*2 GOODWIN, WALLACE, Before KEN- NEDY, ANDERSON, FLETCHER, FAR- RIS, PREGERSON, CANBY, BOOCHEV- ER, REINHARDT, NORRIS and Circuit Judges.
FLETCHER, Judge: Circuit scope This case involves the of state au- thority to proceeds tax the of tribal mineral leases, requires that we examine a congressional series of regulat- enactments ing gas tribal land for oil and production.
Between 1932 and the Blackfeet Tribe executed 125 leases authorizing the mining gas of oil and on tribal land located within the Blackfeet Indian Reservation. Approximately 12 of the leases were made authority under the of the Act of February ch. as amended the Act May §§ (codified Stat. 244 at 25 U.S.C. 397-98 (1976)). The balance of the leases were made of the Act of May 11, 1938, (codified §§ (1976)). 396a-396g at 25 U.S.C. All 125 in operation today remain and will gas continue until supply the oil and paid exhausted. The royalties Tribe is cal culated on the gas basis of the amount of produced or oil under the leases. The imposes State of Montana four distinct tax interests, royalty es on the Tribe’s without distinguishing royalties between the col pursuant lected to 1938 Act leases and the royalties collected under 1891 Act leases. §§ See Mont.Code Ann. 15-36-101 to -121 (1981) (Oil Tax); and Gas Severance Mont. §§ (1981)(Re Code Ann. 15-38-101 to -109 Tax); Indemnity source Trust Mont.Code §§ (1981) (Oil Ann. 82-11-131 to -132 Tax); Gas Conservation Mont.Code Ann. §§ (1981) (Oil 15-23-601 to -612 and Gas Collins, Boulder, Colo., Richard B. Tax). Net Proceeds Montana assesses the plaintiff-appellant. against Tribe’s share of all four taxes Missoula, Mont., Maclay, S. Helena Chris producer-lessees, who then deduct it from Tweeten, Gen., Helenea, D. Atty. Asst. royalties payable to the Tribe. Mont., Missoula, Mont., Boggs, Deirdre Department the Solicitor of the defendants-appellees. opinion of the Interior issued an concluding
that Montana was
tax
pro-
entitled to
duction of oil and
under 1891 Act leas-
history
from
two statutes contains little
es,
proceeds
tax tribal
but could
explicit guidance,
The Pro
and resort to
Status
convention-
1938 Act leases. Tax
yields
Leases
and Gas
al “canons
construction”
inconsist-
duction
Oil
from
Lands Under
The Fort Peck Tribal
ent results.3 Our resolution of this diffi-
Act, 84 Interior Dec.
Leasing
thorough analysis
requires
1938Mineral
cult issue
*3
to assess
(1977).1 Montana continued
905
language, purpose
the
and historical con-
royalty interests
against the Tribe’s
taxes
of both
schemes.
texts
1978,
the Tribe
all 125 leases.
seeking to
in
court
an action
federal
I
filed
royal
taxation of tribal
enjoin Montana’s
begin
prin
We
with the well settled
446,
court,
F.Supp.
507
The
ties.
district
ciple that state taxation of tribal income
the
summary judgment State
entered
on
the bound
from activities carried within
Montana, holding
1924 amend
of
impermissible
is
aries of the reservation
expressly
the
Act
authorized
ment to
1891
expressly
Congress has
unless
consented
oil
production
of
of
state taxation
imposition
Bryan
v.
of
tax. See
lands,
1938 Act left
on
and that the
Indian
373,
2102,
County,
96
Itasca
426 U.S.
S.Ct.
authority undisturbed.
