*1 being to it days prior minimum of ten report copy this mandate. ignore cannot filed. We court, the trial order of reverse the Accordingly, we opinion. with this consistent proceedings remand for ORDER 10, 1991, the order of the Court NOW, June AND above-cap- in the County Montgomery Pleas of Common remanded reversed, and the case is matter tioned opinion. consistent with proceedings relinquished. Jurisdiction

SILVESTRI, Judge, dissents. Senior

593 A.2d 28 CATHOLIC LEONARD REGIONAL BISHOP Petitioner, SCHOOL, BOARD COMPENSATION UNEMPLOYMENT REVIEW, Respondent. OF Pennsylvania. Court of Commonwealth 13, 1991. Argued Feb. 12, 1991. Decided June Denied Nov. Appeal Petition for Allowance *3 Quinlan, Maura K. for petitioner. Blaze, F. for respondent.

Clifford Kubacki, Jr., for Joseph Wesley. intervenor Maria CRAIG, DOYLE, Judge, Before President McGINLEY, SMITH, PELLEGRINI, BYER, KELLEY and JJ.

McGINLEY, Judge. Leonard Regional Catholic School Leon- (Bishop ard) appeals from an order of the Unemployment Compen- (Board) sation Board of granting Review unemployment compensation (Claimant).1 Wesley benefits Maria employed by Bishop

Claimant was last Leonard as a fifth and sixth math and grade, science teacher at a final rate of $11,000 Her per year. day last of work was December facts, Board, 1989. The relevant as found are as follows:

3. The school has a policy providing as follows:

1.2 The Parish shall prerogative retain the to dismiss a teacher for public serious immorality, public scandal doctrine, or public rejection teachings, of official In laws the Catholic Church. event Parish exercises such prerogative, grievance proce- *4 dure in this applicable. Handbook shall not be Such a would, however, termination subject to review under the Code for the Assurance of Due Process of the Diocess of Pittsburgh.

4. did sign Claimant not a contract of in employment she recognized employer’s right which the to dismiss a teacher who violated a law of the church. present controversy pursuant

1. Claimant has intervened to 1531(a). Pa.R.A.P. relationship a Claimant, Catholic, entered into who is 5. married on planned and to be they a non-Catholic with December 1989. her fiance. not with

6. did cohabit Claimant a Catholic wom- was from 7. fiance divorced Claimant’s proceedings. annulment initiated subsequently an who the Catholic by has not been annulled marriage Church. a marriage first to fiance’s was

8. Because claimant’s annulled, he and claimant were has not been Catholic and Church, they Catholic so married unable to be Church. Presbyterian married a decided to be 13,1989, also told the December claimant 9. or about On nun, to be married of her intentions a Catholic principal, in the Church. Presbyterian man divorced unsure of claimant she was what 10. The told principal get in touch needed to with to do and that she Office. Diocesan later, informed claimant principal an hour About of the Church. violating for law

she was terminated on until Decem- stay claimant principal 12. The asked day last work. ber claimant’s fiance on Decem- married her subsequently 13. Claimant 23, 1989. ber Decision, 23, 1990, The Board af- at 1-2. May

Board’s of benefits2 concluded granting the referee’s firmed do rise to the level willful actions not that “Claimant’s law the church ... did not violate misconduct [s]he her.” Board's to terminate decision prior employer’s 2-3. decision at 1) Board argues: that Leonard appeal Bishop

On did not constitute conduct concluding erred in Claimant’s was misconduct; 2) that the Board’s determination willful 3) evidence; not substantial supported first and four- Leonard’s Bishop decision Board’s violates policy was unreason- Leonard’s 2. The referee determined marriage her choose between able it forced Claimant because violating policy. good cause job result had and as a Claimant *5 amendment rights by imposing teenth a burdensome tax on religion. It is Claimant’s position that Bishop Leonard’s ambiguous is and that the denial of policy benefits on the religious preference basis of furthers the establishment of a particular religion.3 the Board Additionally, and Claimant contend that discharged Claimant was the alleged before willful misconduct occurred.

Our scope review is limited to determining wheth er there has been a constitutional violation or an error of law and whether the necessary findings of fact are sup ported by substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Adminis Law, Agency 704; trative 2 Pa.C.S. Kirkwood v. Unem § Review, ployment Compensation Board 106 Pa.Com (1987). monwealth Ct. 525 A.2d 841 Initially, Bishop Leonard argues that Claimant’s actions constitute willful misconduct because she was informed that fiance, her marriage prior annulment, to an would be a public rejection Church, of the laws of the thereby subject- ing her to termination according to its policy. Bishop Leonard further argues that Claimant did not have good cause for her conduct. argues Claimant that Bishop Leon- ard’s policy ambiguous and asserts that the term “public rejection” appears as it in the policy is subject to different interpretations. Claimant maintains that she did not know that her marriage would constitute a “public rejection” of the laws of the Catholic Church subjecting her to dismissal. question of whether conduct rises to the level of willful misconduct is a question of law be determined by this Court. Fritz v. Unemployment Compensation Review, Board Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 446 A.2d Willful misconduct is defined as conduct that represents a wanton and disregard willful of an employer’s interest, rules, deliberate violation of disregard of standards of behavior which an employer can rightfully expect from 3. The Board and Claimant assert that this Court is able to render a unemployment decision as compensation to the issues and need not address the constitutional issues. See Brief of the Board at 5 and Brief of Claimant at 7. culpability, which manifests negligence

