67 W. Va. 253 | W. Va. | 1910
Rebecca Black owned a tract of 140 acres of land in Upshur county, and, on the 25th of December, 1906, conveyed it to her nephew, A. Y. Post, in consideration that he would support her while she lived, supply her with medical attention in case of sickness, and at her death give her a respectable burial, and in further consideration that he would pay to Rosie Bonnell and Charley Bonnell, her grandchildren who were then infants about the age of thirteen and sixteen years respectively, $500 each, which was not to become payable until each of the said infants should arrive at the age of twenty-one years, and then to be paid in installments of $50 per year without interest.
On the 14th of January, 1907,- she brought this suit in the circuit court of Upshur county to have the conveyance set aside and declared void on the following grounds; (1) mental incompetency in the grantor to make a conveyance; (2) inadequacy of consideration; and (3) fraud in the procurement of the deed. Pending the suit Rebecca Black died, and an amended bill was filed by- Mrs. Jane Bonnell, her daughter and only heir at law and the mother of the grandchildren provided for in the deed. The defendant answered and denied specifically all
The presumption of law- is always in favor of the competency of the grantor to execute a deed at the time it was made, and the burden of proof is on the party attacking the deed to overcome this presumption. Smith on Frauds 187; Eakin v. Hawkins, 52 W. Va. 124; Irwin v. Hedrick, Id. 537; Delaplain v. Grubb, 44 W. Va. 612; Snodgrass v. Knight, 43 W. Va. 294; Buckey v. Buckey, 38 W. Va. 168. The judge of the circuit court, in deciding this case, rendered a carefully prepared written opinion which is made a part of appellee’s brief. We conclude our observations upon the question of the grantor’s sanity and mental capacity at the time of making the deed with the following quotation from that opinion, viz: “But when the opinions of these witnesses are analyzed in the light of the facts upon which they are based, there is scarcely a fact in the case tending to warrant the opinion that she was insane. Neither is there much to justify the opinion that she was an imbecile, or non compos mentis, and incompetent to transact the ordinary busi
Having ascertained that the grantor had sufficient capacity to dispose of her property, which is the point on which plaintiff chiefly relied, and the one upon which the overwhelming amount of testimony seems to center, it goes a long way towards disposing1 of the other charges of inadequacy of consideration and fraud in the procurement of the deed. Inasmuch as the law gives a person an unqualified right to dispose of his property as he pleases, even to the extent of giving it away, it necessarily follows that inadequacy of consideration is not alone sufficient to overthrow a deed. It is only evidence to be considered along with other facts and circumstances bearing .on the charge of fraud in the procurement of the deed. Is this charge sustained ? We think not. The grantee is a nephew of Bebecea Black,, he is her brother’s son. Bebecea Black, having, as we find, sufficient capacity to dispose of her property, had a right to-give it to her nephew if she so desired. We are unable to discovery from the evidence that any unlawful means were used to induce her to make the deed. She proposed to her nephew the making of the deed. Her motive seems to have been self, protection, her support. There is no proof that he, or any one else, persuaded her, against her free will, to make the deed, or that she was deceived or misled. Fraud can not be inferred from the grantor’s age and enfeebled state of health; and the need of someone to take care of her property and to provide for her. These circumstances alone do not prove fraud. They may be simply matters of inducement which inclined her to make the deed, which she did, apparently, with perfect freedom of will, and mental comprehension as to the nature and effect of a conveyance. The only testimony we find in the record as to what took place between Bebecea Black and the defendant, leading1 up to the execution of the deed, is that of the defend
That such undue influence was exerted upon the grantor as to overcome, or destroy, her free agency, and to substitute the will of another for her own, must be proven. The proof of a motive and an opportunity to exert such an influence, without more, is not sufficient to overthrow the deed. Woodville v. Woodville, 63 W. Va. 286; Deleplain v. Grubb, 44 W. Va. 613.
