of the of city of 1851, Chicago the common council of city gave Chicago power control and “exclusively regulate streets and alleys,” had common council lawful authority ordinances pass constructing rail- privilege street granting operating on the streets of and to ways Chicago, prescribe terms and Moses F. of such P. W. R. Co., conditions v. &c. R. grants: Chicago and Evanston Railroad.] Sec. 3. [As corporations purchase, said shall authorized to 4. Each of hold Sec. necessary convey, personal estate, corpora- use such real tion, materials, stock, machinery rolling and to manufacture for'the ' corporation. such use of act, public act Sec. 5. This shall be deemed a and noticfed all courts such, passage. as without take effect from pleading, and shall 419 BLAIR v. CHICAGO. city Argument Chicago. U. 201 S. v. 39 522; Chicago,
21 Illinois, Murphy Illinois, 286; Chicago Elec. 155; v. 115 v. Aurora Illinois, McWethy Dock Co. Garrity, 548; State v. Co., Illinois, 218; Murphy, Missouri, 202 134 Light 324; W. Co., Illinois, Co. v. N. 199 Chicago Telephone Telephone 523; 484, v. City Chicago, Illinois, Union Traction Co. 199 City Missouri, Louis v. 96 Atchi Bell Telephone Co., 629; St. son Street R. Co. v. v. Co., Kansas, 660; 31 State Ry. Pacific Carrigan Co., 263; City Consolidated Street Ry. Missouri, Dillon, Louis v. Union Tel. U. Co., St. Western Mun. Corp. § does
Especially authority where, such exist Chicago, owns the v. Chicago streets fee. municipality Union Mt. Bldg. Assn., Illinois, 379; Carmel City of Shaw, Illinois, 37; City 87 Illinois, Chicago Rumsey,
The ordinance common council of the passed on 16, 1858, was of its August valid-exercise charter Chicago “to streets,” Parmalee and his power regulate gave*to railways associates the construct and street operate on the streets therein .described, street, Madison including State street to Western avenue, the terms and conditions time stated, therein limitation including therein contained. The ordinance also constituted valid contract between the n city of associates, Parmalee and his by means whereof the became vested with at any time right, after August purchase the street lines described, and the therein property appurtenant and then in connection therewith, used at a to be price determined in accordance with appraisement; provisions ordi- nance. February 14, 1859, is unconstitutional and void.
The constitution of Illinois then force that no provided pri- *17 vate or local act should contain more than one The subject. is a act or private act, local its last although section declared “This act act,” deemed public shall etc. v. McCartney &C. E. R. R. 112 Co., Illinois, 611; Belleville &c. R. Co. v. R. 190,5. TERM,
420 city Chicago. 201 Argument for the U. S. v. I. C. 33 Fed. 28; R., Rep. 15 State R. Gregory, Illinois, by Mr. Justice'Harlan. opinion subject act incorporation embraced general (cid:127) of its the method City Railway govern- Company, Chicago of emi- the exercise of powers certain
ment, capitalization, ahd street authority to construct domain, operate nent divisions of the where and city, in the south and west railways with ex- should ordinance prescribe,, important of com- ordinary'liability and immunities from the emptions beyond of its business the limits carriers; mon the extension the' another private corporation, Chicago.; organization like City Railway powers the North Company,, in the north division duties, exemptions, contra is an manifestly Apparently expression, Chicago. Lake obiter N. C. C. Co. v. 105 213. dictum, Ry. View, Illinois, subject an act more than one is unconstitu- Such embracing are tional, Subjects even both its title. though expressed Illinois, 565, 577; v. 133 Const. Lim. People Nelson, Cooley, 6th ch. 6, 4, ed. p. § subject The real of the first nine sections of this act was thé n
creation of one certain The real private corporation. subject of the tenth section of this act was the . creation of another distinct A entirely private local corporation. priváte two attempts incorporate private corporations, make two contracts between the and the separate pri State vate interests concerned offends corporations, against Belleville & Ill. the constitutional' inhibition. R. R. Co. v. 20; v. 20 Gregory, Illinois, People Denahy, 349; 15 Michigan, Ex 61 parte Conner, 571; King Banks, Georgia, Georgia, County And for a close see Fulton Supervisors analogy ex v. M. & W. R. R. rel. &c. Co., Illinois, People County 147 Tazewell, Illinois, “An
The title was act to the construction of horse promote railways ’! Section 5 to au- Chicago. attempted “ thorize railways thé to extend its corporation point within the points Cook,” and section County attempted *18 421 v.
BLAIR CHICAGO. Chicago. for the Argument 201 U. S. authorize said “with the assent of corporation, super
visor
down and maintain
rail
any township,
lay
its said
way
railways
any
over
in, upon,
along
public highway
”
in said
The sections
for such extension
township.
providing
beyond the
limits are
“in
the words
expressed
city of
whole
limit the
there
Chicago,”
title,
are,
fore, void. People
Mellen,
ex rel. v.
32 Illinois, 181; Lockport
v.
Illinois,
61
v.
Dea
Gaylord,
276;
Inst.
Protestant
People
conesses, 71 Illinois, 229; Middleport
Co.,
v. Ætna
Ins.
82
Life
Illinois, 562; Snell
Ex
Chicago,
413;
v.
133 Illinois,
parte Paul,
If said act is any valid to extent and purpose, only which the receive thereunder- complainants could would be limited to railways city. horse North Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Town Lake View, Illinois, 105
The preexisting charter power city, recognized reaffirmed by act, in prescribe terms and conditions, cluded fix power the time when the privileges granted should terminate. Cleveland Elec. 137 Cleveland, Fed. Co. v. Rep. 111; Louisville Trust v.Co. 76 Fed. Cincinnati, Rep. 296; Ry. Detroit Citizens’ St. Co. v. Chi Detroit, 646; 64 Fed. Rep. cago Terminal R. R. Co. v. Chicago, Illinois, 576; 203 Coverdale v. 155 Edwards, Indiana, 374; Plymouth v. Township Railway, 168 Pa. 187; St. Minersville v. 181, Borough Elec. Schuylkill Ry. Co., 205 Pa. St. 294. time The limit and the consent are inseparable. court cannot strike down the one and hold Qpnsent the-other valid. The must stand or fall in its entirety. St. Louis & Meramec R. R. Co. City Kirkwood, 159 Mis v.
souri, 238, 253; Elliott on Railroads, 1081; Blaschko v. § Wursteer,156 N. Y.
Where a has the municipality or refuse con- give sent to the occupation use its streets for street railway purposes, may terms impose and conditions, including time and an limit; of a acceptance carries with it all the con- ditions-and limitations which it is based. Ter- Chicago minal R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 203 Illinois, 576, 589; Byrne v. TERM, 1905.
422 Argument city Chicago. for the v Co. Illinois, 75; Chicago Ry. 169 Gen. Ry. Co., Gen. R. Chester v. W. C. & W. R. 253; Illinois, Chicago, Illinois, R. Co., v. Suburban R. 382; People Co., Illinois, Town Indiana, 374; Plymouth 594; Edwards, Cover dale v. Borough Minersville 168 Pa. St. ship Ry. Co., *19 City Pa. 394, 401; Allegheny St. Schuylkill Ry. Co., Elec. 205 Mer 159 St. Louis & 411, 414; v. Millvale Pa. Ry. Co., &c. St. 239; 159 Kirkwood, Missouri, amec R. R. Co. v. City of of Railroads, 456; Elliott on Detroit v. Detroit 95 Ry., Michigan, McQuillin Dillon on Mun. 576; Corp. on Mun. Ord. 1081; § § forty years and for over city 3d ed. 706. The companies § occu have contracted for limited of street periods repeatedly The the city of have pancy. grants proceeded and the full thereof companies, and power, recognition timé limits. This construction of acts practical impose is Insurance Co. v. ordinances 95 controlling. Dutcher, 131; U. S. v. 122 U. 269, 273; Topliff, Chicago S. Topliff Lehigh 9 Coal & Nav. Co. v. 54; Wall. Sheldon, Harlan, 439; Pa. St. District Columbia v. Gallagher, of Burgess Badger, Illinois, 21, act of February
The *the incorporating Chicago West Division is also Railway unconstitutional and Company, ' than void because it embraces more one wit: The subject, to of- named in corporation thereof, creation section private and the of said with powers conferred vesting company the act of February 14, another certain sections of company said 1859; the authorization contracts between cor- private of ordinance purchase porations privileges; misdemeanors, and definition of certain creation for the commission thereof. So penalties establishment of much as vest the company power of the act sought of the. act of in the fifth sixth sections Feb- enumerated of said subject is void because the matter sec- ruary 14, 1859, said act of tions is not the title of Feb- expressed five six said act of February 14, or the title of ruary 21, 1861, February much 21, 1861, attempted So of said BLAIR v. CHICAGO. Argument city Chicago.
201 U. vest with unite and exercise the company power acquire, franchises and powers, privileges City Railway Chicago by the act Company, any February 14, ordinances of the common on such terms as council, should be aby contract agreed upon void, between said corporations, subject-matter because the is not thereof the title expresselhin of said act. if valid to act, vested said extent, merely West Division Railway Company accept street grants privileges the streets oFthe from’ common and to council, recognize preexisting right such pass ordinances and the terms prescribe conditions of such at which grants, period including time the said should terminate.
The act of February 6, 1865, is unconstitutional and void, in that it embraced more than one to wit: The amend subject, ment two separate private local acts of the General As sembly;' the ratification of deeds transfer of rights, privi *20 and franchises in said leges corporations the acts between named; ratification of contracts the ordinance between and said city an corporations; ratification of ordinance with still (the contract another private, & corporation Chicago Railroad), Evanston not mentioned in acts of 1859 and 1861. of None the sections of this act the sub except those ject matter which is in the expressed words of general “ ” title, Horse is valid. N. C. Railways city Chicago, C. Ry. Co. Lake View, 105 v. 207. Illinois, The -ratification of (a) cohveyances from one private- another corporation private corporation of personal, property and ordinance rights (6) and of contracts between these companies respectively and the city, are not included within the title of the act. Village Lockport Gaylord, v. 61 Illinois, 276 The act did amend sections 5 or 6 said act of nor did it to extend purport or-affect contracts between companies Nor did it township supervisors. extend or street railway affect or ordinance contracts in any of mentioned in clause .streets the exclusion Chicago TERM,
424 Argument Chicago. for the 201 U. S. reenacted in section 3 of said act of charter, and Evanston the life as in the said hereof,” used expression "during It section, second ambiguous. capable vague As act; of three life interpretations: meaning contracts; the lives of the rail life of licenses and deeds, That interpretation way corporations, respectively. ” “ will must be hereof, the life words, during adopted, and the public give companies against v.Co. Mining in the streets. Coosaw minimum privileges Stein Water 550; Supply 144 U. S. v. Bienville Carolina, South 97 Hyde Park, 141 Co. v. U. S. Co., 67; Fertilizing U. S. v. U. Co., Central Co. Pullman’s Car 139 S. 666; Transportation 171 U. 24, 49; 48, 54; Citizens’ Co. v. Detroit S. Ry. Ry., St. 587, 598; Freeport Freeport City, Long Water Co. v. 696; Rockland v. Brooklyn, Island Water Co. 166 U. Supply S. Co., 563; Water v. W. Maine, 562, Co. Camden &c. 80 also Long Terminal R. R. Co. v. 203 576. See Chicago, Illinois, Minnesota, 280; C., Rep. 913; v. 49 S. 51 N. W. City Duluth, 796; Bridge v. 101 S. Charles River v. Warren Wright Nagel, U. 11 Pet. et in 3 Rose's Bridge, 544, 549 notation thereon seq., Detroit v. 582-587; City Notes United Reports, States pp. 873; Ry. Fed. Omaha Horse City Ry. Co., Rep. 872, Detroit v. Fed. Citizens’ Street Co. Tramway Co., 324; Cable Rep. v. Syracuse Water Co. Ry. Jones, 579; Co. v. 34 Fed. Rep. N. N. E. State v. 167; C., 22 Rep. 381; 116 Y. Syracuse, Co. v. 422; Prager, J. L. W. W. Co., Freeport Consumers’ 51 N. Saginaw Saginaw, Co. L. Fed. 371; Rep. 3 Pa. Ct. Gas Co. (W. Va. 1900), Elec. L. 529; Clarksburg Clarksburg Co. Co., & R. R. 27 Pa. St. L. A. Commonwealthv. E. E. R. *21 339. a statute of construction well where
The rule settled or irreconcilable pro- or of statute contains clause repugnant End- last must prevail. in order of date visions position on Potter’s Dwarris 183; lieh of Statutes, on Interpretation § 554; n.; Trustees, v. 10 Wend. Harrington 156 p. Statutes^ BLAIR v. 425 CHICAGO. (cid:127) Argument city Chicago. for the Brown v. 21 St. County Commissioners, 42, 43; Pa. Pacher v. Sunbury R. 19 Pa. Hall Co., 211; Co., R. St. v. &c. Equator Quick 5931; Fed. Cas. No. Smith Moore, 396; 26 Illinois, Whitewater Twp., Indiana, 7 578. As statute framed against in covert and obscure and claimed to ratify con- language, firm wholesale the of a acts municipality its with dealings will claimants, .the adopt .court strictest con possible in order to prevent struction of valuable wresting from the such insidious and public surreptitious legislation. Oakland v. Oakland Water Front Co., 118 California, 160, 194; Coosaw Co. v. South Mining Carolina, U. 550-561; Or dranaux on Const. Legislation, p. 604.
The act February 6,1865, did .not when postpone date city might purchase West Division Rail- under way the ordinance of Company The August 16, 1858. was right purchase conferred Parmalee ordinance 1858, and affirmed by section 7 of the act of August of twenty-five years. for the This period affirmed was right by the act and said section of said act of 1859 was n by- not amended the act of 1865. If act of 1865 be construed as the date postponing which the was entitled to purchase railway property, then impairs city's obligation contract with ancl company of its deprives without due property in violation of process law, the Constitution of the United States and of the State Illinois. Art. sec. I, 10, Constitution V S.;U. 'Art. and XIV, Amendments to Constitution U. S.; Art. XIII, sec. 17, Const. 111. right purchase the city vested in was a private property it could De sell. Motte v. Valparaiso 67 N. (Ind.), E. Rep.
In contracting railway company the purchase of its rails,' cars, etc.,- city acting’ proprietary business capacity not in its governmental capacity, its contract is within the constitutional protection. Wagner v. City Rock Island, County Illinois, 139, 154; Richland v. County Lawrence, Illinois, 1; Cicero Lumber Town Co. v. *22 TERM,
426 1905. Chicago. Argument city for the of Park Com’rs v. Detroit, Illinois, 1; Board 28 Cicero, 176 v. 230; Philadelphia, City Western Sav. Fund Soc. Michigan, v. 189; Woodward, Dartmouth 185, St. College Trustees 31 Pa. 633; Pike’s Peak City Power Colorado 4 Wheat. Co. v. 111; Proprietors Mt. v. Fed. Rep. Cemetery 105 Hope Springs, Milwau Massachusetts, 509, 511; Town Boston, 158 93; 12 Ry. Milwaukee, Wisconsin, New Orleans kee v. City of 116 481; State Barker, v. 26 La. Ann. v. Co. New Orleans, 12, 19. Vermont, v. 29 E. 244; Iowa, 96, Montpelier, Montpelier pos have been-held property The species following Water as a private corporation: a by city capacity sessed Hill, 531; Pike’s v. 3 The N. system, Bailey works Mayor Y., A1. build Rep. Power Co. v. Colorado 105 Fed. Springs, Peak offices, hall and rented out for city partly for a used ing partly Massachusetts, works, 102 489. v. Gas Scott Worcester, Oliver 2 204, 210; H. & N. The v. Mayor of Western Sav Manchester, Pa: 31 Pa. 185; 31 St. C., v. Society S. ings Philadelphia, Fund of San lots the State St. 135. Water granted California, 18 590. Ferries v. San Francisco, Grogan Francisco, v. Second Avenue Railway railway franchises, Mayor &c. v. houses, Y. 261. Public wash Cowley Mayor 32 N. Co., cemetery, 6 H. & N. 565. A Pro public Sunderland, &c. of Massachusetts, v. Boston, Mount Hope Cemetery prietors of line within of a to construct company specific failure Upon in the ordinance time allowed therefor particular covering to construct under said company same, all rights Kansas, Ry. Nave, Atchison St. Co. lapsed. ordinance Wilmington Ry. B. S. 744; Wilmington City Ry. Co., Co. & 12; and see St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. 46 Atl. Rep. Co., Ry. Co., Borough v. Schuylkill Minersville &c. 148 U. 54 Atl. 294; S. C., Rep. 205 Pa. St. construction of particular an ordinance authorizes
Where and subse- is done uhder it line, but nothing street relat- ordinance, new and plainly another superseding quently is passed, same same and to the privilege, grantee, ing BLAIR v. CHICAGO. Argument Chicago. U. S.
-the the last ordinance will provisions, control, and acceptance under last and action ordinance will be a sur waiver, *23 of render or abandonment any privileges be con sought ferred first ordinance. The by the second ordinance is, in a of effect, revocation and a for .legal substitution the first. East Ry. City St. Louis Union Co. East Louis, v. St. Ill. 39 of Co. v. 114 App. 400; Logansport Ry. 688; Fed. Logansport, Rep. Cleveland Elec. Co. v. Ry. 111; 137 Fed. Cain Cleveland, Rep. v. 104 Ill. Wyoming, 540; Belleville v. Cit. Horse App. Co., R. 152 Illinois, 171; Galveston R. Co. v. City Galveston City Ry. St. Co., Texas, 63 529. Failure to construct or forfeits operate chief rights grantee, consideration of the grant service; is the of performance the public Citizens’ St. Co. Ry. v. Jones, 34 Fed. State 579; v. E. Rep. Ry. St. 140 Co., Fifth Louisville Missouri, 539; T. v.Co. 76 Fed. Cincinnati, Rep. A 726. mere colorable operation is not sufficient. Snouffer v. Cedar Rapids Ry. &c. 92 Co., N. W. 79. Rep. on
Street
streets
any
under an ordinance
be construed
to contain no
for
provision
the term
are' terminable at
will
council.
Co.,
Boise City & C.
v. Boise City, 123 Fed.
232; Lambe
Rep.
v.