H99 replaced prior leasing mineral give statutes Indians authority granting in deny- or leases, comprehensive proce- with a and ing detailed and enable the gain Indians to leasing dure for mineral of unallotted greatest return from their property. supra, lands. at S.Rep. Cong., 534. No. 75th 1st Sess. 2 Report accompanying Senate noted bill The Act made no mention of taxa- purposes tion, were uniformity to obtain legislative history and the is silent on lands, respect with leasing to the of tribal the issue. any ership lotted lands within Indian or to reservation unencumbered real estate of a value tribe, any by group, equal lands owned Indians, band of to or twice the of amount the bonds. jurisdiction, except oil, operations Federal any under SEC. 4. That all under specifically excepted gas, those pursuant hereinafter from or other mineral lease issued to provisions may, ap- of any terms affecting of this or other Act Interior, proval Secretary subject of the of the be restricted Indian lands be shall to the mining purposes, by regulations promulgated by leased for of rules the Sec- spokes- retary the tribal or other council authorized the Interior. discretion of the Indians, Secretary, any men for for to exceed gas such terms not said for lease oil or issued long provisions ten and as thereafter as minerals under the of this Act shall be made produced paying quantities. subject any are cooper- in to the terms of reasonable gas-min- approved plan SEC. 2. That leases for oil- ative unit or pre- other and/or or ing covering purposes by Secretary such lands subsequent unallotted scribed said or highest respon- any shall be for sale to the offered to the issuance of such lease which in- bidder, qualified public development at sible auction or on volves the or of oil bids, advertisement, sealed after notice and from or land covered such lease. upon subject Secretary such terms and condi- to such SEC. 5. That the of the Interior discretion, Secretary may pre- may, superintend- tions as the in his Interior authorize scribe. Such advertisement shall to or other reserve ents officials in the Indian Service to oil, Secretary right reject approve gas, of the Interior the mining leases for or other lands, judgment covering purposes any all bids in his interest whenever restricted Indian doing, of the be Indians will served so or allotted. tribal received, satisfactory if no bid is the ac- 6. or SEC. Sections and 4 of this Act lease, cepted complete apply Papago bidder fails to shall to the Indian Reserva- Arizona, Secretary Interior shall determine tion tana, the Crow Reservation in Mon- that it is unwise the interest Indians ceded lands of the Shoshone Reser- bid, highest accept Secretary may Osage Wyoming, said vation Oklahoma, Reservation in sale, asphalt lease readvertise such for or with the nor to the coal govern- consent of the council or Choctaw tribal other and Chickasaw Tribes in Okla- authorities, ing may tribal a lease made homa. Provided, private negotiations: parts That the fore- 7. All Act or SEC. Acts inconsistent going provisions hereby repealed. shall in no manner restrict herewith are right organized incorporated May (codi- tribes 396a-396g (1976)). sections and 17 of the Act of June fied 25 U.S.C. §§ at (48 984), oper- lease lands Six reservations were excluded from the mining purposes provided as therein and in ation of much of the Act. These included the Reservation, provisions any Papago subject special accordance with consti- mineral IRA, adopted by any leasing provisions tution and Indian charter of section 3 of the Reservation, pursuant against tribe to the Act of June voted Crow which or- IRA, ganizing Taylor, supra SEC. 3. That hereafter lessees of restricted under the see G.D. lands, allotted, mining tribal or note which was purposes, including gas, May oil and shall furnish the Act corporate surety bonds amounts satisfacto- 659. Also excluded *8 Interior, ry Secretary guarantee- to the of the were lands that the Shoshone Reservation had States, ing compliance with the leases: the terms of their ceded to United and three Oklahoma
Provided,
surety
may
personal
That
bonds
be
that had
excluded
reservations
been
from the
accepted
deposit
Papago
where the sureties
as collat-
IRA. The Crow and
reservations were
Secretary
ultimately
subject
provi-
eral
Interior
with the said
of the
made
to the 1938 Act’s
106, 1,
any public-debt obligations
May
United
of the
sions. See Act of
ch.
67;
90-308,
guaranteed
principal
May
States
as to
and interest
Act of
Pub.L.
Maxfield,
by
equal
generally
the
to
amount
United States
the full
Stat. 123. See
P.
M. Diete-
Trelease,
satisfactory
of such bonds
other collateral
& F.
or
rich
Natural Resources Law on
Interior,
Secretary
to
of the
the
or show own-
American Indian Lands 164
prior
statutes on the
repeal
infer
the
II
general repealer in section 7 of
basis
argues that
the
The Tribe
Act
introduce serious uncertain-
the
implicitly re
repealer
general
clause
Act’s
legal'status
to
of the indefinite-
ty as
the
We
to taxation.
pealed
1924 consent
the
earlier acts and
term leases executed under
into
Many of the
entered
disagree.
leases
authority
Secretary’s
to
cast doubt on the
re
of earlier statutes
authority
the
under
regulate them. Such a result
effective, indeed,
continue to
effective
remain
mained
the interests of the
prior
provi would serve neither
the
today, because
producer-les-
to
for an
leases
continue
authorized
Tribe nor the interests
sions
Appropriations
term. See
indefinite
sees.
