ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND GRANTING MOTION FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and stay of proceedings came on regu *1101 larly for hearing before this Court on January 14, 2002. 1
On November 15, 2000, Defendant DirecTV, Inc. (“DirecTV” or “Defendant”) filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Resolution of Duplicative Litigation, or in the Alternative, to Stay Proceedings Pending Arbitration and to Compel Arbitration (“Motion to Stay”). 2 On December 22, 2000, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. On January 8, 2001, Direct filed a reply.
Supplemental briefing was filed by Plaintiff on March 30, 2001 (“Pis’ March 2001 Supp. Brief’) and by Defendant on April 13, 2001 (“Defs April 2001 Supp. Brief’). On April 23, 2001, the Court stayed the instant action pending resolution of the action EchoStar, et al. v. DirecTV, et al. On November 9, 2001, DirecTV notified the Court of the resolution of the EchoStar action. The Court lifted the stay on December 10, 2001.
On December 21, 2001, DirecTV filed a supplemental brief in support of their Motion to Stay (“Defs December 2001 Supp. Brief’) and on January 7, 2002, Plaintiffs filed their supplemental brief (“Pis’ January 2002 Supp. Brief’). 3
The Court has thoroughly considered the papers presented by the parties and has listened to oral argument by the parties. For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS the Moving Parties’ Motion to Compel Arbitration and GRANTS the Moving Parties’ Motion for a Stay of Proceedings.
I. Background
DirecTV provides television programming services via satellite to consumers nationwide. See Motion at 8. To obtain these services, a potential DirecTV customer first purchases from a retailer the equipment necessary to receive a satellite signal. Id. The potential customer then calls DirecTV and becomes a subscriber by electing to receive one or more of DirecTV’s numerous programming packages. Id. A “Customer Agreement,” which governs the relationship formed between DirecTV and the customer, is then mailed to each customer along with the first billing statement. Id.
DirecTV mailed plaintiff Mitchell Guzik a Customer Agreement after Mr. Guzik began to receive services. 4 According to DirecTV, the Customer Agreement, dated October 1999, became binding as soon as Mr. Guzik received DirecTV’s programming service. The Customer Agreement states:
“This document describes the terms and conditions regarding your receipt and payment of DirecTV service. If you do not accept these terms, please notify us immediately and we will cancel your service. If you agree, it will mean that you accept these terms and, accordingly, they will be legally binding on you.”
Customer Agreement at 1.
The contractual mechanism for dispute resolution is defined in paragraph 8 of the Customer Agreement, entitled “Resolving Disputes.” Under paragraph 8(a), either *1102 DirecTV or plaintiff must first notify the other of a claim at least 60 days in advance of filing an arbitration demand so the parties may attempt to resolve the claim informally. See Customer Agreement ¶ 8(a). The Customer Agreement defines “claim” as “any legal claim relating to this Agreement, any addendum, or your Service.” 5 Paragraph 8(b) of thе Customer Agreement provides that any claim that cannot be resolved informally must be resolved by binding arbitration:
Except as provided in Section 8(d), if we cannot resolve a Claim informally, any Claim either of us asserts will be resolved only by binding arbitration. The arbitration will be conducted under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association that are in effect at the time the arbitration is initiated (referred to as the “AAA Rules”) and under the rules set forth in this Agreement.
Customer Agreement ¶ 8(b).
The arbitration clause also sets out possible payment mechanisms for arbitration. For instance, the clause states,
“If you initiate the arbitration, you agree to pay a fee of $125 or, if less and you tell us in writing, the amount that you would pay to initiate a lawsuit against us in the appropriate court of law in your state. We agree to pay any additional fee or deposit required by the American Arbitration Association in excess of your filing fee ... ”
Customer Agreement ¶ 8(b).
The arbitration clause exempts disputes involving (i) intellectual property rights of the parties or of DirecTV’s operating licenses, (ii) illegal rebroadcasting, and (iii) violations of the Communications Act of 1984 or the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Id. ¶ 8(d).
