52 Ga. 621 | Ga. | 1874
This was a bill filed by J. J. .Cohen and others, citizens and tax-payers of the city of Rome, praying for an injunction to restrain the mayor and council of said city from levying and collecting an extraordinary tax for the payment of the interest due on certain described bonds, as well as for the payment of said bonds issued by said city, on the ground that said bonds were illegally and fraudulently issued, and that the same may be declared null and void. The defendant answered the bill, as well as other parties who were holders of the city bonds, and who were allowed to come in as parties defendants. The bill did not waive discovery, but required an answer to the allegations made therein. On the hearing of the application, the presiding judge, acting as chancellor, granted the injunction restraining the levying and collecting an extraordinary tax to pay the interest coupons attached to the bonds issued by the mayor and city council of Rome to pay the subscription for stock to the North and South Railroad Company of Georgia, and the sixty-five bonds issued to redeem what is called city currency, numbered from one to sixty-five, inclusive, but refused the injunction to restrain the raising, by extraordinary tax, money to pay the $5,000 00
1. The main controlling question in this case is, whether the defendant had, as a municipal corporation, lawful authority to issue the bonds. If it did not have the lawful authority to do so, then the bonds are void, and no extraordinary or other tax should be levied and collected to pay them, or the interest due thereon. But if the bonds are not void for the want •of lawful authority to issue them, although the same may have been irregularly or fraudulently issued by the defendant, it is bound to pay them to the innocent holders thereof, and therefore should levy and collect the extraordinary tax for that purpose. It appears from the record that the bonds are payable to bearer, and due at a future date, have been negotiated, and are now in the hands of different parties as the holders thereof.
2. It is insisted that the sixty-five bonds, numbered from one to sixty-five, inclusive, issued to redeem the city currency, were issued without authority of law, because the defendant was not authorized to make a contract by issuing its bonds for that purpose, and that the currency which the bonds were issued to redeem, was illegally issued by the defendant in •violation of the statute law of the state; that the act of the general assembly of the 23d of August, 1872, legalizing and making valid said bonds, could not ratify an illegal transac■tion. It appears from the record that the.currency which the bonds were issued to redeem, were certificates of indebtedness issued by the defendant for the purpose of liquidating the indebtedness of the city, and were receivable for all public dues. By the 13th section of the original charter of the
3. As to the illegality of the currency which these bonds were issued to redeem, it will be seen by reference to the act of 1851, on which the 4456th section of the Code is-based, that although the defendant might have been indicted and punished for issuing the currency in violation of its provisions, still, it was bound to redeem that currency. The fourth section of that act declares, “ that the bills, notes or checks, if paid away, or tendered in payment, contrary to the-provisions of this act, shall, notwithstanding anything con-, tained in this act, be valid, and collectible the same as any other note, bill or check, and shall be subject to taxation at-the discretion of the legislature:” Pamphlet Acts 1851-2, page 26. The principle contained in that act is right. If the defendant has received the benefit of the currency issued by it, though issued illegally, it ought to redeem it, and it was not illegal to make a contract for its redemption by the defendant, in issuing its bonds for that purpose, inasmuch as it was a contract “ for the welfare of the city.”
4. Besides, the defendant being legally bound to redeem that currency, it was competent for the general assembly, by the act of 23d of August, 1872, to ratify the issuing of the bonds, if any ratification was necessary to have made them valid. As to the discrepancy as to the date of the bonds mentioned in the title and body of that act, which were intended to be ratified, see the decision of this court in Hill vs. The Commissioners of Decatur, 22 Georgia Reports, 203.
5. It is further insisted by the plaintiifs in error that the Memphis Branch Railroad bonds and the North and South Railroad bonds are void, because the acts of 14th of October, 1870, and 1st of December, 1871, authorizing the defendant to subscribe to stock therein, were passed in violation of that provision of the constitution of 1868 which declares, “Nor
6. The constitution of 1868 has in it an additional clause that was not in the old constitutions, to-wit: “Nor shall any law or ordinance pass, which refers to more than one subject matter.” Does the act of 1870 and the amendment thereto, refer to more than one subject matter? "What is the subject matter of the original and amended act? The subject matter, is the subscription of stock to railroads by the mayor and council of the city of Rome, including the Memphis Branch Railroad, or any other railroad that might be projected and have its terminus in that city, and when the amended act authorized the subscription to the North and South Railroad, that had^ reference to the same subject matter, to-wit: subscription to the stock of a railroad specially named, which had
7. The authority to the mayor and council to subscribe for stock in the respective companies, necessarily implied that it. was to provide the means to pay for it; paying for the stock subscribed, was the most important part of the whole subject matter. Courts will not declare an act of the general assembly unconstitutional and void, unless it is plainly and manifestly so. The two or more subjects matter referred to in the act, not contained in it, to make the act unconstitutional and void for that reason, should be so distinct and clear, as to leave no doubt upon the mind of the court, as, for instance, if an act to subscribe to stock in a railroad company, should refer in the body of it, to a subscription for stock in a gold mining company, that would be two distinct subjects matter referred to in the same act, which the constitution prohibits, but that is not the case now before us, nor anything like it; the whole subject matter referred to in the body of the act of 1870 and the amendment thereto, is in relation to the subscription to stock by the mayor and council of the city of Rome in two named railroads having their termini in that city, and providing the means of payment therefor. If there was anything said in the opinion of this court, in the case of The Board of Public Education vs. Barlow, 49 Georgia Reports, 232, seemingly in conflict with our present ruling, we modify what was said in that case, upon a more full and deliberate examination of the question.
8. On the 22d September, 1870, the general assembly passed •an act to authorize the mayor and council of the city of Rome to issue bonds, and borrow money for purposes therein specified. By the first section of that act the defendant was authorized, in its corporate capacity, to negotiate a loan and
In our judgment, the defendant had the lawful authority to issue the bonds complained of in the complainants’ bill, and if the same were irregularly issued by the defendant, or if any ■of them were negotiated and sold for less than ninety cents in the dollar, the defendant is bound to pay them, and the interest thereon to the innocent holders thereof. In support of our judgment, we cite the following authorities: Knox vs. Aspinwall, 21 Howard’s Rep., 544; Bissell vs. The City of Jeffersonville, 24 Howard’s Rep., 298; Mercer County vs. Hacket, 1 Wallace’s Rep., 94; Gilspeke vs. Dubuque, 1 Ibid., 203; Supervisors vs. Schenck, 5 Ibid., 781; City of Lexington vs. Butler, 14 Ibid., 294; Moran vs. The Commissioners of Miami Co., 2 Black’s Rep., 729.
The application having been made in this ease to a court of ■equity to restrain the defendant from levying and collecting an extraordinary tax for the payment of the interest due on the bonds, the question naturally presents itself, where were the complaining citizens of the city of Rome, when the stock subscription to the railroad companies was made and the bonds issued by the defendant in payment therefor? Why did not they interfere then to restrain the defendant from subscribing for the stock and issuing the bonds of the city, if the defendant was violating its duty, as they now allege? Why remain quiet and passive until the bonds liad been issued and sold, and were in the hands of innocent holders thereof? In view
Let the judgment be so entered on the minutes of this court-