171
Manning,
612;
Illinois,
Water Co. v.
Freeport
Freeport,
Illinois,
186
S.
179;
C.,
587. A grant indefinite as
to time will be construed as
perpetual
therefore void under
of
the strict rule
construction
to such
applicable
Mil
grants.
et
hau
al. v.
et
Sharp
al.,
where the maximum constitution or statute of a fixes State period for time which a franchise may be or a con granted, made, tract a franchise or contract for time running longer void, wholly will not for the valid upheld period. v. Little Falls E. Flynn & W. Co., Minnesota, 180; 74 Gaslight TERM, 1905.
428 U. Chicago. 201 S. Argument 59 Indiana, 406; 156 C., v. &c. Co. City Albany, New W N. Co., 83 v. Minnesota 176; State Ry. N. E. Rep. Transfer 990.; City Atl. v. 56 Rep. City, 32; Westminster Water Co. Rep. v. T. 456; S. W. Manhattan Co. Rep. v. 49 Smith, Somerset v. Lehr, Fort 327; City Wayne Dayton, 59 Fed. Rep. Davis v. 437; 156 N. Y. 62; v. Indiana, Wurster, 88 Blaschko L. N. J. Harrison, Co. v. Cedar Rapids, Water contra, Rapids Cedar
Apparently, Iowa, 234, of street invalidity And as to see, also, grants authority, charter term, express fixed absence Louis 147, 157; East St. v. 59 Ohio St. Morgan, Wellston City of 415, 432, 456; Illinois, Co., & v. East Louis G. L. C. St. West End Co. 7 Biss. &c. Garrison v. City Chicago, State Minn. Trans 151, 155; Georgia, Co., Atlantic &c. *24 Co. v. 30 W. 32; 83 N. W. Parkersburg, Rep. Co., Gas Ry. fer 182; 116 N. Y. 167, W. Co. v. 440; Syracuse Va. 435, City, 306; Illinois, 299, Danville v. Danville C., S. 178 Co.,W. City of U. v. 187 S. Illinois, 235; 180 Ry. Maryland, Northern Cent. Co. Illinois, 125; 175 Harvey 258, 270; People v. Pullman Car Co., 295, 307; Cumberland Illinois, 174 v. Co., Aurora & Genera Ry. 187; 127 rel. v. Chi ex T. Co. v. Fed. Rep. City, People Tel. & Sons Co. v. 268; Chas. Simons’ Illinois, 130 Co., Gas T. cago 193; (Md. 57 Atl. 1904), Rep. C., Tel. & Tel. Co. S. Maryland A. Railroad v. St. Louis &c. 727; Pennsylvania Rail 63 L. R. 312. 309, U. S. 290, road, 118 date, law, from the of its city adop
The village general twenty years. all street tion, limited municipal grants v. V, Act; Art. Cities 24, 1, Villages Clause sec. Chester This Illinois, limitation 382, 182 R. W. C. & W. R. Co., artifice or indirection. Cedar Rapids be avoided cannot 240; Gas & Iowa, 234, 118 Light Water Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 406; Blaschko v. Wurster, Indiana, v. New 156 Albany, Coke Co. N. Y. 432. 156
- invalidity assert the is not city The estopped to. City vires. Chester or otherwise ultra twenty years beyond BLAIR v. CHICAGO. 429 n Argument city Chicago. for the
v. W. C. & W. R. R. 182 Illinois, 382; Cedar Co., W. Rapids Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 91 N. W. Levis v. Rep.. 1081; New City of Fed. Rep. 889, 890; City Detroit v. Detroit City Ry. ton, 75 Fed. Rep. 893, 894; 20 Am. & Co., Ency. Law, 1182, Eng. 56 And n see v. 85, 133 Illinois, Seeger Mueller, 94, quoted with, approval Danville v. Water 311; 178 Illinois, City Co., v. Illinois, 397; 176 Snyder City Mt. Pulaski, Cedar Rapids W. Co. v. Cedar 1085, N. W. Rapids, Attorney Gen eral v. Bristol W. W. 884; 10 Exch. 24 L. J. Exch. Co., C., . (N. S.) 205.
By ordinance of accepting “power” March 30, West Division Chicago Railway Company expressly recog- (cid:127) nized to the time agreed limitations prescribed the or- under which the various lines of the were company
dinances as a being operated, exercise of the power of legitimate fix time limits. It was at the end of those time limits that to remove tracks. company agreed Cleveland E. R. Co. v. Cleveland, 137 Fed. Rep.
The West Railway Division Chicago Company, City Chicago Railway Railway North Company Chicago Company, had no. from the corporate capacity accept permission its cars animal operate by other Chicago power. than View, North Street Town Lake Chicago Railway Co. v. Illinois, 207; v. et Edison Co. et McCartney al., al.
Illinois, 611, 653; Co. Omaha Horse Railway Cable Tramway 30 Fed. Farrell Rep. Co., Winchester Ave. R. R. Co., n Connecticut, 127; v. Transit Rapid Hawaiia Company *25 13 Hawaiian Reports, 371, 374; Tramway Companies, Limited, Company, Indiana Cable Street Railroad v. The Citizens’ Company Railroad . R. 8 548; A. 539, & Newport Newport L v. 1 Dayton Street Railway Co., Ky. 404; L. Rep. The ex rel. People Third Avenue Railway 407; v. 112 N. 396, Y. Company Newton, V. & Railway Co. v. 2 Denver Street Railway Co., Colorado, S.
673, 680.
The leases and transfers under which the receivers claim are invalid. Thompson, 5880; Law vol. Corporations, 5, § TERM, 1905.
430 Railway Corporations. Argument U. 201 S. Rev. 111.ch. Stat. 135, 170,172; 114, Intercor. Rel. Noyes, §§ (Hurd’s Rev. ed.); 114, §29; ch. Stat. Evans 45 §§44, 24 Rev. Ill. Illinois, 52; 32; Stat. ch. Rev. City Chicago, v. ex rel. Gas 120, 32, 40; People v. Chicago Trust, Stat. Ill. ch. §§ Railroad R. 268, 285; Oregon Oregonian Co. v. R. Illinois, 130 Co. v. City Chicago, Union Traction 1; U. S. Co., 130 Terre Haute I. R. 484; R., Cox v. & 133 Fed. Illinois, Rep. 371, 374. n Mr. G. John S. Miller and John Tolies,
Mr. Mr. Brainard W. W. Mr. Gur- Auerbach, whom Mr. S. Johnson, Joseph and Mr. John J. Herrick were on Mr. John P. Wilson ley, and' corporations: for the receivers briefs, has controversies jurisdictiort pre The Court Circuit of the court jurisdiction bills. The herein sented these alone from record these cases be must determined of the record of transcripts now here on appeal. equity, recovered, which law in which the Were judgments at suits were bills which the receivers the creditors’ were basis of , of record Nor transcript here. are no part appointed, such, creditors’ suits of record the transcripts are Pacific 522; 505, 111 U. Conti Co., R. Co. Missouri R. Pacific v. 645; 642, 82 Fed. Co., Rep. v. Toledo &c. R. Trust Co. nental aré records They Loree, Rep. Richardson Fed. on court thesé appeals. than those before the of other suits juris defeat the in order to can be looked into Neither of them decrees; although to enter these of the court below diction here, offered in evidence they might that authority there v. Mayor, Wines sustain the decrees. in order necessary, if N. Y. 639. Carpenter, Stillwell N. Y. case showed each prqmissory The declarations *26 v. BLAIR 431 CHICAGO. Argument the Railway Corporations. 201 U. S.
mént on the notes was clear. Wachusett Nat’l Bank v. Sioux City Stove 56 Fed. Works, Rep. 321; Holmes v. Goldsmith, 147 S. Bank British North 150; U. America v. 46 Barling, Fed. 357. Rep. The notes were made payable order of the makers anc
' indorsed, by them as held court in Falk Moebs, v. 127 U. S. And that is question- 597. one of general commercial law on which that is decision conclusive and Illinois law counsel conceived for the Burgess v. Chicago. S. Seligman, 20; Independent 107 U. Dist. v. 111 Rea, Fed. Rep. 1; Peck v. Central Vt. R. 79 Fed. R., 590; v. Rep. Hard Phipp ing, 468; 70 Fed. Windsor Bank v. Rep. McMahon, 38 Fed. 283; Bank v. 90 In Rep. Board, event, Fed. 7. Rep. counts in the money
common loaned and ad ^declaration ¿n vanced to defendant, upon stated, etc., account within controversy jurisdiction showed court, that these it must be counts were presumed sustained proof. 131 U. Cuddy, Petitioner, 280; v. Galpin Page, Wall. 350; Coleman, Connecticut, 324; Wolcott v. Bunyea v. Metropoli 76; tan R. 19 D. C. Co., App. Harvey Laflin, Indiana, 477. this attack on the is a collateral judgments Again; attack, Every cannot made. intendment made in their favor. Petitioner, 285; Fleet, Cuddy, Van Collateral Attack, 12, 829. §§
The the court to jurisdiction entertain the creditors’ bills for the collection of these judgments rested brought upon that said bills were for the collection of ground brought judg law at rendered said Circuit Court of ments the United -States, diversity upon ground citizenship. That cannot be here jurisdiction collaterally Re questioned. Cuddy, 285; S. 280, 131 U. Commercial Bank Burch, 141 Illinois, Paul Trust Co. St. v. St. P. Pub. Co., Minnesota, 105; Ins. Cap. City Co. v. 172 Pa. Boggs, St. 91. jurisdiction Circuit Court to entertain .the bills which the decrees were present rendered dependent The fact three the subject matter grounds: TERM, *27 Railway Corporations.
Argument 201 U. S. actual was-in the receivers controversy possession appointed of the United States. The fact Court the Circuit by aid in the collection of of the action was to judgments purpose properly certain assets by applicable at law preserving by and quiet satisfaction of said judgments, establishing they of which property title of the receivers were ing were they vested, or with which and which possession might a adminis necessary to sell the course complete become of said corporation defendants for the tration the property The fact of action of their creditors. the ground benefit contract obligation was the attempted impairment aets the de ordinances, resolutions legislative common the imminent council, fendant,' through acting in the same direction with still more of further action danger Howe, 450; Freeman v. How. consequences. destructive 24 v. 124 276; Pitkin, U. S. Gumbel Hyde, v. 110 Krippendorf U. S. Ry., v. Texas Central 137 Morgan’s Company U. S. 131; U. S. 164; 47; Rouse v. 156 Letcher, In re 149 U. S. 171; Tyler, 36; Ry., v. Louisville Pope U. &c. 173 v. 159 S. Ewing, White McAu 473, 479; 149 v. Sabin, Byers v. U. S. U. Porter S. 570; 506; Price v. 17 608, 618; Abbott, Rep. Fed. 149 U. S. ley, v. 275; Jesup, Trautman, Rep. Compton 39 Fed. v. Armstrong v. Lanning Osborne, A. 397; 15 C. C. 263; C., S. 68 Rep. Fed. v. Trust &c. R. Co. Continental Toledo 657, 662; Fed. 79 Rep. Davis 155; C. C. A. v. C., 36 S. Co., 497, 505; Fed. Rep. 95 C. A. C. 27. C., 51 6, 9; 113 Fed. S. Martin, Rep. Vicksburg Water Works was A question presented. Fedéral S. 65. 185 U. Vicksburg, Co. v. the repudiation whether no difference
It makes ordinance in its administrative was legislative character — S. 1; 172 U. Co., v. Water Walla Ameri- Walla or resolution. 171; Fed. Co.; Rep. v. Water &c. Co. can Waterworks 118 Fed. Riverside, Rep. v. Ry. Co. &c. Riverside col cannot be impaired actions in- these The jurisdiction Cuddy, Petitioner, law.- at the judgments on attacks lateral Huston, Ap- U.S. Dowell v. 423; Cutler 280; 131 U. BLAIE v. CHICAGO. Argument Corporations. for the Railway Russell, U. S. W. B.
plegate, Conkey Co. 111 Fed. Rep. no
There was
collusion in
the suit.
bringing
The only pos
of collusion was in
subject
sible
the choice of tribunals as be
the courts
Illinois
tween
and the courts
United States.
“
” can not be
Collusion
of such
predicated
choice. The
make
a choice
one
given
the Con
complainant by
laws
stitution and
of the United States, without restriction as
to motive. There
a real debt and a real
being
diversity of citi
motive
zenship,
creditor
suit
bringing
inquiry
matter
this court. South Dakota v.
Caro
North
286, 310;
lina, 192 U. S.
Dickerman v. Northern Trust Co., 176
*28
190; Lehigh
U.
181,
S.
&
Mining Mfg. Co. v.
160
Kelly,
U. S.
v.
327, 336;
The Circuit Court had jurisdiction to a render decree protect- possession title of ing quieting the receivers. The whole attitude of the authorities was municipal calculated to lead to take irresponsible persons the law'into their own hands. It only- needed some overt and official conspicuous act, like thé from the notice Commissioner of Streets, turn loose forces of chaos destruction. The Mayor had his dec- public larations made messages, police protection a 'im- political possibility. a court of has equity give relief such against
That an intolerable condition of affairs is clear. In holding such will equity give relief, court has shown ho disposition within restrained the narrow to be limits of ancient precedents. Cases, this kind are sui of generis and constitute a in striking adaptability stance of equitable remedies ’to-new condi Walla Walla v. tions. Walla Walla Waterworks Co., 172 U. S. Los 12; v. Angeles Los 1, Angeles City Water Co., 177 U. S. 581; Detroit 558, v. Detroit Citizens’ Street Railway Co., 184 368, 379; U. S. Water Co. Vicksburg v. Vicksburg, 185 U. S. v. 65; Co., Cleveland Cleveland R. U. S.
vol. oci—28
n m TERM, 1905. Railway Corporations. 201 TJ.S.
Argument for
is
irreparable
a
title
one
cloud upon
existence
injuries
complain
agáinst
of which the complainants
is
relief. Where
duty
equity
give
it
of a court
the’
cloud
of is
and substantial and occasions
serious'
complained
cases
relief is
limited to
where there
irreparable injury,
Vicksburg
an
valid hen
title
Water
outstanding,
apparently
65;
v.
185 U.
American
&c. Co.
Co.
S.
Vicksburg,
Waterworks
171; Detroit Detroit Citi
v.
115 Fed.
v.
Co.,
Rep.
Horn Water
is not
a
Co.,
only
zens’
It is a maxim of
that the court
once obtained
having
equity
will
subject matter,
proceed
over
jurisdiction
complete
entire-
controversy
determination
between
parties
subject
to such
matter. United States v.
Pa
relating
Union
52;
Gallagher,
Ober v.
Co.,
R.
160 U.
cific
The removal of within the court because essential to an intelli- jurisdiction full' administration develop- gent property usefulness time ment its that it should public during court; the control and also to remain -under protect *29 unlawful in a sale value from case should impairment become v. 16 Gray, 203; Davis Wall. Connor v. necessary. Alligator Fed. v. Co., 155; Lanning 98 79 Rep. Osborne, Lumber Fed. S. Rouse 164, 181; In re 149 U. v. 657; Tyler, 156 Rep. Letcher, 49. S.U. that objection
It was no title is an complainants’ estate for in v. 22 Gilliland, fee. Goldsmith 865; Fed. years Rep. Colorado, 538; 17 31 Pac. Howe, Rep. 115; v. McKee Pennie 127, 130; City California, Newport 81 v. Hildreth, v. Taylor’s Kentucky, 669. Ex’rs, 55 a claim was cloud city’s right purchase
The on title. option claim an outstanding The purchase, unaccom- BLAIR v. 435 CHICAGO. Argument Railway Corporations. 201 IT. S. exercise such was option,
panied by present attempt as a from which Circuit court of cloud title Court Illinois, bound to relief. Sea 79 grant Morehouse, was equity v. 539; Lesser, Altschul v. 62 Fed. Lane v. 135 Hogg, Rep. 216; Illinois, v. 144 This is Illinois, 567; Kill, Monson 248. gen as a of relief in when no erally equity, even ground recognized no of suits are present possibility trespass multiplicity 431; v. 58 Hodgen Guttery, Illinois, Key to be apprehended. Munsell, 305; Gas Co. v. Tucker v. Kennis Light Iowa, 19 47 N. H. 267. It is no ton, objection complainants’ right is suit, to maintain the claim to a city’s right that futuro. claim to an estate remainder or is An unfounded reversion a cloud will relief. Rhea on title v. against equity give Dick, 420; 320; St. Niles v. 12 Ohio Onderdonk Gray, 34 Ohio St. Mott, 106;, v 34 Barb. Clark v. 7 S. Dak. Darlington, 148. It no to maintain the suit objection complainants’ in a sue Davis v. they representative capacity. Gray, 16 v. 41 203; Laverty Sexton, Iowa, 435; City Newport Wall. v. Ex’rs, Kentucky, 55 699. While has been Taylor's repeat that a suit to title cannot edly quiet held Illinois be main administrator, tained an the reason is that given the ad ministrator has no estate but land, only a interest sale, v. 144 Ryan Duncan, Illinois, . It is no ob that there is no statute of jection Illinois authoriz specifically it. jurisdiction Courts of have inherent equity ing such relief in a Whitney Stevens, case. proper 97 Illinois, Lamb v. Farrell, 5; Fed. Allen v. Rep. Halliday, 25 688; Sharon 144 U. Rep. Tucker, Fed. S. 533; Holland v. Challen, U. Ñor defendant is á municipal corporation certain under a claiming powers statute State. Watson v. City Elizabeth, 35 N. Eq. 345; City J. Newport v. Taylor's Ex’rs, Kentucky, 699; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. no complainants under to set obligation out spe- were cifically in their bills of, the nature the adverse claims made
