The appellant, Edwin Birge, along with two co-defendants, was indicted by the grand jury of Carroll County for violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act by possessing more than one ounce of marijuana. Appellant was convicted of possessing one ounce, or less, of marijuana, and sentenced to twelve months imprisonment. Held:
1. The evidence shows that, at the time of his arrest, appellant resided in an unnumbered, simulated-wood dwelling owned by his father on Lake Carroll. The dwelling was situated at the end of an unnamed city road branching just past a residence numbered 140 Lakeshore Drive. It was the only dwelling located at the end of said road; the residence on the other fork of the road was described as a pink-colored house. The search warrant, pursuant to which the contraband was seized, described the place to be searched as "a wood dwelling house setting on the lake bank” at the end of a dirt road branching just past 140 North Lakeshore Drive.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the above-described search warrant, and in admitting into evidence, over objection, said evidence. In an exhaustive argument, appellant asserts an array of theories in support of his contention.
(a) Several of appellant’s theories may be categorized as mere "technical irregularities,” the existence of which is insufficient to invalidate the warrant. Code Ann. § 27-312 (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 567, 571). The alleged "irregularities” as to time of issuance of the warrant and the incorrect caption on the search warrant all fall within the category of a "technical irregularity not affecting the substantial rights of the accused.”
Merritt v. State,
(b) As to appellant’s assertion that the investigating officer’s alleged misstatement concerning appellant’s inclusion in the City Directory would constitute grounds
*633
for invalidating the warrant under principles enunciated in United States v. Thomas, 489 F2d 664 (5th Cir. 1973), we find that the trial judge did not err in his conclusion that the appellant failed to establish an intentional misstatement of a fact such that invalidation of the warrant would be required. In a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, "the trial judge sits as the trior of the facts, hears the evidence, and his findings based upon conflicting evidence are analogous to the verdict of a jury and should not be disturbed by a reviewing court if there is any evidence to support it.”
State v. Swift,
(c) Appellant contends that the description of the place and persons to be searched is ambiguous and overbroad. We find that the description of the premises "... sufficiently permits a prudent officer with a search warrant to be able to locate the person and place definitely and with reasonable certainty.”
Fomby v. State,
(d) Appellant urges upon us the application of the principles established in Connally v. Georgia,
Appellant’s first enumeration of error is without merit.
2. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s motion challenging the composition of the grand and traverse juries as to sex, race, age and geographical distribution. On the hearing of appellant’s jury challenge, the only evidence as to the composition of the jury panels was the opinion testimony of a statistician employed by appellant. The trial court, as trier of fact, was free to reject such expert testimony.
Birge v. State,
3. Appellant challenges the correctness of the trial court’s refusal to grant appellant’s motions for severance and mistrial, inasmuch as the co-defendants’ defenses were claimed to have been potentially antagonistic. "The mere fact that co-defendants’ defenses are antagonistic is not sufficient in itself to warrant separate trials.”
Cain v. State,
4. Appellant enumerates as error the trial court’s limitation of cross examination on certain matters not relevant to the determination of whether appellant was guilty of committing the offense charged. Specifically, appellant sought to introduce evidence concerning a separate search of the automobile and residence of appellant’s co-defendant. While it is true that the right to a thorough and sifting cross examination may not be abridged, the permissible scope of cross examination is
*635
not unlimited.
Jones v. State,
5. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s motion for an independent laboratory analysis of the contraband seized. The principles established in
Patterson v. State,
The evidence shows that there was no bona fide dispute that the contraband was marijuana. During the search of appellant’s premises, he was asked to "get the marijuana,” upon which he handed the officers a plastic bag containing green, leafy material later identified by the state as marijuana. The appellant admitted that, together with two other individuals, he owned the marijuana, then later stated that the marijuana belonged to another individual. Appellant never claimed that the contraband was not marijuana, or any other legitimate substance, arguing simply that it belonged to someone
*636
else, or, alternatively, that the state had failed to adequately identify the substance as marijuana. Under these circumstances,
Patterson
does not require reversal, there being no bona fide claim that the contraband is not marijuana. Moreover, the law is settled that error, to be reversible, must be harmful.
Robinson v. State,
6. Appellant urges as error the trial court’s admission into evidence, over objection, the contraband seized and later identified by the state’s witness as marijuana, on the ground that the state’s witness was not properly qualified to testify as to the identity of marijuana. Appellant contends that, as a result of the state’s failure to adequately identify the contraband, the court erred in refusing to grant a motion for directed verdict. "Whether or not a witness is allowed to testify as an expert is a question for the sound discretion of the trial court and such discretion, unless abused, will not be interfered with.”
Frazier v. State,
The evidence shows that the witness had a bachelor of science degree in chemistry and had three years of experience in the analysis of drugs in the state crime lab. The witness testified that he had received training on how to run tests on marijuana at the state crime lab, and that he had performed over three thousand tests on controlled substances, including marijuana. The trial judge committed no error in allowing the witness to testify as to the identity of the alleged marijuana, and subsequently admitting the the same into evidence. Frazier v. State, supra, p. 645.
As to appellant’s contention that the court erred in
*637
admitting the marijuana into evidence in the absence of a showing that it was "Cannabis Sativa L,” the state is not required to prove that the marijuana is "Cannabis Sativa L”; a showing that the contraband is marijuana is sufficient.
Frazier v. State,
supra, p. 645;
Manis v. State,
7. For the reasons enumerated in the preceding paragraph, appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s demurrer to the indictment, which challenged the state’s failure to specify the precise genus of marijuana, is without merit.
8. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding all of appellant’s actions and statements made prior to the giving of the Miranda warnings.
First, Rule 18 (Code Ann'. § 24-3618) as to structure and content of the briefs and enumerations of errors in each case has not been complied with by appellant, in that he has failed to cite the particular parts of the transcript which are essential to the consideration by this court of the errors alleged. Specifically, appellant has failed to disclose where, if at all, objection was made to the introduction of appellant’s acts and statements, and this failure, alone, leaves us unable to consider this enumeration of error.
Herrin v. State,
Second, the Miranda rule falls far short of encompassing all acts and statements of a defendant.
Shy v. State,
Here, investigating officers merely asked the appellant where the marijuana was hidden, in order to avoid "tearing up the house.” Appellant voluntarily led
*638
the officers to the hallway, where he handed them the marijuana. The situation did not require Miranda warnings.
Boorstine v. State,
There is no merit in this enumeration.
9. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting certain remarks made by the state in closing argument, and in overruling appellant’s motion for mistrial based on the admission of such remarks. Specifically, appellant urges that the prosecutor’s statement that appellant’s testimony was "the most incredible, preposterous story I have heard ever since I have been trying cases” amounted to prejudicial personalization of argument. As the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the remark, no reversible error was committed.
Baker v. State,
This enumeration of error is without merit.
10. Appellant claims that the trial court committed reversible error in instructing the jury that "... the contents of a house are presumed to be those of the head of the household, and he who is in charge of the household.” The court further instructed the jury that such a presumption was rebuttable. The evidence shows that the appellant resided in the dwelling in which the contraband was seized, and that the dwelling was the property of appellant’s father. This properly raised a question for the jury to determine whether he was guilty of possession as a householder.
Bass v. State,
11. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury in the exact language requested by appellant, concerning pre-trial publicity. Appellant fails to establish any showing of harm or prejudice, and it is well settled that, in the absence of injury, reversal is not required.
Robinson v. State,
supra;
Dismuke v. State,
Judgment affirmed.