Blackwelder v. StateBlackwelder v. State
Appellant seeks review of an order which denied his motion for postconviction relief after an evidentiary hearing.
Appellant was charged with first-degree murder. The jury returned a verdict of second-degree murder. Appellant’s conviction was affirmed by this court. Blackwelder v. State,
Appellant later filed a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, asserting that hе was improperly denied his right to be tried by a twelve-member jury. The court ordered an evidentiary hearing at which it was developed that at the beginning of the trial, appellant’s сounsel and the prosecution agreed in open court that twelve jurors would be chosen with no alternates. There was a further agreement that if no more than one or two of the jurors had to be excused during the trial, the case would be tried to its conclusiоn before the remaining jurors. In the course of the trial it became necessary to excuse one juror, and the verdict was ultimately rendered by eleven jurors.
Appellant’s сounsel testified that it was a tactical decision on his part not to pick alternаtes. He said he discussed this matter with appellant and that appellant agreed to this tactic. An investigator for appellant’s attorney confirmed this conversation. Appellant admitted that he had verbally agreed to not having alternates chosen аnd was aware that this could result in having his case decided by less than twelve jurors. However, it is undisputed that appellant did not sign a written waiver of a twelve-person jury.
An accused’s constitutional right to a jury trial may be waived. State v. Garcia,
All of the foregoing cases involved waivers of a jury trial. However, in Jones v. State,
Even if we were to accept the rationale of Jones, we would find it distinguishable from the instant case. In the first place, Jones was decided on a direct appeal; whereas, here, the point was not raised on аppeal but first appeared in a motion for postconviction relief. As we stаted in Triola v. State,
Even though the basis of appellant’s collateral attack is alleged to bе one of constitutional magnitude, we find that he has waived that argument by his failure to assert it on his plenary appeal.
Moreover, unlike the circumstances in Jones, our record demonstrates that appellant affirmаtively agreed with his counsel’s trial tactic not to select alternates and to proceed with less than a twelve-person jury should one of the jurors be excused. See United States v. Ricks,
In determining that there must be a written waiver, even in cases where the parties agree tо proceed with only one less than the required number of jurors, Jones relied substantially upon the decision in Nova v. State,
It would be a travesty of justice to permit aрpellant to now repudiate his lawyer’s trial tactic with which he fully concurred and thereby to set aside his five-year-old conviction for reasons totally unrelated to whether he received a fair trial.
Affirmed.