§ 26,
June
Having
concluded that
1938 Act
exceptions); Act
(“irrevocable” with certain
prior leasing
superseded
repeal
not
but did
(“as
May
statutes,
we turn to
current effect
in paying
be
oil
shall
found
long as
or
to
contained in the
the consent
taxation
Act
limits
expressly
The 1938
quantities”).
Act.
to the 1891
We hold
1924 amendment
to
entered into after
application
leases
its
pursuant to
that leases executed
one,
Act’s effective date.
section
1924 Acts remain
to those
provides that “hereafter unallotted
the Act
Acts,
promulgated
regulations
to
mining
may
...
... be leased
authority of
Secretary
under the
language
The “hereafter”
purposes____”
Finally,
regulation
Act.
in section 3 of the
4 of the 1938 Act for
is echoed
section
provides
“opera-
“pursuant
Act
section
leases issued
to the terms
this
oil,
any
gas, or
mineral
under
other
tions
any
Act.” It follows that the 1924
or
other
to
pursuant
the terms of
lease issued
ef
to
taxation remains
Act’s consent
state
affecting
Indi-
any
Act
restricted
or
other
to
un
respect
fective with
leases executed
subject to the rules
an lands shall be
1891 Acts.20 We there
der
1924 and
Secretary
promulgated by the
regulations
grant of
the district court’s
fore affirm
supplied).
(Emphasis
We
of the Interior.”
to
Mon
summary judgment
the State of
statutory language
infer from
upholds
validity
as it
tana insofar
pur-
issued
Congress envisioned
leases
proceeds
taxing
from 1924 Act and
tribal
be
prior
to
acts would continue to
suant
leases.
1891 Act
duration, subject
reg-
their
to
effective for
Secretary and
promulgated
ulations
Ill
they
exe-
under which
were
to the statutes
argues
Act
Montana
that if the 1938
did
made after the effective
cuted. Leases
implicitly
it
repeal
must
Act, however,
gov-
to
were
be
date of the
incorporated the
implicitly
read
to have
procedures.19
new terms and
erned
Therefore,
contends, if
1924 Act.
Montana
believe, is both the
interpretation,
This
we
may
gas production
oil
under
it
tax
statutory lan-
reading of the
most natural
leases, may
pro-
tax
1891 and 1924 Act
it
reading
adapted
guage
best
to
1938 Act leases as well. The
purposes.
To duction under
effectuation of
statute’s
The 1938 Act
scope
charters. See
lease lands for
feel constrained
statutes
might
cause makes
susceptible to more than one
We
it
thus be
and,
acknowledge
issued
affecting
tribes
excludes six Indian
read
pursuant
supra
addition,
of their tribal constitutions
no
mining purposes
the six excluded tribes.
organized
provision
*9
reject
note 18. The reference
refer
expressly preserves
this
only
"any
statutory language
for
interpretation.
tribes
other statute"
extant,
according
IRA
from
IRA to
indefi-
We
be-
to
Professor
20. utes.
nite-term leases entered into
plied;
interpretation:
The latter
and includes a
related
[sic] or
[1938]
footnotes
(as
Acts to which the
parts
supra
provision likely
Cohen’s treatise
new
of Acts inconsistent
omitted).
omits
note
provision
leases).
any taxing
at 409
repealing
repealed
suggests
tax consents
(emphasis
authorization
herewith.”
prior
”[a]Il
a similar
stat-
sup-
had
argument
per-
production
district court found
same as
on unrestricted
We do not.
suasive.
lands ...” is nowhere
by
contradicted
1938 Act and is
provi-
inconsistent with no
entirety provides
The 1924 Act in its
as
sion of
Therefore,
the later statute.