- It city. sufficient to that such generally allege adverse
436 TERM, 1905.
Argument Railway Corporations. U. for the 201 291; claims Mexico R. Ely Co., existed. v. New &c. 129 U. S. Club, v. Clough, Indiana, 93; 146 Holbrook Chicago Tolleston v. 23 394. issués Winsor, Michigan, joined When have been and fully tried between the will not courts proper parties, draw a remedy fine distinctions to defeat it is in the Detroit interest have administered. v. Detroit Citizens’ public Co., 368; St reet R. v. Gridley Watson, Illinois, 53 186; Peters, Nebraska, Mollie v. Goodrum v. 5 670; Ayers, 28 6 93. Arkansas,
The ffanchises the North possessed respectively by Chicago Rail City Railway Company and West Division Chicago way construct, maintain and street rail Company operate ways in the streets .and other public places over in county in 'and Cook, were Chicago highways direct derived State of Illinois. It was the grant duty increased fa legislature provide transportation streets. & W. Chicago Ry. cilities N. v. Chicago, 140 Q. Chicago, Ry. B. & v. Illinois, 309; Attorney General, Fed. 2666; Keokuk, Cas. No. U. S. Barney 341. The owner the fee streets made ship no difference. Kreuger, Illinois, Palatine clear,
It is under the decisions in equally Illinois, in 1859 was passage under direct immé- public of the General Its this re- Assembly. powers diate control only to limited delegated had been extent, pur- spect In the defined. exercise of these clearly powers, 1859,' poses all from constitutional restrictions. Ex- practicallyfree provisions, as constitutional this subsequent modified cept day. be the doctrine Illinois to the present continues Jackson v. Railroad Co., Illinois, ex rel Suburban People Park Commissioners v. 134 Illi- McMullen, West 1865 was a nois, legislative .construction effect. the-act of 1859 will en- authority
In courts sovereign every grant will beneficial an and. intelligible purpose, deavor to see favor that be- purpose so construe go BLAIR v. CHICAGO. *31 Argument Corporations. Railway for the country it. In a constituted as this where
yond is, sovereign by are exercised representative powers legislative bodies, but one State,” courts mode recognize “favoring that is effective the sustaining making pur legislative v. Union Romer St. Paul R. pose. City Co., Minnesota, 217; 75 Railroad v. 91 Pearsall v. Great Hall, 343; Co. U. S. Pacific Co., 161 S. State St. 16 R., 646; Newport Ry. Northern R. U. v. 537; R. J. Cen 533; Hancock, I. State ex rel. &c. 35 N. L. v. 24; tral Co. v. Pullman’s Car 139 S. Transportation U. Co., 238; City v. 186 U. Manning, Wilmington Co. S. Telephone 10 Wall. 12; 46 Atl. Yates v. Ry. Railroad, Milwaukee, Rep. v. only Smith v. 148 51. it is matters 497; McDowell, Illinois, rule of to main that the object grant essential Seminary strict will be Chicago Theological interpretation applied.- U. R. Illinois, 662, 676; Heights 188 Co. Brooklyn v. City Brooklyn, 244; People Deehan, v. 152 Y. ex rel. v. N. 528, 153 N.Y. 532. nor council
Neither its common ever possessed to limit the for the May 3, 1875, enjoy- time power, prior directly ment of the made to these chartered specially - Until Assembly. passage General companies Act of the Cities and the whole was Villages acceptance The .assembly. retained regulation highways a state function and the and af- purely corporations, created fected the acts to that time did not derive their prior powers 1859, from the See acts of 1865. municipality. 1861, This view as of the common powers council under the 1861 and acts of 1865 judicial deci finds'support many sions in other States. v. Mis Westport Mulholland, 159 86; Atlantic s souri, City Water v. Work Consumers’ Water 44 N. J. Company, 427; Dayton State v. Eq. Co., Traction C. Ohio C. 490; Galveston R. &c. Co. Galveston, 90 Texas, 398; Appeal City 115 Pa. St. 4; Citizens’Street Pittsburgh, R. v. Co. R. Co., 647; 64 Fed. Citizens’ Rep. Street R. Co. v. City Fed. Memphis, Rep. 715, 732; National Foundry and Pipe Works Fed. Oconto, Beek- Rep. TERM,
Argument Railway Corporations. for the 201 IT. S. man v. 144, 158; People Third Ave. R. R. N. Y. The Co., 153 ex rel. v. 153 N. Y. Deehan, 528,
There are limits on
rule of
construc
contemporaneous
tion of
acts
case of a
cor
public
legislative
especially
strictly
of its
poration.
the exercise
municipality, through
can so
of any
far embarrass the work
municipal powers,
public
controversy
service
the inducement
avoid
corporation,
”
“
is almost
A
the company’s
irresistible."
on
course
conduct
under
referred
naturally
such circumstances
part
may more
place
desire
than to an intention
preserve
peace
*32
a
24 Illi
construction on
City Chicago Evans,
a statute.
v.
52;
Trust
132 Fed.
nois,
City
Colony
Co.,
Wichita v. Old
Rep.
Los
Los
641;
Angeles v.
Water
contract under which
occupy
is a contract between the State and
derived,
the specially
whose
held
railways
chartered
are
under lease. The
companies
common council had
to act in
authority
the matter
as an
only
not of the
State,
city.
function did not
agent
extend
.Its
of the contract,
only
but
certain
making
supplying
administrative
contract
details, necessary
carry the
into ex-
ecution. Hence
to be
consti-
appears
impossible
tutional
should arise as to
the State to
question
power
the State's own
without
the consent
modify
contract,
asking
of Chicago.
ifBut
were
as to the
question
squarely presented
Assembly
modify
of Illinois in 1865 to
General
contract
State,
made
the conclusion must
municipality
had
in favor of the existencé of the
no
power. Chicago
special
such as is
Denver or
status,
constitutional
St.
possessed
In that
stood on
Louis.
she
a level
the most ob-
regard
scure
in the State.
v.
People Hill,
Illinois, 186;
village
Illinois, 302;
Hawthorne
Wilson v.
People,
Trustees, 443. See also
Illinois,
Covington Kentucky,
The act of 1865 was not Governor meaningless. Ogelsby it in on the 1865 that it an ground vetoed extension granted as we now of franchises contend. See also opinion corpora- counsel, 1871; tion of Mayor Harrison, Message 1883; Report R. R. Commission, Street 1900. act is particular abundantly as a
Though justified wise exercise of or legislative the wisdom judgment, unwisdom the court can have no legislation judicial concern. v. Priestman United 4 Everett States, 28; Dall. v. 2 Knells, 531; N. R. 11 v. N. McCrusky Cromwell, Scott Y. 601; Atkin U. Kansas, v. 191 S. 207. TERM,
440 1005.
Argument Railway Corporations. In act of in giving only effect principles are those in which terpretation any statute there applicable is a declaration about matter plain legislative purpose within the decide. clearly legislature competency v. Bate Illinois, 626; 84 Springfield Edwards, Refriger Q. R. 1; C., Co. v. U. S. v. B. & 73 ating Sulzberger, Fry Co., 157 399; 34; Beardstown v. 76 Ottawa Gas Illinois, Virginia, Illinois, v. Illinois, & Coke Co. 127 Steere v. Brom Light Downey, 201; 27; 124 v. The Ill. well, Illinois, People, McGann 97 591. App. It is a cardinal construction that effect must be principle v. to all the words of the statute. possible, Ogden if given, 2 v. 584; Illinois, Decker 68 Strong, Paine, Hughes, 33, 41; 139; v. Plank 2 Attorney Road, Opinion Michigan, General 22 2 571; Wells, 255; Nichols v. Justices, Kentucky, Pick. Reynolds, Iowa, Lever see v. 13 310. life “during the hereof” mean “during
The words con an tinuance or existence of this statute as amendatory 'act.” 33 A of a Minor, Connecticut, Benham v. 252. section statute life no has or can have whole statute. except part no or or meaning significance apart It has force the enact Burritt ing Chubbock, Illinois, 361; clause. Wheeler v. 16 v. In 322; State Contracts 120 re Seat Comm’rs, Illinois, Govern 115; 1 T. Patterson, Wash. State v. 98 N. Car. No ment, 660. can of a but part statute, only “life” be predicated The as a whole. words “hereof,” “herein,” statute statute, refer to in an “hereby,” original itself; the act .an refer to amendatory original act as amended. they statute 636; Nichol, Illinois, Holbrook Kolb, Alabama, Lane v. 628; Ohio Lester, Ely Holton, McKibbin v. St. Y. 595. N. as to the words “as made or suggested difficulty .The word “as” devoid
amended” equally is substance. It simultaneity. similarity, either may identity express sig- in the latter or time. Its use form, relate to manner Sei- recognized. established frequently nificance well bert’s Pa. St. Appeal, *34 -y.
BLAIR CHICAGO. 441 Argument Railway 201 U. Corporations.
The rule is
always
applicable
legislature is presumed
legislate
not for
For
future,
past.
this reason
are
courts
reluctant
to give statutes a retrospective operation.
White v. United States,
Particularly principle statute applicable which a general as is here done expresses principle, words “all To contracts," lay etc. down a rule general and then to ex- its clude all operation cases, from future would verging upon absurdity. City Co. v. Railway Citizens' Railroad 166 Co., U. S. 565. So established is firmly this rule of construction courts in cases many have construed statutes pros- even where the pectively, legislature had confined apparently with intention to language the past present tense. Ams- Hinds, 57; v. 48 N. Y. v. 2 bry Harvey Tyler, 328; Wall. Rail- 117; road Co. 63 Blackman, Illinois, v. People Hinrichsen, v. Illinois, 223; Harris White,
161
v.
Words technical are to be taken in their common or unless popular-acceptation, some special reason exists for them a giving strict interpretation. City of 24 Chicago Evans, Illinois, 52; v. Bridgewater State Town v. 614; J. L. 21 Fowler, N. Gross v. ship, California, 393; 215; v. 5 Blatchf. File Wood, Sharpening Co. v. Schriefer Parsons, Connecticut, 310; Maillard v. Lawrence, 16 How. This been held to principle has apply peculiar force to the titles legislative acts. v. Enterprise Smith, Kan 815; West sas, Plains 69 Fed. Township Sage, Rep. 943, Little State, Nebraska, The motive to be used a street power railway is pecu- liarly a subject-for time, by from time to regulation, police of thé State. The courts .will attribute to the leg- islature an limit the abridge power by intention to police *35 -TERM, 1905.
442 Corporations. Railway U. for the 201 S. Argument that such a limitation is assuming pos charter, even corporate S. Co., R. 161 U. 665. Pearsall v. Great Northern sible. railway,” of the term "horse significance See as popular Fed. Tramway Co., Rep. Co. v. Cable 30 Horse Railway Omaha . 51 N. J. 213 Grundy, Co. v. Ry. and Paterson Eq. on an additional servitude In steam railroads impose- Illinois Q. B. R. R. do not & C., while horse railroads highway Railroad Illinois, 255; R. Chicago Co., Street 156 Co. v. West v. 439; Pennsylvania Co., 171 Bond Hartley, Illinois, 67 Co. v. burden. Cases railways-a Neither are electric Illinois, 508. in accord with the so reached was The conclusion supra. authority Newport in other States. v. Taggart weight great Halsey R. I. Transit Co., 669; v. Street Railway Rapid 16 Street City Detroit v. 380; Railway N. J. Co. Railway Co., Eq. 47 634; Co., Koch v. North Avenue R. 75 Michigan, 85 Mills, Bois Co., Du R. 222; Passenger &c. R. Co. v. Maryland, Buffalo 1; Baker v. &c. R. Co., Alabama, 149 Pa. St. Selma 130 Street ex rel. Howard v. Street 474; Co., State R. 76 Connect Hartford In while less icut, regard railways decisions, 174. cable T are to effect. v. St. numerous, the-same uebner California Co., City Lorie v. R. Co., California, 171; R. 66 North Fed. 270. Rep. 32 "horse the city,
The term as used the charter of railway,” construed includes railways by electricity. has been operated R. Co., 299; C., v. Aurora and Geneva Harvey Illinois, Illinois, North Chicago The act of 1865 applied Railway and with manner the same as to same effect Company referred to in the and second sec- first companies the other two the act. tions such an of-statutory construction all
By principles amende all parts in the act 1865 amends as is contained ment amend reference, and from the time of the it has act to which been is to be.read as if it the former act had ment, originally n Nichol, the amendment. in the form fixed Holbrook v. 163; State, 54 N. J. L. &c. Illinois, 161, 423; Farrell Dexter BLAIR CHICAGO. Argument- Railway Corporations. for the Allen, 15;
Co. v.
Drew v.
16 Barb.
West
J.
Orange,
483;
64 N. L.
v. Lester,
9 Ohio
Ely
St.
v. Holton,
McKibbin
15 N. Y.
no .
city has
standing
question
rulings-
Cir-
Court
of.
regard
cuit
the leases under
validity
receivers derived title to the
complainant
franchises.
executed,
There are
contracts and whether ultra- vires or not
have
under
titles
Such
passed
conveyance or lease
them..
*36
or
real
personal
including notes and
property,
of.
other choses
like a
or
action,
conveyance
transfer- to a
corporation
excess
its
is not
but
powers,
absolutely-void,
voidable, and
-the
passes
title,
no one can object thereto save the sov
and, under
ereign
certain
the- stockholders
conditions,
Bank v.
company.
Whitney,
3; 282; v. 132 U. S. Palmer, City Spokane Trustees, v. (Wash.) 141; 60 Pac. Mallett Rep. 94 Simpson, 37; v. N. Car. Land Fayette Co. v. L. & N. R. 93 Co., Virginia, 274; The Banks Poitiaux, (Va.)
v. 136; 3 Rand. Land Bushnell, Co. v. 11 Ne 192; Barnes braska, Suddard, 237; v. 117 Illinois, Lancaster v. Co., 576; A. I. 140 N. Houston Y. &c. Shirley, R. Co. v. 54 Bank Texas, 125; Grand v. 8 Archer, (Miss.) Smed. & M. Gulf n The act of 1865 had the effect of extended postponing life of corporate West Chicago Division Railway Company made provision ordinance of August 16,-1858, for terminating certain .occupation. streets, through pur- chase of its property by city. nn A legislature with state to respect municipal corporations unlimited has pass any legislation expressly pro or by-.state hibited Federal constitutions, thereby to di vest them property rights franchises conferred legislature unexecuted by at the date of the city sub sequent legislation, provided in the only case of property held specific trusts, spirit purpose trust be n Simon v. 487; McIn- preserved. Northup, Oregon, Coyle 27 v. TERM, 1905.
444
Railway Corporations.
U. S.
Argument
Armstrong,
v.
Park
728;
Comm’rs
Rep.
Brooklyn
Atl.
tire, 30
169; Atkin
64 Pa. St.
v.
234;
Fox,
v.
45 N. Y.
Philadelphia
The used tracks, cars, implements appurtenances carriages, West of certain lines in the operation before cause Railway taking steps Company Division said of railway lines operation a discontinuance is not en its successors company,, assigns. until is made. National Water payment titled to possession Los Angeles Kansas 62 Fed. City, Rep. Co. Works Fed. Angeles, Co. v. Los Rep. Water In with the decisions are accordance these those spirit at hold that when a lessor has covenanted pay cases which *37 for made by end of the term lessee improvements upon of such lessee, covenant, breach property, the demised in until Frank possession payment. remain he receives 22 Card, Maine, 528; v. 84 v. Hopkins Gehnan, lin Land Co. 47 Wisconsin, 476; Wisconsin, 581; S. Mullen 16 C., Pugh, v. 337; Rensselaer v. 6 Penniman, Van Wend. 569. App. Ind. West Division Railway lines of Company The Chicago street Randolph Madison street, on avenue Ogden State street to Wabash street from were avenue, on Randolph and authority with the consent of the common constructed and as such lines the West city, Chicago council and its an lessees are with- vested Railway Company Division the same to maintain the period during unimpeachable 1865. the act of by prescribed acts that to be designations
There no provision council shall be resolu- the common ordinance or made BLAIR v. CHICAGO. 445 Argument Railway Corporations, U. 201 for in the tion. The fact construction and acquiescence public for a of forty of such lines years, constitutes operation period as substantial, binding precise any ordi designation and raises conclusive inference law that nance; such use sanction proper authority. Chicago under City v. 425; 2 v. 418, Robbins 4 Robbins, Black, Chicago City, Wall. v. The 679; Gridley City Bloomington, 68 Illinois, 47, 50; v. Chicago, Illinois, 451; 145 Town
Gregsten City New Co., Erie R. R. 155 Indiana, 18; v. Lake &c. ex Castle People v. Div. N. Y. Cromwell, 291; &c. 89 App. rel. Railway Co., R. 166 U. v. Citizens’ Street R. S. 557, 568; Co. Town of Illinois, 527; Jennings Bruce v. 116 v. Van Dickey, Schaick, 144 530, 532; Jorgensen Y. v. N. Y. Squires, 108 N. 285; 281; N. Y. Powers, Donnelly City Roches Babbage Y. 315, 166 N. ter, is- now deny
In event estopped existence The situation cannot be designation. of a distin- proper v. Stock City Chicago from that Yards Company, guished Illinois, Division Railway Company West had The a con- charter, its complete 'under construction tract right, and to the same operate its railway period prescribed route charter, upon any or its designated its prede- May priof 3, 1875, title had cessor constructed before said at date, least partly been to the extent (cid:127) railway to such its authorized terminus prolonging on the which such same street on construction had been begun. Illinois decisions are a unit that where ordi holding only formally
nances are but accepted actually acted upon, contracts which they become neither the State nor .city without can consent' impair of the company, save of some reserved exercise power. City Quincy v. Bull, Illinois, 337, Chicago Mun. Gas Co. Light v. Lake, *38 42; Illinois, Belleville v. Citizens’ H. Ry. Co., 152 Illinois, The 185; 171, v. People The West Chicago Railway Division Ill. 125; Village 18 Co., aff’d 118 Illinois. App. 113: C. of TERM, 1905.
