157 Pa. 278 | Pa. | 1893
Opinion by
The Bird Coal & Iron Company, the appellant, is a corporation ; it is the owner, among other lands, of a tract in name of James Butcher, underlaid with coal, in Snowshoe township, Centre county. The capital stock of the company was 100,000
On July 18,1884, Mr. Humes became a director of the company ; he accepted and served in the office. About the first of August following his election, Somerville and his associates requested a reduction of the rojmlty payable under the lease on account of competition and lower selling price in the market. Correspondence in reference to the matter was then had between Pemberton Bird, president of the company, and Mr. Humes. Bird’s letters are not before us, two of Humes’s are. The first is as follows :
Bellefonte, Pa., Aug. 9th, 1884.
Pemberton Bird, Esq., President,
Northumberland, Pa.
Dear Sir:
I have yours of the 8th, and agreeably to your request have
Truly yours, etc.,
E. C. Humes.
P. S. If this meets your views, perhaps you had better advise me immediately, fixing the time to commence.
The second letter, dated August 26,1884, addressed same as first, is as follows :
Dear Sir:
In reply to yours of 25th, I have to say, that, after some reflection, I have arrived at the conclusion that, in view of the great depression and competition in coal, it possibly might be unwise for us to decline the proposition of Iiarned, Jacob & Co., although I do not quite like extending the time during the year 1885, still, as the projected railroads are opening up a vast area of new territory, it is probable a change for higher royalty will not occur soon, hence I would suggest that we agree to continue the reduction of three cents per ton for one year, say from September 1, 1884, on all shipments over the 20.000 stipulation in the agreement; and this strikes me as reasonably fair, if they are not bound to take out more than 20.000 tons. At the same time, they would have an inducement to exceed this quantity. I shall be satisfied with your making this proposition, and 1 am induced to think they will agree to it.
Truly yours,
E. C. Humes.
Between the dates of these two letters, on August the 16th, 1884, a meeting of the board of directors was had, Mr. Humes not present. The minutes show this business : “ The president
Mr. Humes did not disclose the fact to any of his associate stockholders, or to any of the officers of the company at any time, that he had an individual contract, by which he was in the receipt of an extra three cents per ton on all coal mined under the lease, nor does it appear that any of them, during the existence of the lease, had knowledge of such fact. Altogether, Mr. Humes received under his special agreement $8,310.83. It does not appear just how much of this amount was received after the reduction was made.
After the facts became known to the company, it brought an action of account render against Humes, claiming: (1) That, as a stockholder, he had no right to make a secret agreement to receive a special profit, and that the whole of the money, received by him, in equity belonged to the company. (2) That, as director, he induced the company to make an abatement of the royalty, while he was secretly in receipt of a special profit, and the fiduciary relation between him and the company demands that he account to the company for this profit received after his directorship commenced.
After the evidence had been heard for plaintiff in the court below, a compulsory nonsuit was entered, which the court af
The learned judge of the court below, in an opinion refusing to take off the nonsuit, very concisely and clearly demonstrates, from both reason and authority, that appellee is not bound to account to the company for any money received by him on his special agreement before he assumed the office of director, about the time the abatement of three cents per ton was made on the 10th of August, 1884.
But as to the second point raised by plaintiffs, he says: “But it was contended that when he became a director of the company there was such a fiduciary relation between him and the company, he would be bound to account for all money received from any dealings in regard to the corporate enterprise: But if we are correct in ruling that there can be no recovery from him for the amount received when he was a mere stockholder, we do not see how liability would attach when he became a director. There was no new contract made, and he did not so manage the affairs as a director as to receive any secret profit detrimental to the interests of the company; he merely continued to receive the amounts due according to the terms of a contract made before he became a director.”
In thus failing to draw a distinction between the duty of the appellee as stockholder and director, we think there was error. There was a radical change in his relations to the company the moment he assumed the office of director. As stockholder, being the owner of his shares absolutely, he had a right to manage his own property as suited his own notions. It is one of the purposes of corporate organization of capital to facilitate the independent enjoyment and use by each member of Iris fractional interest in the whole. But a director is a trustee for the entire body of stockholders, and both good morals and good law imperatively demand he shall manage all the business affairs of the company with a view to promote, not his own interests, but the common interests, and he cannot directly or indirectly derive anyr personal profit or advantage by reason of his position, distinct from his co-shareholders : Potter on Corp., vol. 1, sec. 330 ; Morawetz on Corp. 517, 518. And by assuming the office, he undertakes to give his best judgment in the
This appeal is from a judgment of compulsory nonsuit. The evidence of plaintiff in the court below must be taken as establishing the facts testified to, or apparent from the books and documents submitted; any reasonable inference which might have been drawn from them must also be taken in appellant’s favor. If defendant’s side had been heard, there might have been contradictory evidence of the alleged facts; by his explanations, unfavorable inferences from the facts might have been shown to be wholly unwarranted. But in reviewing this judgment we have nothing to do with his side of the case as it might have been presented. Our duty is solely with plaintiff’s side as it was presented in the most favorable aspect the evidence will warrant.
We assume, then, the existence of this individual agreement was wholly unknown to the company at the time of Mr. PJumes’s election as director, and afterwards, up until the demand for an accounting from him. We may remark, that the fact of it did not necessarily affect his official action. Having been made at a time when he had the undoubted legal right to make it, its existence, if circumstances remained the same, would in no respect warp his judgment or impair his devotion to the interests of the company. So, although it would have been wise to disclose it at the time he accepted the office, there was no imperative duty on him to do so.
The suggestive interrogatory then is, what was the motive for this disingenuousness and disregard of a manifest official duty ?
If the facts be as appellants on their unanswered testimony claim them to be, then it is not an unwarranted inference that Director Humes made for himself, by reason of his official action, a profit outside of and distinct from the other stockholders, for which he ought to account. It is argued, fairly, that he protected his three cents by getting the reduction on the company’s fifteen.
It is a mistake, however, on this view of the facts, to assume, as appellants have assumed, that the whole three cents per ton belongs to the company. He had the right to receive the three cents at least up until the corporate action of the company, prompted by him, lost it twenty per cent of the contract price, while the director lost nothing. His profit by the transaction is all the company can equitably claim. What was his profit?
As the evidence stands before us, there is no legal conclusion
Assuming, then, that the reduction was, under the circumstances, a proper one, what reasonable inference as to the director’s profit may be drawn'from the evidence? There ought, says he in substance, to be a reduction of three cents, otherwise the mines will stand idle. A reduction on what? Clearly, as he knew, on the eighteen cents then being paid. He also well knew that President Bird and the other members of the board would act on the assumption that fifteen cents was the royalty then being paid, and if they did as he advised, would reduce the company’s fifteen cents to twelve; would do this because ignorant of a material fact which it was his duty, as director to disclose. If they had known he was in receipt of three cents, while that fact would not have affected the propriety of a reduction, they would have been bound, in fairness to the company, to have insisted that the three cents should be taken from the whole royalty, and not exclusively from five sixths of it, for it was as much the interest of the man in receipt of one sixth to have the mines running, as of those receiving five sixths. His profit, then, by concealment of the truth, was just what he saved in the reduction, one sixth of three cents from
This discussion of the question is based exclusively on the facts as here presented; as they may present a very different appearance on a retrial, our conclusions then may have no value.
The judgment is reversed, procedendo awarded.