80 Ind. App. 450 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1923
Appellee while in the employ of appellant received an injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment An agreement for com
Appellee while in appellant’s employ fell and fractured his left leg. He was seventy-five years old at the time, and was confined in bed at a hospital for eight weeks under the care of physicians employed by appellant. While at the hospital he fell and broke his leg about four inches above the first fracture. When he left the hospital and was taken to his home the splint was still on his leg, and he could not bear his weight on it. About a week after going home while on the porch and being supported with crutches he slipped and fractured the leg a third time. Appellant’s contention is that the present disability of appellee is not the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, but that it is the result of an acci-. dent which occurred after he ceased to be an employe.; that his present condition is the result of the last two fractures which it contends were caused by the willful conduct of appellee Appellee contends that he has fully recovered from the last two fractures and that his present disability is the result of the first fracture. The evidence upon this question is conflicting as it is on all other questions of fact before the board. The evidence does not, as appellant contends, without conflict, show that the present disability of appellee was
Appellant contends there is no evidence to sustain the finding and award setting aside the final receipt which it designates as the “release.” But it is to be remembered that when this receipt was signed, appellee was over seventy-five years of age. He was unable to move except on crutches. Appellant’s representative figured the amount due him and informed appellee that it would be necessary for him to sign the receipt before he could get the compensation then due him. When the receipt was executed, appellant was owing appellee for four weeks’ compensation which it was obligated to pay, so that the consideration for the signing of the receipt was the payment of the amount then due and owing appellee. Appellee could but did not read the receipt and release before signing the same. This, however, is no reason why the purported release for which appellant paid nothing should be permitted to stand in the way of the payment to appellee of the compensation to which he is entitled. If appellant believed its liability had ceased because of changed conditions, §45 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Acts 1915 p. 392, §8020l et seq. Burns’ Supp. 1921) provided a remedy.
. Appellant asks us to hold as a matter of law that appellee’s failure to read the paper signed by him calls for a reversal of the award. This we cannot do. The administration of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, Acts 1915 p. 392, supra, calls for a more liberal construction of the law in order to carry out its purpose than is required in an ordinary action at common law where the execution of an instrument without reading is involved.
The award is affirmed and ordered increased five per cent, in accordance with §61 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, Acts 1915 p. 392, supra.