18 Pa. 434 | Pa. | 1852
The opinion of the Court was delivered, by
In England, committees of lunatics are appointed by the Lord Chancellor in his ministerial and not in his judicial capacity, by letters patent under the great seal, and during pleasure. The committee is considered as a mere bailiff appointed by the crown and under its control, to take care of the property, and has no interest in the land of the lunatic: Shelf ord on Lunatics, 180; 2 Law Library 114. And it is laid down by Lord Coke, that the committee of a lunatic, whether acting by the authority of the crown or not, has no further or other powers than those of a bailiff: 4 Rep. 127 b. Regarded as a mere bailiff of the crown, the committee is liable to account, to censure, to punishment, and to removal if he shall misconduct himself. Bankruptcy is a cause of removal, though the custody of the person is not always changed on that account: Ex parte Mildmay, 3 Ves. Jr. 2.
In Pennsylvania, the constitution clothes the Supreme Court and the Courts of Common Pleas with the powers of a Court of Chancery, as to the care of the persons and estates of those who are non compos mentis. Inasmuch as when the constitution was adopted, Courts of Chancery in England never appointed committees, it might be doubted whether the constitution conferred this power on our courts ; but if it did not, the legislature supplied it. The appointment of committees of lunatics being a prerogative of the sovereign, it must reside somewhere in our government, and if the people did not vest it in the courts by the constitution, they left it with the legislature, who. have vested it in the courts. Without recurring to the earlier Acts, the 14th section of the Act of 13th June, 1836, relating to lunatics and habitual drunkards, provides that on the return of an inquisition finding the lunacy or habitual drunkenness, it shall be lawful for the Court of Common Pleas to commit the custody and care of the person or estate of the lunatic or drunkard “to such person or persons as they shall deem most suitable, according to the rules heretofore practised and allowed.” According to the rules heretofore practised and allowed, whether in Pennsylvania or in England, the committee has been regarded as the mere bailiff of the appointing power, holding his office by no other tenure than that of the pleasure of the crown in Great Britain, and of the courts in Pennsylvania, and, of course, removable at pleasure. It is remarkable how carefully the Act of 1836 intrusts the estate of the lunatic or drunkard to the Court, and limits the powers of the committee. The management of the estate and the application of the income are the only things the committee may do without the precedent authority of the Court; and for the faithful performance of these duties, he must give security to the satisfaction of the Court, and receive such compensation as the Court shall allow. It is a naked power, and that carefully limited and restrained, that is intrusted to the committee, withoirt any interest whatever in the estate. He is a mere instrument, by whom the Court works out the beneficent purposes of the statute, and may be dispensed with when a more efficient and satisfactory instrument is at hand. Bolling v. Turner, Randolph’s Reports 584, is an authority to this point.
If it be said that this is clothing the Common Pleas with despotic power, let it be remembered that it is in behalf of a class of fellow beings, who, beyond all others, deserve our sympathies, and need the protection of despotic power. Arbitrary power can never be better employed than in watching over and providing for those who have been smitten in the seat of reason. It may be abused, but the inducements to abuse it are almost inappreciable ; whilst the necessities for its existence and exercise are frequent and real.
In dismissing this appeal, we do not mean to be understood as approving of the practice that was pursued in this case. We think it would be well for the Common Pleas, to conform their practice as nearly as possible to the course of proceeding in chancery ; but holding that no appeal lies from their interlocutory act of dismissing the committee and appointing another, we dismiss the appeal, at the costs of the appellant.