MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Lorenzo Bishop, Jr. (“Debtor”) filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection on January 31, 2002. Debtor listed Firstar Bank as a secured creditor holding two claims, one of which was secured by a 2000 Pontiac Grand Prix and the other by a 1998 Ford F-150 truck (“the truck”). A proof of claim regarding the truck was filed by “U.S. Bank, a/k/a Firstar Bank” (hereinafter “Bank”), and Debtor surrendered the Grand Prix to Bank. On June 11, 2002, this Court confirmed Debtor’s Modified Plan of Reorganization, which provided for payment in full of Bank’s secured claim.
On September 30, 2002, Debtor filed an adversary complaint asserting that Bank had willfully violated the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) by taking several actions which culminated in repossession of *893 the truck. Bank was timely served, but filed no response. On November 25, 2002, the Clerk entered a default against Bank as authorized by Bankruptcy Rule 7055, and a trial date was set for a hearing to determine damages.
The hearing on damages was held on January 23, 2002. Bank received timely notice, but did not appear at the hearing. After hearing Debtor’s testimony and oral argument of Debtor’s counsel, I instructed the Chapter 13 Trustee to cease making disbursements under Debtor’s plan to Bank and took the matter of damages under advisement. On April 4, 2003, Bank filed a request for an additional hearing on damages.
This Court has jurisdiction in this core bankruptcy proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(e) and 157(b) and the general order of reference of the District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. Having considered the evidence and applicable authority, I make the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in compliance with the directives of Bankruptcy Rule 7052.
FINDINGS OF FACT
On or about the evening of September 18, 2002, approximately three months after Debtor’s Chapter 13 plan was confirmed, an individual acting under Bank’s authority (“the repo agent”) went to the home of Debtor’s mother for the purpose of repossessing Debtor’s truck. The repo agent informed her that Debtor had filed bankruptcy, and he refused to leave unless and until she provided Debtor’s address. Debtor’s mother, who had been unaware that Debtor was in bankruptcy, but who had experienced an earlier wrongful repossession attempt by Bank, became upset and telephoned Debtor. 1
Debtor spoke to the repo agent, first by telephone and then in person. Debtor reminded the agent that Debtor was in bankruptcy, and informed the agent that Debt- or was making payments according to his bankruptcy plan. Debtor and his wife then drove to meet the repo agent, talked with him, and showed him the bankruptcy paperwork. When Debtor returned home, the repo agent called Debtor and told him that the agent still intended to repossess the truck. Debtor went to the police station to show the agent proof that he was making payments under the bankruptcy plan. Debtor told the repo agent he was keeping the truck and that he needed to consult his bankruptcy counsel. Debtor then returned home.
After Debtor returned home, a law enforcement officer telephoned Debtor and told him that he would be arrested if he did not surrender the truck. Believing that his arrest was imminent, Debtor returned to the police station and gave the repo agent the key. The repo agent took possession of the truck. On the following day, after Debtor met with his attorney and his attorney made numerous demands upon the Bank, the truck was returned to Debtor.
As a result of the repossession, Debtor was unable to work for one day and lost $90.00 in wages and $53.00 in traveling expenses, first in attempting to keep his truck and then in effecting its return. In prosecuting this proceeding, he lost more time at work which amounted to $135.00 in lost wages. Debtor’s out-of-pocket expenses totaled $ 278.00. Ex. A.
*894 Debtor also incurred legal expenses resulting from the repossession. His bankruptcy attorney took numerous actions on his behalf to effect the return of the truck and to compensate and protect him by prosecuting this adversary proceeding. Those expenses, which totaled $1,028.84, see Ex. B (itemizing costs and 6.8 attorney hours at $150.00 per hour) are reasonable.
Bank had notice of the bankruptcy case, the adversary proceeding, and all scheduled hearings. Bank filed no answer and elected not to appear at the hearing on damages. Bank’s sole response—a request for a second hearing on damages— was filed more than two months after the hearing. At the time Bank repossessed the truck, Debtor was current in making payments under the Plan, and he has continued to make timely payments.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A petition for bankruptcy relief operates automatically upon filing as a stay of “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate ... until such property is no longer property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), (c)(1). As “one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by bankruptcy laws,”
Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Env. Protection,
An act taken in willful violation of the stay subjects the actor to liability for “actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate circumstances ... punitive damages.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(h). A stay violation is “willful” if a creditor has knowledge of the bankruptcy filing and deliberately acts in such a way that violates the stay.