On September 7, 2000, plaintiffs Jeff Bischoff and Mitchell Guzik, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, brought an antitrust action in this Court for damages and declaratory and injunctive relief under the Sherman Act and the California Cartwright Act against DirecTV and a number of other defendants. See Cpt. at 1. Plaintiffs alleged that DirecTV, by itself, and by conspiring with its co-defendants, illegally attempted to monopolize the distribution and sale of high-power direct satellite service and equipment. See Cpt. at 2. According to Plaintiffs, DirecTV, which effectively controls more than 70% of the Direct Broadcast Satellite (“DBS”) market, has attempted to exploit its dominant market position to exсlude competition, force retailers to boycott competitors’ products and services, restrain trade, and monopolize the DBS market. Id. Plaintiffs assert that as subscribers and customers of DirecTV, they have been injured as a result of Defendants’ anti-competitive actions and competition in the DBS market has been stifled. Id.
II. Standard
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, “upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration ... is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 4. Thus, a district court must determine: (1) whether a valid, enforceable arbitration agreement exists and (2) whether the claims asserted in the complaint are within the scope of the arbitration agreement.
Id.; Howard Elec. & Mech. Co., Inc. v. Frank Briscoe Co., Inc.,
The scope of an arbitration agreement is governed by federal substantive law.
Tracer Research Corp. v. National Environ. Servs. Co.,
The general policy in favor of arbitration applies equally to antitrust claims.
Nghiem v. NEC Electronic, Inc.,
III. Analysis
Defеndants argue that Plaintiffs should be compelled to arbitrate their pending claims and that the Court should stay the instant action because one of the named plaintiffs, Mitchell Guzik, agreed to arbitrate this type of dispute with DirecTV when he accepted DirecTV’s programming services. See Notice of Motion at 1. Plaintiffs assert that they are not required to arbitrate their pending claims because the arbitration clause included in the Customer Agreement is invalid. Plaintiffs further argue that even if the arbitration agreement were found to be valid, it cannot be enforced in the instant matter because the arbitration clause does not cover the claims sought under the instant action and, in any event, is unconscionable. See Opp’n. at 10-18.
A. A Valid and Enforceable Arbitration Agreement Exists Between the Parties
Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration clause is unenforceable because Guzik did not agree to the arbitration provision. Plaintiffs note that DirecTV only provided the arbitration provision to Guzik after the parties had already entered into their agreement for satellite programming, after he had purchased the DirecTV equipment and after DirecTV had activated the service. See Pis’ January 2001 Supp. Brief at 3. Plaintiffs further argue that DirecTV’s actions amount to an attempt to “add terms to the parties’ relationship after the customer is ‘on the hook’ for the services.” Pis’ Opp’n. at 13.
*1104
Plaintiffs cite a 1954 case,
Deering, Milliken & Co. v. Drexler,
Unlike the services at issue in this case,
Deering
involved the sale of goods. Before the seller sent the arbitration provision to the buyer, the buyer and seller had already reached agreement on the сontract terms over the phone, and the buyer had accepted delivery of one installment of the goods. The court found that the seller’s inclusion of an arbitration clause in the “Acceptance of Order” it mailed to buyer with an installment of the goods was an attempt to add additional terms to an already completed transaction.
Deering,
In
Badie,
the defendant bank attempted to insert a new term — an arbitration clause — into an already existing customer agreement between the bank and four credit card account customers. The bank mailed each customer a half-page bill staffer which informed them that, from that time forward, any dispute between a customer and the bank regarding customer accounts would be resоlved by arbitration. While the California Court of Appeal held that the parties had not entered into an enforceable agreement to arbitrate, the court distinguished the facts in that case from a scenario in which an arbitration clause existed in an original agreement. The court stated, “[a]II this is not to say that the bank could not have included an ADR clause in the original account agreement ... But the validity of an ADR provision included in an account agreement in the first instance is a different issue, which we are not required to address here.”
Badie,
Two years after the
Badie
decision, the California Court of Appeals distinguished
Badie
on precisely this ground in
Villa Milano Homeowners Assoc. v. Il Davorge,
*1105
The Court finds the eases cited by Defendant,
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,
cashiers cannot be expected to read legal documents to customers before ringing up sales. If the staff ... had to read the four-page statement of terms ... the droning voice would anesthetize rather than enlighten potential buyers ... Customers as a group are better off when vendors skip сostly and ineffectual steps such as telephonic recitation, and instead use a simple approve-or-return device. Competent adults are bound by such documents, read or unread.
