Bladow v. BladowBladow v. Bladow
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Sandstrom
[¶ 1] Cheryl Bladow is appealing an East Central Judicial District Court judgment granting Bruce Bladow an equal distribution of the marital estate. Cheryl Bladow argues the district court erred in dividing thе marital estate in half, because the majority of the parties’ total estate consists of her personal injury settlement. She argues the district court’s findings of faсt, taken as a whole, were clearly erroneous and led to an inequitable distribution of the parties’ property. We affirm the judgment of the district court.
I
[¶ 2] The parties were married in Fargo, North Dakota, on August 22, 1986. At the time of the marriage, the parties moved into Bruce Bladow’s home, which had a fair market value of $55,500 and on whiсh he owed between $15,000 and $17,000 on the first mortgage. The parties satisfied the mortgage in 1993, and substantial improvements were made on the home during the marriage. From August of 1988 until Mаy 2001, Cheryl Bladow worked at the Southeast Human Service Center as a therapist and, later, as a supervisor. In July 1999, she opened a rubber stamp business called “Border Buddies,” which has held a deficit. During the entire marriage, Bruce Bladow worked a variety of intermittent jobs. The two parties made equal contributions during the first two years and thе last four years of the marriage. During the middle ten years of the marriage, Cheryl Bladow made the majority of financial contributions. In February 2001, she received a $650,000 pеrsonal injury settlement for personal injuries and pain and suffering from taking the drug Phen-Fen. Her net settlement after fees and costs was $430,970.39, and of that amount, the district court concluded she dissipated $105,948.70. The settlement check was written out jointly to Cheryl L. Bladow and Bruce Bladow, and both parties signed a “confidential, release, indemnity, аnd assignment agreement.” The trial was held on September 17-18, 2002. The district court found the parties’ marital estate had a value of $427,151.56, of which $325,021.69 was traceable to Cheryl Bladow’s settlement. The district court awarded $213,639.56 to her and $213,512.00 to him.
[¶ 3] The district court had jurisdiction under
II
[¶ 4] Cheryl Bladow argues the district court erred in dividing the marital estate in half, because the majority of the parties’ total estate consists of her personal injury settlement. She argues she should be awarded the entire amount of her settle
[¶ 5] “A trial court’s findings on matters of property division will not be set aside on appeal unless they are cleаrly erroneous under
[¶ 6] “ ‘[A]ll of the real and personal property accumulated by the parties ..., regardless of the source’ must be included in the marital estate to be divided by the trial court.” Glander v. Glander, 1997 ND 192, ¶ 10, 569 N.W.2d 262 (quoting Gaulrapp v. Gaulrapp, 510 N.W.2d 620, 621 (N.D.1994)). We have repeatedly held that “[separate property, whether inherited or otherwisе, must initially be included in the marital estate.” Gaulrapp v. Gaulrapp, 510 N.W.2d 620, 621 (N.D.1994) (citations omitted). See also Grinaker v. Grinaker, 553 N.W.2d 204, 208 (N.D.1996); van Oosting v. van Oosting, 521 N.W.2d 93, 96 (N.D.1994).
[¶ 7] After a trial court has included all of the assets in the marital estate, it considers the Ruff-Fischer guidelines in its distribution of the assets to the pаrties. Weigel v. Weigel, 2000 ND 16, ¶ 6, 604 N.W.2d 462. The Ruff-Fischer guidelines are a list of factors used by trial courts in dividing marital property and awarding spousal support. The guidelines originate from Ruff v. Ruff, 78 N.D. 775, 52 N.W.2d 107 (1952), and Fischer v. Fischer, 139 N.W.2d 845 (N.D.1966).
“Considered under the Rujf-Fischer guidelines are: the respеctive ages of the parties, their earning ability, the duration of the marriage and conduct of the parties during the marriage, their station in life, the circumstances and necessities of each, their health and physical condition, their financial circumstances as shown by the property owned at the time, its value at thе time, its income-producing capacity, if any, whether accumulated before or after the marriage, and such other matters as may be material. The triаl court is not required to make specific findings, but it must specify a rationale for its determination.”
Weigel, at ¶ 6 (quoting Wilhelm v. Wilhelm, 1998 ND 140, ¶ 11, 582 N.W.2d 6).
[¶ 8] The origin of the property is only one factor to consider undеr the Rujf-Fischer guidelines, even if the property was acquired before the marriage or was inherited. Winter v. Winter, 338 N.W.2d 819, 822 (N.D.1983). We have never held that property brought into a marriage or acquired by gift or inheritance by one spouse must be irrevocably set aside to that spouse. Grinaker, 553 N.W.2d at 208. As we held in Gaulrapp, 510 N.W.2d at 621, the length of the marriage is relevant to the distribution of gifts and inherited property as part of the “equitable” division of the marital estate. In general, a lengthy marriage supports an equal division of all marital assets. Glander, 1997 ND 192, ¶ 11, 569 N.W.2d 262.
[¶ 10] Cheryl Bladow аrgues the district court’s findings of fact, taken as a whole, were clearly erroneous. She argues the court erred in not giving enough weight to the evidence tending to рrove that she was the primary wage earner. She further argues that the court erred in giving too much weight to the evidence tending to prove that Bruce Bladow hеlped with the cooking and household chores and contributed to paying the monthly bills, and that she accumulated the majority of the marital credit card debt. She аlso argues that because she has not been able to work and currently needs the personal injury award to pay her living expenses, the court erred in finding she wаs able to earn enough to pay for her own normal living expenses.
[¶ 11] The district court found that “[o]ver the course of the parties’ marriage, Cheryl used numerous сredit cards and incurred significant credit card debt. On a number of occasions, the parties refinanced the home, in part, to pay off this credit card debt.” Thе court specifically set out the loans taken by the Bladows and what debt the loans covered. The district court also found that “[b]oth parties are emplоyed on a full-time basis and able to earn sufficient income to pay for their normal living expenses.” The court stated:
Although Cheryl has shown a greater income producing capacity than Bruce, Cheryl’s spending habits have resulted in substantial credit card debt. A considerable portion of the phen-fen settlement proсeeds were used to pay off credit card debt and put into joint investment accounts, which shows an intent not to keep the settlement as separate рroperty. The portion of the settlement proceeds which were jointly invested or used to pay off debts has benefitted the parties. The portion Cheryl spent on personal and business expenses has been dissipated with essentially nothing to show for it.
Under the Ruff-Fiseher guidelines, a substantially disparate asset and debt allocation in Cheryl’s favor is not justified or equitable in this case.
[¶ 12] The trial court considered all of the facts of the case against the Ruff-Fiseher guidelines, and we do not conclude that the district court’s property division under the guidelines was clearly erroneous.
Ill
[¶ 13] The district court did not err in its property division to Cheryl and Bruce Bladow. We affirm.