delivered the opinion of the Court.
Pеtitioner seeks to suspend respondent's wholesale liquor permit issued under the Fedеral Alcohol Administration Act (49 Stat. 977, 27 U. S. C. § 201) for having made “quota” sales of alcoholic beverages in violation of § 5 (a) and (b) of the Act. The agency ordered suspension of the-permit for 15 days for that violation. The Court of Appeals set the order asidе,
*25 Sеction 5 makes it unlawful for a wholesaler to induce a retailer to purchase distilled spirits “to the exclusion in whole or in part of distilled spirits” offered by other persons “by requiring the retailer to take and dispose of a certain quota of any of suсh products,” where, inter alia, the effect is “substantially to restrain or prevent transactions in interstate or foreign commerce in any such products.”
The facts are that during the period in question Johnny Walker Scotch and Seagram's V. 0. Whiskey were in short supply, while Seаgram’s Ancient Bottle Gin and Seagram’s 7-Crown Whiskey were plentiful, Ancient Bottle being a pоor seller. Respondent, in order to increase its sales of Ancient Bottle Gin and 7-Crоwn Whiskey, compelled retailers to buy them, which they did not desire, in order to obtain the оther two whiskeys which they did desire. The agency found that respondent’s sales were “quota” sales within the meaning of the Act, that they affected adversely the sales of competing brands, and “excluded, in whole or in part, distilled spirits . . . offered for sale by other persons in interstate commerce” — all to the end of substantially restraining and preventing commerce. The Court of Appeals concluded that the transactions complained of, although tie-in sales, did not violate § 5 of the Act.
Tying agreements by which thе sale of one commodity is conditioned on the purchase of another hаve been repeatedly condemned under the antitrust laws, since they serve no purpose beyond the suppression of competition.
Standard Oil Co.
v.
United States,
The court below relied on two countervailing considerations. It noted that § 5 (a) is hеaded “Exclusive outlet” and § 5 (b) “Tied house.” These titles were enough, it thought, to raise doubts concerning the meaning of the statutory clauses, since the retailer in question was not a “tied house” or “exclusive outlet,” but only the victim of these particular tied-in sales. The court was constrained to read the Act narrowly, as it conceived it to be penal in nature when it forfeited a permit to do business. But we deal here with remediаl legislation whose language should be given hospitable scope. See
Securities and Exchange Commission
v.
Joiner Corp.,
The other consideration relied upon by the Court of Appeals was a letter written by the agency to Congress in 1947 asking for an аmendment to § 5 because it had doubt “whether violations of the statute could be established through the 'tie-in’ sales.” The administrative practice, we are advised, has quite consistently reflected the view that such sales are banned by the Act. See Annual Reрort, Commissioner of Internal Revenue 1946,
*27
pp. 45-46;
id.,
1947, p. 49. The fact that the agency sought a clаrifying amendment is, therefore, of no significance. See
Wong Yang Sung
v.
McGrath,
Reversed.