446 Railway Corporations. Argument for the Ill. 146, 105 App. v. Telephone Circuit, Mills London v. 63 Co., Green Bowling Ry. Co. See also Louisville &c. R. R., Missouri, 79 Horse R. v. City Kansas 4; S. W. Rep, Hoodman Texas, 548; 83 Hudson v. Ry. Co., Houston St. 632; Mayor 303; 49 N. J. L. Rochester &c. Water v. Jersey City, Tel. Co. N. Y. 71; Div. v., 84 App. Co: Co., Telephone Rochester Co. v. 121 502; Telephone Northwestern Michigan, City Joseph, St. of v. 140; Minnesota, 81 Duluth Co. v. City Minneapolis, of 492; Abbott v. Minnesota, 486, 84 Duluth, Telephone Co., Duluth v. Gas Company, 104 833; City 104 Fed. Rep. Indianapolis of 107, 115. Indiana, or an by muncipiality abutting when once given
A consent -a street for purposes property to the use owner the constitutional provision forbidding 'meaning within the without property due person process deprivation 41 v. Illinois, Baer, 306; of law. Chicago Chicago City 587; Illinois, 576, v. 203 R. Rail Chicago, T. R. Co. T. Cicero 504; 176 Rich v. Illinois, 501, v. way Chicago, Chicago, Co. v. Consumers’ Gas 140 18; Indianapolis 152 Illinois, Co., v. 111 Y. 1; N. T. 107, 113; People S. R. Indiana, O’Brien, v. 520; Paige 128 N. Y. 510, Co. v. Schenectady Ry. Mayor, 112; N. Ghee v. Northern Union Gas 158 178 Y. Co., Co., Co. v. 510, 513; People ex rel. Woodhaven N. Y. Deehan, Gas 532; Y. 68 Matter Seaboard App. 153 N. Co., T. & T. 283, 285; Y. v. H. G. & C. Trac. Co. H. & N. L. Elec. Div. . 402, 410 69 Ohio St. Co., Tran. “in the title of the Chicago”
The words act. authority void the in’ the render conferred did not of 1859 City Railway' Company North to extend Chicago limits Chicago City outside its lines 233; 48 Prescott v. Illinois, rel., ex v. The People Ottawa 288; v. 123; Illinois, 81 Weber, Binz Illinois, 60 Chicago, Illinois, Timm v. 109 30; Harrison, Illinois, v. 103 Hall, Cole Illinois, 122; Education, West McGurn v. Board 597; 332; Hud Sweet, Illinois, Park Commissioners v. Illinois, Illinois, Bobel Ham, People, nall *39 ¶. BLAIR CHICAGO. 447 Opinion of the 201 TJ. S. Court. Park v. Modern Woodmen
23; America, 181 Illinois, 227; of 182 Hertz, Boehm v. Illinois, 156; Village of London Millsv. , Edward White, 208 289; Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 Illinois v. Detroit Citizens’ 155; U. S. St. 184 Ry., 368; Detroit U. S. Mellen, Illinois, 181; v. 32 v. 61 Illi People Lockport Gaylord, v. L. Jonesboro Cairo & St. R. R. U. nois, Co., 110 S. 198; Protestant Deaconesses, Institution 71 229. People v. Illinois, of the act incorporation of the town legislature of'Lake View did not the North deprive City Railway Chicago charter its to extend its street Company railway lines the town Lake View its streets and into highways. Gas Co. v. Town Municipal Light Lake, Illinois, 130 Bull et Quincy al., 54; City Illinois, 349; The People Illinois, Blocki, Day, Mit. Justice after making foregoing statement, court. opinion delivered Circuit Court jurisdiction
THe to render the original companies maintain the against arid judgments ancillary bill at the outset. These objections challenged require is. controversy notice before considering merits. ,had that It insisted Circuit Court no jurisdiction at law render the .because judgments provisions of the 25 Stat. 13, 1888, 433, 434, act of August providing that no - of any shall cognizance Circuit Court suit have. recover any the contents note favor promissory assignee; <if holder such subsequent instrument be payable bearer, suit unless such have might been in such court prosecuted if an recover, assignment or transfer had been made. As the notes were made payable to the order “Markham B. Orde, Treas.,” and there is no that Orde was not allegation a citizen of the State Illinois, of which State defendant companies citizens, were it is insisted corporations that fail, must jurisdiction provisions under the statute Assuming to. without deciding .ques- referred just TERM, Opinion of-the Court. by way ancillary bill,
tion could be raised of defense to the fail, think must under objection we the allegations was money directly the declaration the furnished the de com Guaranty fendants Trust Company, was first v. Moebs, taker of the notes. In Falk pany U. S. held that made in this form, payable *40 treasurer, delivery by *41 of on the the with in part city the while it was the property hands of the court’s receivers, still the record that shows the city strenuously contested the asserted the rights corpora- tions to the franchise to use the of the city streets for ninety- nine the years, term claimed to have been to granted them the act of It February, 1865. was the claim of the city that to many as of the in a ordinances granting rights number streets, of the the to the use and of them right occupancy would July 30,1903. city The had asserted in a expire number its to treat ways the the purpose rights companies and they whatever- franchises had as terminated at that date. It declared its to resume purpose possession the streets and what, resort to all means to legal protect rights against were deemed the unfounded claims of the companies the extended franchises. Without into further detail going this branch of upon case, the we think that the attitude and , claims of city the cast a cloud to this title property the. which was in hands to be the receivers administered
VOL. cci—29 TERM, 1905.
Opinion 201 U. S. of the Court. in re court, and that such case the the orders under an authority court, proceed ceivers may, to administer jurisdiction, cillary protect bill validity the claims and to determine the property, a cloud which cast franchises rights the parties in such receivers, and the and that companies claimed an until injunction rights it to grant case was the. proper . Detroit v. Detroit Citizens’ could determined. parties the. 164; In Co., 368; Tyler, re 149 U. S. Railway Street White U. U. S. S. 36. Letcher, Ewing, Rouse had case then, that the court think, jurisdiction We bills. ancillary in the made question
A further made the contention preliminary which the various were made, the leases under transfers to have title in which are vested supposed Chicago void Traction are for want of Company, corporate Union to make or companies receive the We do same. city is in a Chicago position think raise that ques have corporations undertaken transfer the tion. rights lessor and the companies, lessees have into gone posses now thereof, the same are sion of the re possession . authority under All of ceivers the court. the companies suit, are of all parties rights franchises are They order of the court vested hold the receivers. judicial title to all these to be at sale; sold otherwise with as the In this view wé dealt court cannot’ direct. validity of the in see is. material into inquire ;No is' termediate transfers between the contract companies.. with, of. undertaken to be enforced has validity of these transfers. The' depends upon has. nofr them, to invalidate and the State attempted no power *42 a in' warranto validity quo into their by proceeding to inquire such, in laid- down Fritts v. case, In we think, principle is “The Palmer, 282, 293, question U. S. controlling: a and hold purchase whether corporation capacity having or in certain quantities, real estate certain defined purposes, BLAIR v. CHICAGO. Court;' Opinion of the
201 U. S. has title to real taken estate not authorized purposes or in law, charter, excess quantity permitted only the State within is concerns whose limits the' property situated. It cannot be raised'Qollaterally by private persons in unless there be the statute nec-. something expressly essáry them to do implication so.” authorizing now to the merits of the will case, we first notice the
Passing . that the acts of objection 1859, 1861 1865 are unconstitu- tional. The Illinois constitution contained the pro- vision that or local law shall than private embrace more one no and' that shall be in acts are subject, expressed the title. The are of this they violations re- ground attacké^ But we do not think that these objections are quirement. act; The title of the act of is “An February 14, 1859, tenable. the construction of horse in railways city promote act February 21, the title is “An act Chicago;” to authorize the extension of horse railways the title of act of February 6, 1865, is “An Chicago;” horse in the In railways concerning Chicago.” v. People’s Light Gas People Company, Illinois, 482, the Illinois cases were reviewed and the conclusion reached that of the constitutional if provision the purpose accomplished title is comprehensive enough reasonably include within the or the subject subordinate branches general thereof, the statute objects'which seeks effect. And it the,several held that was title is no objection generality,of is. not made to law so as it cover long legislation incongruous cap no fair itself andv intendment be included as necessary connection. proper the case of Mont- having In clair v. Ramsdell, statute New Jersey was before this court which was claimed tó be unconstitutional, because it embraced more than one subject, expressed its title. Jersey of the New constitution provision “Tb avoid influences which improper from inter- result same, such act, one as have no mixing things proper other, every each- law shall relation to embrace but object, one *43 TERM, 452 Opinion of the Court. 201 U. S. ” in the title. The Montclair and that shall be expressed case an act That this does the title of require held: 1. provision statement or index or abstract of its to set forth a detailed' an does it the same numerous contents; prevent uniting nor n one indicated. object fairly by- provisions having general extended, however. varied and title. 2.-That the- powers, exercise, which a constitute but one object, township in a title than fairly is' more expressed showing nothing which In to establish such the late purpose township. legislative Railway Company, of Detroit v. Detroit Citizens’ Street 184 case with a the court had occasion deal 368, similar-provi U. S. In it sion in constitution of Michigan. language Judge Secretary ex rel. State v. State Insurance Cooley People quoted 19 “We Company, approval: Michigan, the constitutional reasonable provision must construc give The constitution no law to tion ánd effect. embrace- requires shall than one be in its expressed more title. object, very be and still with object may comprehensive Now the be us out one before is of that character. But objection, it no means essential that end and means every necessary accomplishment or convenient-for object general to or necessarily should be either referred indicated the title. reasonably is, All that'can that the title shall not required to cover and which itself, be made legislation incongruous can be considered as fair intendment having necessary no -connection.” this we do not Applying principle, or proper were so far subjects treated think foreign acts as to this the several to be constitutional open the title of this subject: Ackley School District See, also,.upon objection. Jonesboro v. Cairo 135, 141; U. S. & St. v. L. Hall, Otoe v. 192, 198; County Baldwin, 110 U. S. U. Co., R. R. S. 508; Carter Quackenbush, County Mahomet U. S. Sinton, the acts analyze time to connection
Without taking features of the important to what wé deem case. we pass more in this case turns controversy upon the con- The principal v. CHICAGO. BLAIit n 201 U. Opinion Court. act of 1859. On
struction of the act of amending’the that this .act means give is insisted' companies part use from the State of the an irrevocable fór á streets street purposes law; *44 ninety-nine term the years passage of the is one of only city the conferred right designation be the with by the streets to and agreement occupied regulation of the “administrative” fea- the what are termed companies of It that this broad is tures the is insisted occupancy. right from act of the which, upon derived the .state public legislature, its has an inviolable contract the acceptance, become between is and the of the it con- city State the companies. Upon part that there been no to railways tended has grant occupy authorizationpf of the with the city city the streets the except conditions, council and and upon such terms the including fix body term of as that see fit to contract occupancy, the only effect of the act companies; the legitimate 1865, other than the extension of the life the corporate city has been to continue the control of the over companies, streets, the and to reaffirm the contracts made be- theretofore tween and the The that the the'city theory companies. fran- to solely chise use the streets was derived from the State, sub- city the of the to ject only to the streets to designate be right to and occupied, the “administrative” features regulate in use,' learned Circuit Court adopted construing the act It is therefore controversy. to consider important licenses, the nature of franchises, and rights privileges, dealt with in the to ascertain, as near as may be, in what its sense terms were and with used, what they meaning are into the In incorporated act. order to construe this áct and if determine, and possible, true the extent meaning of the powers intended to be rights granted confirmed, reference may had appropriately prior legislation upon is subject, the act amendatory can only be understood if a correct is first had of apprehension the powers previously the extent and nature granted, TERM,
Opinion of the Court. 201 ti. S. severally and the which they conferred sources charter, the constitu- city came. Whether the .granted while force, tion 1848 was in gave right grant the streets for railway street privilege using companies much is a discussed the briefs and railway question purposes at the charter of 1851. city, bar. arguments had to control .the . the amendment' use general the streets .occupation regulate thereon; of tracks railways of horse therein and the laying use of the acts under city that, independent It is insisted powers this conferred case, general consideration Court of city charter, Supreme' Illinois, as construed it use streets empower were broad enough Bull See et City Quincy al., for street purposes. cited in the Illinois, 337, 349, and cases On the opinion. contended could part companies only act in from the and that effect of the State, question come *45 was to confer the as companies charter.'right the right . the power. granted sovereign said, It is to been the settled of all con- understanding have then cerned, and in accordance with the of the policy existing directly was a State, that the of 1859 franchise granted full to of State, the the use the streets the giving right of subject only the term the life corporate companies, to to the the as streets used. designating power that In this be observed the Court Supreme connection Chi- Company City of Illinois in Union Traction Chicago the distinctly stated that act of Illinois, 484, 525, cago, council to pass the common the the recognized power ” it said in “There, the 16, opin-. ordinance of 1858. August council, taken of the common before “was nó other action ion, ordi- 1859, the 14, except February =of act of the passage the ‘with such words, the use By nance 16,1858. of August council pre-' common the said as has rights other not have could referred scribed,’ legislature of the ordinance passage than the action of common council BLAIR *. CHICAGO. Opinion of Court'. It thereby power, 16, recognized August here and the ordinance, appellant
common council pass thereby introduces it and relies it. legislature-, of Au- and- of the ordinance recognizing passage affirming council of the common 16, 1858, also gust' recognized power four that ordinance nine of section under clause pass 1859 the In the act of four, of charter of 1851.” chapter term for did not fix assume to legislature independently common use of the but affirmed that which the streets, au- do, council had authorized the -gave corporators thority corpora- to confer future by agreement first, of Feb- tions. In of the aet after the passage grants ruary 14, 1859, Chicago-City those of 1859, May 23,. Com- Railway Railway and the North Company far from act- as show so pany, later, we shall have occasion to theory corpo- had ing upon the the State granted life of rations the full to use for the corporate the streets eity council no from the companies and needed permission admin- other than such the streets regulated designated accepted istrative the council and the features, companies made for the term the ordinances which on the north side were and on west twepty-five and no the south years longer, affirmed sides for named in the term the act had council in The south from the the ordinance not only and west side as its recitals ordinance, show, but February of the act also passed pursuance 14, 1859, .of authority by virtue of otherwise vested common council Union Traction v. City charter. Co. Chicago, Illinois, 484, 525. Thereafter frequently until the the aet the council and the made passage *46 companies accepted specific ordinances the time of fixing oc- been cupancy, had done in the original May 23,' ordinances of after, 1859. And before nor act neither of the of passage the ninety-nine was the year, term or recognized upon acted in ordinances the use of the granting streets. - Under the ordinance of 1858 council au- the undertook to TERM,
Opinion of Court. 201U. S. and lay operate-a railway named to horse thorize the persons city. This of in certain streets the terms right, ordinance, twenty-five was period years, granted until the in the manner council, common should designated, com- railway elect pin-chase pay property If this ordinance had been without author- panies. legislative' to the ity February 14, 1859, act that act consti- previous tuted the of. with one named the ordinance persons under other, successors, body politic corporate their the name for the term City Railway Company, of the Chicago cor- to such twenty-five years, with all the incident powers construct, was authorized porations. The corporation track in the maintain or double and operate single future limits presént'-or within the Chicago, city. south or But the did west divisions of the It was and limited stop immediately qualified there. common council for it authority city, pro- given street, and operate railways that this to maintain vided right common council said streets, was “as etc., or shall them, have authorized said corporators, do in such manner and upon authorize said so to corporation condition, and with such privileges, such terms contract with said may by par- as the common council has or ties, corporation or any them, prescribe.” either Then as to the action was eminent domain. given sec- 1858, by under the ordinance of already taken city, or intended so all privileges granted tion of the rights by the associates ordinances and their be, to incorporators ap- were council and amendments thereto passed act By 10 of the section and vested in the corporation. proved incorporated. City Railway Company North full franchise theory with the Is this consistent authority regard without streets, and using occupying was vested streets, city, except designating from the This act conferred incorporated? State in companies occupy to use and true, the right the railway companies, *47 v. CHICAGO. BLAIR '457 2(51 Opinion of the Court. U. S. but this was the city, upon
the
of the
terms
right
pre
streets
law.
the
plenary
in the
Conceding
power
leg
scribed
time,
at
franchises,
over the subject
islature
conferred
the
are
broadly speaking,
from a
power,
derived
State,
grant
sovereign
are
its
exercising
authority
nevertheless the State while
might
in
and control
the mat
the
such measure
city
right
give
705; Rail
Corps.,
ed.,
ter
it saw fit. Dillon on Munic.
3d'
§
is
city
Opinion of Court!. no such corporation can clearly conferred, impose itself streets unless it enters into an highways public oi; of such occupancy streets, resorts touching agreement *48 to of of an the default This right agreement. condemnation terms obviously to and conditions most impose bright implies the of such The the to duration agree upon occupancy. right had to exclude unless resort be to condemna right altogether, ' to limit tion, period involves the the grant.” Elliott on Rail Edwards, Indiana, 374, Coverdale v. roáds, § fix the du- assumes to
The act under consideration nowhere is nor the that it em- ration of the excludes grant, conclusion to fixed by terms and conditions which aré be braced in the If the to the city. streets, the franchise use contract fully was action, conferred municipal without regard only had consideration, act under then company legislative of as to streets, subject possession regulations take cars, etc., by contrary, of council. On the running of act, city, by its con- withholding under the terms the use of the streets the corporations. could sent, prevent which this out -consent could No com- way pointed the will of the council. body .against might, pelled That with- act; by under the terms of this itself, sufficient reasons that it was undesirable to have determine assent, holding use of the in control streets. corporations are Court the State Supreme the decisions of While whether contract us determining not binding upon under the Federal Con- entitled protection made which is of Chicago Railway the case Com- City we notice stitution, was a That Story, Illinois, pro- ex rel. People pany v. Railway the Chicago warranto quo against ceeding ,t° its franchise forfeiture to declare Company, asking relied The Indiana avenue. grounds a portion operate upon obtained had not railway company were fronting owners of the property consent two-thirds of the passage fifteen months from on within the avenue BLAIR v. CHICAGO. Opinion of the Court. time 22, 1864,
ordinance of August limited construction the ordinance of date. The respondent, the Chicago City Railway relied an ordinance Company, No- passed 13, 1871, amendatory vember ordinance August 22, the time to complete railway for extending a period (cid:127) years of two from the date of the last-named ordinance. The court found that two-thirds the property owners had con- in the ordinance sented, provided August 22, 1864, but , found that had company neglected construct its road limits within fifteen months from the passage as therein ordinance, provided. question turned upon the validity of the ordinance of extending November 13, 1871, after the constitution of went passed into effect. The majority of the court—Chief Justice Walker and Justices *49 Breese that dissenting the common council Sheldon —held authority had the under extend the time for the of the roads on Indiana avenue, as the building time limita- was a in of the city, tion favor which it provision might waive, as the charter of the was silent company the time within which the railway constructed,- in this might connection held that the by city the right granted construct the railway was a from license franchise distinguished derivable from the State, and, therefore, not within the constitutional prohi- bition the of local or against passage special laws granting any corporation, association or individual the to lay down right railroad or tracks, amending'-existing charters for that purpose, or to any granting corporation, association or individual any special exclusive privilege, immunity franchise whatever. The of the minority court were of the constitu- opinion tion of 1870 made the ordinance invalid. In neither extending the nor majority the opinions there intima- dissenting tion that the could or use a street of company occupy city the the the In city. without permission how far discussing company the charter authorized the to act without the of the city, Sheldon, consent Mr. Justice the by course the of an able concurred Chief opinion, dissenting TERM, Opinion of the Court. is careful to out the point Justice Breese,
Justice and-Mr. is not in the complete streets occupy right from, and is’ exercised only charter the State, capable being And see city. of the by the authorization when supplemented In 38, Railroad, Wall. People’s Memphis Railroad v. a street that a authorizing that case this court held charter in all railroads the streets street operate railroad company until was city” “with consent of the city unavailing was a con was first which consent city had, the consent of the use of the dition streets. precedent by franchise was conferred What, then, granted be a for the corporation period It State? right city to use streets and to named, acquire The upon. terms and tó be agreed contract conditions is of value until practical the State no franchise conferred of the council of authority the consent supplemented common act of city. thé the passage After an ordinance au- May 1859, on passed council rail- horse operation the extension certain thorizing city, and west divisions of the streets of south ways in the- Railway use thereof to the Chicago granting authority to act under purported Company. other- authority virtue of the powers act of 1859, this ordinance By council law. the common wise vested all was fixed at of use-and occupation “during the term February, A. D. in the said act fourteenth term council day On the same passed and prescribed.” specified *50 the North certain streets to granting an ordinance This ordinance contained Railway Company. City Chicago and the said privileges granted “The rights this language: shall be, or intended to continue ordinance, this by company full of said the the benefit company in force for and be ordinance, years the of passage term twenty-five of passed the February 21, 1861, legislature and no On longer.” Com- Division Railway the West Chicago an act incorporating to pos- twenty-five years, corporation for the term of the pany BLAIR v. CHICAGO. Opinion
201 TJ. S. of the Court. enumerated powers second,- sess fifth and sixth third, sections the act of February 14, section By act the was authorized to from the corporation acquire Chicago City Railway Company powers, franchises, and privileges immunities conferred that and the company, consent of the directors of said company made a condition precedent to the exercise the powers conferred as to any streets of the south and west divisions of the city of Chicago.