his employee, intent, design, evil or intentional substantial wrongful *6 or duties disregard employer’s employee’s for the interest Unemployment Compensation Frick v. obligations. and Review, 31 198, Board of A.2d Ct. 375 Pa.Commonwealth a upon is based (1977). the willful misconduct 879 “Where must employer policy, employer rule violation policy of the rule or and that the existence establish Unemployment Sauer v. it.” aware of employee was Review, 110 Pa. Board Compensation Ct. Commonwealth 108, 1174, (1987). A of a A.2d 1176 violation rule establishes willful misconduct. known and reasonable Re Board Compensation v. Unemployment Williams view, Ct. 531 A.2d 88 Pa.Commonwealth institut controversy, Bishop

In Leonard present rejecting teachers from publicly ed a its policy prohibiting doctrine, teachings, or laws the Catholic “the official Handbook, I, Require Chapter Teacher Church.” Teacher (C.R.), 3. Law ments, Item No. Father Certified Record (Fr. Donardo), Of Chancellor the Diocese rence Donardo as a sacrament ... Pittsburgh, “[mjarriage testified that marriage, “when enter public people action” that church within the realm they marriage enter whether else, are marriage they enter its rule or somewhere accepting that are be making public proclamation they February Notes of person.” Testimony, married another mar (N.T.), at 7. Fr. Donardo stated Claimant’s rejection it was a riage public was invalid because Fr. that is indissoluble. marriage which holds Church’s law that who violates the church’s person Donardo stated “a fact, law” law, that in violated church’s proclaims they, forum, is a public automatically that it’s in the “because This N.T. particular of that law.” public repudiation applied to Catholics and non-Catholics.4 policy marries a 4. Fr. Donardo testified that "a non-catholic teacher who conformity person marriage rules and this is not in with the catholic person subject discharge.” to ... N.T. of the church ... would at 9. A of the record taught review reveals Claimant system beginning August Catholic school of 1987. Al- sign did not a contract of though employment Claimant with Leonard5, by Bishop Claimant was informed Leon- marriage ard that her policy was violation its in her would result termination. Claimant testified that she 13, 1989, notified on inten- Dorothy Sister December of her marry. tion to Sister after the diocese Dorothy, contacting office, informed her marriage Claimant that would result in her termination. N.T. at 14. acknowledged Claimant she “exactly was informed what rule was breaking [she] ... N.T. at 14. maintains that handbook.” Claimant because she did not communicate her marriage plans to her students that her did marriage ability not reflect on her disagree. teach math and science. We *7 Fr. Donardo testified that Catholic teachers are expected to be role models for their students of and out the classroom and their that failure to follow the Catholic teachings compromises their effectiveness in the class- room.6 “The teacher is a employed by religious organiza- tion, to the subject discipline direction and authorities, and works in a dedicated system rearing to Kurtzman, faith.” Lemon v. particular children 403 602, 618, 2105, 2114, (1971). 29 L.Ed.2d 745 agree We that Claimant’s conduct reflected on her directly Paragraph lay 5. four of the standard contract for full time teachers states: recognizes Teacher nature of the Catholic School and agrees Employer right that has the to dismiss a teacher ... public rejection teachings, of the official doctrine or laws of the Church, thereby terminating any rights Roman Catholic and all that hereunder____ may the Teacher have Teachers, Elementary Lay Contract For School Full Time Item No. 3. 6. Fr. Donardo stated: Very briefly primary purpose young people, ... is to teach ... therefore, people happen about the catholic faith. And who there, happen responsible teach primary to be for the school. teachers, they only they interest is that not be skilled but that also philosophy have within their own minds the of catholic education obviously they and their own actions as ... as that live out the faith faith____ gospel obviously both the Christian the catholic N.T. at 10. affect- assigned adversely duties and perform her

ability Bishop Leonard. ed the interest argues that there is substan Bishop Leonard next its finding that Claimant violated support tial evidence to Bishop argues Leonard that Claimant Specifically, policy. she during compli the time that was employed remained it discharged she was after policy and that ance with on marriage place would take apparent became maintain that The Board and Claimant December Leonard’s because Bishop policy not violate Claimant did her intention terminated as a result Claimant was marriage. of her and not because marry as a rea is such relevant evidence evidence Substantial a conclu adequate support might accept mind as sonable Department Home v. sion. Pine Residential Care Haven Ct. 512 A.2d Welfare, Public 99 Pa.Commonwealth evi (1986). In there is determining whether substantial findings, the Board’s we must examine dence to support to the testimony light in the most favorable prevailing, inference which giving party benefit party, from the evidence. logically reasonably can be drawn Re Compensation Board Unemployment Johnson A.2d 738 view, 94 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 13, 1989, princi- that, on December The Board found “informed she was termi- Leonard Claimant pal Findings Board’s violating law of the church.” nated for *8 the record fails to and 11 at 2. A review of of Fact Nos. 9 fact, Bishop In Leonard and findings. the Board’s support terminated because that Claimant was agree Claimant referee, counsel At the before the marriage. hearing her claimant, this case for stated that Bishop Leonard “[i]n planned marriage her would the fact that discussing after school, went forward with of the rules be violation terminated marriage employment her subsequently, her stated “she N.T. for Claimant on this basis.” Counsel of the catholic outside marry forced was [Claimant] situation, that the school terminated and a result of church her employment.” Further, N.T. at 4. Claimant’s own testimony corroborates that she was terminated because of marriage. her Claimant testified that “it was just matter [principal] an hour she came said, know, back and you you have to be terminated.” N.T. at 14. (emphasis add- ed). Claimant remained as employed long as she inwas compliance with Leonard’s policy or until December 22, 1989.

