21 Abb. N. Cas. 99 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1887
This is an application for an injunction ■by the plaintiff against the defendants, who, as the complaint states, claim to be members of an association called or known as the “ Black Rabbit Association.” The complaint sets out the incorporation of the plaintiff under the act of May 12, 1875, and its amendments, and states the business ■of the company to be that set out in the act. It further ulaims that the defendants, in conjunction with other persons, without the consent or authority of the plaintiff, have held meetings and transacted business under the name of the “ Black Babbit Association,” and sets out that they have circulated notices purported to be issued by the Black Babbit Association—who are about having an excursion and-selling tickets, as authorized by the Black Babbit Association ; that the public are misled by these acts into the belief that it is the excursion of the plaintiff; that defendants are
The complaint is accompanied by the affidavit of Henry M. Groldfogle, stating that the defendants are not incorporated, also the affidavits of Edward J. Kennedy, who swears he is president of the plaintiff, which is a corporation; that he knows the defendants, and that they are maintaining a-club called “ Black Babbit Association ” or “ Black Babbit Association of Hew York,” and that they are not members of the plaintiff; that their act in using the name as they do-is against the wish and order of the plaintiff; that the-defendants claim the plaintiff is a fraudulent concern, without any right to its corporate name, and that the defendant is the original and genuine society; that the defendants-have advertised themselves largely as the “ Black Babbit Association,” and have advertised an excursion or chowder-party under that name, and claims that the Black Babbit. Association is a social organization and has gained prominence by its select entertainments, and that the plaintiff is-deprived of the full use of its corporate name by the acts-of the defendants and are put to financial loss.
James B. Heal’s affidavit is also annexed. He is the treasurer of the plaintiff and has read the complaint and knows- .
Elmer W. Brown is also connected with the plaintiff substantially as stated in the affidavit preceding. The affidavit of Frank J. Carroll is also read for the same purpose.
It will be seen that these papers by their statements aver the organization and association of the defendants under the name which they claim to have been since the incorporation of the plaintiff.
The defendants produce the affidavits of Thomas J. Munday, who swears that the defendants are members of an organization known as the Black Babbit Association; that it was organized April 19, 1885; that he was elected the president and has continued as such up to the present time; that it was for social purposes, including excursions and' picnics ; that among the persons who associated in the
It is very evident from the proofs before me that such was not the fact; that the organization sought to be enjoined is one that was in existence and known long prior to the formation of the plaintiff’s association ; and that the plaintiff’s association have apparently simply made an effort by incorporating itself to take the name which was already in existence and used prior to its organization, and then restrain the party who used and is using it from its use.
The defendants had acquired the name prior to the plaintiff’s incorporation, and have had a property right in it, if a property right could exist in a name—certainly the right to the name ; and the question, is, Is there anything in the statute that will enable persons who thus take a name which they know to be already in existence, and by incorporating themselves, put them in a position to prevent all .others from using that name, including those who are- already acting under it ? There is nothing in the act which leads me to any such conclusion. The words of the act undoubtedly refer to rights thereafter to be acquired, or the right thereafter to adopt, not those already in existence and vested.
There is nothing in the act to show that the Legislature intended to permit any person to thus get possession of a name, or its use, that belongs to some other person or association ; and if there is any such inference from the act, it seems to me that it cannot be in the power of the Legislature to thus take away from any person or association rights which they had, and bestow them on any one else.
: Ordered accordingly.