6 Minn. 136 | Minn. | 1861
By the Court.
— The authority of an attorney to bind his client, as defined|by s. 10, p. 667, Comp. Stats., extends to “ any of the proceedings in an action or special proceeding duly made, or entered upon the minutes of the court.” This provision is sufficiently broad to cover a stipulation of the hind here presented, and it is binding upon the client, until he is relieved therefrom, by proper order of the Court, or due course of law.
The Counsel for the Respondent claims that the order is not appealable, on the ground that setting aside the stipulation and releasing therefrom, is nothing more than granting leave
It remains, therefore, to consider whether there was any sufficient cause shown for setting aside this stipulation. The only evidence upon which the Court acted, so far as appears from the case, were the affidavits of. Tale and Seaton, which appear in the return. The affidavit of W. H. Tale, Esq., the acting County Attorney, sets forth all the facts upon which the Defendant grounds his claim for relief. That states in substance, that the answer interposed by Seaton, the former
There is no allegation that any fraud was practised upon the Defendants or their attorney, by which the latter was induced to sign the stipulation, nor of any collusion between the attorney and Plaintiff. No mistake, accident, or surprise is asserted, nor that the attorney was not fully aware of all the defences of which his client could avail himself, and of the nature and effect of his stipulation. And even any presumption that such matter exists in justification or excuse, is rebutted by the affidavit of A. S. .Seaton, Esq., who states, “ that the said stipulation in this case, and mentioned in said Tale’s affidavit, was made by this deponent after a thorough and careful investigation of the subject matter in controversy, and from such investigation this deponent believed, and still does believe, that he did not stipulate away any defence to said action, either legal or equitable,” &c. And indeed, it nowhere appears, that the Defendant did not have full notice of the action of his Attorney in the premises, and did not consent thereto; and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it must be presumed that such was the case, as in the management of a cause, an Attorney is presumed to be acting under the authority and by the direction of his client.
Upon the facts here presented therefore, we see no ground whatever, upon which the Court could properly interfere to set aside this stipulation. Even had fraud been alleged against the County Attorney, and collusion between him and the Plaintiff, whereby the Defendant was prejudiced, it is extremely questionable whether the relief asked would be granted, without showing the insolvency of the Attorney. (6 John., 296; 6 Wen., 514; 9 Wen., 437; Id., 499; 1 Binn., 214; 10 Barb., 547.) If the Defendant has in fact the de-
The Respondent claims that the Court had no jurisdiction over this case, and that jurisdiction could not be given by stipulation where it had none originally. In the latter part of the proposition he is correct, and it becomes therefore necessary to inquire, whether aside from the stipulation the Court could entertain a suit of this nature, and had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon a claim of .this kind.
The counsel cites in support of his proposition, Sec. 6, p. 198, Comp. Stat., which provides that “at the annual meeting of the Board of Supervisors, or such other times as they shall direct, the County Treasurer shall exhibit to them all his books and accounts, and all vouchers relating to the same, to be credited and allowed.” Also Sub. 5, § 13, Comp. Stat., p. 154, and, Sub. 2, § 4, Comp. 8tat.,p. 194. As to whether these provisions of statute oust the District Court of jurisdiction of an action of this kind, it is unnecessary now to inquire, since they are all repealed by Chap. 3 cmd 15 of the Session Laws of 1860. Chap. 15, p. 131, Sess. Laws 1860, defines the powers and duties of County Commissioners ; and their authority with regard to settling claims, is prescribed in Seo. 23 of said chapter, which provides that the Board of Commissioners shall have full power to examine and settle all accounts of the receipts and expenditures of the county, and shall have the care of the county property and the management of the county funds and business, except in cases otherwise provided for, but shall exercise no other powers than such as are given by law.” The counsel for the Respondent relies strongly (among others,) upon the cases in New York, citing 20 Barb., 294, 2 Sand., 460, and 6 Sel., 260. The statute of that State upon which these decisions were based, reads as follows, viz.: “to examine, settle and allow all accounts chargeable against
But again, we find it provided in Seo. 8, p. 132, Sess. Lems 1860, that “ all actions, local or transitory, against any county may be commenced and prosecuted to final judgment in the District Court of the county against which the action is brought.” And in Sec. 7, p. 136, of the same act, in which the powers and duties of the Commissioners are defined, it is provided that they may, “in like manner, by and under their name of office, be sued by any person or persons having any manner of claims against such county.” We find no such provisions in the New York statute, and indeed, it differs in other respects than those above quoted, very widely from our own, with reference to the powers and duty of County Commissioners. The provisions above quoted from the law of 1860, are so clear and explicit, that we think no doubt can be entertained but that the Legislature intended that the District Court should have jurisdiction of actions, such as the one at bar, and indeed of any claims that may arise against the County. The policy of such a law may -well be questioned, but with that, Courts have nothing to do.
We think the Court below erred in setting aside the stipulation, and granting leave to amend, and the order must be reversed.