71 So. 689 | Ala. | 1916
Action, by passenger against common carrier, to recover damages on account of personal injuries. The negligence alleged, which went to the jury, was the closing of the gate of the street» car upon plaintiff while she was in the act of alighting from the car at the end of her journey; and the sudden jerking or lurching of the car, at that moment, which caused plaintiff to fall and injure herself. There were no pleas of contributory negligence, and the wanton counts were charged out by the court. The jury found for the plaintiff and assessed her damages at $375.
Each of the counts was sufficient in an action by a passenger against a carrier for negligence in causing personal injuries, and they were therefore not subject to the demurrers thereto interposed.
In an action against a common carrier for injury to a passenger, complaints of pain and suffering, and symptoms indicative of injury, made by the person injured, are admissible.
“(2) If the jury is reasonably satisfied from all the evidence in this case the defendant, its agents or servants, negligently closed the gates on the plaintiff as alleged in the said complaint, while plaintiff was in the act of alighting from said car, and that she received her said injuries proximately from said gates being closed upon her, you must find a verdict for the plaintiff.
“(3) The court charges you, gentlemen of the jury, that the law requires the highest degree of care and diligence and skill, by those engaged as a common carrier of passengers by street cars known to careful, diligent, and skillful persons, engaged in such business, consistent with the practical operation of the road.”
Charges 1 and 2 practically hypothesized the material averments of the complaint, and as there were no special pleas of con-
The evidence was sufficient to support a verdict under either of the counts allowed to go to the jury; hence there was no error in refusing defendant’s requested charges which were in effect the general affirmative charge -to find for the defendant as to these counts.
We find nothing m this record which would justify us in holding that the trial court erred in refusing the motion for a new trial. As we have said above, there was evidence sufficient to support the verdict; and we are not prepared to say that the verdict was excessive.