130 Ala. 584 | Ala. | 1900
Lead Opinion
The sole purpose of the bill in this case is to admit the complainants to come in as parties defendants and to defend in the case of Samuel L. Nelms, administrator of Sydney S. Blackburn v. J. T. Fitzgerald, Admr. of W. H. Blackburn, pending in said chancery court of Perry. This last named bill was filed solely for the settlement of a partnership between the said Sydney S. Blackburn and W. H. Blackburn carried on during their lifetime, and it is averred in said bill that the assets of said partnership 'consisted exclusively of personal property. The complainants in the present bill aver that they are heirs-at-law of the said W. H. Blackburn, deceased, and that they are beneficially interested in his estate. They also aver that the partnership which at one time existed between the said Sydney S. and W. H., who were brothers, was wound up and settled before -the death of the said Sydney S., who -died first, and that there is now no unsettled part-
In the bill for the settlement of the partnership, the assets of the partnership consisting exclusively of personal property, the administrators of the deceased partners were the only necessary parties.—Moore v. Huntington, 17 Wall. 417; Hawes’ Parties to Actions, § 25. The relation of the parties, as heirs-at-law of W. H. Blackburn, deceased, to the administrator of his estate, was that of beneficiaxfies under a trust, and as such, before they can proceed by bill in equity for the enforcement of equitable rights, they must first move the trustee to act, or show some'sufficient reason for the failure to do so.—Bailey v. Selden, 112 Ala. 594; Arnett v. Bailey, 60 Ala. 495; Bridges & Co. v. Phillips, 25 Ala. 136. In order to maintain such a bill by the beneficiaries, they must aver the facts which bring the case within the exception.—Bailey v. Selden, supra; Sullivan v. Lawler, 72 Ala. 73. No sufficient reason is shown by any statement or averment in the bill which would withdraw the complainants from the general rule and bring them within the exception as laid down in the above authorities.
The bill was submitted for decree upon demurrer and motion to dismiss the same for want of equity. There was no consideration of the demurrer by the chancellor, and hie decree was rendered on the motion to dismiss the bill, that motion being sustained. It is now contended by appellants that the dismissal of the bill on motion for want of equity was erroneous, inasmuch
In Seals v. Robinson & Co. it was said: “A motion to dismiss for want of equity is not the equivalent of a demurrer, nor is it appropriate to reach mere defects or insufficiencies of pleading curable by amendment, which is matter of right at any time before final decree. It should be entertained only when admitting the facts apparent on the face of the bill, whether well or illy pleaded, the complainant is without right to equitable relief. When it is apparent, if the facts were well pleaded a case for relief would exist, the defendant should he put to a demurrer specifying the ground of objection, affording the complainant the opportunity of removing them by amendment;” citing Hooper v. S. & M. Ry. Co., 69 Ala. 529. The other cases cited above reiterate the same principle. In Scholze v. Steiner, supra, p. 152, it was held that where the bill failed to state the facts, but averred conclusions, that it should not be dismissed upon motion, but the defendant should be put to his demurrer, as the bill showed equity on its face and was open to amendment by averring the facts upon which the conclusions stated were based.
In addition to cases already cited, in the following cases the rule as laid down in Seals v. Robinson & Co., supra, has been followed: Glover v. Henry, 82 Ala. 324; Harland v. Pearson, 93 Ala. 273; Pate v. Hinson, 104 Ala. 599; S. & N. A. R. R. Co. v. H. A. & B. R. R. Co., 117 Ala. 395; Brown v. Mize, 119 Ala. 10; Sullivan v. Vernon, 121 Ala. 393; Gardner v. Knight, 124 Ala. 273. While cases may be found in which loose expressions occur, that a motion to dismiss should not be entertained, if the bill is capable of amendment so as to give it equity, yet we have not been able to find 'any decision by this court, that goes to the extent of holding that a motion to dismiss, is not the appropriate remedy, where from the averment of facts, whether
Dissenting Opinion
dissent from the conclusion reached on the motion to dismiss the bill for want of equity, and cannot concur in the reasons given by which that conclusion was reached. Tyson, J., desires to say further that the record shows that the submission on the motion to dismiss was in vacation. Since the case of Kingsbury v. Milner, 69 Ala. 505, the rule has been that notwithstanding the facts shown by the bill, after considering all amendable defects as cured, do not make a case for equitable relief, still as the right of amendment is conferred by statute, the court cannot dismiss the bill without affording to the complainant an opportunity to exercise this right. 'Code, § 704 et seq. And this opportunity is not afforded when the submission is for decree in vacation. “To hold otherwise would be, in effect, to adopt the legal dogma of professional infallibility, which would render nugatory the necessity of all amendments” and to strike down the right conferred by the 'statute.
In Kingsbury v. Milner, supra, the bill was filed by a vendor of land who had conveyed with warranty to enforce the vendor’s lien and to make the defendant responsible for waste. It appeared from the bill that
This rule Inis no application to a dismissal in term time when the right to amend is not claimed. For the reason that the party being in open court, has the ap-portunity to exercise his right and his failure to ask leave to amend will be construed as a waiver of' that right.—Buford v. Ward, 108 Ala. 307.
The complainant’s right to amend being a matter of right and limited only to his. not making an entirely new case or a radical departure from his original cause of action nr working an entire change of parties, I do not see how it is x>ossible to say in advance of the amendment which he may offer, that he has no such right.
I have been unable to And, after diligent search, a single case in our reports where a decree dismissing a bill in vacation, without giving the complainant the right to amend, has been sustained. And I do not believe that one can be found. This point was not considered by Justice Dowdell in his opinion. He seems either to have overlooked it or to have regarded it not worthy of consideration.