Lead Opinion
Nаn B. Blackford has appealed the decision of the Arkansas Board of Review concerning her claim for unemployment insurance benefits arising out of her employment with The National Medical Rental of Dardanelle, Arkansas. The Board of Review adopted the decision of the Appeal Tribunal upon the finding that Blackford was discharged from her job with National Medical Rental for misconduct connected with the work, and, therefore, held her disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits for eight weeks of unemployment pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § ll-10-514(a) (Repl. 1996). Blackford’s appeal requires us to determine whether the finding of misconduct connected with the work is supported by substantial evidence. Because we hold that substantial evidence is not present to support the finding, we reverse and remand to the Board of Review so that Blackford’s benefits can be awarded.
Appellant was discharged from her position as a customer service representative on May 16, 1995, after having worked for National Medical Rental for eleven years. During the fall of 1994, she began falling behind in her work without apparent cause. She was counseled conсerning this problem in January 1995, and her employer temporarily relieved her of some work duties so that she could bring her paperwork current. However, after appellant became сurrent on the paperwork and resumed her regular workload she again fell behind. The record contains clear proof that appellant’s work in customer service had been substandаrd, including proof that she informed customers on several occasions that items would be delivered when she had not first verified that the items were available.
The proverbial last straw appears to have occurred on May 10, 1995, when appellant directed a delivery driver to a customer’s residence in Clinton, Arkansas. The customer was being released from hospitalization on that date, and was supposedly en route home. Although appellant informed the delivery driver about that situation, the customer had not arrived home two and a half hours after the driver arrived to mаke the delivery. After this incident, appellant was discharged due to poor job performance. Her claim for unemployment benefits was denied on the finding that she had been discharged for misсonduct connected with the work.
In unemployment compensation cases, the scope of review by an appellate court is governed by the substantial evidence rule. Substantial еvidence is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequately supporting the conclusion. Haig v. Everett,
This standard of judicial review requires us to determine whether the Board of Review’s finding that appellant was discharged from her last job because of misconduct connected with the work is supported by such relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequately supporting that conclusion. In doing so, we are guided by the long-standing principle that mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure of good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies, ordinary negligence or good-faith errors in judgment or discretion are not considered misconduct for unemployment insurance purposes unless it is of such degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, evil dеsign, or an intentional or substantial disregard of an employer’s interests or an employee’s duties and obligations. Willis Johnson Co. v. Daniels,
This case is fundamentally different. The parties do not dispute that appellant was discharged in the wake of the May 10, 1995, incident when she routed a delivery driver to the home of a customer who had been released from hospitalization, but who was not home two and a half hours after the driver arrived to make the mediсal supply delivery. Appellant’s evidence that she had spoken with the hospital and been informed that the customer was en route home was not contradicted. Appellant informed the delivery driver about the customer’s recent release, so it cannot fairly be said that she intentionally withheld information vital to the employer’s interest, or that she was deliberately inefficient, оr guilty of such negligence as to be deemed in deliberate violation of the employer’s rules. Indeed, it is difficult to fathom how appellant could have been more dutiful in the situation, considering thаt the customer apparendy desired or needed the ordered item shordy after being released from the hospital.
Based upon our review of the record consistent with the substantial-evidеnce standard, we hold that the Board of Review’s decision that appellant was discharged from her last job because of misconduct connected with the work is not supported by substantial еvidence. Therefore, we reverse that decision, and remand the case to the Board of Review so that an order can be issued granting appellant’s unemployment benefits.
Reversed and remanded.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. I dissent from a reversal of the Board’s decision because it represents a departure from our standard of review. The focus of the Board’s finding of misconduct was on the recurring deficiencies in appellant’s performance of her duties over an extended period of time. As stated by the majority, misconduct can be found when the failure of good performance is of such a degree or recurrence as to manifest an intentional disregard of the employer’s interest. That is what the Board found to constitute misconduct in this case. While the majority recognizes that the final delivery incident was the “last straw,” it treats this as an isolated incident rather than the last occurrence in a series of events demonstrating unsatisfactory performance in all of her duties. By foсusing on this one incident involving one aspect of her duties, the majority has succumbed to the temptation of substituting its judgment for that of the Board in a misguided effort to decide this case as if it were the trier оf fact. That this is so is further demonstrated by the majority’s mention of only the decision of the Board, but not the findings of fact made by the Board in support of that decision.
It is for the Board to translate the evidеnce before it into findings of fact, and it is our function, upon review, only to determine whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence. As noted by the Board in its findings, appellant, a long-term emрloyee, possessed the demonstrated ability to do her job, but for reasons appellant did not explain (in her “uncontradicted” testimony), her performance declined and continued оn a downward slope despite the warnings and the opportunities afforded by her employer to improve her performance. Thus, the Board reasoned that this was not a case of mеre inefficiency or the failure of good performance as the result of inability, but rather a case where the evidence revealed a pattern of poor performanсe of such a degree as to manifest an intentional disregard of her employer’s interest.
This case is similar to Perry v. Gaddy,
Whether an employee’s acts are willful or merely thе result of unsatisfactory conduct or unintentional failure of performance is a fact question for the Board to decide. Rucker v. Director,
ROGERS, J., joins in this dissent.