9 Mass. 462 | Mass. | 1813
Lead Opinion
As the effect of judgments recovered in other states in the Union, when produced in this Court to maintain actions sued here on such judgments, has been the subject of much discussion, we have considered in some detail the effect which is allowed to foreign judgments in our courts.
* A foreign judgment may be produced here by a party to it, either to justify himself by the execution of that judgment in the country in which it was rendered, or to obtain the execution of it from our courts.
If the foreign court, which rendered the judgment, had jurisdiction of the cause, the justification is admitted, and the regularity of the proceedings is not to be drawn into question. But if the foreign court had no jurisdiction of the cause, the justification will be rejected, without inquiring into the merits of the judgment. In such case, therefore, the judgment may be impeached, by showing that the Court rendering it had no jurisdiction of the cause.
If the judgment be produced by a party, to obtain the execution of it here, the question of the jurisdiction of the Court rendering it, is still open to inquiry. And if a defect of jurisdiction should appear, the party producing the judgment must fail, without any inquiry into its merits. But if the foreign court rendering the judgment had jurisdiction of the cause, yet the courts here will not execute the judgment, without first allowing an inquiry into its merits. The judgment of a foreign court, therefore, is by our laws considered only as presumptive evidence of a debt, or as prima facie evidence of a sufficient consideration of a promise, where such court had jurisdiction of the cause; and if an action of debt be sued on any such judgment, nil debet is the general issue; or, if it be made the consideration of a promise, the general issue is non assumpsit. On these issues the defendant may impeach the justice of the judgment, by evidence relative to that point. On these issues the defendant may also, by proper evidence, prove that the judgment was rendered by a foreign court, which had no jurisdiction ; and if his evidence be sufficient for this purpose, he has no •'ccasion to impeach the justice of the judgment.
As some inconveniences resulted from this consideration of the judgments rendered in the neighboring colonies, by debtors, after judgments against them, removing with their effects into the then province of Massachusetts Bay, before satisfying those judgments,— it was provided by the provincial act of 14 Geo. 3, c. 2, that on judgments rendered in the courts of the neighboring colonies, actions of debt might be sued here, and that, on a plea of nul tiel record, the records of those judgments, attested by the clerk of the court rendering the same, should be good and sufficient evidence of the records. By this statute, judgments rendered in the courts of the neighboring colonies could not be here impeached, provided the courts rendering those judgments had competent jurisdiction. For the statute is predicated on the fact that the defendants were, at the time of rendering the judgments, inhabitants of the colonies in which the judgments were obtained. This act was in force until the statute of 1795, c. 61, was passed.
In the mean time, by the ratification of the confederation, the several states agreed “ that full faith and credit should be given in each of the states to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings, of the courts and magistrates of every other state.”
Afterwards a similar provision was made in the federal constitu tian, which declares that “ full faith and credit shall be given, in each state, to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings, of every other state;” and power is given to the Congress to prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings, might be proved, and the effect thereof.
By an act of the first Congress, c. 38, this power was executed; and it is therein enacted that records and judicial proceedings, authenticated as in that act is prescribed, shall have full faith and credit given to them in every court within the United . States, as they have, by law or * usage, in the courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be taken.
By the statute of the commonwealth already cited, (1795, c. 61,) actions of debt may be brought upon any judgment for debt, damages, or costs, rendered in any court of record of the United States, or of any other state in the Union, in any court of record of this commonwealth holden for the county, in which either party shall dwell, or in which the debtor shall have any valuable estate. This
But it does not appear to me to be material whether this cause is to be governed by our statute, or by the laws of the United States, as my opinion will rest upon the same principles. And I am satisfied that it was the intention of our own legislature, and also of the federal government, to place the judgments recovered in any of the courts of the United States on better ground than judgments rendered in any other state or country; and that judgments of this last description only can now be considered as foreign judgments.
If such was not the intention, it is difficult for me to conceive on what ground so much care was taken, as well in the confederation as in the federal constitution, to give full faith and credit to judgments rendered in any of the United States. If it be supposed that all this care was taken to restrain any state from placing the judgments of the other states on a ground less favorable than judgments rendered in foreign states or countries, this supposition is defeated by the act of Congress before referred to, which enacts that the judgments of any of the United States, duly authenticoted, shall have in each state the same faith and * credit given to them, as they have in the state whence they shall have been brought.
It has been further objected, on the part of the defendant in the case at bar, that the provision in the federal constitution has no force until Congress declare the effect of judgments rendered in any of the United States, and that Congress has made no such declaration.