As to the value of the land the proof is, taking the average estimate, that it is worth about $4,500, that some parts of it are underlaid with a valuable seam of coal which some of the witnesses estimate to be worth $100 an acre. Other witnesses state that this vein of coal underlies only about five acres of the land; that the annual rental value of the land' for farming purposes is only about $125. • So that, taking into consideration the obligation of the grantee to pay the Bonnell children $1,000, and to support the grantor, then only sixty-three years of age, and furnish her care and medical attention in case of sickness, we can by no means say that the consideration is so inadequate as to shock the - moral conscience. It assured the grantor a comfortable support and a decent burial, and this seems to have been the controlling thought in her mind. Her farm, without some one to cultivate it, to harvest and take care of the crops, would contribute nothing towards her support, in view of her inability to do the work herself. Her daughter, Mrs. Bonnell, appears to have shown her but little attention, in fact seldom visited her^ until after she learned of this conveyance to A. Y. Post, and then she suddenly became very solicitous about her mother’s welfare, as did a number of other relatives in the neighborhood. These persons apparently set themselves to work
There is another matter appearing in the deed which not only placed an additional contingent burden on the grantee, but which is further proof of the fact that Rebecca Black knew both what she'was about at the time she executed the deed, and the probable value of her land. The deed provided that, if the coal underlying the land was sold for $100 an acre during the lifetime of Rebecca B-laclc, then her two grandchildren, Charley and Rosie Bonnell, were to have $200 each. This provision was more than likely suggested by Rebecca Black herself; there is no reason to suppose that it was voluntarily proposed by A. V. Post.
The fact that the grantor hastened early on the morning of the 25th of December, the day after Rebecca Black proposed to make- the deed, to get a notary to write it, is relied on as evidence of fraud. The oral agreement to convey was made on the day before; the execution of the deed was in consummation of it. Why could he not consistently procure the deed to be made as soon thereafter as possible P He may have thought, and doubtless did think, that if some of Rebecca Black’s relatives should learn of her purpose to convey her land to him they would try to dissuade her from doing so, and he was therefore anxious to have the matter consummated. She was not legally bound by her oral promise, and many persons, possessed of even stronger will power than Rebecca Black, have been known to change their minds, when not legally bound not to do so, in less time than twenty-four hours. Having exerted no influence on her mind to induce her to make the deed, and she being competent to malee it, there is certainly no fraud in procuring some person competent to write the deed and take the acknowledgment thereto at any convenient time thereafter, however soon it may be.
There is no lien retained in the deed to secure the grantor’s support, and this omission is urged as a badge of fraud. The grantee was personally bound to furnish her support, and there is no evidence that he made any effort to avoid his contract. Neither is there any proof of an agreement that such lien was to be retained in the deed, or that the grantor requested it to be done. Deeds are often executed -without reservation of a lien to secure the unpaid purchase money, even where the considera
After Bean had returned from Bebecca Black’s, after writing the deed and taking her acknowledgment, he was asked by some of the neighbors where he had been, and his reply was that he had been up to write 'Lum Post’s will. This statement is admittedly untrue, and it is urged as showing fraud, a desire to. cover up, to conceal what had actually been done. But we regard it as wholly immaterial' and a trivial matter, so far as it relates to the merits of the case. Lum Post was the father of the grantee and the brother of the grantor; he knew that his neighbors would be curious to know what had been the occasion of Bean’s visit to the neighborhood, knowing that lie was a notary public, and that he often prepared deeds and wills, and he suggested t'o him this reply in case he was asked where he had been. The purpose of the remark was apparently to deceive those who Lum Post knew were possessed of* sufficient idle curiosity to inquire into the business affairs of their neighbors in which they had no pecuniary interest. He no doubt thought that he could thereby defer the evil day which he felt sure 'would come to his son, A. Y. Post, as soon as the information should reach the ear of Mrs. Jane Bonnell, the prospective heir of Bebecca Black, that she had conveyed away her land. He very likely suspected that as soon as the transaction became known to. certain others of the relatives of Bebecca Black they, would set about to1 persuade her to bring a suit to avoid the deed. This piece of deception has no relation to the merits of the case. It -does not prove that the deed Avas fraudulently obtained, and, under the circumstances of this particular case, we do not think it even tends to prove fraud. We hold the deed from Bebecca Black to A. Y. Post to be valid.
For the reasons herein expressed we are of the opinion that the circuit, court erred in decreeing a cancellation of the deed from Bebecca Black to A. Y. Post bearing date' on the 25th of December, 1906, and the final decree made in this cause on the 25th of January, 1908, will be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in the matter of the settlement of the
Reversed and Remanded.