1 Posey 355 | Tex. Comm'n App. | 1880
The only question presented is the sufficiency of the deed set out in the petition.
The appellee insists that it is void for uncertainty; 'and urges that the allegation of mistake in the number of acres, as stated in the amendments to have occurred in writing, the deed, changes the suit into a proceeding to correct,such, mistake, and without making the grantor a party. To this we cannot assent.
In suing for the land in trespass to try title the plaintiffs are entitled to a liberal construction of the terms of description; such also follows from the disposition of the case.upon demurrer. The description in the deed is supplemented by allegations to which parol evidence may be admitted.
The question cannot be considered an open one. In 46 Tex., 335, Roberts, C. J., delivering the opinion (Flanagan v. Boggess), in discussing the validity of a tax deed, containing
Referring to the case of Wofford v. McKinna, 23 Tex., 45, Justice Wheeler discusses the principles controlling' such deficient descriptions, as follows: “A grant by the owner of a certain number of acres in a particular tract would confer the right of election upon the grantee, and authorize him to locate the quantity upon any part of the tract he saw proper to elect, upon the principle that a conveyance must be held to pass some interest, if such effect may be given to it, consistently with the rules of law; and that if uncertain or ambiguous it must be construed most .strongly against the grantor. But in this respect, it is said, there is a wide difference between a conveyance by the owner and by a public officer. The former may sell upon his own terms, and may confer a right of election upon his grantee.”
The right of the grantee to explain the intent by parol evidence to aid a latent ambiguity in description, recognized as existing in deeds made by the owner, obtains equally in deeds for a good as for a valuable consideration. The limitation upon deeds by public officers is based upon the want of power of such officers. By the amendments to the petition in this case the land is described as being in Robertson countjq state of Texas, five hundred and forty acres of the H. Reed survey, all she had on the survey; being that deeded to her and on which she resided; described by metes and bounds.
• Such descrijftion fully answers the requisites when sus- ’ tained by testimony, validating a deed equally indefinite as that described. It does not appear but that five hundred and forty acres was all of the headright. of H. Reed, located in Robertson county.
It is not perceived why a deed by the owner for a definite
The subject is discussed or noticed in the following cases: Flanagan v. Boggess, 46 Tex., 335; Wofford v. McKinna, 23 Tex., 36; Kilpatrick v. Sisneros, 23 Tex., 136; Ragsdale v. Robinson, 48 Tex., 379; Kingston v. Pickens, 46 Tex., 99; Wilson v. Smith, 50 Tex., 369; Norris v. Hunt, 51 Tex., 614; Rainbolt et al. v. March, 52 Tex., 246; Davenport v. Chilton, 25 Tex., 519; Presley v. Testard, 29 Tax., 201; Early v. Sterrett, 18 Tex., 116; Berry v. Wright, 14 Tex., 270.
For the error in sustaining the demurrer to the petition, the judgment below should be reversed.
Reversed and remanded.