97 Ala. 220 | Ala. | 1892
— Under the decisions of this court the second count of the complaint sets forth with sufficient certainty a cause of action under subdivision 1 section 2590 Code, and the demurrer to it was properly overruled.
The third plea was manifestly bad. It states simply that plaintiff’s intestate was guilty of contributory negligence, without averring that such negligence contributed proximately to the injury. The demurrer was properly sustained.
The demurrers to the pleas of the statute of limitations to seventh and eighth counts which were introduced by amendment were properly sustained. The matter introduced by the new counts was within the lis pendens. — A. G. S. R. R. Co. v. Chapman, 83 Ala. 453.
This is an action under the Emploj^er’s Liability Act against the appellant for negligently causing the death of appellee’s intestate, Julius N. Weiss. The appellant was engaged in operating an iron furnace and Weiss was engaged as its master-mechanic whose duty was to see that the furnace and all its machinery were kept in proper repair and condition. One Thompson was foundry-man and had general charge and control of the operation of the furnace. P. Hogsett was the general manager of defendant, having the superior control and management of its business generally. In operating the furnace, air is forced by the engines in pipes through what are called the stoves and thence into the furnace, making the blast. The air enters near the base of the furnace and blows towards the top. This forces the smoke and gas through the top of the furnace, if the
It was shown that sometimes when -the furnace was in operation the weight of the chain suspended from the arm of the lever above referred to would raise the damper at the top of the bleeder and cause the gas to escape and produce a disagreeable noise ; and sometimes the force of the gas flowing from the downcomer into the bleeder would produce a similar result. This noise was very disagreeable to the 'persons about the furnace, though it did not impair in any way, the operation of the furnace. Weiss complained that it interrupted his sleep at night. The deceased, W eiss, and foundryman, Thompson, had, within a period of a month or more before Weiss was killed, talked about the noise, and
With this outline, let us see what the issues are as presented by the pleadings. The action is under the Employers Liability Act. Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8 of the complaint are relied on. The first, fourth and seventh counts are framed under subdivision 3 of section 2590 of the present Code. The first alleges that Thompson, to whose orders intestate was bound to conform, negligently ordered intestate to ascend to the top of the furnace stack and shorten the lever of the bleeder to prevent the gas escaping from thebleeder; that the bleeder was in an unsafe and unsound condition in this that gas was escaping therefrom which was caused by the negligence of Thompson in not closing the bell at the top' of the furnace, but negligently allowed it to remain open when the intestate was ascending or had ascended near the top of the furnace stack; that intestate was overcome and caused to fall and be killed by the escaping gas. The fourth count is substantially the same as the first. The seventh
Is there any evidence tending to support these counts? When the plaintiff closed his evidence, no testimony whatever had been given touching the subject of any order given by Thompson to Weiss in the'premises. When Thompson, took the stand as a witness for defendant, plaintiff examined him on the subject, and he testified positively and fully that he gave Weiss no order whatever to go up and fix the bleeder and that he did not know he had ascended the furnace until he called down to him for permission to close the bell. Win. Etheridge one of the laborers was introduced by defendant, and on cross-examination he testified, after stating that he and other laborers were with Weiss on the furnace, fixing the arm of the lever, “that Thompson knew they were on the furnace and told them to fix the lever.” This statement of the witness Etheridge is the only evidence which it can be urged tends to show an order given by Thompson to Weiss. It may be seriously doubted under our rulings whether the statement tends to prove the order alleged in the complaint —whether the jury could legitimately conclude from it that Thompson ordered Weiss to ascend to the top of the furnace and fix the lever, at the time he did so ascend. In M. & O. R. R. Co. v. George, 94 Ala. 199; s. c. 10 So. Rep. 145, we ruled that the orders mentioned in the statute “evidently refers to special orders and directions in respect to the particular service in which the employe is engaged, at the time of the injury, as distinguishable from a general order or direction in reference to the discharge of his general service growing out of the nature and scope of his employment. • • ■ • There being no evidence that the yard-master gave plaintiff any order or direction to uncouple the car from the engine, at the time of Ms injury, he has failed to establish one of the essential statutory propositions.” It is manifest that to come within the statute, the order must be such as implies requirement of obedience at once, or under conditions existing or in contemplation of the person giving the order when it is given, for it is, necessarily, by the conditions existing or in contemplation at the time the order is given, that the question of negligence vel non in giving it is to be determined. The statement of the witness is extremely vague
