Bishop v. KellyBishop v. Kelly
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Peters
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether
This action arose out of an automobile accident that occurred on January 21, 1979, in Newtown. The jury could reasonably have found that at the time of the accident the defendant, traveling on route 25, in the opposite direction from that of the plaintiff, drove his car so as to cross the median of the highway and to strike the car of the plaintiff. In addition, the plaintiff presented evidence that, at the time of the accident, the defendant had been driving above the speed limit and was intoxicated. The accident resulted in severe injuries to the plaintiff.
Before the commencement of trial, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint seeking double or treble damages pursuant to
On appeal the defendant’s claims of error are directed only to the trial court’s doubling of the verdict pursuant to
I
We consider first the defendant’s argument that the statute is void for vagueness, since our interpretation of
The defendant claims that
In unbroken precedents dating back to 1913, judicial discretion to impose multiple damages under
Taken together, these decisions provide a judicial gloss for
II
We consider next the defendant’s claim that the award of double damages pursuant to § 14-295 violates the right of trial by jury afforded to him by our state constitution. We must address two issues: (1) did the defendant properly preserve this claim at trial; and (2) can he prevail on the merits? We conclude that the constitutional claim is properly here and that the statute unconstitutionally deprives the defendant of a jury trial.
A
The plaintiff urges us to hold that the defendant waived any right to a jury trial because he did not object to the plaintiff’s motion for multiple damages under § 14-295 on constitutional grounds until after the jury had returned a verdict for the plaintiff and had been discharged. The plaintiff claims that by waiting to raise this issue on a motion to set aside the judgment, the defendant foreclosed any possibility for the trial court, had it agreed with the defendant, to put the issue of multiple damages to the jury. A necessary predicate to the plaintiff’s argument of waiver is a construction of § 14-295 that would have permitted the trial court, upon a timely request by the defendant, to seek jury findings pertaining to the defendant’s deliberate or reckless disregard of the rule-of-the-road statutes that are incorporated by reference into § 14-295. In support of this position, the plaintiff maintains that, when § 14-295 confers authority to impose multiple damages upon “the court,” the term “court” signifies the whole
Neither in its ordinary meaning nor in its historical origins does the term “court” in § 14-295 encompass the jury. In legal usage, authority conferred upon a “court” normally contemplates action by a judge and not by a jury. For example,
Our construction of § 14-295 is supported by what we can glean from its history. In 1915, the statute
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the term “court” in § 14-295 does not purport to authorize jury determination of multiple damages. We recognize that, confronted with a literal reading of a statute that places it in constitutional jeopardy, we have an obligation to search for a construction that will achieve the legislature’s purpose in a manner that is both effective and constitutional. French v. Amalgamated Local Union 376, 203 Conn. 624, 636-37, 526 A.2d 861 (1987); Moscone v. Manson, 185 Conn. 124, 128, 440 A.2d 848 (1981). We are nonetheless unpersuaded that the legislature intended, in § 14-295, to entrust multiple damages to the province of the jury when it left that issue to the “court.” Therefore, despite our acknowledged duty to avoid constitutional confrontation, we refuse to rewrite § 14-295 to equate “court” with “jury.” See Seals v. Hickey, supra, 346. We hold, accordingly, that the defendant did not waive his jury trial claim by failing to raise it until after the jury had been discharged.
We turn then to the merits of the defendant’s claim. Under article first, § 19, of the Connecticut constitution, as amended, “[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” We have consistently held that the scope of article first, § 19, is defined by applying a historical test. The right to a jury trial may not be abrogated for causes of action that were triable to the jury prior to the constitution of 1818, and extant at the time of its adoption. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. of the United States, Inc. v. O’Neill, 203 Conn. 63, 76, 523 A.2d 486 (1987); Seals v. Hickey, supra, 349-50; Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267, 298, 363 A.2d 1 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041, 96 S. Ct. 763, 46 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1976); Swanson v. Boschen, 143 Conn. 159, 165, 120 A.2d 546 (1956). Consequently, statutory actions established since the adoption of the constitution of 1818 ordinarily fall outside the scope of the provision, “unless, perhaps, the new remedy constitutes ‘a modification of existing remedies, so vital as to unduly limit and violate the right of trial by jury.’ ” United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Spring Brook Dairy, Inc., 135 Conn. 294, 297, 64 A.2d 39 (1949), quoting Meigs v. Theis, 102 Conn. 579, 592, 129 A. 551 (1925). The question before us then is whether § 14-295, in entrusting the award of multiple damages to the court, unconstitutionally modifies a right of action that in 1818 was committed to the jury.
