38 Ala. 111 | Ala. | 1861
The motion to suppress the 'deposition of Gideon Leverett was made upon the ground of his failure to answer a question propounded by the appellant. The question is as follows : “ If you say a deed was executed, tell everything that was done, so that the court may know what you mean when you say, a deed was executed.” To this the witness answers, as appears from the transcript: “I refer to my answers made to the direct interrogatories what know deed of trust or gift, and I hope the court will understand what'I mean or know about it.” It is evident that there is some imperfection in taking down the answer of the witness ; but we think it may fairly be understood as referring to,the answers to the direct interrogatories for such knowledge responsive to the question as he had. On looking to the answers to the interrogatories, we find a statement of -many things pertaining to the execution of the deed; and those things, the answer in question, fairly interpreted,’says, constituted the sum of his knowledge on the subject. We do not feel authorized to pronounce the answer so evasive, that the deposition ought to be suppressed ; and -although it may be inconvenient, sometimes, for a witness to refer to some other part of a deposition Lor Lis answer to a question, that is not a fatal objection. Indeed, it is an established practice, to refuse to suppress a deposition on account of a failure to answer a question, if -the facts sought to be elicited can be ascertained from other parts of the deposition, or are immaterial. Spence v. Mitchell, 9 Ala. 744; Gibson v. Goldthwaite, 7 Ala. 281; Buckley v. Cunningham, 84 Ala. 69. We decide, that there was no error in overruling the motion to suppress the deposition.
We entertain no doubt that the rulings of the chancellor . upon the different exceptions to evidence, so far as they could possibly influence the result of this case, were'correct. It is not necessary that we should go into an examination of them.
What is said by .this witness, as-to Ms father going to Upson county, to-deliver the deed, is made harmonious with the rest o£ the deposition, .by understanding, the witness to speak of delivery in its very- common acceptation of giving manual- possession of it.
The witnesses who, it ia contended, controvert some of the statements of this-y/itness, are themselves not in a position entirely above- suspicion.; and as this witness, Gideon Leverett, is sustained by other-.witnesses as to the most material facts -stated by him, we regard him as entitled to our credence, notwithstanding whai-.those other witnesses may have said. The depositions of Abram Leverett, J. J. Holly, William, Page, Henry Pruitt, Joseph Pruitt, and Leroy Gresham, strongly fortify and corroborate the testimony. of Gideon .Leverett. The .testimony of Holly proves the admission by the appellant of the deed, that it was lost, -and had been established as a lost deed in the superior court of Troup county, Georgia; and the record from the superior court of Troup county, Georgia, shows that the deed there- established was the same with the copy, proved by the complainants’ witness, Gideon Leverett. Other corroborations, quite as strong, might be drawn from the testimony of the other witnesses; but it is unnecessary for us to farther amplify. Every fact necessary to sustain the title of the complainants, and to show the defendant’s want of title, was fully made out by two witnesses, or by one with strong corroborating circumstances. The appellant had no interest whatever in the property, upon which he could either defend the original bill, or sustain his cross-hill. There was, therefore, no error of which he can complain.
Affirmed.