Before the act of passage 1865 a number ordinances were passed, conferring privilege streets, most using cases a time definite in character. The record dis- limit an by closes that of July agreement 29, 1863, the City Chicago had Railway Company agreed convey to the West Chicago Division Railway certain stock, Company rolling equipment, etc., with “all and together singular franchises, rights, and immunities” privileges the Chicago City Railway Com- pany and certain streets, “conferred, or given granted any under or all acts of the Assembly General of Illinois, State and and all any ordinances of the of Chi- or contracts with the common cago council.” In this contract it was also if at any time it provided should be adjudged consent to the sale the council of of Chicago was, necessary is, secure to grantee company the rights In embraced contract, grantor company' would do all in its reasonable and proper effort to secure such common consent council. By deed of transfer of July 30,. 1863, the grantor company conveyed its and franchises in the use rights, privileges and occupation “ streets, certain hold have the above bargained granted premises property party second part, etc., all said during the time party first part hold, might enjoy exercise the same under its present charter and all and. extensions thereof.” On December 13, 1859, City Railway the Chicago Company agreement to the North gave Railway Company permission authority construct make, and use for *51 TERM, 1905. ,
Opinion of the Court. 20117. S. etc., necessary be extend tracks, might twenty-four years, in the south and west divi- southerly points to such railway its (Chi- the first streets, “as the party part sions certain along has been or be authorized City Railway Company) cago the same.” to make and have of the at least clearly up passage
It appears, thus and en- subject recognized that' upon legislation fix city during the term authority of the forced the right street com- be occupied which the streets might (cid:127) the ordinance of confirmed had panies. legislature city 'and until years twenty-five the term at city fixing railway company. of the property should see fit to purchase authority to obtain the companies It had required terms and con- upon such use to be streets, before using as the had and privileges and with such ditions, with the com- contract' prescribe by thereafter might panies. far action thus
We find intention evidenced legislative no the im- authorities-from prevént exercising municipal contract authority fixing portant far-reaching franchises are whom persons corporations granted shall continue. the State the term during occupancy streets, hardly This need feature of the to use right lati- of most vital to both said,.is importance parties. Some in- stability to the value and tude of time essential An conclude unduly to be made. long period might vestment' when conditions and pop- municipal changing growing action in the interest. ulation demanded it public its now to Does interpretation come the act of 1865. We terms the State took the contention that justify which had been theretofore the local authorities control what to determine recognized, right authority for,what railways occupy time the might terms length building, than the and without other streets, consideration roads, conferred equipment operation ninety-nine years use occupy companies BLAIR v. CHICAGO. Opinion
201 IT. Court. *52 come the of the which streets city might thereafter be desig- nated the confirmed city-council,'and without qualifica- tion for that term the to use and the streets' right occupy covered in contracts already made with the city? mayWe before premise, this act for up more detailed considér- talking ation, that it is a firmly established which rule, we shall have occasion to to later on in refer this discussion, but which must in mind borne as we enter the upon consideration this act, that one who asserts in private rights public property under of the grants character of those under consideration, must, if he would establish them, come prepared they show that have been conferred plain terms, nothing passes by it be or grant except clearly stated necessarily implied.
first section of the act of effectual extend the cor- life two porate of the created and companies, acts twenty-five ninety-nine from years The second each. section authorizes the construction and maintenance of street in the railways such city upon within streets, etc., the, limits named,*as common council’ have authorized? or shall from time to authorize, time and rights, privileges immunities and to be such as the exemptions common council has or prescribed by contracts with said or parties, either of them, In the first prescribe.' then, clause that section, no there shown from the disposition depart of the policy action, State as indicated act and companies thereunder, which required street railway- before companies entering or occupation use the' streets to obtain by agreement sanction and its authority for the of so right privilege Then comes doing. clause, it is works a contended, revolution of former n policies extends former franchises and the full of, term ninety-nine years, withholds any further the use streets to granting companies, except upon terms extending.the right like While no period. we have to consider clauses were segregating though separate'enact- they TERM, 1905.
Opinion Court. clearly view, its provisions of having for the ments, purpose this clause: we insert acts or deeds transfer of and all rights,
“. . and any said several corporations between or franchises contracts, and all them, stipula- two any acts named, into or made, entered undertakings, given, tions, licenses said common by and between the as made or amended respecting of the said corporations, one or more any council streets, in or railways or exclusion of use location, and held shall be deemed city, of said them, hereof, effectual, .as'valid and the life continued force during *53 and the same are if made a all intents and as part, purposes, a of said several acts.” hereby made part act ex- a clause of Does fair interpretation the and contracts theretofore franchises, all the privileges tend This clause deals ninety-nine years? for the term of made with: or franchises privileges between rights, .transfers
the corporations. made the contracts between
2. Comprehensively speaking, companies. the and the city as the terms are and privileges,” definition “rights The. It is contained the difficult to act, in this
used find. im- and rights the act “such confirming context’-uf privileges, common council has [pre- as the and exemptions, munities or ariy with said either parties, contract may by scribed], or. conforms to the use of' This definition them, prescribe.” on as well subject the legislature acts the terms' prior the use of the streets. the- granting as tó ordinances such as have been de- intended are and privileges The rights in the sense Franchises city. with the from contracts rived Stated Licenses have been grants have stated we act- the city, been obtained from privileges and all other have acts óf the authority legislature under the ing As the deeds in this discussion. earlier manner outlined franchises, well as and acts of transfer rights, BLAIR CHICAGO. Opinion of Court. declares, act city,
as the contract secured from the rights “ shall deemed and held and continued force they during effectual, as valid to all intents and hereof, the life purposes, are said part, hereby part as if the same' made made several acts.”
What does this It the con- mean? cannot extend operate tract obtained directly privileges, or after transfer one company other, before ninety-nine for as to years, distinctly these the declares that contracts, licenses and be- stipulations, undertakings, tween the shall stand “as made or companies council amended.” This declaration is in the and can tense, past no fair by any have reference construction to'future engage- ments. ¿11
The contracts this clause in their time terms, including into limits, are acts original of 1859 .written if made a Much has thereof. discussion beén had as to part “dur- proper interpretation ambiguous expression hereof.” For the it is companies life insisted ing is to extend all franchises and contracts, whether meaning latter have been thereafter be made the end so as to years, give railways franchise ninety-nine use the streets for an period irrevocable irre- grant, limitations spective by state or action sub- municipal *54 undertaken. sequently To this act the in- give construction sisted on the is inconsistent with companies the of policy State, the declared in act the which ratified ordi- nance of 1858, and gave additional in rights only the streets obtaining consent city. It reads practically out the act the preceding clause of the under very section consideration, which expressly authority of recognizes city to control the council use the streets contracts it which has or made may make in the future. To say that
contracts, the terms and which left conditions of are to agree- with the ment city, could'only made terms exten- sion to ninety-nine is in an years, to nullify important partic-
vol. cci—30 TERM,
Opinion U. of the Court. ulár in act. The construction conferred powers us the sense for to ignore entirely contended requires change the contracts as an made, terms establishing requires the future what is interpretation applies specifically to for It does violence to the rule stated to be meant the past. for for the that words are companies; contended counsel in every ordinary signification, part be considered their harmony with its if in statute, meaning practicable, given is that the words subject. other It provisions upon the úrged futute, must have reference to the made amended” “as intended, act prospective operation were give as made, to be as well and to read into all contracts thereafter made, a to use the streets without the con- theretofore And sent of the for the extended it said period. “ this is use of the words as amended.” particularly shown was used expression But seventh paragraph 1859,. privi- the corporations of' vesting “ of the common council and' by the ordinances granted leges 16, 1858, The ordinance of the amendments thereto.” August ' an amendment of prior itself municipal legislation: continue, made, of the act of was to the former purpose If it was with their intended ex- contracts, amendments. use of tend all contracts and licenses for the the streets past and to council ninety-nine years, to the term require no new for terms and conditions engagements to enter into not to that would have been period,, which should extend words, to such plain easy expression purpose give which, as stated one of briefs resort language is “unusual and more companies, the learned counsel If no control the words used have effect to or less figurative.” but do extend the of the con- contract, of future term the right we ninety-nine years, then have the anom- tracts made to contracts for -short and some long situation some alous we are of railroads. It is true that system in the same terms as it was when was passed, the situation the á'ct to consider and development and not in the light subsequent growth *55 BLAIR v. CHICAGO. Opinion of the Court. But in 1865 the of local control of the streets policy city. had been and acted So purposes upon.
for declared as is in contended for must be found terms . departure radical and clearly stated defined. It is contended that'Un- plainly insisted the for the is upon companies less construction given “ no force effect act, to the the given expression during and a all hereof,” the rule is invoked that well-recognized life law in must be and force effect parts given interpreting While it is incumbent those meaning. claiming as we already stated, under have to make out public grant, for clearly the contended terms and rights unequivo- cally convey them, it is deny enough if, for, contended mind act, the rests considering as to uncertainty doubt whether intended to be they are conferred, we think this act can be a construction which given some shall effect words give meaning “during Literally life hereof.” construed, would mean phrase fife the act. It has for the been that it suggested may mean' until corporations, forféiture out of otherwise, go But existence. these do not seem aicl the meanings purpose in 'the law, manifested are not meaningless phrases sup- used to express be posed will. legislative Bearing mind that the franchises granted came the State, nature extent of' the in those rights franchises, included that the franchise to be a corporation extended (cid:127) act, first section and that the franchise, the transfer of which was intended to be confirmed the .clause now before us, embraced the by the State to right granted use the streets authority city, and that the privi- were obtained from if leges city, us see let some meaning can found consistent with the other parts be act,' rules of recognized construction. Conceding this purpose the contention on behalf of companies the phrase, fife “during hereof,” may mean for the term of ninety- nine years, period act provides that certain things “shall and held deemed and continued force.” 'What *56 TERM, 1905...
n Opinion of the Court. U.S. are and all acts or of transfer of “Any rights, they? deed? n franchises the corporations or between said privileges “All several named or two of them.” any contracts, acts made, into, licenses and entered stipulations, undertakings, or and as or made amended and between the said given, any common council and one or more of the said corporations, or in or location, railways the use exclusion of the respecting city.” the or of them of said The context streets the as to be act, seen, we have defines rights city. from the contracts the It such as derived are as do ordinances in the use passed, the previously recognizes, that the is the source from whence made the same phrase, Franchises, as we have from they said, Came. came the State. the cannot held to life.hereof,” be extend phrase, “during ninety-nine years contract without to violence doing to. just which are found precede phrase terms all contracts, licenses sentence, stipulations, same confirming The vital “as made amended.” part undertakings streets, is contracts the duration occupancy such the. years, to some cases twenty-five limited expressly city. say To and until twenty-five years purchase “ it means ninety- the life the sense that hereof,” that during contracts, to be the life permits part, nine is years, which of the clause to repeal provision the sentence .of in all into act- as made respects them the original reads therefore, such construction impossible amended. Rejecting, only is very law,, terms there violence as doing consistently for which can ex-' be left of things provided the acts or deeds of transfer ninéty-nine years, tended as to franchises they so far relate corporations between the n limitations the act— subject express which are not made. conveyed as These franchises as they shall stand the then twenty-five years, life necessarily-limited were of this act has The first part the companies. prolonged In which we years. the sense ninety-nine life corporate franchise as- State, already granted defined the have BLAIR CHICAGO. Opinion of Court. streets occupy to use with permis- right
conferring the held to consistently the act extend city, sion of transfer a continued deeds conveying and .validate the extended of the lives of period such franchise some and force weight gives This construction corporations. entire act and, taking together/ expression,
this ambiguous with the than purpose expressed is consistent legislative more the reference to forward, the con- put ignores the one and extends them' all for tracts in form original ninety- their *57 they while the act declares shall not be nine disturbed years, not to the as made. It is be understood interpretation from, mind judicial frees the doubt as the herein suggested of this more than its act, any and con- meaning ambiguous could have tradictory impressed upon the phrases legislative now contended for by the the meaning understanding compan- is the of the settled rule of application ies. It interpretation to such which the claims made for it, rather grants invalidates any satisfactory than clear and interpretation been has by or arrived at the court. by counsel suggested construction in harmony policy This is the of the State, with on as evidenced in the and in prior legislation subject, earlier of the section under part consideration, some gives to all of the and makes its meaning act, provisions parts con- with sistent each other. It local control of preserves streets for in all of which the purposes, the acts legislature under consideration has sought protect. Considering act as a it has whole, the effect to extend the life of the corpora- tions ninety-nine years and to authorize the use of the streets of with the Chicago, consent and terms agreed upon council, may be right like manner acquired the extended during life of the corporations such periods as may be contracted for. Contracts already made are af- as firmed made. The transfers between the companies are validated.-
Further contracts may be into and entered amendments made without resort to new empowering cor- legislation. TERM,
Opinion of the Court. 201-U. S. as the of is porations, amendment right given, reserving by of modification or a majority the aldermen right repeal, elected or act of General a Assembly, right charge than five rate cents. higher if a
While it is true that act the State had conferred ninety-nine to use grant the'streets for right period entitled to the clause years, contract protection any such subse- Constitution, could not be right impaired it is the contin- quent worthy note, legislation, showing of March, uous that in the act policy State, legislative it was Chicago, pro- the charter amending that no to use should-be vided the streets grant already extended, or those vote of given, unless given three-fourths of all the aldermen and that no elected, grant, consent or theretofore thereafter permission made-,or given year should case extended within one given, until consent or and in case expiration grant, permission, receive mayor veto such should permission grant the vote of three-fourths of all the aldermen. This shows with the consistent of local inconsistent policy control, of a made streets for theory already use of the ninety-nine years.