But this objection is founded on an erroneous construction of the constitution; for, by the express words of the constitution, all the effect is given to judgments rendered in any of the United States, which they can have, by securing to them full faith and credit, so that they cannot be contradicted, or the truth of them denied. And the future effect which Congress was to give relates to the authentication, the mode of which is to be prescribed. In this sense the Congress understood the subject;,for, after providing a mode of authentication, it is enacted that judgments so authenticated shall have the same full faith and credit given to them in every state, as they have in the state from whence they were taken.
But neither our own statute, nor the federal constitution, nor the act of Congress, had any intention of enlarging, restraining, or in
This question came before the Circuit Court of the United .States holden at Exeter some years since. Dr. Scott, late of Boston,, while he lived, was seised of lands in New Hampshire.
* His administrator obtained a license from the legislaturc of Massachusetts to sell those lands, and under that license they were sold. When the children of Dr. Scott came of age, they sued a writ of entry against the assignee of the purchaser, to recover the lands. The license and sale under the authority of the state of Massachusetts were given in evidence in the defence; and the federal constitution and the act of Congress were relied on. But the Court were of opinion that the full faith and credit that were to be given to public acts of the legislature, were confined to those acts which a legislature had lawful authority to pass; and that it was not within the jurisdiction of the legislature of Massachusetts to license the sale of lands in New Hampshire.
And upon the same principle, if a court of any state should render judgment against a man not within the state, nor bound by its laws, nor amenable to the jurisdiction of its courts,— if that judgment should be produced in any other state against the defendant, the jurisdiction of the court might be inquired into, and if a want of jurisdiction appeared, no credit would be given to the judgment.
In order to entitle the judgment rendered in any court of the United States to the full faith and credit mentioned in the federal constitution, the court must have had jurisdiction, not only of the cause, but of the parties.
To illustrate this position, it may be remarked that a debtor living in Massachusetts may have goods, effects, or credits, in New Hampshire, where the creditor lives. The creditor there may lawfully attach these, pursuant to the laws of that state, in the hands of the bailiff, factor, trustee, or garnishee, of his debtor; and on recovering judgment, those goods, effects, and credits, may lawfully be applied to satisfy the judgment; and the bailiff, factor, trustee, or garnishee, if sued in this state for those goods, effects, or credits, shall in our courts be protected by that judgment, the court in New Hampshire.
From this reasoning the conclusion is manifest, that judgments rendered in any other of the United States are not, when produced here as the foundation of actions, to be considered as foreign judgments, the merits of which are to be inquired into, as well as the jurisdiction of the courts rendering them. Neither are they to be considered as domestic judgments, rendered in our own courts of record, because the jurisdiction of the courts rendering them is a subject of inquiry. But such judgments, so far as the court rendering them had jurisdiction, are to have in our courts full faith and credit. They may, therefore, be declared on as evidences of debts or promises; and, on the general issue, the jurisdiction of the courts rendering them is put in issue, but not the merits of the judg ments.
When we look into the case before us, we find that the judgment, on which the present action was brought, was rendered in a court of record in the state of Neio Hampshire, against defendants who are named in the writ as of Boston, *in this commonwealth; and it is agreed that, when the writ was issued and served, they were in the state of New Hampshire, and that the original process was served on them personally. It appears from the record, and is agreed, that they appeared to the writ and defended the action, and were thus parties to the judgment. Now, an inhabitant of one state may, without changing his domicile, go into another; he may there contract a debt or commit a tort; and while there he owes a temporary allegiance to that state, is bound by its laws, and is amenable to its courts. The de
Concurrence Opinion
were not present at the argument or decision of the action.
The difference of opinion, in deciding the question submitted to the opinion of the Court in the case at bar, is to be regretted, particularly on my part; but I have found it unavoidable, after a full consideration of the provisions of the constitution and the statutes of the United States, which, in the apprehension of a majority of the Court now present, and who alone were present at the argument, are to govern the decision. My dissent from my brethren may perhaps be attributed to a preconceived opinion, formed on the same general question, in the case of Bartlett vs. Knight,
It would seem, from the course of the argument, that the motion for a new trial, in the case at bar, depends upon the general question, whether a judgment recovered in the Superior Court of the state of New Hampshire (the record thereof, and the proceedings on which it was founded, having been authenticated according to the provisions of the statute of the United States) is to be regarded in the light of a domestic judgment, rendered in the Supreme Court of this state, and is to have the effect of incontrovertible evidence of a debt or promise, in an action commenced in a court of record within this state, to enforce payment.