Gateway,
In
Carnival,
two passengers purchased tickets for a seven-day cruise, the terms of which, including a forum selection clause, were sent to passengers in the mail after they bought their tickets. The face of the ticket read, in pertinent part, “[t]he acceptance of this ticket by the person or persons named hereon as passengers shall be deemed to be an acceptance and agreement by each of them of all the terms and conditions of this Passage Contract Ticket.”
Id.
at 587,
“[c]ommon sense dictates that a ticket of this kind will be a form contract the terms of which are not subject to negotiation and that an individual purchasing tickets will not have the bargaining power with the cruise line.”
Id.
at 593,
Finally, the Court notes that four different courts around the nation, including a federal district court in the Western District of Texas, have ruled that the Customer Agreement presently at issue is binding on a DirecTV customer who accepts services from DirecTV and that disputes re *1106 lating to customer actions against DirecTV must be arbitrated pursuant to the Customer Agreement. See Miller v. DirecTV, No. W-00-CA-117 (W.D.Tex. July 25, 2000); Steinberg v. Hughes Electronic Corp. and DirecTV, No. 24052-1999 (Sup.Ct.N.Y.1999).
B. Plaintiffs’ Claims are Covered by the Arbitration Agreement
The scope of an arbitration agreement is governed by federal substantive law.
Tracer Research Corp. v. National Environ. Servs. Co.,
Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration agreement, if found to be enforceable, does not cover the dispute in this case because the agreement applies only to disputes arising from the parties’ contractual relationship. See Pis’ Opp’n. at 15. Plaintiffs contend that their claims in this case do not relate to non-performance by DirecTV under the parties’ contract, but rather, relate to DirecTVs illegal conspiracies with other parties in an effort to violate anti-trust laws. Id.
However, the Court finds that the scope of the arbitration agreement is sufficiently broad to cover the instant claims as it extends to “any Claim either of us asserts,” where a Claim is defined as “any legal claim relating to this Agreement ... or your Service.” Similar language was used in
Arriaga v. Cross Country Bank,
In his complaint, Plaintiffs allege that DirecTV has been able to extract monopoly prices for its programming services supposedly as a result .of its ability to induce retailers to sell only DirecTV compatible electronic equipment and DirecTV programing. See Cpt. ¶¶ 33^40. Plaintiffs allege that they have paid higher prices for services and equipment than they otherwise would have but for DirecTV’s alleged anti-competitive acts. See Cpt. ¶ 45. These allegations center around DirecTV’s services, disputes which clearly fall within the scope of the arbitration clause.
C. The Arbitration Provision is Not Unconscionable
Despite the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,”
Green Tree Fin. Corp.
—Alabama
v. Randolph,
The unconscionability analysis begins with an inquiry into whether the contract is one of adhesion.
See Armendariz,
As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the Customer Agreement signed by Guzik was a contract of adhesion as it was a form contract imposed by the party with superior bargaining power and Plaintiffs could not negotiate the terms, but could only “take them or leave them.” Therefore, the Court finds the arbitration agreement to be procedurally unconscionable as “a finding of a contract of adhesion is essentially a finding of procedural unconscionability.”
See Flores v. Transamerica Homefirst, Inc.,
Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable because (1) it does not permit the arbitra-bility of class action claims and (2) it is comprised of one-sided terms and lacks mutuality. See Pis’ Opp’n. at 15-16.
1. The Arbitration Agreement’s Silence on the Arbitrability of Class Actions Does Not Render it Substantially Unconscionable
Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration clause in the Customer Agreement is unenforceable because it effectively forecloses the possibility of class-wide determination of customer disputes. See Pis’ Opp’n. at 16. Plaintiffs further assert that DirecTV’s attempt to force an arbitration agreement on its customers is essentially an effort to avoid class action lawsuits because DirecTV knows “that many claims which would be worth pursuing only as a class action (due to cost compared to potential damages) would not be pursued in arbitration.” See Pis’ Opp’n. at 16.
Plaintiffs refer to
Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc.,
In Powertel, a class of plaintiffs brought an action alleging that the defendant cellular telephone service provider had wrongfully billed services. After the plaintiffs entered into an original service contract, the provider mailed plaintiffs a pamphlet describing new provisions, one of which included an arbitration clause. The Florida trial court found that the arbitration clause was unconscionable for a number of reasons, including (1) the fact that the arbitration clause was added to an existing agreement, (2) the arbitration agreement limited the provider’s liability to actual damages, (3) the clause precluded class litigation, which would be the most economically feasible remedy for the plaintiffs in that ease and (4) the clause could not be applied because the dispute had already ripened into a lawsuit. While the Powertel court based its finding that the arbitration clause was unconscionable partly on the fact that it prohibited class actions, this Court is not convinced that the Powertel court would have made the finding of un-conscionability on the class action prohibition alone.