Lastly, argues Claimant that her marriage was in compliance with the laws of Pennsylvania and that a denial of benefits based on religious dogma constitutes an uncon stitutional establishment of religion.

The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides “Congress shall make no respecting law an establishment of religion____” Constitution, I, Amendment I. Article Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution relevantly provides that pref- “no erence shall ever given be by law religious establish- ments or modes of worship.” The primary purpose of the Establishment Clause is to prevent “the sponsorship, finan- cial support and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.” Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 668, 90 1409, 1411, L.Ed.2d 697 402(e)

Section of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law), 43 802(e)8 P.S. provides in pertinent part that § “[a]n employee shall ineligible compensation for for any week (e) ... which unemployment is due to discharge [i]n [her] ... from work for willful misconduct connected with [her] work.” earlier, As stated Bishop Leonard established the existence of a reasonable policy, Claimant was aware 7. The referee confirmed that there dispute was no factual between the parties. The referee stated: So, where ... does that leave proceed, us? ... To claimant went marriage ahead with the ... and then was terminated employer policy you under the discussing. Okay, have been well witness, why then, you don’t call a purposes just that we outlined. N.T. at 6. 5, 1936, 8. Act (1937) of December Second Ex.Sess.P.L. as amend- ed, 43 P.S. 751-914. §§ *9 438 of policy her constituted and that violation policy the her denying that bene- argues Claimant misconduct.

willful is a Leonard’s marriage her violation fits because religion. the Catholic serves advance policy In Lemon out a Supreme Court set United States “the Govern- whether to determine. three-pronged test9 religion through its own activities ment itself has advanced Presiding Bishop v. Corporation influences.” Amos, 483 U.S. 2864, L.Ed.2d 328, 107 S.Ct. 97 (1987) (emphasis original). Appeals Commission Unemployment

In Hobbie Florida, 136, 107 1046, 94 L.Ed.2d 190 (1987), 480 U.S. S.Ct. (Em Company Lawton and employed was Paula Hobbie April In and one-half years. two jeweler, ployer), Employer informed her that she was 1984, Paula Hobbie she Adventist and that Seventh-Day practicing become Friday from sundown on able to work longer no would was terminated and Paula Hobbie Saturday. on sundown benefits was compensation for unemployment her claim work.” “misconduct connected with ... because of denied 443.101(l)(a) (1985). The Unemployment Ap Fla.Stat. § Commission) the denial affirmed (Appeals Commission peals challenged Appeals Commission’s “Hobbie of benefits. Appeals” District Court of the Florida Fifth order Commission.” Appeals summarily court affirmed “that Hobbie, The United 139, 107 at 1048. 480 U.S. at determining that reversed Supreme Court States “[u]nder disqualification of Appeals Commission’s precedent, our receipt from of benefits violates ... [Paula Hobbie] Amendment, applicable the First Free Exercise Clause Hobbie, Amendment.” the Fourteenth through the States omitted). 139, 140, (footnote 107 S.Ct. at 480 U.S. at Appeals Supreme rejected Court also The United States would that the award of benefits argument Commission’s legislative requires serve “a secular test that law The Lemon primary principal or effect ... purpose"; law have "a religion"; does and that the law not or inhibits neither advances government religion. entanglement Id. promote an excessive S.Ct. at 2111. *10 violate the Establishment Clause. In Hobbie the United Supreme States Court determined that Court has “[t]his long recognized that the government (and may sometimes must) religious practices accommodate and that it do may so violating without the Establishment Clause.” Id. at 144- 145, (footnote 107 omitted). S.Ct. at 1051 In Corporation Presiding Bishop, United States of Supreme recognized Court also that the accommodation of beliefs the employer does not violate the Establishment Clause. The United Supreme States Court stated:

[R]eligious groups have been better able to advance their on purposes account of many laws that have passed constitutional muster: for example, the tax ex- property emption at issue Walz v. Tax Comm’n supra, loans of school children, books school including paro- chial students, school upheld in Board Education v. Allen, 392 88 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 1060 A law is not unconstitutional simply because it allows churches to advance religion, which is their very purpose. Corporation Presiding Bishop, 336-337, U.S. at S.Ct. at 2869 (emphasis in original).

A denial of benefits pursuant Act, to the secular in nature, is not an excessive entanglement government and religion. The failure to charge the coffers of Bishop Leon- ard because of Claimant’s failure to follow its policy does not advance or promote a particular religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. The Commonwealth accommo- dates Bishop Leonard by allowing it to advance its religion and as a result to discharge any employee in violation of its policy and the teachings and laws of the Church.

Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Board.