On this question, however, there is but one opinion ; and it is this, as I understand it, — that a judgment certified from New Hampshire has not the effect of a domestic judgment, and is not, as this
By a clause in the federal constitution, full faith and credit are to be given, in each state, to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings, of every other state; and Congress are authorized to prescribe, by general laws, the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings, shall be proved, and the effect thereof. The manner of authenticating has been prescribed; and records and judicial proceedings, so authenticated, are to have such faith and credit given to them in every court of the United States, as they . have, by law or usage, in the courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be taken.
Does faith and credit, whether full, or determined by the laws and usages of the state from whence the record of a judgment is authenticated, import legal effect and operation ? This import, although professedly stated, I believe, to be the true construction, was practically denied in all the cases which occurred, where the same words, used in the articles of confederation, were brought into question.
In the case of Kibbe vs. Kibbe,
Now, if full faith and credit mean any thing, one would suppose the judgments certified from Massachusetts to have been entitled to credit for the jurisdiction of the court in which they were rendered; that is, that their authority had been d"'v exercised, according to the laws and usages of Massachusetts, ot which the judgments themselves were sufficient evidence ; and especially that a judgment against the person had not been rendered on a process restricted in its operation to the article returned as attached, and there understood to be altogether a process in rem.. These decisions are, therefore, to be regarded as violent expedients, to which recourse was had to avoid a construction at which courts of justice naturally revolt, as soon as the consequences in particular cases are perceived.
* In the case of Armstrong vs. Executors of Carson,
If the rules and doctrines of the common law, on this subject, have been abrogated by the federal constitution and the act of Congress, so far as the several states and the nation of the United States are concerned, — if the several states are no longer foreign to each other, in the jurisdictions of their legislative assemblies and judicial courts, — then, indeed, what is decreed in one state, whether legislatively or by the interpretation of the law in a civil action, is authoritative, in every other state, to be implicitly obeyed and carried into execution : and it is only upon this ground that judgments rendered in one state are to be received as conclusive evidence of a debt or promise, when, to enforce payment, actions are brought upon them in the judicial courts of another state. To inquire of the jurisdiction of a supreme or superior court, from which a judgment is certified, is to refuse full faith and credit; and judgments are certainly deprived, in the outset of the inquiry, of the effect to which they would be entitled, in the state from whence they are taken. .
*In the decision of the case of Hitchcock & Al. vs. Aicken, already mentioned, in the Supreme Court of the state of New York, the better opinion — that of three justices against two — was, that the rules and doctrines of the common law remain unaltered in their application in this particular; and that the states of the confederacy of the United States remain, as before their union, for certain purposes foreign to each other in the exercise of all legislative and judicial authorities; in short, that, by the full faith and credit provided for in the clause cited from the federal constitution, and in the statute enacted pursuant thereto, is not intended legal operation and effect, but the effect of evidence, to be received as competent' under the formalities prescribed. Judge IAvingston, one of the justices who dissented, in the report of his argument is made to cite the decisions in Connecticut and Pennsylvania with approbation, and to resolve them into the necessary discretion required in cases which lex non exacte definit, sed, arbitrio ■boni viri permittit. And it is obvious that the construction contended for, of the provisions of national law on this subject, leads inevitably to the exercise of a discretion which is guided by no rule, one consequence of which must be, that authenticated judg
For my part, I am desirous of adhering to the rules of the common law, for I cannot admit the construction that authenticated judgments, taken from one state, are, in every other state, conclusive evidence of a consideration from which a debt or promise is to be implied, against the supposed debtor, subjecting him to an action, or rather to an execution, in another jurisdiction than that where the judgment was pronounced. • And on the other hand, I cannot rest in a more limited construction of the provisions of national law on this subject, understood as abolishing the rules of the common law, and introducing a vague discretion to be exercised in a great number of judicatories, so * far independent, of each other as to have no common controlling jurisdiction even in cases of the last resort.
It is not easy to perceive why, in the examination of an authen ticated judgment, by the court to which resort is had for process to enforce payment, the only inquiry to be permitted is of the jurisdiction which the court rendering the judgment-had of the parties. Why not extend it to their jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action in which the judgment had been recovered ? For it may happen that a party may be concluded, because personally liable to the process of a court which had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action, or where it had been accidentally taken,— if I may use the expression,-—in consequence of the transitory nature of the demand, and by finding the party liable to be transiently within the bounds of their territory. It is at least sapposable that, in such a case, where the laws of another jurisdiction are to be administered, not within the judicial cognizance of the court, an erroneous judgment may have been rendered upon facts alleged or proved, and this may be apparent from the proceedings certified. The case would be stronger, if such a judgment should be brought, to be enforced in the state where was the proper jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the original action, and whose laws had been thus erroneously administered in another jurisdiction.
