Plaintiff in error, together with one Meyer and one Beattie, was indicted upon a charge of conspiracy under section 37 of the Criminal Code (Comp. St. § 10201) to commit an offense against the United States, the charge being in substance this:
Meyer'had been convicted in the court below of a criminal offense, and had thereupon been sentenced to imprisonment in the Warrensville workhouse. The three conspirators agreed that Meyer and plaintiff in error should pay a_ certain sum of money to Beattie, in consideration of which the latter would pretend to be Meyer, and under that name and character present himself to and get himself accepted by the workhouse officials as Meyer, and so serve Meyer’s sentence; that during such service Meyer should absent himself from Cleveland and remain in hiding; that after the sentence had been served he should return to Cleveland, and with the co-operation of plaintiff in error further compensate Beattie-for so serving the sentence. The overt acts charged were that Meyer made the agreed initial payment, and that Beattie presented himself to the workhouse officials as Meyer, procured himself to be so accepted, and accordingly served a portion of Meyer’s sentence. Beattie pleaded guilty. Plaintiff in error demurred to the indictment as not stating an offense against the laws of the United States. The demurrer was .overruled, plea of not guilty was entered by plaintiff in error and Meyer,' and trial had. The facts charged by the gov-
“We must look to the indictment itself, and if it properly charges an offense under the laws of the United States, that is sufficient to sustain it, although the representative of the United States may have supposed that the offense charged was covered by a different statute.”
And in the Nixon Case it is said:
“What was that statute, and on what statute the indictment was founded, was to be determined as a matter of law from the facts therein charged.”
The notice afforded to defendant would be no less, nor his confusion greater, because the reference to the statute is in the body rather than in the caption or margin of the indictment. In either case the reference to the statute 'indicates merely what the pleader thought was the applicable statute. Our conclusion is not wholly unfortified by authority. In Sugar v. United States, 252 Fed. 79, 84, 164 C. C. A. 191, this court held that the unnecessary (and possibly confusing) naming of section 5 of the Selective Service Act (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 2044e) as the legislation involved, when in fact the offense charged must, in connection with conspiracy section 37, have its basis,.
“based on those provisions of the act, the language of which covers the offense charged, whether that language is found in section 5 or elsewhere; the act, and not the mere numbered sections of it, being the substantial thing to be regarded, and particularly, when the language of the indictment clearly points out what conduct is aimed at and sought to be punished.” Certiorari denied, 248 U. S. 578, 39 Sup. Ct. 19, 63 L. Ed. 429.
In Vedin v. United States (C. C. A. 9) 257 Fed. 550, 551, 168 C. C. A. 534, 535, it was held that “the statute on which an indictment is found is determinable, as a matter of law, from the facts charged, and they may bring the offense charged within an existing statute, although the same is not mentioned, and the indictment is brought under another statute,”
Willful and intentional disobedience of the order of a court of competent jurisdiction (even though made in a civil cause) is criminally punishable, so far as the proceeding is in vindication of. the authority of the court. Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 31 Sup. Ct. 492, 55 L. Ed. 797, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 874; Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324, 24 Sup. Ct. 665, 48 L. Ed. 997; Proudfit Co. v. Kalamazoo Co. (C. C. A. 6) 230 Fed. 120, 132, 144 C.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
The opinion states that “tbe indictment in each count charged violation of” the statute referred to in the above quotation as “another statute.”