Mon-
follows:
insists,
tana
Congress’s silence in 1938 on
Be it
by
enacted
Senate and
subject
of taxation must be interpreted
Representatives
House
the United
implicit
as an
incorporation of the taxation
States
America in
assem-
portion of the 1924Act into the
bled,
1938 statu-
That
land
unallotted
on Indian res-
tory scheme.
ervations other
lands of
than
the Five
Osage
Civilized
Tribes and
Reserva-
is,
argument
essence,
Montana’s
in
an
subject
mining
tion
for
purposes
to lease
invocation of
statutory
assorted maxims of
period
for a
provi-
of ten
Citing
construction.
United
v.
States
so to section
Act of February
3 of the
Greathouse,
166 U.S.
17 S.Ct.
(Twenty-sixth
Statutes at Large,
(1897),
States,
cert.
F.2d
990
—
-,
purpose
subject
a
to
leas-
manifestation of
denied,
S.Ct.
U.S.
statutory
to the
the new
scheme
es under
L.Ed.2d 86
old
under several of the
taxes authorized
argument that the
Montana’s
asks that we
schemes. Montana
as
be construed
a blanket
must
consent
Congress’s si-
purpose from
infer such a
taxation,
respect
with
effective
consent to
Supreme Court has instructed
lence. The
treaty
leases on unallotted
all mineral
to
us, however,
to
congressional
consent
a
lands unless issued under
reservation
of tribal income from on-res-
state taxation
taxation,
stretches
prohibiting
statute
express.
must be
ervation activities
disfavoring repeals
of
canon
construction
Bryan
County,
v.
426 U.S.
Itasca
scope.
beyond
implication
its intended
S.Ct.
that invoke
The
Montana cites
cases
canon of con-
We decline to hold that a
case,
apposite.
In one
not
canon are
supply the
will suffice to
deficient
struction
dispose
arguments
to
of
invoked
canon was
Congress’s
express
of
intent
manifestation
re
addressing one
a
concern
statute
permit the tax.21
to
addressing anoth
statute
pealed an earlier
Mancari,
er,
v.
U.S.
see Morton
insists that we
Montana also
(1974) (Civil
2474,
view to be an Congress part intended that of one sen- IV tence in one of the statutes otherwise total- argued Montana ly superseded to the incorpo- the 1938 Act district court be Act, Congress if rated into even had Congress and that not consented to taxa through proceeds manifested its intention tion of tribal silence. from 1938 Act leas es, nothing There is in legislative history its taxes were nonetheless valid because the language of the 1938 Act legal even hint- incidence of the taxes fell on the ing Congress anticipated pro- producer-lessees non-Indian and not on the visions of any statutes tribe. Because the district court concluded applied would be to leases issued under the valid, that the taxes were it did not reach 1938 Act. question legal of the taxes’ incidence. We therefore remand the case to enable note, addition, We that the 1924 Act the district court to address this issue. integral part Congress’s was an allot- Should court determine that legal program, ment under which all Indian land producer- incidence of the tax falls on the subject was intended to become to state lessees, it should then decide whether Mon expiration taxation after the of a brief preempted tana’s statutes are period. Depart- trust See United States standards Interior, 856-59; articulated supra, ment of the Crow Tribe In Montana, supra Congress’s dians v. State 650 F.2d section I. consent to the (9th Cir.1981),amended, (9th taxing authority exercise of state 665 F.2d over Indi- Cir.), harmony denied, an Tribes was in pur- with the cert.
poses
of allotment. The
how-
22. The district court found
harmony
pay
between
been forfeited for failure to
assessed taxes.
purposes
of the IRA and the 1924 consent to
Act of June
theory
sought
taxation on the
that the IRA
(codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C.
412a
§
enable Indians to enter the economic world on
(1976)).
H.R.Rep.
Cong.,
74th
2d
equal footing
an
and taxation statutes are eco-
(1936). Congress’s
Sess.
commitment to the tax
gas production.
nomic facts of oil and
In iden-
land,
exempt status of restricted
and its continu
tifying
aspect,
this harmonious
the district court
education,
ing appropriations for health
disregarded
express
the IRA’s
extension of the
care,
courts,
police
tribal
and tribal
services
land,
tax-exempt status of Indian
see IRA §§
traditionally provided
citizens
state
state
5;
(codified
at 25 U.S.C.
taxes,
governments from state
demonstrate to us
(1976)).