The more persuasive case in this matter is
Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., Inc.,
Similar to Guzik, the
Champ
plaintiffs also complained that “various inefficiencies and inequities ... will result from denying them the opportunity to pursue arbitration on a class basis.”
Id.
at 277. The Seventh Circuit rejected that argument and noted that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that courts “must rigorously enforce the parties’ agreement as they wrote it, ‘even if the result is piece-meal litigation.’ ”
Id.
(quoting
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,
Consistent with the Seventh Circuit, the Central District of California has held that a district court cannot order arbitration to proceed on a class-wide basis unless the
*1109
arbitration clause contains a provision for class-wide resolution of claims.
See Gray v. Conseco, Inc.,
No. SACV000322,
Here, as in Champ and Gray II, the parties’ contract does not provide for class arbitration. For the reasons articulated abovе, the Court finds that the arbitration agreement’s silence on arbitrability of class actions does not render the arbitration clause substantially unconscionable.
2. The Arbitration Agreement Does Not Lack Mutuality
Plaintiffs also argue that the arbitration provision is unconscionable because the terms of the provision are one-sided and lack mutuality. See Opp’n. at 18. Plaintiffs base their argument that the terms lack mutuality on the fact that (1) DirecTV demands that ‘all’ claims of the consumer be submitted to arbitration while DirecTV is not bound by the same requirement, (2) DirecTV gave itself several exceptions to the arbitration provision and (3) DirecTV will not be bound to arbitration because the majority of its claims against consumers, such as collection lawsuits for unpaid DirecTV services, are exempt from the arbitration provision under the AAA rules. Plaintiffs argue that DirecTV’s claims would likely involve collection matters for amounts under $10,000, which would be filed in Small Claims Court and are exempt from the arbitration agreement under the American Arbitration Agreement Rules. 8
First, the Court disagrees with Plaintiffs’ interpretation that the arbitration agreement requires ‘all’ claims of the consumer be submitted to arbitration while DirecTV is not bound by the same requirement. Paragraph 8(a) of the Customer Agreement states “... neither of us may start a formal proceeding (except for Claims described in Section 8(d) below for at least 60 days after one of us notifies the other of a Claim in writing ...).” See Customer Agreement ¶ 8(a). Aside from the exceptions listed in paragraph 8(d), the requirement to forward all disputes to arbitration appears to apply equally to both plaintiffs and defendants. In addition, the exceptions listed in paragraph 8(d) are limited to disputes arising over the validity of either party’s intellectual property rights or DirecTV’s licenses to operate their business and disputes involving a violation of the Communications Act of 1934 or the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.
*1110
Plaintiffs’ argument that the arbitration clause does not apply equally to both parties because the FAA permits DirecTV’s collection claims against customers to proceed in Small Claims Court does not persuade this Court that the arbitration agreement is so one-sided as to “shock the conscience.”
See Arriaga,
The arbitration clause analyzed in
Gray I
is also similar to the clause at issue in this case. In
Gray I,
plaintiffs sued on behalf of a purported nationwide class of borrowers who obtained loans secured by residential property from Defendants. The promissory notes signed by plaintiffs contained an arbitration clause, which the Court found to be enforceable despite the fact that they were form contracts and plaintiffs were required to sign many papers at once. The court noted that the clause did not impose expenses above and beyond the cost of litigation upon Plaintiffs, because defendants had offered to pay the full costs of arbitration.
See id.
Another recent district court case found that an arbitration clause was not unconscionable even though it contained some elements of one-sidedness. In
Arriaga v. Cross Country Bank,
Plaintiffs argue that
Arriaga
is not dis-positive on the instant matter because the arbitration clause present in that case required both sides to submit all of their claims to arbitration.
See
Pis’ January 2002 Supp. Brief at 5. However, the
Arriaga
court also noted that arbitration may favor consumers in many cases and that the Supreme Court has recognized specific advantages that the arbitration forum affords plaintiffs.
