11 Barb. 96 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1851
By the Court,
By the 124th section of the act entitled, “ of courts held by justices of the peace,” it is enacted that “ in cases where a plaintiff shall be nonsuited, discontinue or withdraw his action, &e. the justice shall forthwith render judgment and enter the same in his docket. In all other cases he shall render judgment, and enter the same in his docket, within four days after the cause shall have been submitted to Mm for Ms final decision.” In the case under consideration, the cause was submitted to the justice on the 28th day of June, 1848, and judgment was rendered on Monday, the third day of July following, in favor of the plaintiff. The single question is whether the judgment was entered in season.
Were this a matter of practice merely, there could be no doubt that the judgment must be held regular. By the sixty-second rule of the supreme court, as well as by several adjudged
In respect to the construction of statutes the rule is otherwise, in this state. In the case of Ex parte Dodge, (7 Cowen’s Rep. 147,) the last day of the period limited by statute, within which a party had a right to appeal, fell on Sunday. The appeal was brought on Monday. The court held that Sunday had in no case been excluded in the computation of statute time, and dismissed the appeal. The cases showing that Sunday would not be counted as one of the four days within which a party might move in arrest of judgment, were cited to the court. But they were said to be cases of practice, and not interfering with the rule which the courts apply in the computation of time under a statute. The same doctrine is laid down as the gene
Pratt, Gridley, Allen and Hubbard, Justices.]
We must therefore reverse this judgment.
Judgment reversed.