187 Iowa 75 | Iowa | 1919
Defendant insists that plaintiff contends the judgment adjudicating there is a contempt for violating a liquor injunction must be reviewed de novo, and defendant concedes that this alleged contention on part of plaintiff is well made. But the parties cannot, either singly or together, make public law by concession. We said in Nies v. Anderson, 179 Iowa 326, at 330:
“Plaintiff contends that certain of our decisions hold that the review of action on a charge of contempt is a hear
In Nies v. Anderson, we discuss other cases, and find they do not hold that the review is de novo. In Sawyer v. Hutchinson, 119 Iowa 93, we said:
“Of course, if the testimony be uncontradicted, or so clearly preponderates as to make it reasonably conclusive that the party charged was in contempt, we shall have no hesitancy in annulling the proceedings and remanding the case for proper action,” but that the opinion of the trial court will not be wholly disregarded if there be a substantial conflict in evidence.
In Dutton v. Anderson, 163 Iowa 613, and Cheadle v. Roberts, 150 Iowa 639, at 642, we held that, in reviewing a finding of guilty on certiorari, weight will be accorded the finding of the trial court; in Rist v. District Court, 162 Iowa 244, that a finding of guilty will not be disturbed if there be a substantial conflict. In Sawyer v. Hutchinson, supra, we ruled that a contempt proceeding is quasi criminal, and requires a greater weight of evidence than ordinary civil cases, and that a clear case should be made before punishment is inflicted for the violation .of an injunction. In summing up the discussion in Nies v. Anderson, supra, we said:
“On the whole, we think the rale is that the review is not de novo; that, while the finding below has weight, it does not have as much as has a verdict; and that, while evidence to sustain a finding of guilty must amount to more than the mere preponderance which sustains an ordinary recovery on the law side, it is not required that violation oían injunction be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
• -II. Will an application of this rule permit our interfering here?
We are of opinion the proof is sufficient so that we may not set aside the order of conviction.