See Arriaga
at 1195 citing
Allied-Bruve Terminix Companies v. Dobson,
*1111
Plaintiffs argue that the Court should find that the arbitration agreement was one-sided based on the holdings in the recent California cases
Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Svcs., Inc.,
The plaintiffs in
Armendariz,
who had brought wrongful termination claims against their former employers, contended that the mandatory employment arbitration agreement was unconscionably unilateral. The agreement required only employees to arbitrate their wrongful termination claims against the employer, but did not require the employer to arbitrate claims it may have had against any employees.
Id.
at 115-16,
However,
Armendariz
is clearly distinguishable from the instant matter. Initially, the arbitration clause in the Customer Agreement does not generally require customers to arbitrate, while permitting DirecTV to litigate. More importantly, however, the holding in
Armendariz
relied heavily on the fact that the case involved preemployment arbitration contracts where the “economic pressure exerted by employers on all but the most sought-after employees may be particularly acute.”
Id.
at 115,
Flores
also involved a clearly unilateral contract, similar to that in
Armendariz.
The plaintiffs in
Flores
had executed a “Loan Agreement and Note,” which contained an arbitration clause and a deed of trust in order to obtain a reverse mortgage on their home. The California Court of Appeal found that the arbitration provisions were unconscionably one-sided because while plaintiffs were required to arbitrate “any controversy” arising out of the loan agreement, the mortgagee was permitted to proceed by judicial or non-judicial foreclosure, by self-help remedies such as set-off and by injunctive relief to obtain appointment of receiver. In contrast, plaintiffs were not given any such right of set-off.
Id.
at 854,
Recently, the Ninth Circuit, ruling in
Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc.,
*1112 Except for our claims against you for indemnification, actions for collection of moneys owed us under this Agreement, or actions seeking to enjoin you from using the Marks in violation of this Agreement, any controversy or claim relating to this Agreement ... will be sent to final and binding arbitration ...
Ticknor,
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s finding that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable because it “required binding arbitration of the weaker bargaining party’s claims, but allowed the stronger bargaining party the opportunity to seek judicial remedies to enforce contractual obligations.” The court found that the “disparities in the rights of the contracting parties must not be so one-sided and unreasonably favorable to the drafter ... that the agreement becomes unconscionable and oppressive.”
Ticknor,
Plaintiffs argue that “similar to the arbitration provision at issue in Ticknor, DirecTV has the choice of selecting a court as the forum instead of the AAA in the likely majority of cases, whereas its customers have no such option.” See Pis’ January 7, 2002 Supp. Brief at 5. However, the Court does not find that the arbitration clause in the Customer Agreement provides DirecTV with the same level of choice in forum selection as existed in the Ticknor arbitration agreement.
The Court finds that while the arbitration clause in the Customer Agreement may in fact contain certain unilateral effects, it is not unconscionably unilateral. The arbitration clausе clearly meets the standard propounded by California courts, which establishes that an agreement is unconscionable “unless there is a modicum of bilaterality” in the arbitration remedy.
See Flores,
D. DirecTV has Not Waived its Right to Arbitrate because of Settlement in Braur Action
Plaintiffs maintain that DirecTV waived its right to seek arbitration in this case — which involves allegations of Sherman, Clayton and Cartwright Act violations — because DirecTV settled Brauer v. DirecTV Inc., et al., No. CV 00-03826, brought in the Central District of California. The plaintiff in Brauer alleged that DirecTV acted fraudulently when it signed up customers promising them that they could or would receive “network” programming when, in fact, federal law provided they could not. See Pis’ March 2001 Supp. Brief at 2. In Brauer, DirecTV withdrew its motion to compel arbitration and agreed to a class-wide settlement. Plaintiffs further allege that the class members in Brauer involve the same class of individuals in the instant matter. Id. at 4.
To establish waiver, plaintiffs must prove (1) DirecTV’s knowledge of the right to compel аrbitration, (2) acts inconsistent with that right, and (3) resulting prejudice to the party opposing the arbitration.
See Chappel v. Laboratory Corp.,
Plaintiffs have established the first element of the three-pronged test used to determine whether a party has waived its right to compel arbitration under a contract. Clearly DirecTV knew that it had the right to compel arbitration as the Customer Agreement contained an arbitration provision and DirecTV had exercised its right to arbitration in other similar lawsuits. See i.e., John Miller v. DirecTV, No. W-00-CA-117 (W.D.Tex.2000).