The historical origins of § 14-295 antedate 1818. The present statute has its roots in a 1797 act that established the rules of the road for horse-drawn carriages. Section 1 required two carriage drivers approaching each other from opposite directions “to turn or bear [their] carriage each driver to his right.hand, or to slacken . . . their pace or gait, or otherwise endeavour to give each other a fair and equal chance or advan
In light of this history, the defendant argues that, under the precursor of § 14-295 in force in 1818, the award of multiple damages was within the province of the jury, and that he therefore has a like constitutional entitlement to jury consideration today. The plaintiff would have us read the statutory history differently. She maintains that the 1797 statute, like § 14-295, assigned to the jury only the role of awarding compensatory damages but left to the court, upon motion by the plaintiff, the imposition of multiple damages. See
The plaintiff’s position cannot be reconciled with the provisions of the early statutes that make it clear that, prior to 1909, the court had no discretion vis-a-vis the award of multiple damages in cases involving violations of the rules of the road. When injury or damage resulted from a driver’s failure to observe the rules of the road, the 1797 act provided that the driver “shall forfeit . . . threefold damages.” (Emphasis added.) Similarly, the act in force in 1905 stated that under such circumstances the driver “shall pay” the injured party treble damages. During that whole period then, the statute required the court to impose treble damages once the jury had made the factual findings upon which such an award was predicated. See Broschart v. Tuttle, supra; Levick v. Norton, supra.
In sum, at the time of the adoption of the constitution of 1818, a defendant had a right to have all the facts underlying an award of multiple damages tried to a jury. That right was substantially diminished by the 1909 statute removing from the province of the jury the determination of one of the factual issues triggering the imposition of multiple damages. While it remains the prerogative of the jury to decide whether a defendant has violated the rules of the road, since 1909 it has been the court that has been authorized to determine whether a defendant’s conduct manifests so deliberate or reckless a disregard of these statutes that an award of multiple damages seems “just.” Thus, § 14-295 arrogates to the court the responsibility for making a factual finding that is crucial to the question of the defendant’s liability for multiple damages. Under the circumstances, “this statute allows the court to interfere with and invade the factfinding function of
There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded to the trial court with direction to render judgment against the defendant in the amount of $60,000.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
Notes
After the named plaintiff withdrew his action, the case was tried on the complaint of Elyse L. Dalton.
The defendant conceded at oral argument that he lacked standing to complain of any putative vagueness of the statute with regard to the imposition of treble damages, since no such damages were assessed against him. See State v. Pickering, 180 Conn. 54, 57, 428 A.2d 322 (1980).
Public Acts 1909, c. 268, provides in relevant part: “Every person who shall, by neglecting to conform to the provisions of section two of this act, cause any injury to the person or property of another, or shall negligently collide with another, thereby causing such injury, shall pay to the party injured double or treble damages as, in the discretion of the judge of the court in which the action is pending, shall seem just, together with the costs of such action.”
In Miles v. Strong, 68 Conn. 273, 286-87, 36 A. 55 (1896), the defendants claimed that Public Acts 1893, c. 66, which empowered the “court” to hear actions to quiet title, violated their right of trial by jury. We held that since the act encompassed both legal and equitable claims, the use of the word “court” contemplated actions tried before a jury as well as before a judge. Whether in any given case a court or jury trial was indicated depended on other provisions of existing law. The statute in point has since been characterized as a “peculiar statute”; Standard Co. v. Young, 90 Conn. 133, 137, 96 A. 932 (1916); that establishes “a novel mode of judicial procedure.” Dawson v. Orange, 78 Conn. 96, 100, 61 A. 101 (1905).
Banks v. Watrous, 134 Conn. 592, 599, 59 A.2d 723 (1948), relied on Miles v. Strong, supra, to interpret a statute providing treble damages for wrongful timber cutting to permit jury consideration of the underlying factual issues, even though the statute referred their resolution to “the court.” Banks v. Watrous has not again been cited on this point of construction.