Other suggestions might be made, of cases arising under laws esteemed to have been enacted against public faith, or contra bonos mores; or judgments recovered against positive regulations within the state to which they are brought to be enforced. Such, for instance, would be judgments upon usurious or gaming contracts, illegal and void where made, but which may happen to be recovered where no such restraints are recognized.
I think the proceedings and judgment, relied on as conclusive evidence in the case at bar, are open to be examined, and that it is competent for the supposed judgment debtor to impeach, if he can, the judgment now to be enforced against him by the process of this Court. The record certified presents a case in which an inquiry, with us, seems to be peculiarly suitable and necessary. The defendant, incidentally visiting in New Hampshire, or occasionally passing within the bounds of that state, became, with his codefendant, since deceased, there liable, or was there charged in an action of trespass. In taking cognizance of the action, the Superior Court of New Hampshire undertook and assumed to administer our laws ; for the defendants were charged, in the original action, as trespassers, in taking certain goods within this state. They admitted the taking, which they justified as done under certain legal process, and by officers of the law, recognized * within this state. The averments of this plea were confessed by a general demurrer. To enforce the judgment rendered upon these pleadings against the defendant, is to administer our own laws by the intervention of a court in New Hampshire, who have no judicial cognizance of our laws or officers.
The statute of this commonwealth, (1795, c. 61,) also relied on for the plaintiff, has given an action of debt upon a judgment rendered and recovered in any court of record in any other of the United States, &c., to be brought in any court of record of this commonwealth, holden for the county in which either of the parties to such judgments, &c., shall dwell and reside, or in which any valuable effects of the judgment debtor shall be found at the time, &c.; the judgment to be certified in the form, and to the effect, which shall be prescribed by an act of Congress, &c. In this I see no provision, which can be construed to vary essentially the rules of the common law on this subject. The form of action is not directed exclusively; but when brought in that form, there is some degree of locality attached to it, which may not be requisite in another form of action, or in other cases. The requisite evidence is that which the federal constitution furnishes and gives effect to;, but the legal operation of that evidence is not enlarged or varied by our municipal statute.
*1 may add, upon the whole, as suggesting a consideration of some weight in determining a question of this kind, that the decision in the state of New York has been steadily adhered to there, and in subsequent decisions has been spoken of as the settled law.
Let the defendant be called,
Defendant defaulted.
• (1) 1 Mass. Rep 401.
1 Caines’s N. Y. Rep. 460.
1786, Kirby. 119.
1788, 1 Dall. 261.
The process, in Massachusetts, on which the judgment sued in the case of Phelps vs. Holker was rendered, and which has obtained the popular name of a foreign attachment, from its resemblance to a proceeding by the custom of London of that name, was not technically a proceeding in rem, as Chief Justice M'Kean was pleased to consider it. The declaration pursued the forms of the common law. So did the pleadings subsequent thereto. Judgment was rendered for the whole sum found due to the plaintiff in the action, and execution issued therefor, without regard to the defendant’s “ reputed property in the blanket,” (which Livingston, J., in commenting on the decision in Phelps vs. Holker, pleasantly enough mistakes for the defendant’s representative in Court, 1 Caines's Rep 473;) and the judgment so rendered, if the proceedings were conformed to the statute, had the same force and effect as a judgment founded on a process more conformed to the course of the common law. The defendant’s agent was admitted to contest the action in every legal mode, on behalf of his principal, who was always supposed to have knowledge of the suit, and might defend against it, if the agent should refuse or neglect to pursue his directions therein. The process alluded to was had under authority of a provincial act of G. 2, which, being originally temporary, was continued by succeeding legislatures until 1795, when a new and permanent act was passed, making some more convenient provisions in the case.
2 Dall. 302.
Doug. 1.
See 1 Johns. Rep. 424, Jackson vs. Jackson. — 3 Caines’s Rep. 26, Post & Al vs. Neafie.
[Vide Jacobs vs. Hull, 12 Mass. Rep. 25. — Commonwealth vs. Greene, 17 Mass. Rep. 545, 546. — Mills vs. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481. — Hampden vs. Connell, 3 Wheat. 234. — Mayhew vs. Thatcher, 6 Wheat. 129. — Borden vs. Fitch, 15 Johns. Rep. 121. — Andrews vs. Montgomery, 19 Johns. Rep. 162. — Rogers vs. Coleman, Hard. 413.— Ed.]