ORDER NOW, AND June, this 12th day the order of the Unemployment Compensation Review, Board of May dated 23, 1990, B-282301, is reversed.

KELLEY, J., dissents.

SMITH, dissenting. Judge, majority facet of the Court’s strongly Every I dissent. conclusions, hold- assumptions, analysis, opinion—its 402(e) facts Section of the Law the ing apply —serves this in a manner violates Establishment case of the First and Fourteenth Amendments Clause I, Article Section 3 Constitution as well as United States the majority’s Constitution. Because Pennsylvania prohibition of the Estab- the fundamental analysis ignores I, against Section 3 excessive lishment Article Clause affairs entanglement by government of religious one thread belief to sponsors ultimately *11 disadvantage of another, in addition to the disadvantage my I am to voice rights, compelled other fundamental dissent.

I “Congress shall provides Clause Establishment of religion____” no an establishment respecting make law Const, Supreme I. The Court has unwav- amend. U.S. U.S. against evils which eringly that the foremost determined “sponsorship, protect intended to are the clause was sovereign of the financial and active involvement support, City v. Tax Commission activity.” Walz religious 668, 1409, 1411, York, 397 U.S. 664, 90 25 New S.Ct. Kurtzman, 403 Lemon v. See also (1970). L.Ed.2d 697 602, 2105, Writing 91 29 L.Ed.2d 745 U.S. S.Ct. Lemon, stated that: Justice Brennan separately foreclose, and our the Framers meant what [w]hat forbidden, have decisions under Establishment Clause institu- religious with secular are those involvements (a) serve activities essentially tions which institutions; (b) organs of employ govern- (c) essentially or use essen- religious purposes; ment for ends, governmental to serve where tially religious means suffice. the secular secular means would Where manner, in such religious institutions involved become relationship dangers— those precisely there inhere

441 as much church to the as to the state —which Framers feared would subvert religious liberty strength and the a system government. of secular Id. at 2126 (quoting S.Ct. School District of Abington Township 294-95, Schempp, 1560, 1609-10, 10 (1963) (Brennan, J., L.Ed.2d 844 Moreover, concurring)). the Establishment requires Clause the end result of government action must avoid the entanglement religion excessive with that the prohib- clause its, regardless of the “Determining motivation. that the legislative exemption of tax purpose is not aimed at estab- lishing, sponsoring, supporting religion not end does inquiry____ We must also be sure that the end result —the government effect —is not an excessive entanglement with Walz, religion.” 397 U.S. at 90 S.Ct. at 1414. I, Article Pennsylvania Section Constitution is more direct and self-evident than the Establishment Clause in its prohibitions and statement of rights:

All men a natural have right indefeasible worship Almighty according God dictates of their own consciences; right no man can of compelled attend, be erect or support any place worship, or to maintain any ministry against consent; his can, no human authority whatsoever, in any case control or with the interfere conscience, rights preference and no ever shall *12 of given by law to or religious establishments modes added.) (Emphasis worship. of The of difficulty integrating government institutions with matters occurring within or affecting religious parochial recognized. schools is well “The substantial char- of acter these gives church-related schools rise to the entan- gling church-state of relationships the kind the Religious Lemon, sought 616, Clauses to avoid.” 403 U.S. at 91 S.Ct. reason, at 2113. For this this Court determined that reli- schools gious exempt were from the mandatory require- ments providing of unemployment compensation benefits under Law in Christian School Ass ’n Greater Har- of risburg v. 55 Department Labor Pa.Com- Industry, this 555, Notably, 423 A.2d 1340 Ct.

monwealth focused the constitu upon Ass’n Court in Christian School like the one exactly inherent situations tional difficulties Court, for eligibility this where the issue of now before reason an employee’s whether the for hinges upon benefits religious dogma, upon matters involves discharge, based misconduct. Breth Quoting willful Grace employee’s MRP, CV 79-162 Nos. CV 79-93 California, ren Church 12, 21, 1979), slip at (C.D.Cal., Sept. op. filed vacated MRP grounds, and remanded on other (1982), that: recognized this Court 73 L.Ed.2d arise in situations will where [Disputes unquestionably reason given are dismissed for cause and the employees to to religious church school failure adhere by the tenets of church. to resolution of necessary type inquiry as is almost identical to that

controversies such these dangers found involve Supreme] which the Court [U.S. entanglement Bishop v. Catholic excessive [NLRB 1313, 59 L.Ed.2d 533 440 U.S. 99 S.Ct. Chicago, (1979)]. 563-64, 423 A.2d at

55 Pa.Commonwealth own, case, has, In Leonard reasons its Bishop this under the Law has chosen to waived its exemption unemployment compen- its the benefit of provide employees mean concerns are sation. This does not that constitutional mean, aside, nor it as Leonard placed Bishop appears does party one in this they apply protect only argue, majority’s opin- Leonard. The proceeding, namely ion, however, dangers by articulated fails to address the the Es- long string regarding Court decisions Supreme nature, disregards in cases of this tablishment Clause Constitution, language Pennsylvania clear avoids expressed earlier this Christian the concerns Court Instead, the on a tradition- majority Ass’n. embarks School Claimant, if analysis al misconduct as rather willful person whose circum- merely deciding marry than *13 employer, caught her was disapproved stances are in her hand the till or on the or absent asleep job with I, The Article without leave. Establishment Clause and prohibit simple approach. Section 3 this

