198 Mich. 59 | Mich. | 1917
This is an action to recover damages for breach of promise of marriage, aggravated by claimed seduction of the plaintiff by the defendant. The trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $5,000, upon which judgment was duly entered.
At the time of the trial plaintiff was a widow about 41 years of age and the mother of two children. The defendant, a brother of plaintiff’s sister’s deceased husband, was a man of about 37 years of age. While they were relatives, they had seldom been together, and knew little of each other until in November, 1911, a year and a half after the death of plaintiff’s husband, when the events which led up to this litigation commenced. At this time they met by chance in the office of the township -treasurer, and the defendant called upon the plaintiff a short time later as the re-
The plaintiff’s claim was, and proof was offered tending to show, that the courtship began in November, and in a few weeks culminated in an engagement to marry, the marriage to occur about New Year’s following; that shortly after the engagement the defendant sought the help of plaintiff in procuring a strip of property necessary for ready access to his own; that she readily consented to help him, and advanced her own money to purchase the property in question, procured a deed for the same, and then executed and delivered a deed to the defendant; that he failed to reimburse her, and that she complained to him concerning it, whereupon he rebuked her for distrusting him, which, it is her claim, was their first disagreement; at Christmas time the parties came to Detroit to buy presents, and the plaintiff, desiring to purchase defendant a present, left him, agreeing to meet him later; she did meet him, and found him sullen and angry and suspicious of her absence, which resulted in another misunderstanding, which was smoothed over on Christmas Day, when the presents were exchanged; that between Christmas and New Year’s the defendant suggested that the plaintiff
The issues of fact were presented to the jury in a clear charge, with the result as above indicated. The case is brought to this court, and 103 assignments of error are urged by the learned counsel in support of his claim that the judgment should be reversed. In the discussion of this large number of assignments of error counsel, for convenience, has grouped them as follows: (1) Errors during the course of the trial in the admission and rejection of testimony and the ruling of the court thereon; <2) refusal of the requests to charge of defendant, were refused, and their modification, where so treated; (3) errors in the charge itself; (4) error in the proceedings after the verdict in the motion for a new trial and the decision thereupon; (5) error in not reducing the amount of the verdict.
In the consideration of the first group of assignments of error it should be stated that a number of the assignments are based upon no objection in the record. A wide range of inquiry was permitted by the
With reference to those assignments of error as to the admission and rejection of testimony where proper objection was made, it would not be profitable to enter upon the discussion of the various claims made by counsel, but it is sufficient to say that we have examined these various assignments, and do not believe that it can be said that prejudicial error was committed by the court in his rulings with reference thereto.
The learned trial judge, in a clear and comprehensive charge, submitted the questions of fact to the jury. Counsel for defendant strongly urges that the court did not set forth the theory of the defendant with the same clearness that characterized his exposition of the theory of the plaintiff. A reading of this charge does not impress us that the charge is fairly subject to this criticism. The theories of the parties were simple and are stated in their essentials. If defendant’s counsel desired to have a more explicit statement of his claims presented, it is his duty to present requests to the court.
In the denial of the motion for a new trial the trial judge said:
“Defendant denied the existence of a promise to marry, and said that the seducing was as much upon her part as it was upon his. The testimony disclosed that he is worth in the neighborhood of $40,000. This consists entirely or almost entirely of land.
“A motion was made for a new trial, and at first I was impressed with the idea that the verdict was excessive, because in this case with a mature woman*65 it was my notion that little respect should be given to the story of seduction.
“I have desired, if it was legally possible to do it, to cut the verdict in two. I have concluded, however, that I have no such power. I have examined cases in Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York,- Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin, and the overwhelming weight of authority is that in this class of cases the amount of the verdict, unless it clearly is the result of passion, prejudice, or a reckless disregard of the evidence, rests in the sound discretion of the jury.”
In discussing the question of damages, the trial judge in his charge said:
“Now, you have not any right, as you have already been told, if you get to the question of damages, to consider that this man can afford to pay a certain amount, looking at the thing entirely from this point of view. The testimony that was offered respecting his financial position and his financial standing, the testimony that was offered respecting the conduct and the habits and the life history of these two people, is all offered and given and permitted to come into court so that you may have before you such testimony as will permit you to judge rightfully. A woman who. is about to marry, or who has a promise to marry a man that is worth $100,000, and is deprived of consummating that marriage by something that that man has done, or by his refusal to do it, has been deprived of more, in a worldly way, than the woman who is engaged to marry a man who is worth $10.”
We are of the opinion that this illustration referring to the man who is worth $100,000, under the circumstances of this case, was unfortunate, for the reason that defendant’s pecuniary responsibility was one of the questions in dispute. As the learned trial judge stated in his reasons for denying the motion for a new trial, the testimony fairly indicated that he was worth approximately $40,000 in real estate.
A careful studying of this record leaves the impression upon us, as it seems to have upon the trial judge,