E.g., Flynn v. IRS (In re Flynn),
In this case, Bank’s liability in willfully violating the automatic stay has been established. Bank made no effort to refute credible evidence showing that Bank had knowledge of Debtor’s bankruptcy, that Bank’s agent harassed Debtor and his mother, that the agent repossessed the truck, and that the truck was not returned to Debtor until the day after the repossession, when Debtor’s attorney became involved.
Only the issues regarding damages remain to be determined. Pursuant to the discussion below, I make the following conclusions with respect to the assessment of actual and punitive damages against Bank.
A. Actual Damages
Section 362(h) provides that an individual debtor injured by a willful violation of the stay “shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorney’s fees.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (emphasis added). In this case, Debtor suffered actual damages in the forms of out-of-pocket expenses, attorney’s fees, and emotional distress.
1. Out-of-pocket expenses and attorney fees
As a result of the repo agent’s violation of the stay, Debtor incurred reason *895 able out-of-pocket expenses and attorney fees in the total amount of $1,306.84. That amount is compensable as actual damages pursuant to § 362(h).
2. Emotional distress
Section 362(h) is a remedial provision within the Bankruptcy Code by which a debtor’s rights under the stay are vindicated.
Flynn,
A bankruptcy court may award damages attributed to emotional distress if a preponderance of the evidence shows that emotional harm occurred and that the defendant’s conduct in willfully violating the stay was the cause of that harm.
See, e.g., In re Steenstra,
An award of damages for emotional distress due to a violation of the stay is appropriate where a natural and powerful emotional distress is readily apparent from the nature or extent of the wrongful conduct under the particular circumstances surrounding the stay violation.
2
Compare Kaneb,
Circumstances surrounding the violation can also show that no emotional distress occurred or that it was incompensable as merely “fleeting and inconsequential.” In
Stewart v. United States (In re Stewart),
In this case, the harm was readily apparent. Debtor testified, credibly. He was subjected to an intentional stay violation by the first contact with his mother and her telephone call to him. He retained his composure and advised the Bank’s agent of his pending bankruptcy case. The agent persisted and wrongfully involved Debtor’s wife, mother, and law enforcement agencies in his unlawful, repeated attempts to flout federal protections on which Debtor rightfully relied. There is no doubt that (1) Debtor suffered fear, anguish, and intense personal humiliation because of the interjection of these outside family members and police authorities into a matter they should never have been aware of, and that (2) Debtor suffered heightened distress over the threat of incarceration.
One Court has held that evidence of financial harm to be a prerequisite for a bankruptcy court’s award of emotional distress. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in
Aiello v. Providian Financial Corp.,
I respectfully disagree with the Seventh Circuit’s piggybacking requirement in
Aiello.
That court acknowledged that emotional distress damages are “actual damages,” yet questioned whether an award for emotional distress is “authorized” by § 362(h).
4
Aiello,
Where both emotional distress and willful conduct have been established, the causal link between the willful conduct in violation of the stay and the harm must be clearly established or readily apparent.
See Burke v. Georgia Dept. of Rev. (In re Burke),
Here, the casual connection between Defendant’s acts and the distress experienced by Debtor is not speculative, but certain. The natural and direct connection between the agent’s acts and Debtor’s loss could not be more clear. Debtor asserted his rights for several hours. He did not take the truck with him the first time he went to the police station. He explained why the truck should not be repossessed. He stated that he needed to talk to his bankruptcy attorney. He returned home. After asserting his rights for several hours, trying to explain about his bankruptcy and his current good standing in making payments, and holding up in the face of his mother’s and wife’s concerns, Debtor’s ultimate capitulation under the more serious threat of arrest and surrender and the *898 distress it caused was the direct result of the wrongful acts of Defendant.
Furthermore, it is clear that mental distress was precisely the effect on Debtor that the repo agent intended. I find that each act was calculated by the repo agent to push Debtor into giving up his truck and that the totality of all the agent’s actions and demands on Debtor culminated in inevitable emotional distress as evidenced by Debtor yielding after several hours of resistance. In light of the egregious conduct of the repo agent and Debt- or’s eventual capitulation, it is clear that Debtor’s emotional distress was both readily apparent and directly caused by Defendant.
