56 Pa. Commw. 403 | Pa. Commw. Ct. | 1981
Opinion by
Joy A. Bitler (claimant) appeals form an order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) denying her Special Unemployment Assistance (SUA) benefits under Title II of the Emergency Jobs and Unemployment Assistance Act of 1974 (Assistance Act).
The Board’s order affirmed a referee’s decision that the claimant had rendered herself ineligible under the disqualifying language of Section 203(b) of the Assistance-Act,
Until June of 1977 claimant Bitler was a full-time professional employee of the Royer Run School District. In that month she was furloughed from her position. In July, 1977, she applied for and was granted SUA benefits; and she continued to receive
At some point, apparently during the month of June, 1978, Central Columbia sent her a written communication inquiring if she was willing to continue as a substitute teacher in the upcoming, 1978-1979 school year. She responded that she was. Prior to that communication from the school district, Bitler had allowed her name to remain on the list of available substitutes for the next school year.
The Bureau of Employment Security
The referee affirmed the Bureau’s determination but modified the basis of the claimant’s ineligibility.
The referee, in applying Section 203(b) of the Assistance Act, used that version of the Section that predated its 1976 amendment. As amended, Section 203(b) provides in pertinent part that, as to any individual who performs services in an instructional capacity, benefits shall not be payable for any week commencing between two successive academic years or terms if:
[S]uch individual performs such service in the first of such academic years (or terms) and if there is a contract or reasonable assurance that such individual will perform services in any such capacity for any educational institution in the second of such academic years or terms. (Emphasis added.)7
Given that statutory language, the sole issue in this case generated by 203(b) is whether claimant Bitler had a reasonable assurance of re-employment in the fall term of 1978.
The referee found that Central Columbia had given such an assurance to the claimant; and we conclude that there was substantial evidence to support that finding. This claimant, after performing as a substitute at Central Columbia from January to June,
In light of the evidence in this case, we must also conclude that the referee and the Board correctly determined that the claimant did not meet the eligibility standard set forth in Section 401(d) of the Unemployment Compensation Law. School employees who expect and desire to work with their educational employers at the end of a summer recess are unavailable for suitable work under 401(d), and as such are ineligible for benefits. Sude v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 43 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 533, 402 A.2d 1122 (1979); Calvano v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 29 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 79, 368 A.2d 1367 (1977); Chickey v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 16 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 485, 332 A.2d 853 (1975). That rule applies absent proof by a claimant that there is some substantial reason to believe he or she will not be recalled at the end of the recess. E.g., Sude, supra. The claimant in the case at bar presented no such proof.
Order
And Now, the 2nd day of February, 1981, the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, at Decision No. B-168011, denying benefits, is affirmed.
26 U.S.C. §3304 (note).
Id.
Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §801(d).
Between January and June, 1978, the claimant served as a substitute teacher for at least one other school district.
Now “Office” of Employment Security.
Added by Section 5, Act of July 6, 1977, P.L. 41, as amended, 43 P.S. §802.1.
Section 203(b) of the Assistance Act was amended on October 20, 1976, by 26 U.S.C- §3304(a)(6)(A)(i). That amendment, which took effect as to services performed after December 31, 1977, substituted the language “if there is a contract or reasonable assurance....” Prior to the amendment the Section referred only to a “contract.”