Eddie BLACK
v.
CITY OF TUPELO.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
*1222 Appellant, pro se.
Tacey Clark Clayton, Tupelo, attorney for appellee.
Before SMITH, P.J., WALLER and CARLSON, JJ.
*1223 SMITH, Presiding Justice, for the court.
¶ 1. This tоrt claims act case comes to this Court on appeal from a Lee County Circuit Court order granting the City of Tupelo's motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) plaintiff Eddie Black failed to serve a "Notice оf Claim" as required by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act and (2) that the plaintiff's case is barred by res judicata. We find that Black failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Tort Claims Act and that Black's case is barrеd by a prior lawsuit. We affirm the trial court.
FACTS
¶ 2. The plaintiff Eddie Black ("Black"), proceeding pro se, alleged the City of Tupelo and individual police officers employed by the Tupelo Police Department, including Mark Price ("Price"), Clay Hassell ("Hassell"), Jaime Harper ("Harper"), James Moses ("Moses"), Jay Clark ("Clark"), Michael Olive ("Olive") and Paul Howell ("Howell"), harassed him, were negligent in performing their duties, were part of a conspiracy to cause and broke a "Covenant Not to Sue." Specifically, Black complains of the following events: (1) He was put in a jail cell with two inmates who had previously attacked and robbed him; (2) He was arrested in violation of the "Covenant Not to Sue" on February 4, 1998; (3) He was arrested on shoplifting charges on November 11, 1997, which were later overturned; (4) He was frequently stоpped by Moses and/or Hassell; (5) He was verbally threatened by Clark; (6) Clark used excessive force; (7) Olive verbally threatened him; (8) Howell reported that Black was a "snitch;" and (9) Harper failed to give Black information regarding an incident with police officers.
¶ 3. Black made the identical allegations against the same officers and the City of Tupelo in a civil action in the United States District Court for thе Northern District of Mississippi. Black's assertions did not meet the Spears v. McCotter test, and the case was dismissed with prejudice on March 24, 1999. Unhappy with the ruling in federal court, Black then filed this case in Lee County Circuit Court. That court grаnted the City of Tupelo's motion to dismiss. Aggrieved, Black appeals alleging the following errors:
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT WITHOUT A HEARING.
II. WHETHER THERE WERE TOO MANY UNADDRESSED COMPLAINTS FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DISMISS WITHOUT A HEARING.
III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO HEAR BLACK'S COMPLAINTS IN OPEN COURT PUT HIS LIFE IN DANGER AND THUS PRECLUDED GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS.
IV. WHETHER THIS COMPLAINT IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA.
V. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE UNDER THE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROVISIONS IN THE MISSISSIPPI TORT CLAIMS ACT.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 4. This Court's standard of review for a motion to dismiss is well established.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Mississipрi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) raises an issue of law. This Court reviews questions of law de novo. When considering a motion to dismiss, the allegations in the *1224 complaint must be taken as true, and the motion should not be granted unlеss it appears beyond doubt the plaintiff will not be able to prove any set of facts in support of his claim.
Poindexter v. Southern United Fire Ins. Co.,
ANALYSIS
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT WITHOUT CONDUCTING A HEARING.
¶ 5. This Court has not addressed the question of whether a trial court may grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for fаilure to state a claim without conducting an oral hearing. However, this question has been addressed in the context of a Rule 56(c) motion for summary judgment. Adams v. Cinemark USA, Inc.,
No error in either the admission or exclusion of evidence and no error in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the Court or by any of the parties is ground for granting а new trial or for setting aside a verdict ... unless refusal to take such action appears to the Court inconsistent with substantial justice. The Court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
Id. at 1164 n. 4 (citing M.R.C.P. 61) (emphasis in original). In Adams we determined the trial judge had all necessary information to make a ruling on the motion for summary judgment in his possession. Id. That being the case, the Court held the trial court's failure to conduct a hearing to be harmless error and affirmed the grant of summary judgment.