II for Bishop The basis Leonard’s contention that Claimant discharged was for willful misconduct connected her with that work is Claimant violated a rule or policy employer, namely, prohibition against “public a rejection doctrine, teachings, official or laws of Catholic Church.” consistently This Court has held that a violation of a known and policy reasonable rule or of an consti employer may tute except willful misconduct when employee good has cause to violate the rule or policy. Spirnak v. Unemploy Review, Compensation ment Board 125 Pa.Common wealth Ct. A.2d Claimant that argues Leonard’s Bishop ambiguous; rule is that she did not know that her actions would constitute a rule violation that (nor, apparently principal, nun); did her is a that in who rule, she any good event had cause to if violate the occur, violation did fact since that only violation consisted entering into (marriage) an institution expressly permit Moreover, ted by the Commonwealth. Bishop Leonard’s rule or policy Scylla forced her between the and Charybdis of either her keeping to the job foregoing marriage person choice, of her choice and the church of her losing job her person of her marrying choice choice, her church of is unacceptable which to the Catholic Church. however, fails to majority, address of Claimant’s

contentions (except Claimant’s argu- Establishment Clause ment), and concludes any analysis without or discussion that Leonard’s rule or policy is reasonable and then that the evidence showed Claimant’s intention to marry man divorced violated that rule or policy. The majority ignores if completely argument Claimant’s a violation occur, did indeed had good Claimant excuse for carrying actions, through her with thus of a depriving Claimant *14 an that meaningful ignoring review and issue Court’s this Further, discussed. the requires majority settled law to a divorced man marry that Claimant’s desire found assigned on her “directly ability perform reflected her to the Leon- adversely Bishop affected interest duties as something neither the referee nor the Board found ard”— thus, discussed; majority impermissi- fact or the a even in finding champion into the area of fact order bly strays Therefore, a op. 437. even under Maj. its cause.1 opin- the analysis, majority’s traditional willful misconduct is insupportable. ion concerns, it noted to the constitutional need be

Turning in the conclusion that Claimant is that order to come to misconduct, ineligible grounds for on the of willful benefits (a) following must at the conclusions: arrive majority prohibiting public rule or a Bishop policy that Leonard’s doctrine, or teachings, of the official laws rejection reasonable; (b) is decision Catholic Church that Claimant’s rule marry person a violates this church-based divorced or (c) that Leonard’s rule policy; applied, Bishop or as i.e., it rule or is reasonable: that is a reasonable policy a divorc- prohibits employee marrying which an from policy (d) good not have cause to person; ed that Claimant did Bishop choice in marry person opposition her how seriously question rule or One must policy. Leonard’s by can be made an arm of the any of these determinations Board, this Court or without government, whether religion. entanglement Upon matters of excessive basis, this hold that one church example, can Court what rule, dogma, rea- upon religious is employer’s work based another’s, upon religious dog- also sonable and that based ma, violating is unreasonable Establishment without unmistakably The result such decisions will Clause? one views endorsing religion’s the effect of over have majority finding accepting Arguably, also fact Fr. Donaro’s is marry person publicly rejects testimony that a decision to divorced law since neither the referee nor the Board of the Catholic Church actually Claimant’s actions were violation found as fact that Bishop policy. Leonard's rule or another, precisely prohib- what Establishment Clause Walz; its. See Christian School Ass’n.

Indeed, argues finding Leonard that a rule its is would policy or unreasonable be a violation of the Estab- and that this lishment Clause Court must find its rule “as a policy be reasonable matter of law.” Petitioner’s Brief, p. n. It would be violative of the equally Estab- Clause, however, if Court, done, lishment this as it has were to find that a rule based upon religious work dogma As Supreme reasonable. Court held School District *15 Rapids Ball, 373, 389, City Grand 473 U.S. of S.Ct. of 3216, 3225-26, (1985): 87 L.Ed.2d 267 Government promotes religion as it effectively when fosters a close of powers identification its and responsibil- ities with those any of religious denominations —or all— as when it to attempts inculcate specific religious doc- If trines. this identification a conveys of message government endorsement ... of a religion, core purpose Establishment Clause is violated. Further, I, Article 3 of the Pennsylvania Section Constitu- expressly prohibits tion the granting preferences any establishment, and religious exactly that is what happens when this engages process Court a that permits it to religiously declare work rules based to be either reasonable or unreasonable.

Perhaps one may argue that the issue reasonableness can determined on an “objective” as if basis this Court rule, had before it based, the work a non-religiously secular In employer. Spirnak, this stated Court that “[i]n reasonableness, determining this Court should consider application whether of the rule or under the policy circum- stances is fair and just appropriate accomplish a legitimate interest of employer.” Pa.Common- Ct. at wealth 557 A.2d at But these standards make the inquiry that much more difficult a only when religiously-based rule is present. work How can this Court fair, determine whether a rule based religious dogma on just, appropriate again stamping without governmental orof disapproving on beliefs while approval some however, determines, majority others? disparaging work rule which fair, appropriate just, it is whose circum- marrying persons from prohibits teachers employer, the church disapproved are stances violating such good without cause the teachers are a rule.