I conclude, therefore, that Debtor is entitled to actual damages for emotional distress in the amount of $5,000.00.
B. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are permitted for a willful violation of the automatic stay “in appropriate circumstances.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(h). “Appropriate circumstances” include actions taken with malicious intent to harm and actions taken in arrogant defiance of federal law.
See, e.g., Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v. Esselen
Assocs.,
Inc. (In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co.),
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit identified the factors to be evaluated in determining whether and in what amount punitive damages are warranted under § 362(h): the degree of reprehensibility of the violator’s conduct; the ratio between the compensatory and punitive damages; and the difference between the punitive damage award and the civil penalties authorized or imposed for comparable conduct.
Varela v. Ocasio (In re Ocasio),
In this case, I find that appropriate circumstances exist for imposing punitive damages. First, Bank had wrongfully pursued this same debtor in another attempt related to Debtor’s bankruptcy. In that situation, Bank’s repo agents attempted to “repossess” a vehicle (that Debtor had already surrendered to Bank in accordance with the bankruptcy plan) by going to Debtor’s mother house. Second, as discussed above, the repo agent’s actions in the recent incident were malicious in their intent to produce anxiety in Debtor. Finally, Bank’s repo agent’s continued harassment of Debtor in the face of the actual knowledge of Debtor’s bankruptcy clearly shows callous defiance of federal bankruptcy law.
Bank has allowed or instructed its repo agents to attempt to repossess a vehicle *899 that Debtor had already surrendered in accordance with the bankruptcy plan, to repossess a vehicle that Debtor was entitled to keep in accordance with the plan, and to engage in a full repertoire of scare tactics available outside of bankruptcy to effect that repossession. Bank’s acts in manipulating Debtor by contact with his mother and the local police is reprehensible. Worse, Bank has made no effort to defend its actions, mitigate their effect, or show any degree of remorse. Bank’s nonchalance about protections of debtors in bankruptcy and its contempt for this Court are apparent. This debtor has been a victim of Bank’s wrongful repossession tactics on two occasions and a victim to particularly malicious conduct on the second occasion. Bank was thereafter served with a summons and complaint ordering it to respond to the charges. It defied that summons, ignored the lawful processes of this court and displayed a continuing complete utter disregard and defiance of federal law and the legal process.
Only now, on the eve of entry of this order, has Bank made an appearance, filing — incredibly—a request for an
expedited,
immediate, additional hearing on damages. A motion to reopen the record prior to the issuance of final judgment is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Lundgren v. McDaniel,
“Perhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.”
BMW,
ORDER
Defendant U.S. Bank/Firstar is hereby ORDERED to pay to Plaintiff Lorenzo Bishop actual and punitive damages in the total amount of $56,306.84 which amount includes actual damages for out-of-pocket *900 expense, attorney’s fees, and emotional distress in the amount of $6,306.84 and punitive damages of $50,000.00.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the punitive damages be offset against the amounts due Bank under the confirmed plan of reorganization,
Notes
. On an earlier occasion, after Debtor had surrendered the Grand Prix to Bank in accordance with his bankruptcy plan, Bank had also attempted, wrongfully, to "repossess” that vehicle at Debtor’s mother's house.
. Medical testimony, while helpful, is not required for sufficiency of proof of emotional harm in a § 362(h) inquiry.
See Flynn,
. The debtor in
Flynn,
who was struggling under the weight of huge tax obligations resulting from her ex-husband's actions, filed bankruptcy because she was assured that filing would stay creditor actions against her. Instead, she was subjected to a wrongful levy by the IRS. As a result of that levy, her bank account was frozen, several checks bounced, a store refused her check in front of other customers, and she was forced to cancel her son’s birthday party. I awarded damages for emotional distress justified by the great consternation and embarrassment she inevitably suffered as a consequence of that levy.
See Flynn,
. Noting that the First Circuit had held that damages awarded for emotional injury under § 362(h) are actual damages, the
Aiello
court commented: "No doubt they are; but whether their award is authorized by the statute is a separate question ____”
Aiello,