However, Plaintiffs have failed to establish the remaining two prongs indicating whether a party has waived its right to compel arbitration. Plaintiffs argue that DirecTV’s desire to waive its right to arbitrate in Brauer is an act that is “overwhelmingly inconsistent with the assertion of that same right in this case.” See Pis’ Supplemental Opp’n. dated March 30, 3001 at 4. Plaintiffs assert that the claims and parties in both Brauer and this case are similar enough to warrant a finding that DirecTV’s failure to seek to compel arbitration in Brauer is inconsistent with DirecTV’s actions in the instant action.
The Court, however, finds that DirecTV has not acted inconsistently with respect to the assertion of its right to arbitrate. First, as Guzik was never a member of the Brauer class, DirecTV did not assert an arbitration right against him nor settle a network programming-related claim with him in Brauer. 9 Second, Plaintiffs acknowledge that the claims in the two lawsuits are not identical. The only similarity that Plaintiffs refer to is the fact that the two suits arise from the same set of customer agreements. See Pis’ March 2001 Supp.Opp’n. In addition, to hold that defendant can no longer assert its right to compel arbitration simply because it did not assert that right in another case is absurd. A finding that DirecTV has waived its right to arbitrate in this case because it agreed to a settlement in the Brauer case would amount to a rule that a party to millions of arbitration agreements has no choice but to arbitrate all claims arising from those agreements if even a single settlement has occurred in a case.
Finally, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not suffered any prejudice as a result of DirecTV’s failure to compel arbitration in the Brauer case. As was stated in Arriaga, the “prejudice that a party must suffer from arbitration itself is not enough to satisfy the Fisher analysis.” Arriaga, at 1201. Plaintiffs must show that their prejudice results from the inconsistent acts of the defendants. Plaintiffs have not made any such showing.
Therefore, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ contention that DirecTV has waived its right to compel arbitration because it did not act consistently with that right, and because its decision to settle the Brauer case does not prejudice Plaintiffs.
E. DirecTV is Not Estopped from Pursuing its Arbitration Clause
Plaintiffs further argue that DirecTV’s actions in the Brauer case should *1114 estop DirecTV from enforcing its arbitration clause.
While “[t]he precise law of judicial estoppel is unclear in the Ninth Circuit,”
Yanez v. United States,
Aside from the fact that Plaintiffs have failed to provide the Court with any examples of a party being estopped from enforcing its arbitration rights in one case because the party decided to settle a second factually and legally dissimilar case, the Court finds that estopping DirecTV from enforcing its arbitration clause will not serve to prоtect the integrity of the judicial process.
F. The Stay Applies to All Parties and Claims
DirecTV moves for a stay of the entire case, including Plaintiff Bischoffs claims against DirecTV and all claims against the retail defendants.
See
Motion at 13. While all of these parties are not signatories to the Customer Agreement, a stay of all issues, and as to all parties, is warranted when questions of fact common to all would be involved in both the litigation and the arbitration.
See e.g. United States v. Neumann Caribbean Int’l, Ltd., 750
F.2d 1422, 1427 (9th Cir.1985) (staying all proceedings in case, including non-arbi-trable third party complaint, pending arbitration for reasons of “economy and efficiency”);
Lake Communications, Inc. v. ICC Corp., 738
F.2d 1473, 1477 (9th Cir.1984),
overruled on other grounds Nghiem, 25
F.3d at 1441 (9th Cir.1994) (noting that it proper for district court to stay non-arbitrable counterclaims in light of their “interdependence with claims properly referred to arbitration”);
Gray I,
Defendants argue that the Court should stay the entire action because Plaintiffs allege the same legal claims against the remaining defendants as they do against DirecTV. Defendants also contend that because the questions of fact involved in an arbitration between DirecTV and Guzik will be identical to the questions of fact involved in this litigation among all parties, the entire action should be stayed.
Plaintiffs argue that the entire action should not be stayed because many of the plaintiffs are not subject to the arbitration provision.
10
A stay of the entire action, Plaintiffs contend, will not promote judicial efficiency because the arbitration between Guzik and DirecTV will be private, “with no record and no precedential vаlue,” and the results of the arbitration, “will not be binding in any way on DirecTV, Bischoff, or the other class members in this action.”