Ill this Court’s Further, decision follow majority’s opens up case this analysis willful misconduct established hearing, Bishop At the dilemmas. other First Amendment in its and laws expert church doctrine produced Leonard public Claimant’s conduct constituted who testified that official doctrine and law. What rejection of that church’s if her produced the result Claimant had would have been public her are not a testify that actions expert own and law? The Board would rejection of official doctrine deciding matters placed position have been in order to determine whether law or doctrine its, and beyond This is expressly rule was violated. work and, tribunal’s, function and competence; court or *16 of the Establishment again, it would be a clear violation such determination and this for Board make a Clause 252, Lee, 455 U.S. it. See States v. uphold Court to United (1982)(“courts 1051, 127 are 1055, 71 L.Ed.2d 257, 102 S.Ct. scriptural interpretation”); Employment not arbiters of Division, Oregon Human Resources Department 1595, 1604, 872,-, 108 L.Ed.2d Smith, 494 110 S.Ct. contexts, (1990) and in different we (“[rjepeatedly many not determine the must presume warned that courts have a or the particular religion plausibility a belief in place of claim”). however, especially By holding, a its Bishop Leonard’s work argument in light Claimant’s did not believe she ambiguous and that she policy rule or is it, into this violating majority straying is not the also was prohibition? Amendment First held, Moreover, again Court has time and Supreme as the government of the action must also the end result or effect See, Amendment violation. Lemon and e.g., free of First holding? the end result of the majority’s What is Walz. observed, as Judge persuasively First it must be Colins in dissent in Carroll School v. Unem- Bishop High wrote Review, Board 125 Pa.Com- ployment Compensation 1141, (1989), 557 A.2d appeal monwealth Ct. (1990), denied, remarkably A.2d 569 a case 525 Pa. in unem- present “By denying similar its facts to the case: circumstances, are under these we ployment compensation (1) allowing declarations: we will be making two on a religion to use the to further its tenets de [Law] facto basis; (2) using recognize we will be [Law] within the Common- system marriage hierarchical Carroll, discharged In a teacher was wealth.” position from his in a Catholic school after he notified his cohabiting that he was with a divorced woman. principal teacher, case, unlike in present signed Claimant had contract that forth the employment policy against an set doctrine, rejection teachings, of the official and laws public The teacher told the school of his Catholic Church. his and then in the plans marry companion civilly Catho- annulment, lic after she and they Church obtained subse- (as did in a in a different church quently marry ceremony case). Notwithstanding, did Claimant in this the school eligibility the teacher’s willful opposed claiming benefits misconduct, position and this Court for essen- upheld the same set forth in the tially majority’s opinion reasons this case.2

Judge correct that the effect of the certainly Colins holding Bishop holding Carroll and the identical this serve, religion case will not to accommodate as the merely contends, majority particular but to endorse the tenets religion give primacy religion’s marriage to one view of any marriage. over other view of This includes the view of and of church that does not follow Commonwealth *17 authority Curiously, majority Bishop Carroll 2. the does not use as for holding, though virtually its the cases are identical. divorce, including in its beliefs about Catholic Church the Also, Claimant married.3 Church where Presbyterian escaping majority’s is the conclusion there no Bishop prefer case to or endorse holding in this serves and of the Claimant’s religious beliefs over that Leonard’s Leonard’s Bishop or endorse prefer serves right priva- fundamental equally Claimant’s beliefs over below, majority’s holding sponsors explained As cy. doctrine, and teachings, gives the official primacy and Law through application of the of the Catholic Church laws to the to the in so financial Church doing gives support and Leonard, who, according Bishop another detriment of doctrine, teachings, to adhere to official happens not laws of its church.4 and

IV cases, upon, relies majority one of which the In a line of who Court has held that an individual Supreme exchange following the referee and Leonard’s between 3. hearing attorney case is in this instructive: QR: contrary way act to the laws of what did claimant In church? She, catholic, marriage being a divorced EL: entered into a with Presbyterian actually in the Church. Protestant] catholic was [he eyes It marriage the Catholic Church. This is not valid in the public it rule that states that was violated the section of the doctrine, rejection teachings, repudiation church and from official laws____ explanation give a Father Donardo ... could further about that. N.T., p. 4. I, Further, holding absolutely violates Article Section 3 provides this Pennsylvania part human that "no Constitution which can, whatsoever, rights authority or interfere with case control Claimant, deciding marry the Catholic outside of conscience.” conscience; Church, majority right has exercised her right doing away by stripping her to benefits penalizes so her go saying it no differ- It without that makes under the Law. should party in is member of an established ence one this action other, considering member of perhaps herself a church and the while church, teachings only respect. The in one deviates from its if that First only religions all protects but not “established” Amendment non-belief, belief, including and does not allow for forms the faith any. Department Employment primacy See Illinois Frazee Security, 103 L.Ed.2d 489 U.S.