¶ 6. The reasoning in Adams applies to the case at bar. In its motion to dismiss, the City of Tupelo argued that Black's failure to file a notice of claim as required by the Mississippi Tоrt Claims Act, as well as the dismissal of his previous federal case, precluded his cause of action. Black filed two responses to the City's motion. Black's failure to file a notice of claim and the dismissal of his previous suit are not in dispute. The only remaining questions were ones of law. Thus, the failure of the trial court to hold a hearing prior to granting the motion to dismiss was harmless error.
II. WHETHER THERE WERE TOO MANY UNADDRESSED COMPLAINTS FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DISMISS WITHOUT A HEARING.
¶ 7. Black argues that toо many "unaddressed" allegations exist for the trial court to have dismissed his complaint. Obviously, the number of issues raised in a complaint have no impact on the ability of a trial court to dismiss an action, so long as the requirements for dismissal are met. As discussed above and below, the requirements for dismissal have been met in the case at bar. This argument is without merit.
III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO HEAR BLACK'S COMPLAINTS IN OPEN COURT PUT HIS LIFE
*1225 IN DANGER AND THUS PRECLUDED GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS.
¶ 8. Black argues that the trial court's dismissal of his complaint withоut a hearing puts his life in danger. Black offers this Court no evidence as to why this may be true. This Court does not see any correlation between the dismissal of the case and any alleged danger to Black. In аny event, alleged danger to a party is not sufficient reason to sustain a complaint of this nature. This argument is likewise without merit.
IV. WHETHER THIS COMPLAINT IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA.
¶ 9. As stated above, Black previously filed a lawsuit in federal court substantially similar tо the case at bar. United States Magistrate Judge Jerry A. Davis held a hearing pursuant to Spears v. McCotter,
¶ 10. Under the doctrine of res judicata, pаrties are prevented from litigating issues tried in a prior lawsuit, as well as matters which could have been litigated in the prior suit, if four identities are present in both actions: (1) identity of the subject matter of the aсtions; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the parties to the cause of action; (4) identity of the quality or character of a person against whom the claim is made. Hogan v. Buckingham ex rel. Buckingham,
¶ 11. The subject matter оf the federal suit and the case at bar are the same; namely, both suits pertain to alleged incidents with the Tupelo Police Department. The identity of the cause of action is likewise the samе. The identity of a cause of action is the identity of the underlying facts and circumstances upon which a claim has been brought. Riley v. Moreland,
V. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE UNDER THE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROVISIONS IN THE MISSISSIPPI TORT CLAIMS ACT.
*1226 ¶ 12. There is a mandatory notice requirement on potential plaintiffs which must be satisfied prior to the institution of аny tort lawsuit against a governmental entity or one of its employees. Specifically, in an action against a governmental agency "ninety days prior to maintaining an action thereon, such pеrson shall file a notice of claim with the chief executive officer of the governmental entity." Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1) (1999). In determining whether the notice of claim requirements have been met, this Court has adopted a "substantial compliance" standard. In other words, strict compliance with the notice requirements of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act is not a prerequisite to maintaining a cause of action against a gоvernmental agency. Carr v. Town of Shubuta,
¶ 13. Black suggests that a covenant dropping charges against Black in exchange for an agreement to not file suit agreed to and executed on September 30, 1993, constitutes a notice of claim. Without analyzing whether such an agreement could be considered a notice of claim, all the events complained of ocсurred well after the date the covenant was signed. Obviously, a document agreed to at least four years before any of the incidents complained of occurred cannot give propеr notice of a claim regarding subsequent events. The trial court was correct in dismissing Black's complaint for failure to comply with the notice of claim provisions in the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.
CONCLUSION
¶ 14. A plaintiff is barred from relitigating all issues tried in a prior lawsuit, as well as all issues which could have been litigated in that prior suit provided the four identities discussed above are present. Black was barred from bringing this claim by res judicаta. Despite the latitude this Court grants to pro se litigants, there are still essential requirements for sustaining an action. A party must substantially comply with the notice requirements of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Black did not provide the notice required. Thus, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
¶ 15. AFFIRMED.
PITTMAN, C.J., WALLER, COBB, EASLEY, CARLSON AND GRAVES, JJ., CONCUR. McRAE, P.J., AND DIAZ, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.