5 Sandf. 134 | The Superior Court of New York City | 1851
By the Court.
The questions first to be consi
The truth of the proposition, that the law will not suffer the same question to be twice agitated between the same parties, but holds them to be concluded when it has once been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, and the judgment so rendered is still in force, is not denied, but it has been strenuously contended, that the doctrine is only applicable, when the cause of action, in the successive suits, is identical, and the decision in the prior has proceeded upon a question of fact, not of law. And upon both these grounds it is insisted that the present case is either an exception from the general rule, or is not within its purview. . The cause of action in the former suit, it is said, was the refusal of W. & J. Brown & Co. to apply the unexhausted balance of the credit to the payment, pro rata, of the bills for ¿65,000 ; whereas, in the present, it is the refusal to apply the same balance to the payment ratably of the subsequently drawn bills for ¿68,000 ; and as the facts in the former suit were found by a special verdict, it is further alleged, that the question for the decision of the court, and upon which its judgment was founded, was necessarily and purely a question of law.
The position, that in order to raise an estoppel by a prior-judgment, the cause of action in the second suit, must, in all respects, be the same, as in the first, we feel no difficulty or doubt in rejecting. It is not indeed absolutely novel, but it is repugnant to the reasons of public policy embodied in the maxim, “ Interest reipublim ut sit finis litium,” upon which the doctrine of the conclusiveness of a judgment is founded; and so far from
The able and lucid opinion of Lord Ellenborough, in Outram v. Morewood, (3 East. 346,) exhausts the learning of estoppel as "applicable to the particular case. It was an action of trespass, guare clausum fregit, and the defendants, admitting the entry, justified under a title to enter the close in question, for the purpose of digging coal. The plaintiffs replied, that the same title had been set up by the defendants, in a former suit by the plaintiff, for a prior trespass, and that upon the issue taken upon the title, in that suit, a verdict had been found against the defendants, and averred that by this verdict, and the judgment thereon, “ the defendants were estopped from setting up the same defence.” To this replication the defendants demurred, evidently upon the ground, that as the causes of action were distinct, they were not concluded by the prior judgment; but the court of king’s bench, by a unanimous decision, overruled the demurrer, and gave judgment for the plaintiff. Lord Ellenborough, in his opinion, examines and analyses the cases, from the time of the year-books, and remarked that the finding upon title in trespass, not only operates as a bar to a future recovery of damages for the same trespass, but also by way of estoppel to any action, for any injury to the same supposed right of possession ; and hence, as the plaintiff would have been eoncludedj had the issue upon the title been found against him, it was a necessary consequence, that the defendants were concluded by the verdict and judgment in his favor. He further observed, that there is an important distinction between those cases, in which a judgment operates as a bar to a future suit for the same thing, and those in which it operates as an estoppel; in the first class, the judgment itself raises the bar, in the second, it is the matter alleged by the party, and upon which the judgment proceeded, that creates the estoppel.
The cases in our own courts, and particularly Gardiner v. Buchbee (3 Cow. 120), Burt v. Sternbugh (4 Cow. 559), and Bouchaud v. Diaz (3 Denio 238), entirely correspond with those that have been quoted. Gardiner v. Buchbee came before- the
It must be remarked that as the judgment which was held to be a bar, was given upon a demurrer, the whole controversy in the first suit, the facts being thus admitted, must have turned upon questions of law, namely, the construction and legal effect of the release and consent set forth in the plea. And it appears from the report, that the sheriff's counsel had contended that these circumstances created a distinction which destroyed the effect of the judgment as a bar.
But the chief justice replied, that it could make no difference in principle, whether the facts upon which the court proceeded were proved by witnesses, or admitted by the parties; the judgment was in both eases equally conclusive.
It is needless to refer to any other cases, and the necessary inference from the review that has been made, may be stated in few words. It is, that as between the parties and privies a judgment is conclusive, as to every question upon which the right of the plaintiff to recover, or the validity of a defence in another suit, is found to depend, and upon the determination of which it appears from the record, or is shown by extrinsic proof, that the judgment was, in reality, founded. The judgment, if erroneous, may be reversed, but so long as it remains in force, the parties are estopped from denying either the facts, or the law, upon which it proceeded.