In the conclusions as to the proper herein stated reaching act of we 1859, the act of construction amending the fact that much can be in not unmindful of said favor are view for the learned counsel for com- by .contended this as have is no construction of we act, said, panies. difficulty. free from means that
It is true Governor in returning his Oglesby message his main- act with veto it construction which would gave this ninety-nine to use the streets for tain the period right /the his construction was than dem- years. assumed rather While im- his stress of onstrated, argument upon invalidity of thus postponing constitutional propriety his that it admitted may be purchase, of the act sustains the view contended interpretation BLAIR v. CHICAGO. Opinion U. S. of the Court. as But, said, we have the act its companies. face must
is and uncertain. We it ambiguous the, judge in which it A can expressed. terms is construction be it given extend all which would the contracts with the for the term years. On other it ninety-nine hand, can be maintained, least, at equal force, that, the Governor’s notwithstanding made, it affirmed the contracts as thus view, distinctly reeog- short term of comparatively nizing twenty-five years, which It they expressly stipulated. be, must un therefore, certain whether the voted for legislators one' may the other. It that very construction be ambiguity of the act was the means of securing passage. Legislative of this character should be in form such grants unequivocal may mind be legislative distinctly expression impressed that with their character order that and'import, the privileges intelligently granted be It purposely withheld. that matter of common of this character knowledge grants by those interested usually prepared them, are sub awith view to obtain from to the such legislature bodies .mitted they most liberal are grant willing many is one reasons they This are to among why- be give. Pierce on Railroads, construed. New Orleans strictly &c New Orleans, Railroad Co. La. Ann. 429, 447. said Mr. equivocal import,” “Words Justice Chief Black, Canal Company Railroad Pennsylvania Commissioners, “ inserted mistake easily are so or fraud 9, 22, Pa. St. that of.justice consideration every policy that requires they they when find nugatory should treated do way their into of the 'legislature.” enactments “The just presumption,” in his on Cooley work says Constitutional 7th Limitations, ed. every “in such case is p. has State granted terms all express at designed all;” and, after from the quoting of Pennsylvania Court Supreme same effect, the learned “This is sound author observes: doctrine, *59 and should enforced.” and be observed vigilantly College 4 Case, the decision the Dartmouth Wheat
Since TERM, 472' Opinion U. of the Court. S. en 518, this court has had occasion to frequent apply a forcé grant public property the doctrine rights by beneficiary will amount to contract entitled accepted State or to action protection impairment against authority.’ under Concurrent state municipalities acting an when this to be considered principle construing .and is well established this character alleged grant equally made in terms rule, plain which such to be requires grants . property, order convey private public rights respect inter in the future control of such public prevent clearness Chief est. rule was laid down with Justice The. Bridge of Charles River Warren Taney in the often-cited case uniformly many and has been applied Pet. Bridge, Chesapeake In Perrine v. & cases in court. subsequent eminent 172, 192, Canal How. same Company, Delaware con said: “The rule of court, Chief Justice, speaking ,. . description this, struction in of this is cases —that must operate in the against terms ambiguity corporation and in favor of the public, the corporation the law. We do clearly that is not given can claim nothing is to a strained or say that the charter receive not mean to obvious intention of construction, contrary unusual fairly considered, It must be examined the grant. In of The justly Bing the case reasonably expounded.” is 51, 75, 3 Wall. said: “The Bridge, principle hamton which asserted the State must that all are this, against and not raised inference defined, presumption; clearly be it does power, is silent about not exist. if the charter instrument, reasonable arise doubts fair reading on a If, it, those doubts given interpretation to the proper as State; and where it suscep in favor solved are to be and the other extend the one restricting of two meanings, tible construction is to be corporation, the powers ing harm the least State.” works the adopted declared axiomatic a doctrine has been This principle U. Fertilizing Hyde Park, this court. Company *60 v. BLAIR CHICAGO. 473 of the .Opinion Court. 666. In Slidell U. Grandjean, 412, it declared 438, a wise “it serves to doctrine, by concealed purpose defeat the skillful use of terms, accomplish something apparent on the face of act, and thus sanctions'-only open dealing the. bodies.” other legislative cases Among affirming in this court is Coosaw South Caro principle Mining Company v. 550, U. S. in which was of two lina, applied adopting, doubtful one State. constructions, more favorable to the are cited in a to Knoxville Many cases note Water Com at pany Knoxville, decided this term'. 200 U. S. 22, uniformly so -and Applying principle frequently asserted maintained, we think it cannot' be successfully maintained that the act of 1865 contains clear expression legislative intention to extend the franchise of these to use the companies without streets reference to the assent'of Chicago, city, term and for that time ninety-nine the long years, pre other and different legislation restricting grant venting of a exclusive So enormous practically privi right. any railway an exclusion from streets of some leges*including conferred in not to be or held to be system, ought presumed doubtful and words. of this character are Grants ambiguous an not to be unreasonable narrow destroyed interpreta n But if is fatal claim of as tion. to such ambiguity for the reason must such public,' stronger grants against asserted, and exclusive as are here fail far-reaching can strained construction "they only when maintained by favor. their of the act of was affirm the as The effect contracts the council and the these contracts companies; made between subsequent as unless concluded, must stand changed agree- (cid:127) As we have parties. said, ment between principal in the case concerns the construction the.act question ' as amended act of February 14, 1859, February 6, Circuit that the Court, opinion The .learned holding right term streets extended for the prolonged use fife of the also held companies, adoption corporate TERM, 1905. Opinion of the Court. 201 IT. S. May, the' Cities and Act Villages Chicago, which' act was under the constitution of Illinois, taking. passed effect in an end to put acts, streets under the-former
to thereafter designate subject made to the limitation contracts were subsequently Act of the Cities and twenty Villages years, provided which it con- principles upon 1872. The court applied *61 strued, as to numerous the in effect question, acts gave subject of contracts between streets which weré (cid:127) the decree must be Under our conclusions the companies. we the act and the construction have reversed, given in the that rendered Circuit. a decree require differing But shall not streets'. we Court, particular when applied in detail and shall leave take these controversies up„all of the the lines of Circuit Court a decree readjustment upon ip case certain matters are, however, this There opinion. and should be determined before fully been argued have in the Circuit On these considered Court. the case is again discussion, will extended of the case we not enter upon features n indicate our views them. briefly but the learned Court by amending It'Was held Circuit City Railway of 1865 had to the North application Chicago act and had the to extend life corporate effect Company, think this a the tenth By is correct view. We company. of 1859 all the im- powers, of thé act grants, privileges, section franchises conferred Earmalee and others, munities n and west for the south divisions Chi- act by the certain by the persons corporate' conferred upon were cago, City Railway Chicago Company, North name of the county fully as city, Cook, division of the north act by had been separate if effectually they incorporated, immunities, powers, said all of grants, act of 1865 the corpo- first section By franchises. created City Railway Company, Chicago lives porate first, act West Chicago section of created the first section Railway Company, Division v. BLAIR CHICAGO. Opinion of the Court. of 1861, expressly years. were extended for ninety-nine was said of the North specifically City
While nothing in this Railway Company the tenth connection, section think, we act, amendment, this should be read in con- after act, nection with the so that the act amended of 1859 is to be read as if it had been in the form. In this originally amended view life the extended first corporations created section must be read into the charter of the North Chicago Railway Company, created the tenth section.
We believe view is sustained by reason and authority. Holbrook v. Nichol, 36 Illinois, The rule was thus stated in Farrell State, J. 421: N. “-As a rule of Law, construc tion, statute amended is to be understood in the same sense as if it exactly had read from the itas does beginning amended. Circuit People Judge, In Conrad Michigan, v. Nall, 275, a Michigan, section of the code chapter amended, it was held that it was not intended to operate of the other independently provisions the chapter, but that the Mole chapter form present must be read .as one act. The rule is correctly stated Endlich on section Statutes, *62 as follows: 'A 294, statute which is amended is thereafter, and' as to all acts to subsequently done, be construed as if the always amendment had been there, and the amendment itself so becómes a of thoroughly part that original statute, it must in view of the be'construed, as it statute, original stands after the amendments are introduced matters super ” by the seded amendments eliminated.’ This view is strength by the ened of the second which language section, of speaks the deeds transfer between rights the corporations, in acts, “any said several two of them.”
The has Chicago constantly recognized corporate of this existence company has made numerous agreements with it as such In corporation. Chicago Wall. Sheldon, 50, a contract in'considering between the North Chicago City Railway Company and the city as to the extent of street im- by way provement etc., paying, could be required TERM,
Opinion of the Court. 201 ü. S. of May 23, the ordinance 1859, under company granting this streets, court, in rights speaking through privileges "A Nelson, Mr. concluded its as follows: opinion point Justice to conferred, made that the has not or intended legislature We authority to make this contract. confer, only conferred, that full was not but only say need body.” The by itself has since ratified the contract been to obviously referred contract, justice, learned speaking con- authority under theprdinance May 23,1859, passed 1859, by and the ratification February the act of 14, ferred have no February 1865. We 6, under the legislature to the North apply that this act was intended Chicago doubt well as to the specifically' as Railway Company companies of 1858 in of the act. ordinance covered the first section "said rail- operate its tenth section gave and thereafter ways twenty-five years, parties operating until the of all railways enjoyment granted said privileges pur- order for purpose common council shall elect sta- houses, station railway cars, the tracks, chase carriages, kind and every furniture implements tion grounds,- of said and operation used the construction description By or the and about the same.” railways appurtenances act of all February 14, 1859, rights seven of the section so to or intended Parmalee granted privileges and amendments were confirmed by the ordinances others, The affirmance of these corporations. rights in the and vested the 'sanction and them part them made gave Afterwards and privi- act. certain legislative City Railway were transferred Company of the Chicago leges conveyance, stated said July the deed of Division This deed of Railway Company. West system the' act of 1865. Later the is confirmed transfer *63 city ordinances of the under extended .railways was (cid:127) It is the contention of trustees. boards of village the assent railway of the the reason by premises that receivers of the for system the entire operate to entitled became compalfies CHICAGO. BLAIR % Opinion of the Court. years of the act of 1865—for ninety-nine period the extended shall city lawfully until the pur- —and thereafter Chicago the said railways, property, chase all of equipment appur- the same in cash at its then tenances, pay appraised It is the contention the value.' extension virtue of the af- 1858, the ordinance of purchase right act of 1859 and the must firmed the amendment of be streets covered ordinance of confined to the That the the streets use under ordinance of 1858 right n to all was extended to use the subsequently acquired rights contracts, streets under so that the would new con- right tinue purchase until be made the entire of both property cannot systems railway, we It concede. does violence to of the ordinance of 1858, language which, by terms, ‘railways limited to the and thereby therein provided for, and an extension of would be corporate privileges implication, of the in violence settled rule which have had we occasion to refer discussion. principal
While not conceding soundness contention of purchase is extended to all right property railway companies by reason the unity of the system, there certain ordinances confirmed by the act of re- are attention. As we quire special have seen, ordinance of May 23, 1859, was permission lay given railway street on certain streets and along in the south and bridges west divisions of “and the same to Chicago, keep,.main- tain use and to operate thereon cars and carriages all the term of the during said act of'February 14, 1859, speci- and prescribed,- fied the manner and upon the conditions hereinafter designated.” On the same day, May 23, made North Railway Company to use certain streets, in force for granted the benefit of the company twenty-five full term of years from passage ordinance This longer. difference in the to the two grants rail- no. is significant. In way companies the ordinance of 1858 *64 TERM,
Opinion of the Court. was for the grant twenty-five to Parmalee. others term of of years, the the parties railways the operating all enjoy by the said until the common council elect tracks order for that the and other purpose purchase prop- in erty used the said operation railways construction in the- same the appurtenances, pay for manner desig- confirmed, nated in was the ordinance. This expressly grant by in 1859, the act of section Otherwise there seven thereof. in for .which was no that act the time specific -fixing grant we have streets. As railway company might operate of what in that law there a distinct affirmation seen, was do, had the corporators common council authorized to do contract. corporation authorize the might thereafter to the act City Railway prior The North Chicago Company, streets. The reason for the 1859, had no agreement we think, companies,, of different terms grant different was made to the term west side reference On the apparent. for the February 14, 1859, purpose giv- granted term as had the same City Railway Company the Chicago ing as to the streets named and confirmed therein been granted in our 1858, and, judgment, gave in the ordinance August, terms, is, twenty- in the same company to that grant in the manner city until the purchase desig- and' years, five. ‘ side, there no such legislative On" the north being nated. undertaken to conferred already be confirmation was limited to specifically- period council, grant no “and longer.” twenty-five years, effect of the ordinances passed considering In period Chicago council common briefly sum- May 1875, be well 3, 1859, February, will found in They ordinances. these the terms marize margin.1 following: we find side west On May 23, 1859— 14, 1859, February in the said act of the term during all “A the time designated and Streets prescribed.” are specified i).
BLAIR CHICAGO. ' Opinion of the Court. U. S. the Cities Act of Villages After the-passage-of following accepted May, or- passed, ordinance being “compromise .so-called dinance:” *65 railways completion limited, for thereon is some for at three five, months, year eighteen months, others at one and still practicable.” others “as soon 13,
February 1860— Amendatory above last-mentioned ordinance. Extends the completion years some, to ten for five-years .time for others. must be completed Certain lines mentioned years. two 18, November 1861—' Exempting substituting certain streets and others. Ordinance- of 23, 1869, May except as amended, force and time completion railways named years certain extended to five 16, November 1863— Excluding railways from certain streets named. 14,1864— March Releasing substituting one street and another. 28,1864- Match Authority to remove from one street to another. 28,1864— March temporary Authorizing, tracks bridge while a is being constructed. 11, July 1864— 1864, 28, Amending ordinances March repealing the temporary use of certain streets. 17,1864— August lines, others, Creating new extending and regulating the use thereof. completion ninety days Times for fixed at and fifteen months. No or, time directly. duration stated reference or 13,1871— November Extension of on tracks certain streets named. MarchS, 1875— Authorizing operation the construction and of a new line. To be 1, 1876, completed October and the term 1, to extend to October 1894, purchased and thereafter until city. April 19,1875— Amending last-mentioned ordinance as to certain legal uses' and claims arising operation from of the lines. On the we following: north side find the 23,1859- May “twenty-five years Term longer.” and no completion Times for fixed January, 1860, July, 1862, at different for some than others. 18, January 1864— Term “subject all rules and limitations and restrictions” TERM, 1905.
Opinion of Court. U. 1883)— (amended 6, July August twenty years term for from this date. Extending City Railway North Accepted by Chicago Company, City Railway by the Chicago Company August División Railway West Company, and the 10, 1883. August in this contained this “but proviso, nothing
This ordinance man- shall contained, hereof, or the acceptance section or alter the impair, change existing rights, duties, ner ob- companies, or of said respectively, ligations years term of hereinbefore mentioned.” and after said through consistent perceive purpose running, We thus term of to adhere to the company the north side grants May 23, 1859, limiting ordinance the original “and no years, to the streets period use the twénty-five ordinances, in subsequent prior' reference longer,” character We do not the exceptional regard ordinance. *66 as 26, 1875, amended 26, 1874, April of October the ordinance re- the ordinances, purpose as to other general overcoming, a in part in That ordinance grant flected them. ' 23, May Authorizes connection prescribed in ordinance of 1859. .the of tracks. 11,1864 August — n conditions, rights the and “subject to albthé restrictions Term 23, Time May in for privileges, of 1859. ordinance mentioned” restricted, sixty days, at unless etc. completion fixed May 8,1871- 1, 1872, completion for fixed at June for the street Time term. Same railway named. 20,1871— November prescribed limitations “subject to all rules and and restrictions” Term 23, May Rights shall granted in ordinance of-yeárs. a term for continue 26, 1874—(cid:127) October 1894, by the 1, purchased and thereafter until until October Term City July 1, Chicago completed lessee of 1875. As city. To portion. Railway Company to certain as 26,1875— April ordinance, Amending the last-mentioned similar to otherwise to conditions. as terms
it
BLAIR v. CHICAGO. Opinion of the Court. U. S. North the lessee Com- Company Chicago in and was doubtless terms to make it changed comply pany, of the latter as to in which with the streets company operated.
As to the west side we find companies running through in the by the ordinances divisions covered making grants to of the system preserve original permission purpose the use of 16, 1858, ordinance granted August years and until twénty-five purchase by streets the term May in city. 23, used the ordinance of language 1859, “ all term said streets, the use is .granting during A. D. February, specified the fourteenth' 1859, This similar prior ones passed prescribed.” .ordinance February act of 6, 1865, act, were confirmed under them were reserved ordinance compromise were July 10, We hold that when streets occupied has authority company under the these ordinances the shall purchase the'use streets right until the contracts thus under made.
In the west side the ordinance of system, August term We think this in- silent as to the do not grant.. if it had on the even part city, dicates intention acts confer existence, under then legislative streets, occupancy point perpetuity do feel called The other ordi- which we decide.. prior terms references ordinances have nances direct side system for the'west made' the term grants twenty-fiye until the man- years, purchase city, do and we not think intention to stated, ner there was any *67 from the depart plan in.this one ordinance omitting specifi- cally to name a definite At this time of time occupancy. had there been no the life of corporation, extension of it twenty-five years. and was limited specifically conclusion, In are not unmindful of the de this we reaching Railway cision of in Citizens’ this Detroit court Detroit a corpo- 368, 395, holding although Company, U. that oci—31 vol. TERM, '
Opinion of the Court. tor' a- the terms of its limited organized period ration be ¡would inure to the bene- charter, may receive grant lawfully fit of those entitled to succeed rights, for a corporation, years beyond although period corpo- rate fife. But in the be present case right granted must construed with reference to the which it was system made of. and where the terms of the were limited to part, twenty- grant until years, five we can find no intention to purchase, a perpetuity years because term of simply no receive was named in the one ordinance under consideration.
It is contended whatever would otherwise- be included contracts confirmed the act of 1865, they were lost the companies conferred accepting privileges in the ordinances” of “power 7, 1886, and March 30, June 1888. But prior of those was the the-passage ordinances ” so-called “compromise ordinance of as July 10,1883, amended certain August 6, settling controversies as to license fees and street paving, the time of extending operation for twenty years, further “But in this providing: nothing contained, section or the acceptance hereof, shall in mari- ner impair, alter the change duties and existing rights, city, or of said obligations companies, respectively, from and after the expiration of the said term years herein- In before mentioned.” the North City Railway Chicago ordinance the West City Railway Company ordinance clauses are inserted to the effect that privileges to time after the expiration of the term of twenty years are to by ordinances theretofore In governed passed. view of are of reservation we opinion whatever rights had company the streets privileges after the expiration time limitation the “power ordinances” were not lost acceptance conferred in those ordi- nances.
It is that the railway contended companies had no power ordinances for the use of other than accept animal because railways, operation of the various titles
BLAIR v. CHICAGO. Court; Opinion of the S.
20m. the charter companies, acts which constituted limiting animal the use of because of constitu- power, them to the to in which we have referred earlier this opin- tional provision, local more ion, that no or law shall embrace private providing which shall in its We than be title. subject, expressed one in think intention legislature respect the animal of road but to operation to confine power, railway street incorporate companies distinguished and to endow with railways, steam them and privi- (act 1865) acts. named Section two of law of leges amendment, gives power expressly providing “it for the said common competent council, shall.be written or consent concurrence of the other or or party parties any of said contracts, their assigns stipulations, licenses or annul undertakings, amend, modify the same.” We think this was broad power to authorize the enough railway a company grant, accept, changed operation railways method thereto applying and more new efficient economical It is true that power. Court Illinois in North Supreme Chicago City Railway v. Town Lake Company View, 105 held that Illinois, 207, North the charter Railway had Chicago Company a steam but not authorized that court railway, has held in an later decisions that railway, electric under incorporated incorporation acts build horse and dummy general railways, a street might railway to be organize company operated motive, electricity other than steam, and' might appropriate private property this purpose. Harvey Aurora & Geneva Railway Company, Illinois, The court has also held that provisions horse and dummy act to electric applied as did companies, paragraph the general incorporation act in regard to horse railways. We think the Illinois cases the distinc- recognize tion in that State legislation between railways intended to operated upon streets of the other cities for accommodation, and railways steam as such local are TERM, 1905.