449 to the exercise of his or her for cause related discharged reason, beliefs, for the same or who refuses work Exercise of the First not under the Free Clause may unemployment compensation deprived Amendment be Verner, 398, 83 374 U.S. S.Ct. See Sherbert benefits.5 (1963) (Sabbatarian 1790, discharged 965 10 L.Ed.2d on Thomas v. Review Board Saturdays); refusal to work 707, Division, 450 101 U.S. Employment Security Indiana 1425, (1981) (Jehovah’s Witness forced 67 L.Ed.2d 624 S.Ct. him transferred to a division employer to leave work when armaments); Appeals Hobbie v. Unemployment that made 1046, Florida, 136, 107 94 480 U.S. S.Ct. Commission of (1987) for refusal to work (employee discharged L.Ed.2d 190 Day to the Adventist on after conversion Seventh Saturdays Church); Department Employment Frazee v. Illinois L.Ed.2d 914 109 S.Ct. 103 Security, U.S. (Christian, (1989) not a member of an established church, offered accept position by sect or refused to Sunday). it work on employment agency required because cases is articulated in posture ably The of these Sherbert: the impede of a law is to purpose For ‘[i]f effect of one or all or is to discriminate religions observance that is invalid even religions, between law invidiously being only characterized as though may the burden (366 at 607 indirect.’ v. Brown ... US [599] Braunfeld (1961)]). apparent appellant’s Here not is it only [ from the ineligibility solely declared for benefits derives her to religion, pressure upon of her but practice forces practice ruling is unmistakable. forgo of her following precepts her to choose between hand, benefits, on the one forfeiting religion religion of her order to abandoning precepts one of work, imposi- other hand. accept on the Governmental upon the same kind of burden puts tion of such a choice imposed as would a fine religion the free exercise appellant Saturday worship. for her against "Congress of the First Amendment reads: 5. The Free Exercise Clause religion]____” prohibiting shall make no law ... the free exercise [of Const, amend. I. U.S. added). 1794 (emphasis at Id. choice of a similar Similarly, government imposition opinion in this case majority Claimant forced upon rights on free same kind of burden Claimant’s exercise against her for outside imposed marrying if a fine as were Church, is effectively happening. what is the Catholic which further stated: The Court Thomas of an benefit receipt important conditions Where state *19 it faith, religious a or where upon proscribed by conduct by of conduct mandated such a benefit because denies on an faith, pressure substantial religious thereby putting beliefs, his and to violate his modify adherent behavior to may the religion compulsion a exists. While upon burden none- free exercise is indirect, infringement upon the theless substantial. no at 1432. This should be 450 U.S. at S.Ct.

Id. 18, 101 717— of receipt important true the state conditions an less where (cid:127) There religious a faith. upon conduct prescribed benefit require question using employees no the Law seems employers upon of their to adhere the beliefs places state-spon- forfeiting of benefits thereunder pain of religion the free exercise of violation sored burden on Further, held that the Court has the Free Exercise Clause. repug- neither “[government may compel affirmation individ- against discriminate penalize nor or nant belief... religious views abhorrent they or hold groups uals because at at Sherbert, 374 S.Ct. to the authorities ...” or, omitted; added), mat- (citations emphasis for that A abhorrent ter, religious, spiritual to one’s view employer. (in case, marriage this to a divorced employer to one’s church) great a different is afforded as or in a person as the under the First Amendment degree protection views; and in accordance spiritual employer’s religious Thomas, Sherbert, holdings the Court’s Supreme with Hobbie, Frazee, stripped of state-created one cannot be religious or upon spiritu- and acting for expressing benefits employer. different from that of one’s al views Lee, where Moreover, this case to parallel one finds a exemption from “[granting held that Court Supreme the religious grounds] employer taxes to an security social [on on the faith impose employer’s religious operates 455 U.S. at employees.” partic- voluntary from its Leonard

exemption under compensation system ipation unemployment in the same effect. case has exactly circumstances this purpose states correctly Although majority beliefs, do so cannot religions is to advance its own religion which the state in a manner by employing organs others and sheds the upon the beliefs of infringes disagree who upon employees financial employer’s burden in matters of faith. free however, may, substantially

The state burden state inter- religion compelling if there exists exercise constitu- regulation subject in the of a within the state’s est no regulate. I can discern power tional Sherbert. justifies state the burden interest which compelling free exercise of her places upon Claimant’s beliefs. majority *20 official doctrines of the Catho- primacy Certainly, Leonard, Church, Bishop over the by lic as enunciated marriage in or outside of concerning beliefs of Claimant is is not sufficient. On it abhor- contrary, that church the First Amendment.6 rent to Further, infringe majority's upon serves Claim decision also to right "free privacy. It is well established that ant's constitutional to family personal is a fundamental dom of choice in matters life protected Santosky v. liberty by interest the Fourteenth Amendment.” 1388, 745, 1394-95, Kramer, 753, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 455 U.S. 102 S.Ct. City Philadel See abo Fabio v. Civil Service Commision of (the (1980) right phia, Pa. 414 A.2d constitutional 82 governmental relating privacy protects from interference activities pre marriage). majority ignores this fundamental constitutional religion cept is sometimes and holds since an accommodation of Amendment, permitted Law to under the this Court will use the First expense Catholic at the further beliefs of the Church right personal beliefs and to make free Claimant’s her constitutional concerning family pain marriage life or suffer choices losing law There is no basis in constitutional state-created benefits. support that could such a result.