The application of the doctrine thus established to the present case, is obvious and decisive.- The plaintiffs sought to recover in the former suit, upon the allegation that the letters of credit, delivered by the defendants to Demarest, combined with the fact, that the bills drawn by him were purchased by the plaintiffs upon the faith of the letters, were evidence of a valid agreement upon the part of the defendants, that the bills so drawn and presented should be accepted and paid by W. & J. Brown & Co., the drawees, and that the refusal of the drawees to accept and pay the bills, rendered the defendants immediately liable to the plaintiffs to the extent of the balance of the credit, then unexhausted. It was, not the breach but the existence of this agreement, that was the principal question in controversy, and it was upon the determination of this question in
It has, however, been contended that in the present case additional facts have been proved, which vary it materially from the special verdict, upon which the judgment of the supreme court was founded ; and, that, had the same evidence been given in the former suit, it is an open question, whether a different judgment would not have been rendered ; and it is insisted, that by this variance between the cases, the effect of the prior judgment, as an estoppel, is wholly destroyed. This argument has, however, failed to convince us ; we are forced to dissent, both from its premises and its conclusion. In our judgment no additional facts have been proved, which are at all material, as bearing upon the vital question of the privity of contract, and certainly none, which, had they been given in evidence in the former suit, could have led to a different result. It is impossible to read the opinion of Chief Justice Bronson, without being satisfied that had all the facts which appear in this ease been embraced
It remains next to consider whether although the judgment of the supreme court involves a determination of the question, upon which the right of the plaintiffs to maintain this action depends, it is yet necessary to hold that it cannot operate as an> estoppel, because the question, as arising upon a special verdict, was necessarily decided by the court, as an unmixed question of law. If we understand correctly the proposition for which
It seems to us that the novelty of the proposition that we have been urged to adept, and its entire destitution of authority, are aloné conclusive reasons for its rejection. If the important distinction which the proposition asserts in reality
Judgments turning exclusively upon questions of law form a very large proportion of all that are rendered in contested suits, and if these are to constitute an exception to the general rule, the common law doctrine of estoppel will be robbed of its principal value, and a wide inlet be opened to all those mischiefs of interminable and oppressive litigation, which it was designed to prevent. It is needless, however, to dwell upon the unreasonableness of such an exception. It is sufficient to say, that liad it been sanctioned by the law, there would have been conclusive evidence of the fact, and none such has been adduced. On the other hand, the general rule, which has prevailed without question from the earliest period of the law, is laid down by Lord Coke in the most comprehensive terms, and Bouchaud v. Diaz may be justly referred to as an express decision. According to Lord Coke, it was resolved by the “ Judges of the King's Bench, in Ferrar’s case (8 Rep. I), that when one is barred in any suit or action, by judgment on demurrer, confession, verdict, &c„ he is barred as to that or the like action, of the like nature, for the same thing for ever.” The terms of the rule plainly embrace the ease before us, as a second action of the like nature, with the first, and for the same thing, and they show that it is the judgment itself, whatever may be its form, and without any regard to the nature of the question in controversy, that creates; the estoppel. Lord Coke does indeed proceed to state, that in
We have already seen that the judgment which the supreme court, in Bouchaud v. Diaz, held to be an estoppel, was given on a demurrer, and it is worthy of remark that it was the estoppel alone which, in that case, prevented the plaintiff’s recovery. Upon the evidence, independent of the record, the opinion of the court was evidently in his favor. It was not denied, upon the hearing, by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, that a judgment upon a general demurrer works an estoppel as to the law, as well as to the facts of the case, but if there is any distinc tion, in this respect, between a judgment upon a demurrer and upon a special verdict, it is a distinction which we have failed to seize, and are unable to state. Whether the facts are admit ted by the parties or found by the jury, the question which is» raised for the decision of the court, and upon which its judgment proceeds, is equally and exclusively a question of law.
It must be admitted that several and distinct questions of law, questions affecting as well the validity of a defence as the right of the plaintiff to recover, may arise upon a special verdict, and in such cases it cannot be ascertained from the record alone upon what grounds the judgment proceeded. In other words, what were the precise questions that the court meant to determine. But when the plaintiff demurs to a special plea, and judgment 5s given for the defendant, there is the same difficulty, since it <eannot then be known from the record alone, whether the judgment was founded upon the sufficiency of the plea, or the insufficiency of the declaration. The reply to the objection is the
For the reasons that have now been given we must adhere to the opinion that a prior judgment binds the parties as an estoppel upon every question which it in fact determined, and precludes them from denying, in any subsequent action, either the facts, or the law, upon which it proceeded. As the principal question upon which the right of the plaintiffs to recover depends, was in the former suit determined against them, we hold it to be a necessary consequence that the judgment, thus rendered, estops them from maintaining the present action.
Had our researches and reflections led us to a different result, we should still be constrained to say, that according to our views of the course we are bound to follow, the judgment of the supreme court ought to control our own. If as res judicata it has not ousted our jurisdiction, yet, as a precedent, it must control our action. As it was affirmed in the court of errors only by an equally divided vote, it may not have settled the law, so far as the court of appeals is concerned ; but we cannot agree that this decision in the court of errors has lessened in any degree the weight of the authority that properly belongs to it, as an unanimous decision of the supreme court, in the exercise of its own appellate powers. Indeed, the counsel, who last addressed us on the part of the plaintiffs, was so sensible of this, that he frankly stated that, unless he could demonstrate to our entire satisfaction that the judgment of the supreme court was erroneous and unjust, he could not reasonably expect from us an opposite decision. The arguments of the learned counsel and his associate were forcible in themselves, and were urged with their usual ability, but they have failed to produce in
Under a system of jurisprudence which clothes those by whom the law is to be declared, with so large a. discretion as our own, it is only by their scrupulous adherence to the decisions of their predecessors that even a resemblance of stability and certainty, in the administration of justice, can be attained or preserved, and hence, it is only where the error in prior decisions is manifest and grave, the violation of principle plain and undeniable, that the obligation of judges “ stare decisis” ceases to exist. It cannot be said that - the case before us falls within this category. Certainly, the judgment of the supreme court is not liable to the imputation of manifest error. The question which it decided in favor of the defendants is considered by ns as, in no ordinary degree, difficult and doubtful, and the whole history of this litigation proves it to be so ; and we, therefore, think that we should depart, and widely depart, from the line- of our duty, should- we refuse to yield to the authority by which it has been determined.
We must therefore hold, conforming our decision to that of the supreme court, that it is not a conclusion of law from the facts in evidence, that the defendants undertook, and promised, that the bills drawn and negotiated by Demarest, at Rio, should be accepted and paid by the house in Liverpool, and consequently that they are not liable for any portion of the damages, which the plaintiffs allege they have sustained, and now seek to recover.
It is proper to add a few words upon another part of the case, in order to re-pel an inference that might otherwise be drawn from our silence. Even upon the supposition that there was a valid agreement, such as is declared upon, on the part of the defendants, that the bills drawn by Demarest should be accepted and paid ; we are not to be understood as saying that
If the parties elect to turn the case into a special verdict, judgment thereon must be entered for the defendants, with costs : otherwise, there must be a new trial, with costs to abide the event.