'484 Opinion the Court. U. And the inserted declaration understood.. generally ‘ will they railways, concern horse acts, not, title *69 the of the constitutional exercise provision,' prevent because lawby' amendment conferred the power upon in to the use of the such manner as authorize companies the as and cable. We with learned electricity such power agree to methods Circuit Court these grants changed within the--powers were conferred operation legally 9, 1897, on June Furthermore, legislature passed an. to under companies act having application organized gen- such rail- “Every which street special laws, provided: eral or other may .animal-, cable, any electric or way operated by be or be have been shall hereafter power granted motive or steam' public 'authorities, to it officers except the proper is that this was It triie statute repealed locomotive engines.” 7; 1899, March- but we do not perceive the act of how to contracts which ratify its effect were destroy could This view it un- when the act renders passed-. existence the city whether necessary pass question Chicago, to to authorize the use of new undertaken power, having authority money which sums of have been large faith can now be made, and extensive heard to changes expended authority had no to such say that it grant right. Circuit Court held .that
The learned privileges granted of the town of Jefferson were ordinances limited to under This it is years. contended twenty -ruling, Chicago is because of Railway erroneous, Division Company, West act of “Section 5. The said provided: corpo- hereby railways is authorized to said several ration extend any built in the manner aforesaid authorized herein in this county State; within of Cook, point points or all of rail- any to construct said corporation enable the-said corpo- or their authorized, ways appendages, therein private to take hereby apply is vested power ration manner prescribed,” property purposes authorized, hereby etc. 6: “The Section said corporation BLAIR v. CHICAGO. Opinion of the Court.
with the supervisor assent of down lay township, and maintain railway railways its said in, over upon, any common said in such man- along but highway township, ner as not to obstruct the common travel of the over the public same.” town of Jefferson was one of the townships Cook County, on the northwest. adjoining Chicago So far as the record no discloses, effort was made to extend the lines of the West Division Chicago Railway Company - into town .of until the. Jefferson 1877. Before that year the town of Jefferson had adopted provisions the Cities Act of in which the Villages use streets street was limited purposes twenty years. On January 28, 1878, the the ordi- village passed nance West granting Railway Division Com- and its successors the to maintain pany operate a *70 in street railway Milwaukee avenue and in' road, Armitage said village, thereby to ex- the-rights granted 'the tend for term of years. Under the act of eighty-one to lay 1859 the down tracks and maintain right over railways the common in the in along highways Cook townships County the consent of in required the.supervisor township. This does have been appear obtained, and when the authority was by the given president board of trustees it ‘the was village, subject already limitation referred to. We cannot assent to the soundness of the that argument act of in of the 1859, the event abolition of the office of super- visor, the life of the during corporation, would authorize the' extension to these of the adjoining townships system of rail- ways intended to be constructed, without official consent.
Before the of the act of passage the board incorporating trustees the town of Lake View, supervisors granted to use permits some of of Lake This highways township. authority was and six of the act under sections five .exercised of February 1859. We the duration of cannot agree these permits would in of the fact that perpetuity, because no time in them. The into specifically named extension TERM, 1905.
Opinion of the Court. of the north side which railway system, Lake View was part the-city were limited to twenty- the terms the grants could certainly five no .There be no inten- years, longer. from, tion in these as exten- supervisors granting permits sions of to make when the system perpetual grants, of user main of the line was limited part expressly A fair inference would be in twenty-five years. that, extend- so as to a system make of that part portion ing such were to be for already the same term granted, grants As' to in already those made. extensions the town of Lake than from the obtained otherwise View, supervisors, appears an act was “An February 16, 1865, that on entitled passed á act to board trustees for the town Lake incorporate .of in and it was County,” Cook View, provided super- and commissioners of visors, assessors highways their in- successors office should be constituted and incorporated, a ex board of trustees for the said town officio, of Lake. View. March an 5, 1867, amendatory On was passed entitled “An act to board trustees for incorporate the town of in Cook County,” (section Lake View, provided 7) that the board of trustees should have the control and supervision streets, alleys highways, public parks said town. This afterwards passed ordinances lay- board consenting down of tracks the town of Lake View, on a ing number avenues streets' named the ordinances. courts are much
The cases the state divided as to the right because of its corporation, of municipal charter streets, use thereof controlling to a street *71 of Some the cases are railway collected in company. Detroit Company v. 64 Fed. Railway Detroit, Citizens’ Rep. 628, 637. six, section consent 1859, required The act of of the super- of the railways visor to the extension into of Cook townships of a County outside When the became Chicago. supervisor board member of trustees and township that board gave we think this consent, satisfied the requirement of the act have respect. legislature might given
BLAIR v. CHICAGO. Opinion of the Court: to extend its lines in company right Cook County without , the consent of local any authority. We not are concerned general with powers supervisor. When the legis- him as designated lature the official whose assent should be obtained it him empowered such give assent, when any given substantial way that satisfied the requirements the act As we understand the decisions of the Supreme Court Illinois, to control the power streets and by the highways trustees, by the act of township 1867, March would given 5, include the to authorize their right use street railway pur Municipal Gas In poses. Co. v. The Town Light Lake, Illinois, 42, the court held: “The to con power trol and regulate streets, alleys and other public places within limits of the town Lake, any abate obstruc tions, encroachments or nuisances thereon, was in its given, charter, to corporate authorities town. Under this town could lawfully permit any use of such power streets that is alleys consistent with the public objects for which a a they held, are could make for the grant right way and mains under the purpose lasting gas pipes surface.” In Blocki, People Illinois, 363, 368, same court said, reference to a having switch lay tracks “The street, street: at the time said permits were granted, was under the control the board of trustees of the town of and under the conferred Lake, municipality , by law it was to allow authorized the use of said for any street not purpose incompatible for which it piirpose was established, to allow railroad track to be laid therein was not a use incompatible with the it purpose which was In established.” City Quincy Bull, 106 Illinois, on “ 349 it In page said: this State there is vested munici pal corporations fee title to simple the’streets. Under very exclusive control over well power.of streets, settled by decisions of this court that municipal authorities may do anything with, of, or allow use streets which is in- *72 TERM,
488 Opinion of the Court. 201 U. S. established, ends for which streets are with the compatible to and that it use of a-'street allow a railroad legitimate e Moses Ft. Pittsburg, Wayn track to laid down it. be v. 515; & v. Co., Illinois, Murphy Railroad Chicago of Co. Railway & Northwestern Chicago, Illinois, In Illinois de 251.” view these Illinois, v. People ex rel., we think of,the.State, acts the cisions, construing legislative that the trustees holding the learned Oifcuit Court erred railway to the use of Lake had no power grant town of the streets for street purposes. for, as to term which the remains question .the of Lake View municipality the. trustees
granted these required were to be The ordinances making grants held.. municipalities, certain duties company perform as the subject approval such laying pavement town of Lake 16, 1887, .trustees. On April incorporated as the of Lake View under city View became incorporated July 15, 1889, the Cities and Act of 1872. On Villages included in the View was annexed territory Lake ' the, think terms We' in such case that Chicago. , beyond would not extend the life- corporation granted a defi- them where there was no to confer attempt conferring that term, nite without it within deciding, assuming, Our authority of municipality perpetuity. called to a case Supreme attention has been late decided rel. not Co., ex Illinois, People Chicago Telephone Court ’ it in which was held where trustees officially reported, telephone and towns have rights extending villages granted such could not not a definite period, grants beyond not extend construed-to be did perpetuities says: The court the lives them. corporations granting does claim ordinance the defendant’s that the “The ground territory is that before limit its the annexed charges had granted the minor' municipalities annexation without business, therein for the streets occupy for terms of If had been limits time. grants as to BLAIR CHICAGO. Opinion the Court. authority and the under
years authorizing them, legislative *73 beyond the existence of the term had corporations extended there be for privileges, might ground saying granting city, were because had be- upon they -the binding grants under which the had contracts defendants vested come binding such but were not definite term; they contract for rights in consideration and the were some- periods, furnishing grants or such as the town to village, to service thing telephone hall or the authorities, town or free or some village village rate. cannot be construed reduced Such to be grants perpet- extend beyond at cannot ual, and lives of the cor- most, annexation porations Upon them. there ceased granting be authorities entitled to any town the benefits of village or authorized demand receive them, contract and it could understood not have been could continue, annexed to it. . . obligation . discharged city extended ordinances of the over the annexed territory annexation, Illinois Central immediately R. R. upon Co. v. U. S. and the Chicago, limitations of the ordi- territory.” nance annexed applied view,
This seems to us reasonable 'the construc- being tion of the court the State of Illinois, of. we are highest willing it. Furthermore, these in accept grants Lake View were system, mere extensions the old as we which, have seen, limited to use the streets received from of twenty-five years, to the term extended twenty years by the In compromise ordinance. the absence of lan- express term, we do not guage conferring longer think it was intended to extend the grant beyond the already period permitted to the system by from the grants city.
As said, dp we have we not deem it necessary to take all up the questions were raised and determined the Cir which1 cuit Court the case considering the decree in settling that court. Upon further this proceedings judgment court only to be held conclusive matters upon specifically stated opinion. TERM,, Brown, JJ., dissenting. 201 U. S.
McKenna, Brewer and the cause the Circuit The decree is reversed and remanded with the views herein Court accordance proceedings, for further expressed. whom McKenna,
Mr. Justice concur Mr. Justice Brown, Mr. Justice dissenting. Brewer case as to common all the railways This questions depends the acts of 1859 and incidentally mainly upon 1865— of 1861. The omitted the act latter from special Laws consideration, as others: Private depends upon Illinois, It West incorporated' p. to that all the Railway Company company Division gave second, conferred the other powers companies *74 fourth and sixth sections of the third, act of 1859. be, of acts they
It will observed the of 1859 and of corporations respectively twenty-five created the period" ninety-nine years, construct, and and them" to empowered - in maintain and and double operate single track Chicago. as was fall into acts, by Court,
The remarked the Circuit (1) divisions: The the of the part, authority three granting (2) to railways; construct the part, companies identifying (3) the the by council; of streets the common the designation and conditions of the by the streets occupation terms and manner in which the terms and conditions the companies shall be prescribed. - is contro- of the third one chief
The meaning division the of words,' authority in the in other extent the case; versies virtually authority it an of common council—whether was in the streets or authority regulate rights by as is or, aptly expressed conferred .legislature; fix it was an Court, authority whether stipulation Circuit side that which relates “to the physical with the companies of of the-streets or the administrative side occupancy > lines.” operation BLAIR, *. CHICAGO. McKenna, Brown, JJ., Brewer U. S.. and dissenting.
It will convenient in' discussion exhibit the acts of and wherein the latter showing former, amends omitting provision extending corporate lives from twenty-five years ninety-nine companies years, about which there nois dispute. words italics are amend- ments made the act of 1865:
"The said corporation hereby authorized and empowered construct, maintain operate or track double single with all railway, necessary convenient tracks for turn-outs, side tracks appendages, city and in, on, such over street or along streets, or highway highways, or or rivers, river within the or bridge bridge's,, future present limits of the South and West Divisions of of Chi- [or] as the common council of said have cago, authorized said or any them or shall corporators time authorize time to said or so to either corporations, do, such manner them, such terms conditions and with such rights and n privileges, exemptions as the said common immunities and council has or may by contract with said any or or parties, them, either and any prescribe; and all acts or deeds trans- or rights, privileges between the corporations franchises fer acts said several or two named, any them, and all contracts, licenses and stipulations, undertakings entered into or made, given, the, and made amended and between said common coun- one more cil, said corporations, respecting the use or exclusion location, railways in or streets, *75 or any said shall be them, city, deemed and held and continued of during hereof, valid and to all effectual, intents force life a, and as made purposes, and the part, same are made a hereby if said several acts: part, Provided .that it shall be competent the said common council, with the written consent -concurrence or the other party or their parties, to assigns, said con- tracts, licenses or stipulations', to undertakings, amend, modify or annul the same.” obvious,
It is as far as words can and as accomplish it, di- as words rectly can accomplish it, the companies were granted TERM, 1905. Brown, JJ., dissenting.
McKenna, 201 U. Bbewek ” “ railways maintain construct, operate could have granted And no other city. power of the the streets 73 Illi rel., ex People City Ry. Co. such right. nois, is, course, come from State
That such must grant passed of rights it is but denied, urged, city, city of the agency through companies is based the State’s This power. delegation receiving authority and the city’s charter, given the words of the con- 1865,to the “terms and designate in the acts of 1859 and ” be occupied. which the streets might ditions upon unim- acts it comparatively I makes The view take to be a charter. There seemed city’s to consider portant themselves, and they complete were necessity acts, what were con- of power, except of other grants independent If charter was _adequate them. tinued or confirmed won- streets, over the we in the city plenary .invest many years of mis-» statutes and der-at the enactment of those and concern about them. Counsel for them apprehension not seem to be and the assertion does companies assert, the Circuit Court of that an was issued injunction denied, of tracks under the or- County,' restraining laying Cook city, however, .power The extent dinance will now more at length, I shall consider presently pass insists conferred authority wtuch.the the act those parts ~ common council: on words, on “terms and of .the is The stress argument city contends, division.- The the third conditions,” the decree the Circuit decides, Court, reversing the- court terms condi authority- prescribe the- included the authority of the streets occupation tions of n I dissent from that interpreta occupation. time of fix the It is to the context opposed reasons. tion for several ¿re used. It and conditions” “terms which the words It would be natural meaning. primary their opposed destroy dis-. them, disregard a careless of. employment *76 BLAIR v. CHICAGO. McKenna, Brown, JJ., dissenting. Brewer necessary
tinctions to be observed. As was said the Cir by. cuit Court,- ordinarily those terms legal are not phraseology “to employed convey over the .time or power period .through which the tenure dealt with is run; conveys intended to but over, or power relates to the in means, methods, and the cidents connected with the exercise of such Citing tenure:”. Hurd v. Whitsett, Colorado, R. R. Co. Terminal v. Chicago, 203 Illinois, 576. Of course, directness and sim of methods are not plicity always used, but some argument can be based on their omission, it is to believe natural that had been intended to for to give power contended words would not city, have been which employed would to be turned from their first and signification have legal and which it, could be express claimed to inbe opposition other parts act, and made besides, dependent, contracts companies, only could be amended consents, of bj1- the companies. The would have more directly been' conferred delegation whole matter to the* and would city,’ been have absolute —not limited embarrassed -or conditions opposed unnecessary to it. á certainly
The act 1859 was direct from the State time of companies their charter life, and the the. or the necessity advisibility conferring authority limit the time of occupancy the streets could not ex-, have into the of anybody. entered head No conditions isted which the necessity or suggested prudence giving authority. such The time of occupancy expressed of 1858, ordinance the time of the life of corporations prescribed of 1859, in the act and the time which the .franchises con- by that act could ferred be exerciseá, all coincided. It could have, riot occurred to any one that twenty-five years, term fixed in all the instruments, was injuriously and de- long manded somewhere limit authority To these to. .excess. “ considerations as the words proof terms and condi- authority tions” were not intended to prescribe time give TERM, *77 Brown, JJ., dissenting. McKenna, U. S. 201 Brewer and of the streets be added contem- of of occupancy porary practice. in 1859 the time of was passed an ordinance By occupation “ in of all the term the said act to be- during
expressed, A. D. and 1859, specified prescribed.” of fourteenth February, (cid:127) “is a distinct by counsel the companies, as said This, recog- for. for of fran- enjoyment fact that the Of the terni nition and was not statute, found in the among was to be chise ordinance the contract which the prescribe.” of might elements a of 1865 there came With the act change—differences of conspicuous import. from act of 1859 striking not be too full of to considered meaning These differences were , of not they of the act were misunder enlargements ninety- The lives of the were extended to corporations stood. about and it this, There is would years. dispute nine no. that the on of provisions other were account necessarily seem of the extension. And the ex and completed purpose It was certainly tension had some valuable purpose. the time only of abstract extending purpose exercise, no with to do—no functions nothing rights, beings can conceive, the latter we be as. no obligations might, —and as the former the com for the enforce necessary public . Traction Co. v. Chicago, Union to exercise panies a It be' confusion con would Illinois, strange a the existence of corporation make purposes founding than that which it created do. Neces more important the term the arid went sarily, together, rights life functions term of corporations coinciding obligations life. their and the corpora- the life
This coincidence easily we can resolve whatever kept mind, tions being of 1865. It will to every in the statute give are ambiguities distinct which was keep a and meaning, word use and the powers exercised exercised legislature me, Let at the expense repetition, common council. the. The act of 1865, amending enter some detail. into BLAIR v. CHICAGO. JJ'., McKenna, Brown, dissenting. Brewer U. the life 1859,. twenty-five enlarged corporations (cid:127) ninety-nine and in
years years, section empowered to “construct, maintain and companies operate” single track of railway double the streets These Chicago. words necessarily imported Time was continuing power. very essence It is true that there was no right. of time but the life of the designation but this corporations, was sufficient in the absence of there was qualification, no qualification, certainly words. Streets explicit none by name, were not but a certain all designated sense streets *78 -subject were to whatever was' it could be given, though in exercised none without the of the common designation council. This is to be made dominant —deter- sought very minative, indeed, of the of power the the city, city making— in of effect, the source the not rights companies, merely the of the manner of regulator those exercising rights. is
Upon the conclusion reasoning based? Before . . con- what mg the however, let sidering question, refer to statement in the -that “the council Opinion made and the companies ordinances accepted specific of time fixing occupancy, as had been done of original May ordinances And neither before nor after the act of 1865 passage" ninety-nine was the year term or acted recognizéd Upon ordinances the use I am uncertain as granting streets.” to the conclusión deduced from the statement. It needs (cid:127) some alone it explanation. Standing may an erró- produce (cid:127) neous If impression. the companies' accepted ordinances, conceding power city, without' or protest reservation of their under the act 1865 to terms of occu- longer pancy, there could be no controversy over the interpretation the act of 1865. Other considerations would and supervene (cid:127) demand attention. Counsel for the city contended for an estoppel against the companies, and court has because the not responded to that contention, but discusses and bases its opinion upon I meaning act, also have discussed as meaning necessary to the case and it; determinative of TERM, Brown, JJ., dissenting.