The 3rd and 8th counts will have to be similarly disposed of upon the same principle. These counts aver, under the statute, that Thompson had superintendence entrusted to him and was negligent in the exercise of such superintendence in that, as charged in the 3rd count, knowing intestate was at work on the said lever, &c., allowed gas to escape from th & furnace stack, in large quantities, by not closing the bell at the top of the furnace; and as charged in the 8th count, knowing intestate was at work on the lever, &c., negligently failed to open the chimney valves of said furnace and to close the bell of said furnace stack whereby gas escaped from the furnace stack and bleeder. It is manifest the charge of negligence in the third count that Thompson did not close the bell is not sustained for the bell was closed by Weiss himself by Thompson’s permission, and remained closed during the whole time Weiss was at work on the lever. It is manifest also that if Weiss was suffocated by gas it was gas escaping from the bleeder and not the furnace stack as alleged. To sustain this count it was clearly necessary to prove these allegations as well as to show there was negligence on Thompson’s part in respect to them. So also, in the 8th count the same allegations are made in conjunction with the further fact alleged that Thompson negligently failed to open the chimney valves, and being so alleged it was likewise necessary to prove them. But assuming the allegations to correspond with the evidence we hold, as above declared, that Thompson was guilty of no negligence, in the premises.
The second count alleges, under the statute, that the death was caused by a defect in the ways, works, machinery and plant of the defendant, in that the defendant had no platform or other safe or suitable contrivance around the bleeder upon which intestate could stand or sustain himself while at work on the bleeder and lever; and that the defect arose from and had not been discovered or remedied owing to the negligence of the defendant, or its superintendent, John Hog-sett, who was in the service of the defendant, and entrusted by it with the duty of seeing that the bleeder, &c., were in proper condition. We do not think it can be seriously con
There are many exceptions to the admission and rejection of evidence. Many of them relate to testimony tending to show the office and duties of foundrymen and master-mechanics and their relation to and authority over each other, in furnaces generally. We think in the effort of the plaintiff to establish the allegations of the complaint in respect of the duties and authority of Thompson and Weiss, respectively, it was competent to prove the duties and authority usually exercised by persons holding similar positions in furnaces generally. Such proof would raise the presump
The witness Middleton was shown to be possessed of sufficient knowledge of the subject to testify that some men can stand more gas than others.
The court erred in refusing to permit defendant to prove by witness Thompson that he and Weiss had had several conversations several days (perhaps as far back as two weeks) before the accident about the gas escaping from the bleeder and that Weiss knew it. So also, it was competent, to show his skill and experience, to prove a statement made by Weiss to Thompson as to how long he had been in the furnace business.
It was not objectionable for plaintiff to ask witness Thompson if he took any precaution to keep the gas from going up.
The court erred in refusing to permit witness Thompson to testify that Weiss said to him several times within two weeks or a month before the accident that he, Weiss, could not sleep well on account of the noise of the bleeder. There was no principle of res gestee involved, as seems to have been supposed. The evidence was competent to show that Weiss knew of the defect in the bleeder and purposed to fix it, and in support of defendant’s contention that he, of his own accord, without orders from Thompson, undertook to repair the bleeder.
The court erred in excluding the statement of witness Hogsett, that Weiss told him the first time the furnace stopped he was going to fix that lever, that it was blowing so he could not sleep.
The judgment of the City Court is reversed, and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.