33 Pa. Super. 123 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1907
Opinion by
It is made very clear by the evidence offered at the trial that the water privilege which was the inducement to the laying of the pipe across the land now owned by the defendant, was limited to the period of ten years. The contract under which the water was obtained from Mrs. Pyle expressly terminates the privilege on June 17, 1899. This right was given to Lewis E. Buckley, predecessor in title of the plaintiffs, and Isabella Buckley, predecessor in title of the defendant. It further appears from the evidence that the pipe was laid and the houses of L. E. Buckley and Isabella Buckley were equipped for the use of water under this limited right. The parties well knew that the privilege for the use of water did not extend beyond the date fixed in tlieir contract, and it must be presumed in the absence of evidence to any other effect that they were willing to incur the expense of piping the water from the spring to
It is contended, however, that the bill may be maintained upon the doctrine of estoppel. This estoppel is supposed to grow out of the fact that the defendant knew that the plaintiffs were purchasing the property; that he spoke to the plaintiffs after they had purchased in regard to the water supply and showed them where the water was shut off in the house; that the plaintiffs then entered into a new contract with Mrs. Pyle for the use of the water for ten years; that some time after this the defendant and Mr. Bishop put a spigot in the pipe at the run and at another time cleaned out the spring. It will be observed that none of the acts referred to are alleged to have been an inducement to the plaintiffs to buy the property. They neither relied upon the defendant nor consulted him with reference to it or to any rights appurtenant. The cleaning of the spring and the adjustment of the pipe with the spigot occurred long after the purchase and long after the lease entered into by the plaintiffs with Mrs. Pyle, and were in no sense an inducement to the plaintiffs to enter into that contract. There was no suppression of a material fact nor was the defendant present at any time when a duty was imposed upon him to speak. The plaintiffs.presumably knew that the
The decree is, therefore, reversed and the bill dismissed at the cost of the appellees.