McKenna, and Brewer I what and recur to the question, Upon reasoning plenary the city'supported? First, me of the act quote 1865, separated let language I to the present think are relevant parts which is authorized corporation of. the discussion: “The said part and operate single maintain empowered construct, or track . . in the Chicago, double . .' . as the such street or streets over and on, along in/ authorized said corporators, of said have common council said cor- from time time authorize or or shall any them, manner and do, in such them, or so either porations, as said common ... such conditions terms by contract with said parties, or council hias (prescribed)1 . . and any them, or either of any prescribe, or of transfer of or.franchises rights, privileges, all acts' or deeds naméd, or any several acts said corporations between under- licensés, and all them, contracts, stipulations, two of and as made or amended into or made, entered given takings one. council, any the said common between location, use or the said corporations,,respecting more of of. them of streets, railways exclusion or. continued in during shall be deemed and held and said city, force all as purposes valid intents hereof, life and-effectual *79 acts., (Italics mine.) said"several . . .” made part if in its re and, is unmistakable orderly me, The language necessary to element is omitted What lations and meaning. have, Not one. We purpose? a definite the clear expression if been, have there would that seen already given the'rights coincident the life time, other been no expression had how to implication, not left but was time ofJ corporations, It was expressed. have been. the implication might clear ever etc., shall be contracts, said that the rights, it is not It is true If it years. ninety-nine in force” for and continued “held 484, 524, _ Illinois, it Chicago, Co. In Traction Union applies, was acci ‘has’ the word to which ‘prescribed,’ “the word said dentally omitted.” BLAIR *. CHICAGO. Brown, McKenna, JJ., dissenting. U. Brewer and no
had, certainly there would be It would suit ambiguity. with the other words and their complete without meaning syllable. then change Why is there single ambiguity, if an we substitute for the equivalent “for phrase ninety-nine life If, years”? “during hereof,” is for equivalent that ninety-nine is, the life of years,” -what corporations, does mean?
There are various answers offered, some that accepting others it. One counsel for the meaning, disputing city sub- mits rather that tentatively the life words hereof” “during “ may be words of limitation, by that grants thus common council ratified should continue for term,” their full unless “the existence of one or corporate moré terminated or for- corporations dissolution period feiture within the which its in the streets It is said were “thus granted.” construed, the act means what it exactly says, that is, precisely during life, e., i. lives of the during corporate several companies^ with them council contracts made the common are as valid and effectual as if made of the act. . .” part
Other for the leave a counsel choice of interpretations. say “the the life hereof” expression They during is--vague It be capable three As ambiguous. interpretations: act; the life of the or the life deeds, licenses meaning contracts; lives the railway corporations, respec- They incline rather tively. second, and say that hereof” the life means the life the section “during or the mentioned the section, matters and .“hereof” should be to “thereof.” The court changed accepts neither of the but interpretations, authority another. It gives was advanced counsel apparent interpretations were restricted too too much the words of the act. ignored It clause the dives of apparent referred to 'the cor- (ninety-nine years), continued porations something those lives, so and the court as the continued selects “the things corporation acts or deeds of transfer between the so far as *80 vol. cci—32 TERM, JJ., dissenting. 201 U. S.. Brewer
McKenna, Brown, relate to they franchises which are not subject express limitations of the act —that they shall stand as made.” The is construction, not however, confidently It asserted. seems adopted submission to the rule of be strict construction. ' A word to that rule. therefore
I
the rule to be that
concede
a
nothing passes by
as those
acts
franchises, such
conferred
under review,
clearly
I
necessarily
unless
stated
but
do not
implied,
think
call for an
application
the statutes under review
yields
is
the acts
a
rule. Whatever
definite
ambiguous
application
and consistent
purpose
meaning
In such case
is no
rules of
there
interpretation.
place
simple
of strict construction. Our
abound in
reports
for the rule
controversy,
bold and able
whére,
public
cases
against
grants
sustained, and
division in the court has
been
where
marked
have
n
of the doubts
And
existed.
emphasis
strength
warn
care to
have taken
against
we
misunderstanding
It
in a case of
will be
import.
conceded,
the rule
significant
I
of taxation is the
highest
that
attribute of
think,
most, necessary to
it,
one the
against
sovereignty,
limitation, which all
The Delaware
proclaim.
intendments
Returning statutes, but required in the find' ambiguity rule to by any ’ Its first if what is found, argument? to solve rule every State policy, that it. was the assumption premise control) of the streets. Some the control in the vest it a qualified unlimited Was policy much? but how yes; *81 BLAIR v. CHICAGO. ' McKenna, Brown, JJ., dissenting.
201 U. S. Brewer and the control; or rights them the grant regulation rights? a Or, term, to use technical the or of franchises the grant grant of' administration over their power exercise? The answer is found in case of Chicago the R. v. The City Co. ex People rel., supra. on The case was based the and 1859, the derived right
n from it as distinguished derived from an ordi- rights was,said: nance of the It city. “It is a misconception the law to railway the derives company its to powers suppose a construct railroad from any ordinance of the city. All its is from authority the and is State, by its conferred charter. has to it the say to in what delegated p'ower manner what conditions the upon company may exercise the fran- chises conferred the State, but more/’ Thé reason nothing was that the ordinance emanated given from a source not to “competent grant franchise.” That power legislature alone The date of the possessed. ordinance was November 13, It that manifest, therefore, of the policy State Illinois up necessarily 1865, was not in.1859 its municipal give corporations Authority grant a in the streets, only but them to empowered regulate And it necessary right. decide the kind and the extent. that authority was vested in the city. It was i that the urged ordinance on passed purported grant “spécial privileges” .under, “franchises,” was therefore void the constitu- tion 1870. The court replied the ordinance did not a franchise and that no construction could the con- stitution be said to be a “limitation municipal corporation certain designate and fix the con- streets ditions a railway under company, organized n charter special previously a general under granted law adoption its constitution, lay might .since 548). track.” (p.
This view acquired from the emphasis opinion, dissenting which took issue with the court and virtually made and, , of the State, source rights not TERM, JJ., dissenting.'
McKenna, Brown, Brewer what, said, the court as to of the describing city, observed: “These special the rail- ways are said to be upon particular conferred, By streets city by ordinance, but the State the company’s ’’ (Italics mine.) city only and the the use. charter, regulates The case was decided in and the it declared principle railways and,:to exact contention of the to-day, is the court, may be added the con- reasoning strength investments sideration property acquired *82 thirty-two years made the sanction of the decision under Such its consider- protection against impairment. now claim over could should ever prevail ambiguity, ambiguity ations It its to received solution and asserted exist. have been to be forward cloud the meaning should never again brought statute. and" the between the limited control plenary The distinction in controversy is city over streets substantial‘ Manifestly, the railway companies. power it and the between to same as the power a' franchise is not the designate to grant course, Of on which franchise can be exercised. streets the franchise can be before must be designated the streets to be may mag therefore the' power designate exercised, It is so the other power.. magni and confounded nified any to action railroads inability compel of the fied, .the and dwelt on counsel. city of the is urged the part - to could refused city desig is have that, as The argument the rail to exact 'of anything it had the street, nate defects the remedies words, the In other roads.- changed the power enlarged companies may Or it be-put the companies. to of the grant nature instru a city as subordinate given way, to defeat the purpose may employed be the State mentality Pitts Appeal City done. be This cannot State. Co. v. Con Water Works Atlantic 4; St. Pa. burg, R. Galveston, &c., 427; 44 N. J. Eq. Company, sumers’ Water v, 91 Texas, Homestead Texas, 398; Galveston, C., Co. v. CHICAGO.
BLAIR Brown, JJ., dissenting. McKenna, Brewer Electric St. Railway, v. Homestead Pa. Railway Street I observe there are duties, 172. And. some 162, 171, immediately cannot be It of which coerced. the performance out that the are agencies be government need not pointed measure, a to cooperation duty sense great kept, should, and if exercise they sense, disregarding propriety, disorder, refuse possessed, act, physical power mere It at would result. is least, besides con- strange temporary that a municipality State, tention me because of it more than ex- may be, refuse to ability, physical, legal, can it, conferred assume assert other ercise powers overlook that a Let us-not must have powers. municipality necessarily implied, for what it It, does. "warrant, express of strict- within the rule construction. Dillon on Mu- too, is section 91. Corporations, nicipal of franchises from the
In the State and their regula- was no there mer.ely inconsistency, tion and this was not natural only of functions of itself,'but division com- as. State, with the ported policy explained The People, Co. v. The decision City Ry. supra. cannot, It away. seems was nearer me, explained time than we to-day, of the statutes áre and’it enactment *83 , that should try the conditions of time we to realize. This it to we easy is not as as seems be. Whatever profess, to easy conditions, it is not realize and thoughts purposes time. 1859 nothing of another indicated the necessity In. city now contended In
giving for. there no could be foresight development of railways. street they were just to beginning of as a thought erf means Then and the transportation city was as to eager procure them as to capitalists construct them. It is said time is the wisest on thing earth, and to in its taking wisdom, ourselves we are sure we an just, would have seen in enterprise starting, and yet it attain and the tentative, measures growth might that would be if necessary to restrain control it. But anyone there was of such capable 1859 did prophecy TERM, McKenna, Brown, JJ., dissenting, Brewer not its exercise. was in it challenge There nothing excessive, as I already have out; to invoke a care. pointed jealous nothing I dwell on this because the of the act of 1859 provisions were carried into the act of 1865, and were not intended certainly to a to the than give greater power city when.used the act of 1859. In other a had words, could have provision no in the act fix of 1859 to to purpose give power the time of the occupation not, by streets could mere repetition, the act of 1865 such have purpose.
The situation in 1859 was Certain exceedingly simple. had been an persons ordinance of the given power by a construct railway. street under the ordinance right it questioned maybe had been adjudged illegal, — n act of 1859 was It passed. explicitly my gave, opinion, construct operate railways in.the streets and authority to gave city only the exercise of regulate But right. some granting words are ambiguous— that the words “terms and granting conditions” can be inter- a preted authorize limitation of time—such interpretation is not the only one of which they are We susceptible. should, therefore, consider whether that can interpretation be adhered to in view of the other provisions the act of I
First, may lay down as a fundamental rule that we must
seek the
of the act from its
meaning
words, and that we should
“
so exercise
interpretation
á
bring sense out of.the words
used,
sense into them.”
bring
McCluskey
BLAIR v. McKenna, JJ», dissenting. and Brown, 201 ti. S. Brewer resist, and must be in to speculation, indulged to work their manifest meaning. makes for certain things, wit, (1)
The section provision of transfer of acts or deeds franchises be- rights, privileges (2) tween the corporations; contracts, licenses stipulations, “ made and entered into and made or as amended!’ undertakings between the the common council corporations “respecting use or exclusion of location, railways And what is done with streets.” these things? answer is be provision: “shall deemed and held following in force the. life continued hereof as valid and during all intents and. as if effectual; to made a part, purposes, ” hereby the same are made of said part, several acts. Gan a distinction be made between the for? things provided Which of those shall “be deemed and things held and continued life” force I corporations? say life of the during cor- it is that, as is porations, decided, the phrase. meaning the provision, there can but Considering language of; one answer. It no nor permits exception things, a distinction between A distinction as- is, however, them. confined, serted, and the is to the instruments provision trans- as “franchises,” from the distinguished instruments ferring and is denied all transferring “rights privileges,” applica- “contracts, tion'to the licenses and stipulations, undertakings” city. between the In what companies way is this done what and with consequences?
It will be observed that the provision does not con- simply ratify firm' or either the acts or deeds of transfer or the con- tracts; does more. It continues them in force and makes them valid and effectual for the life of the act, the conceded equivalent life the corporations. The provision not, therefore, that contracts obtained from “ ” the city shall stand made, but shall be continued force the life during distinctly different the corporations pur- —a one which at pose, the words of the act sustain and the same time exclude the other. It was not rat- provision simple *85 TERM, McKenna, Brown, JJ., and dissenting. Brewer .
ification which would carry by force time necessary the limits but one another measure of contracts, adopts neces-, the And time, life the a was corporations. provision to sary. time the new measure of to the con- make applicable (cid:127) tracts. It and the is afforded, necessity demon- again to strated of the words- of the unless we adhering act, a mistake in to a it the of words have regard its. purpose. “ the Plainly, therefore, the life hereof” cannot phrase during to acts or of transfer To do be limited the deeds of franchises. to the so is not between instruments of trans- only distinguish the and fer franchises and instruments transfer of rights .of the but is to detach and its correlated words phrase privileges, from its licen- objects, “-contracts, stipulations, immediate ses and entered into the common council undertakings” objects and and to leave those without companies, provision —without connection with coherence or anything, purpose. all rules and interpretation the rules protest, Against a justify liberty. of construction cannot be invoked to greater is to arrive at conclusions construction,^ true, The purpose Hermeneutics, beyond Lieber, the absolute sense of the text. I do of the text cannot But integrity disregarded.. fact that an be- inconsistency court sees not- overlook section two and to them. reconcile parts attempts tween me, As it seems way? magnifying But in what ob- it prevail of the section over making in one part scure “ By words terms clear in another part. making manifestly I which, can necessarily, think, doubtful conditions” put be given meaning an extreme only by indulgence even to else, breaking them, everything dominate my To mind a parts.' unrelated and meaningless into section the State had legislature presented. situati'on'is strange purpose told, simple purpose are we mind, in- its —the and to them- give corporations acquire create they did express purpose simply, city; from thé how — n directly No; but words way such obviously? BLAIR V. CHICAGO. Brown, JJ,, dissenting. Brewer McKenna, Ü. confused-or employed And opposed purpose. legis-
lature was dealing to be confined important rights,,some to twenty-five years, ninety-nine years; be extended to others and we are asked believe that it in- bunched those rights discriminately and trusted to sort construction searching them afterwards take them out words meaning which included them all.
There is another consideration of The con- potent weight. struction of the court was not the construction contemporary of the act of It was not the by construction proclaimed the Governor, his-veto of the justifying act. He out pointed necessary that the effect the lives of the extending corpora- tions was to extend their in of the city, the streets that he had received petitions a number of- signed large citizens as one Chicago, protesting measure against which had been without passed their or that of the cor- assent, authorities, and that it porate extended the franchise for ninety- nine in years advance of the term already vested the corpora- tion.' And he also out that the pointed given to purchase at the property twenty-five end of secured it years, the ordinance was 16, 1858, of August (cid:127)also ninety-nine years. extended to And a fair construc- tion the said, Governor “the act hardly seems susceptible any.other said, “and had he he further meaning,” heard,” “none other claimed for it.” The Governor also considered continued force the acts or of trans- deeds clause far fer, and, so as his words no indicate, he difference perceived between the instruments of transfer.
Seldom has a statute at enacted time received so distant clear and influential proclamation of its and effect as meaning is afforded It 1865, by the Governor’s message. now, forty years seems removed from law, the enactment the Governor, who was close its and the enactment, citizens who Chicago' mistaken in protested it, were against its And meaning. Governor was part lawmaking It was his power. duty, study the statute and therefore, to TERM,'1905.
Syllabus. U. n only from from ex- try know its not its text but purpose, ternal ac- circumstances. His needs misunderstanding counted for.' The citizens misunderstanding protesting to be cannot be Explanation needs accounted fo.r. syl- found the act. There is not asserting ambiguities lable of evidence to indicate that or re- perceived were Governor was confident his garded consequence.. Of of the effects of the could act, views. one one which result, correct, unless his construction was he said he had it heard no claimed for than that which he entertained other doubt, therefore, with him, There was no no expressed. are, advocates. We however, measure disguise now asked alone saw or to believe either legislature real measure, passed merits it persuaded over a with conscious- veto ignorant opposition, groundless now ness that would be construed to have the meaning am constrained to dis- I am unable to so believe and given it! sent the judgment. *87 STREET RAILROAD COMPANY
WEST CHICAGO rel. CITY ILLINOIS ex OF THE PEOPLE STATE OF OF CHICAGO. ILLINOIS.
ERROR TO THE COURT OF THE STATE OF SUPREME Argued January 10, 11, April 9, No. 241. 1906. Decided rests-partly judgment grounds on of local Although the of the state court law, opinion may expressly although refer general States, necessary operation judg- if United Constitution up claim, right specially a on constitutional set rejects-a based ment case, cannot, prayed view of the answer, relief process or due clauses consistently with contract granted jurisdiction to review under Rev. Stat. Constitution,-this, has § court paramount, public and the owner of right navigable a stream the In public so far as only use it consistent with bed can under the- soil flows, navigable through stream municipality, right; and a itself navigation thereof nor bind to obstruct cannot obstruction, and this rule is not affected anof permit the continuance notes bills of herein. The ancillary complaint originally called in- to a of Illinois and him were citizen payable sued Trust York Guaranty New and af- Company dorsed no to enter the jurisdiction forded the court original judgments lessness, any parties, neglect agent or misconduct of or servant of said employment of their construction or the use of the said the course railways, parties pay property and said shall moveover tracks any railways, so them on street used as aforesaid for their said owners January, day paved, first D. which has since the A. been macad- planked, at time amized or between said date last mentioned and
Notes
notes defendant bearing plaintiff delivered were that, maker, treasurer the assistant indorsement so by-the plaintiff, the defendant advanced to money not as an taker, first notes as held the plaintiff render judg- the Circuit Court to The jurisdiction assignee.
notes
the
indorsed before
are
notes
him,
the
And
company.
the
when
that
the indorser
appears
fact an
in a
of the
suit
be
assignee
paper,
brought
court
a
diverse
Federal
holder
the
citizen
having
requisite
indorser
the
have been
citizen
notwithstanding
ship,
might
with
Goldsmith,
of the same State
the defendant. Holmes v.
U. S.
147
that
It is further
the entire
were fraudu-
argued
proceedings
collusive';
money
and
that no
was in
that
loaned,
lent
fact
were the
they
conspiracy between
corporations
result
the jurisdiction
court,
Illinois
obtain
and its
Federal
on the controverted
the
decision
the
rights
under
-parties
State.
statutes
the
We
the supplemental
have.examined
submitted
records
since the
this
argument
court, on
think
case,
branch
the
of bad
the
faith
charges
are not sustained.
conspiracy
We have no doubt
that
the
was loaned
money
by the
Trust
Guaranty
to these
Company
and that
were bona
original
corporations
judgments
fide.
Federal,
case into
conspiracy
get
court,
As
the decision of the
a view to
rights
therein,
parties
which
principle
prevents
aware
hav-
parties
are not
we
and a
citizenship
justiciable
demand
requisite
ing
if
redress,
courts
such
their
the Federal
choice
seeking
to have
in which
contested
Hav-
rights
forum
litigated.
of a
of action and
requisite
diversity
cause
a proper
ing
jurisdiction upon
courts,
Federal
citizenship confers
(cid:127)
of the creditor in
the .motive
Federal
seeking
cases
such
Dakota
Carolina,
South
is immaterial.
v. North
jurisdiction
v. Northern
310; Dickerman
Trust
Company,
U. S.
192
Com-
Manufacturing
Lehigh Mining