Congress
§§
In
acted to
did not intend for Indians to be
exemption
purchased
extend the tax
to land
See,
equally
purposes.
e.g., Ap
treated
for tax
funds,
appro-
with Indian trust or restricted
propriations
August
priated money to reimburse Indians whose land
574-90.
any
had been taxed and redeem
land that had
Construction,
Statutory
part,
part
Sutherland
REVERSED
AFFIRMED
(4th
1972).
fact,
23.08 at 221
ed.
and REMANDED.
general
imply
has been held to
repealer
ANDERSON,
Judge,
Circuit
J. BLAINE
“very
may
there
strongly that
acts on
KENNEDY,
with whom WALLACE
thereby
same
which are not
join, concurring and dis-
Judges,
Circuit
repealed.”
Reynolds,
Hess v.
*12
senting:
(1885).
377, 379,
927
5 S.Ct.
28 L.Ed.2d
must
therefore to other rules
One
turn
reasons, in
concur,
additional
I
but with
governing the determination whether the
holding that the
Act did
majority’s
repealed
Act
the 1924 Act.
Suther-
repeal the 1924 Act.
I re-
impliedly
land, supra.
express-
did not
As
however,
dissent,
from the ma-
spectfully
Act,
question
ly repeal
is
the 1924
taxing
the 1924 Act’s
jority’s
that
view
impliedly
whether it
did so.
inapplicable
is
leases en-
authorization
promulgation of the 1938
tered into after
Repeals
strongly
by implication are
disfa-
Act.
Mancari,
vored.
Morton
2474, 2482, 41
L.Ed.2d 290
S.Ct.
First,
My
has three
disagreement
bases.
Bank,
City
v. National
Posadas
misapplies
majority
well-established
296 U.S.
S.Ct.
stating
by
construction
rules of
L.Ed. 351
As stated
the Su-
Act
the issue is whether
preme Court in Posadas:
Act’s
“expressly incorporated”
categories
There
Majority
are two well-settled
taxing
Opinion
authorization.
where
repeal by implication (1)
provi-
having
concluded that the 1924
Once
—
effect, I
acts are in
Act is
fail
understand
sions
the two
irreconcilable
still
conflict,
to the
how it
construed
have no force.
the latter act
extent of
can be
Second,
long-standing
implied repeal
has been a
constitutes an
there
conflict
one;
(2)
interpretation
Depart-
if the
consistent
of the earlier
latter act
effective-
ment of Interior of the continued
of the
covers the whole
earlier
taxing
ness of
1924 Act’s
authorization.
clearly
intended as a substi-
one
is
prior
tute,
I find
consistent
similarly
as a
operate
repeal
it will
much
of the intended effect
case,
more indicative
act. But in either
earlier
Act on the 1924 Act than the
legislature
repeal
intention
prior
Department’s
position
of its
reversal
manifest ....
must be clear and
Third, Congress
in 1977.
if
meant to abro-
at 352.
Section 7 of
guage of
does not evince a clear
“general
clause. It
hornbook
the statute
repealing”
is
taxing
repeal of the
authori-
repealer
“legal
indication that
general
law that a
is
face,
Sands,
was
taxation
nullity.” 1A
zation
intended. On
contemplation a
C.
mineral
quite compatible
Broadcasting
Co. v.
367,
395
Nor
U.S.
does the 1938 Act
any ambigui
create
381,
ty.
89 S.Ct.
23
It is
repeal
L.Ed.2d 371
silent on the
of the 1924
Act. Use of this canon of construction
require
the court to amend the 1938
having
Once
concluded
implied
that no
expressly
That,
Act to
limit the 1924 Act.
occurred,
repeal
majority
nonetheless
however, goes beyond
interpreta
a liberal
taxing
states
consent does not
ambiguous
tion of an
phrase
clause or
apply to the 1938 Act because the 1938 Act
legislating by
judicial
entails
branch.
“expressly incorporate”
did not
may
This we
not do. Shields v. United
taxing
Act’s
authorization.
majority
States,
987,
(9th Cir.),
698 F.2d
cert.