See
Pis’ January 2002 Supp. Brief at 10. The Court acknowledges that while the results of the arbitration will not be binding on DirecTV, Bischoff or the other class members, a failure to stay the action may lead to inconsistent findings which will hinder the pursuit of judicial efficiency.
See Contracting Northwest, Inc. v. City of Fredericksburg, Iowa,
Plaintiffs have also argued that the Court should not be persuaded by the Ninth Circuit cases upon which Defendants rely for the argument that the entire cаse should be stayed because those cases do not order a stay of “the claims of another
plaintiff
not subject to an arbitration agreement.”
See
Pis’ January 2002 Supp. Brief at 9. Indeed,
Neumann, 750
F.2d at 1427 (9th Cir.1985) involved the staying of claims the plaintiff had against
another defendant
and
Lake Communications,
The cases cited by Plaintiffs do indeed indicate that a stay of litigation is not always, appropriate when all parties to a litigation are not bound by an arbitration agreement. However, the similarity of the issues of law and fact in this case to those that will be considered during arbitration, as well as the potential for inconsistent findings absent a stay, persuade the Court that a stay is warranted in the instant matter.
The Court also notes that Plaintiffs have incorrectly cited the holding in
Hikers Indus. v. William Stuart Indus. (Far East) Ltd.,
Having found that judicial economy and the desirability of avoiding possible inconsistent findings militate in favor of a stay, the Court grants DirecTV’s request for a stay of the instant action. To ensure that the parties are not prejudiced by an unreasonable delay in the arbitration, the Court ORDERS that DirecTV shall initiate arbitration proceedings within thirty (30) days from entry of this order and shall file a written report regarding the progress of the arbitration every sixty (60) days thereafter.
IV. Conclusion
Pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 4, the Court hereby ORDERS DirecTV and Guzik to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the Customer Agreement.
*1116 Pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 3, the Court STAYS the action until conclusion of the arbitration proceeding. The Court ORDERS DirecTV to initiate arbitration proceedings within thirty (30) days from entry of this order and to file a written report regarding the progress of the arbitration every sixty (60) days thereafter.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. The Cоurt notes that this motion to compel arbitration was brought as to Plaintiff Guzik only. See Notice of Motion at 1.
. On November 15, 2000, this Motion to Stay was joined by defendants Thomson Consumer Electronics, Inc., RadioShack Corporation, Best Buy Co. Inc., and Circuit City Stores, Inc.
. On January 11, 2002, DirecTV filed a "Notice of Lodging of Additional Authority in Support of its Motion to Stay.” As DirecTV did not seek permission from the Court to file this supplemental briefing, the Court has not relied on this filing.
. The Court notes that the parties dispute the date on which Mr. Guzik received the Customer Agreement.
. "Service” is defined by the October 1999 Customer Agreement collectively as DirecTV subscription programming, Direct Ticket Pay Per View Services, and other services, and is described in paragraphs 1(a) through l(n) of the Customer Agreement.
. The Court found the arbitration agreement was unenforceable on other grounds.
. The Villa Milano court also noted that Badie did not involve condominium units and recorded CC & R's and therefore, a separate body of law applied to the fact scenarios in both casеs.
. The Customer Agreement provides that the arbitration will be conducted under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA”). However, it is the AAA's policy that all disputes for less than $10,000 are to be resolved under the AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules. See Ami-cus Brief filed by AAA June 6, 2000, Request for Judicial Notice, Exh. B. Under the AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules, parties are not precluded from seeking relief in a Small Claims Court for disputes or claims within the scope of its jurisdiction. Plaintiffs contend that the jurisdiction of most Small Claims Courts should cover the typical amount of any collections action by DirecTV against a consumer (e.g., California's Small Claims Court jurisdiction is $5,000 maximum. Cal.Code of Civ.Proc. § 116.220(a)(1)).
. Indeed, when plaintiffs Guzik and Bischoff attempted to raise objections to that settlement, Judge Lew, who presided over Brauer, struck their pleadings on the ground that, as non-class members, they lacked standing to object and their individual rights would not be affected by the settlement. See Defendant's Supplemental Brief dated April 13, 2001.
. The fact that the issues are the same is relatively uncontested by the parties.