v Having the majority’s opinion insup- established in its portable right own and as a matter of constitutional law, the discussion must address the constitutional concerns by Bishop Bishop raised Leonard. Leonard an argues that affirmation of the Board’s order in essentially would result its free exercise of against a tax in religion levied it violation of the First Amendment. question There is no that either result in this case—the granting or denial of some entanglement See religion. benefits —involves with Bishop Carroll (Colins, dissenting). J. must What avoided is an excessive entanglement state Walz. religion. Pursuant to decisions of the Supreme Court, grant benefits Claimant would be constitu- in tionally permissible and indeed accordance with the con- First, stitutional Judge scheme. Colins’ in analysis able Bishop Carroll is noted:

A system state cannot effectuate religious doctrines. Bishop Carroll of its volition in participated own unemployment compensation It system. was never re- quired participate and remains free to terminate its participation any at time. Once it chooses to voluntarily assume this relationship, thereby places it itself within jurisdiction of the the same manner as [Law] other employer holdings give must toway secular laws. Carroll must the fact that accept under the mandate of the First Amendment the state has obligation to remain as neutral as possible the face of religious differences. School District Abington v. Schempp, 1560, 1567-68, 374 U.S. [83 L.Ed.2d 844].

125 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 557 A.2d at 1146. This analysis is mirrored the words of the Supreme Court Lee:

Congress and the courts have been sensitive to the clause, needs from flowing the free exercise but every person cannot be shielded from all the burdens incident to exercising every aspect right to practice religious enter into particular of a sect When followers beliefs. choice, they of the limits as a matter activity commercial and a matter of conscience their own conduct as accept on statutory superimposed on faith are not activity. others in that binding are on schemes which added.) (Emphasis in Lee at 1057. The Court 102 S.Ct.

455 U.S. at 261, Amish self-employed Old Order argument by rejected an security social imposition that the of carpenter farmer his First Amendment free violated requirements taxes and mem- employees and those of his because rights exercise religiously-based is a religion of believe that there his bers the kind of for their fellow members obligation provide system, the social contemplated by security assistance social religion acceptance of securi- prohibits therefore their of taxes. payment security social ty benefits Leonard, Therefore, Bishop having voluntarily partici- system unemployment compen- state-created of pated its relief, superimposing from prohibited sation is Although of the Law. statutory scheme upon beliefs right Leonard has the question Bishop there no religious tenets of the violating any employee terminate Church, agree- reason any or for other absent Catholic contrary, require ment to the it cannot Commonwealth’s to define violations of unemployment compensation system tenets as work-related will- the Catholic Church’s J., (Colins, dissenting). ful misconduct. See Carroll hand, “no ‘may it is also clear that State On other Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, exclude individual Non-believers, Jews, Methodists, or Presbyterians, Baptists, faith, faith, their of other because members public welfare it, receiving lack from benefits ” Sherbert, 83 S.Ct. at legislation.’ 374 U.S. Ewing Town- (quoting Everson Board Education 504, 512, 91 L.Ed. 67 ship, (1947)) Moreover, an in the award benefits (emphasis original). more than “nothing in this case would reflect to Claimant in the governmental obligation neutrality face of *22 represent and not the involve- religious differences, [would] it is the religious ment of with secular institutions which object the Establishment Clause to forestall.” Id. added). (emphasis U.S. at 83 S.Ct. at no act committed being by There Claimant which could of absent a tenet to the employer complain the order of the Board must be affirmed. contrary, BYER, Judge, dissenting.

I dissent and would affirm the decision to respectfully un- grant unemployment compensation benefits. Because state, compensation paid by benefits are I employment alone, a cannot religious teaching, standing believe that be by for a determination the state to predicate deny upon benefits based willful misconduct. To hold otherwise authorities unemployment compensation would involve the courts in to make determinations having upon based religious principles objective legal principles rather than treating result in institu- employees would differently employees non-religious employers tions from entitlement to determining unemployment compensation benefits.

Furthermore, I majority’s very troubling find the decision I consider how lines in cases appropriate when we draw in the future. For might example, which arise what would if religious teaching question the result were that a employee marry person could not different if the religion? religious teaching What would be result marry person that an could not of a employee were I like hold that the different race? would to think we would may deny payment state not of benefits on the basis of cases, in these on what hypothetical willful misconduct but distinguish basis would we this case?

I these is on way questions think the best to answer basis, religious employers objective treating employees non-religious employers equally purposes paying benefits. I have no doubt that unemployment compensation the work rule involved in this case would not be a basis for misconduct on the basis willful deny benefits the state I non-religious would employer. imposed if it were differently here.1 hold no *23 A.2d 1389 FRISHMAN, Petitioner,

Michael STATE, OF PROFESSIONAL OF BUREAU DEPARTMENT AFFAIRS, VE STATE OF BOARD AND OCCUPATIONAL MANUFACTURERS, DEALERS and SALESPER HICLE SONS, Respondent. Pennsylvania.

Commonwealth Court Argued 1991. March 13, 1991. Decided June Reargument Aug. Denied 1991. right imply to terminate that a institution has no I do not Wuerl, teachings. employee violating religious Little v. See Cir.1991). (3d question from the That is a far different F.2d 944 case, deny may benefits question whether the state in this which is avoiding religious teaching. upon a The same considerations based entanglement Circuit in Little which motivated Third excessive apply cause us to VII does to this situation should hold that Title not the award of benefits here. affirm