990
13,
opinion at
plainly
17. Such a result
—
denied,
-,
73,
U.S.
104 S.Ct.
78
principle
contravenes the
having
that once
(1983);
L.Ed.2d 86
Fry
see
v. United
implied repeal,
found no
it is the court’s
States,
646,
(9th Cir.1977),
557 F.2d
649
obligation to read the
together
statutes
denied,
cert.
434 U.S.
98 S.Ct.
Mancari,
to both. Morton v.
give
effect
L.Ed.2d 754
2483;
1. Mr. Cohen also made no mention of
loss
surely
authority
underlying
he
of the
Act’s
the intent
the 1938 Act and
effectiveness
any
have
aware of
loss of effective-
state taxation due
the 1938 Act. At
time
been
Handbook,
operation of
publication
Act due to the
of the 1942
of his
Mr.
ness of
why
Department
Depart-
Perhaps
Act.
was an Assistant Solicitor in the
is
Cohen
consistently upheld
taxation of
Mr.
who
of Interior
state
ment of Interior.
died
country’s
authority
preeminent
until 1977.
also this
mineral resources
was
disagree
majority's
I also
with the
rejec-
the result of what the Department thought
long
tion of the
Department
and consistent
plainly
law, i.e.,
was
the 1938 Act had
of Interior
that the 1938Act
power
no effect on the
of the states to tax
right
did not affect the
of the states to tax. mineral resource extraction on unallotted
First,
Department
from 1938to 1956 the
land because it
expressly repeal
did not
acquiesced
Interior
in state taxation min-
1924 Act.
production, notwithstanding
eral
the exist-
If Congress had intended to limit the
ence of the
spon-
1938 Act. Since Interior
taxing
Act,
authorization of the 1924
it
certainly
sored
it
could have would have
expressly.
done so
Surely,
put an end to state taxation of mineral
there would have
pro-
been at least some
extraction if it intended the 1938 Act to
test
representatives
from the
of the west-
Then,
have that
effect.
the Solic-
states,
ern
to which the taxation of mineral
Department
explicit-
itor for the
of Interior
important,
resources is so
if the 1938 Act
ly found that the 1938 Act did not affect
was intended to have such effect. No such
taxing
the 1924 Act’s
authorization.
protest can be found in
history
of the
position.
the Solicitor affirmed this
passage of the 1938 Act.
It was not until
Department
reasons,
preceding
For the
I would af-
position.
reversed its
leases entered
1924 and interpreta- 1891 Acts. This later
tion, however, long-standing overturned a
and consistent administrative construction law, and is not any entitled to sub- Alaska,
stantial deference. v.Watt 259, 272-273, 1673, 1680-81, 68 L.Ed.2d America, Red Lion Broadcast- UNITED STATES of Co., ing 395 U.S. at Plaintiff-Appellee, S.Ct. at 1801. *15 Instead, this court rely should on the Department’s prior interpreta consistent OTTE, Craig Defendant-Appellant. true, tion of the 1924 and 1938 Acts. It is No. 83-1965. states, majority as the an Department nouncements of the were not Appeals, United States Court of contemporaneous the passage Ninth Circuit. Also, they 1938 Act. opin were informal Submitted March Nonetheless, ions. 1984.* they are still entitled to deference from the courts. See Rice v. Decided April — Rehner, U.S.-,---& n.
103 S.Ct. 3300-3301 & n.
L.Ed.2d 976-977 & n. 13 Assi Nordwick,
niboine & Sioux Tribes v. (9th Cir.1967), denied,
F.2d cert.
389 U.S.
88 S.Ct.
(1968). Moreover, they likely most were 2. The Act of March codi- a like effect on the continued effectiveness of 398a-e, permits fied at 25 U.S.C. §§ the state largely which was modeled on the taxation of mineral resource extraction on unal- 1924 Act. lotted executive order reservation land. See * Tribe, Apache Merrion v. Jicarilla panel appropriate finds this case for submis- majori- argument pursuant sion without to 28 U.S.C.A. ty point holding fails to 3(a) out that its would have 34(a). Fed.R.App.P. 9th Cir.R.
